The Greek Elections and the Future of Greece

Author: Ambassador Thomas Miller

As of now it looks virtually certain that Greeks will return to the polls on either June 10 or 17—just a few weeks after the last inconclusive election. On May 6, Greeks resoundingly turned out the two parties that had alternated power for nearly the last four decades when 70% of them voted for parties that rejected the austerity plan these two mainstream parties had signed with the European Union, IMF, and the European Central Bank (ECB).

Why such a massive turn of events? The May 6 vote is a repudiation of the four decades of alleged corruption, inept economic policies, and most importantly a rejection of the austerity measures Greece’s European colleagues had insisted upon as the price for getting 174 billion Euros to bail Greece out of its difficulties. The message of the anti-austerity parties was fairly simple: paraphrasing the movie, Network, “I’m mad as hell and I’m not going to take it anymore”.

Unfortunately the anti-austerity parties (mostly from the left) have no real solution. While most (and most Greeks) want to stay in the euro, they don’t want to abide by the terms their predecessors already agreed to as the price for remaining in the eurozone. They somehow think that if they scream loud enough, the Germans and others who have been underwriting this bailout will knuckle under to Greek indignation and soften their terms. Given what we have heard recently out of both Berlin and Brussels, it seems they will be sorely disappointed. While there may be a prospect for some softening of the terms around the edges, it is highly doubtful that there will be a wholesale repudiation by Greece’s lenders of the austerity package.

So, not unlike earlier crises in Greece, but with the stakes much higher this time, the question is who will blink first? Greece is not playing a strong hand, and there is a point beyond which its lenders will be unwilling to act. The consequence of pushing too far and too hard could be that Greece will lose the funding that has been promised and any future funds. That in turn would lead to Greece’s inevitable withdrawal from the euro and reversion back to the drachma with tremendously negative consequences: significant devaluation, the collapse of its banking system, massive spikes in unemployment above the already high levels, and the collapse of the Greek economy. Greece would be hard put to even pay its civil servants and the reduced pensions for its aging population. Ironically, the rejectionist parties are insisting on more civil service hiring and returning pensions to their earlier levels.

Let’s hope that some sanity returns to this situation and that Greece and its lenders are not put on a “who blinks first” path because while the consequences of a withdrawal from the euro for Greece would be catastrophic, the spillover effect to the rest of the Eurozone could be very serious.

P.S. With events moving so quickly and unpredictably, the only thing that is certain is that this note will be overtaken by events by the time it hits the wires.

Related posts:

1. Why EU Sanctions May Hurt the West More than Iran
2. Syria: A Moment of Momentum?
3. A Different Goodbye

Reflections on the Coup, Part 2

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1. Reflections on the Coup, Part 1
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3. Ambassador Linton Brooks Speaks on Nuclear Challenges

To boil down all the implications of recent events in Mali into a single post would not give justice to the true breadth of what has happened. Instead I will split this into two separate pieces: part one will focus on what this coup means for Mali and Malians. The second will focus more on what this means for me, the Peace Corps, and the international community at large.

Part 1: Mali and Malians

It’s become relatively common knowledge that the main grievance that drove the military to overthrow Amadou Toumani Toure (Better known as ATT) was the belief that ATT was strangling the military effort to maintain security in the vast northern regions of the country. Lack of food and supplies, while facing a Tuareg rebellion recently augmented by the fall of Gaddafi and the return of arms and trained Malian Tuaregs from Libya, drove mid-ranking military leaders to try to take matters into their own hands.

Hands ill-equipped to run a military, let alone a government.

Since Capitan Sanogo seized power a laundry list of problems have arisen: The Malian military has withdrawn from all its strategic strongholds in the north (the separatist MNLA and Islamist Ansar Dine are the two main groups now in control of the cities of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu); ECOWAS threatened and then delivered short-lived sanctions to try to choke out the military junta; And nearly all non-essential international aid (except for emergency famine relief) has been pulled from the country.

All in the name of overthrowing a president who had publicly stated that he intended to step down at the end of this month and cede power to the winner of the election, an election that was slated to take place on April 29^th.

And, if all this hadn’t made matters bad enough, recent moves by the junta that technically “stepped down” a little over a week ago have made it painfully clear that they still have their incompetent hands in the cookie jar, and intend on continuing to meddle in the affairs of what was mere months ago a democratic poster child for the developing world.

So what exactly does all this mean for your average Malian?

-A lot of things, and none of them good.

When I first told my Malian friends and family that I had to leave Mali, they did not understand. They all said that the fighting was far from here, and that I wasn’t in any danger. In fact, some of them, disgruntled with ATT’s failings over the years, went so far as to support the coup.

It’s hard to blame them. At the time, I didn’t feel as though I was in any immediate danger either, and as members of a fledgling democracy with only 20 years of stability under its belt, I think it’s relatively safe to say that there were many amongst them who didn’t yet understand the vast and far-reaching political implications of what had just occurred.

It took about a week, but as time passed more and more Malian nationals sobered up to what was happening around them. The MNLA took Timbuktu, and came within hours of the Northern river port city of Mopti. San, the city I was in at the time became flooded with military vehicles and cars filled with personal belongings, all of them fleeing Mopti. By then all other international aid organizations had not only pulled out of the city, but out of the country, and we were left standing with only an uneasy feeling in the pits of our stomachs.

Our friends, our families had already been struggling. A poor rainy season and harvest was showing the beginning signs of a famine, as many areas began to start rationing their meals. Emergency aid distribution will be severely hampered by the political upheaval, and at best Mali is in for a few months of growing pains as it finds its feet. The reality of the situation on the ground however hints at something longer, quite possibly with an indeterminable end.

The situation in the north won’t help things either. Although the MNLA has clearly stated that it has no intentions of ever pushing past Mopti, the security situation for foreign nationals in the region looks as though it will only continue to deteriorate. With the kidnappings of Algerian nationals in Gao, and the kidnapping (and release) of a Swiss missionary in Timbuktu, it is quite clear that the northern corridor is fast becoming a no go zone for all foreigners, not just the white European ones. The MNLA may have no interest in kidnappings, but their ability to keep Ansar Dine, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram and other new splinter groups at bay seems questionable at best.

The coup and the incompetent and misguided junta that ran it have dealt Mali a devastating set back in terms of economy, politics and security. Even if the coup leaders immediately remove themselves from the picture, it could take the country as long as a year to get back on its feet, and even longer to restore its economic and security situations. Unfortunately it doesn’t seem as though that scenario is likely to happen.

All of these facts are made even harder by knowing that Malians are a warm, hard-working and welcoming people who would invite you to come eat from their bowl even when they are struggling to feed their own families. Keep them in your thoughts and prayers because, like is most often the case, the people who will suffer most from these political failures will be the ones least deserving.

Ala ka nogoya ke, ala ka coup ban peu. (Bambara blessing: “May god make it better, may god finish the coup completely).

Related posts:

1. Reflections on the Coup, Part 2
2. Brian J. Davis: SYRIA – What do we do now?
3. Alliance with Egypt is key for U.S.

Senior Fellow, Partnership for Secure America

Policy-makers have been looking for some good leverage to affect the situation in Syria for months. Americans, and those around the world, are watching in horror at the violence. The moral imperative to do something is clear: each day the atrocities continue; each day the disproportionate use of force affects innocent civilians; and the situation is going from bad to worse. However, decisions about what course of action to take are complex. Experts point to the complications of a campaign against Syria’s sophisticated air defenses, the practical challenges of training and equipping the Free Syria Army (FSA), the limitations of implementing safe-zones without significant ground force protection, and the risk of getting drawn into a messy proxy-war with very real effects throughout the region and direct effects for Americans. On top of that, the majority of Americans are weighted with  “intervention exhaustion” and extremely hesitant to get involved in another military conflict in the Middle East.

It’s depressing to acknowledge this very real list of things we cannot do, or risks we are not ready to take. Especially when so many innocent civilians are dying every day and there is a real case to be made for our national interests in the region. So America’s leaders and others around the world have been scrambling for viable options.

After months of frustration, there was finally some good news over the last week. Headlining, of course, was the announcement by UN Special Envoy Kofi Annan that Bashar al-Assad had committed to a cease-fire and Annan’s six point peace plan. It is prudent to wait and see what actually happens in the next days and weeks on the ground though, before we applaud. It is not sure that the parties will actually adhere to this cease-fire, or that it will be more than a pause for rest and restocking. The parties are far from a sustainable peace.

What is more encouraging is that we are finally seeing progress on a number of less-noticed tracks. None of them will make enough difference on their own. But collectively they are building momentum to pressure the Assad regime and break the status quo.

First, at the “Friends of Syria” meeting last week in Istanbul the opposition seemed to finally be on an upswing. After months of work, the Syrian National Council (SNC) is now finding a way to integrate diverse voices in order to work as a collective. A common platform may be as good as it gets; unity is a far reach. But the SNC’s commitment to an internal restructuring committee is a positive first-step to organize such a disparate group. It also helps to whittle away the argument in the international community that “there is no unified opposition to support anyway…”

The opposition also came out of the Istanbul meeting with a momentum of their own. Large pledges of money, sophisticated non-lethal assistance (such as the US offer of secure communications equipment), and the implication of committed arms supplies increased their swagger. Paired with explicit statements of recognition by powerful countries, this was significantly different than the first meeting of the “Friends” group in Tunis. Appearances matter. And this was something for Assad to note.

Second, the work to hit Assad and his cronies with relevant sanctions made real advances. Sanctions is such an all-encompassing and oft-used phrase, it can lose rhetorical impact. What matters is who is sanctioned, where (by countries with real leverage), how fast, and how tightly. In practical terms, a lot of that comes down to the speed and precision of information and having the systems in place to react in time to make a difference. The U.S. and Europe have made significant progress to hone and synchronize sanctions regimes. This is the type of collaboration at the core of the global sanctions regime on Iran. It took years of work to get these systems coordinated. The sanctions coordinating committee for Syria announced in Istanbul will enable countries that have useful information and influence with Syria to utilize these systems, and for us to link up with their information and resources. By casting a wider net and working more efficiently in the “Friends of Syria” group, we have a much greater chance to show Assad and the perpetrators of violence that there will be near-term consequences. Things on the ground are moving fast, and we need to enable our sanctions to keep up.

Third, at the UN, the preparatory work for a potential cease-fire monitoring mission helps to push the ball from rhetoric to reality. Of course, there is no mission until there is a cease-fire and until the Security Council authorizes it. But starting preparations now shows Assad that the international community is serious. It also gives any eventual UN monitoring mission at least a chance of hitting the ground quickly, once authorized. Time and again we have seen cease-fires or Security Council authorization followed by large time gaps before a UN mission is actually deployed. Standing up a peacekeeping mission is no overnight feat. Even when pushed fast, new missions are often delayed by the hurdles of personnel, logistics, transportation, and security. From his own experience as UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan knows this as well as anyone. If Assad really does implement Kofi Annan’s six point plan, the international community must be ready immediately to monitor compliance and shout loudly if it is violated.

None of these small levers will break the cycle of violence in Syria.  But line up the progress on these quieter tracks with the timing of Kofi Annan’s diplomatic track and you see a momentum developing unlike any in the past year. It shouldn’t be overstated, but it should be noticed.

Certainly, the diplomacy to end the conflict is the center of the story. The announcement of the Syrian government’s agreement to his Security Council-endorsed six-point plan is a breakthrough. It took a lot of diplomatic leg-work to get here, especially to soften the Russian’s hard-line position. All eyes are now on the April 10^th commencement of the cease-fire, and pledges to comply. If that transpires, the priority shifts to ensuring that the parties will follow-through and ensuring that Security Council countries – especially Russia – authorize concrete consequences for non-compliance in the next UNSC resolution.

While that plays out in the foreground, the work to expand leverage over Assad’s regime continues in the background and it must not let up. Whether we need it now or later, it will be necessary for us to continue to strengthen the leverage we have over Assad. Unfortunately, we may only be at the beginning of a long and protracted conflict in Syria. Even if the fighting diminishes for a short time, it will be very difficult to resolve the grievances between the parties when it’s a stay-or-go imperative for Assad. Assad has shown no hesitation to use excessive actions at home when cornered. The opposition is unlikely to let up until he is gone.

We are going to need every piece of leverage possible to try to change the calculus of the Assad regime, to halt the violence, save lives, and stabilize the spiraling situation. A significantly tighter sanctions regime, a new accountability initiative recording atrocities for future prosecution, the image of a stronger opposition group with concrete support from powerful countries, and the ability to rapidly deploy a UN monitoring mission all can help to strengthen a negotiator’s hand vis-à-vis Assad. We’ve seen some small signs of momentum building in the last weeks. Now the challenge is to keep the ball rolling.

Related posts:

1. Brian J. Davis: SYRIA – What do we do now?
2. The Value of Being There in Syria
3. William Cohen: What the U.S. Should Do About Iran

Despite the partisanship that currently afflicts our nation’s politics, there is at least one issue that both Republicans and Democrats can agree on – the need to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear bomb-making materials. Solidifying the historic legacy of American leadership in countering nuclear terrorism, more than fifty heads of state will gather today for the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. The summit will bring together world leaders to strengthen global defenses against nuclear terrorism, one of the gravest threats to our security. The international nature of this gathering is critical; without a global effort to strengthen global defenses against nuclear terrorism, we could easily fall short.

In the United States, enhancing global nuclear security has been an area of bipartisan cooperation for more than two decades. In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused command and control of the vast Soviet nuclear stockpile to unravel, and there was no accounting system to track nuclear weapons or materials. Fences surrounding installations that housed the Soviet nuclear arsenal were riddled with gaping holes, and there was no system to detect individuals who might steal weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. Scientists with the knowledge to create weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were suddenly jobless, and countless individuals – including guards at nuclear facilities – were struggling under hard economic times, giving them an incentive to steal nuclear material and sell it to the highest bidder. The challenge to keep Soviet weapons, materials, and expertise off the black market was overwhelming.

However, a little over 20 years ago, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program championed by Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) was passed in the United States Congress. The Nunn-Lugar program enabled Russia and the United States to work together to safeguard WMD, dismantle nuclear weapons and provide work for weapons
scientists.

Since the passage of Nunn-Lugar, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program has deactivated 7,601 nuclear warheads, upgraded security at 24 weapons storage sites, and destroyed thousands of nuclear launchers. Additionally, as a result of the program, three states that inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union – Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus – are now nuclear-free. Beyond these remarkable achievements, thousands of former weapons scientists have been engaged in peaceful work.

Dollar for dollar, you would be hard-pressed to find a program that has contributed more to the security of the United States and the world. Without the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, it would be far easier for terrorist groups and non-state actors to acquire the materials and know-how needed to obtain weapons of mass destruction. The bottom line is that bipartisan and international cooperation on a pressing threat yielded real and lasting improvements in both U.S. and global security.

The era of bipartisan cooperation on nuclear security must continue. The cost of a nuclear terrorist attack – in terms of lives and the impact on the global economy– is far too high to react with anything less than urgency.

Today, two major impediments confront future progress on nuclear security. First, financial constraints, both at home and abroad, threaten vital programs that prevent nuclear terrorism. It is obvious, however, that the costs of responding to a nuclear attack would far exceed the costs of preventing one.   Congress and the president must work together to ensure that efforts to strengthen global nuclear security are appropriately funded.

Second, not all nations share our resolve in countering the nuclear terrorist threat. Many nations have not responded to the threat with appropriate action. Others still falsely perceive nuclear terrorism as merely a threat to the West or specifically to the United States. The United States and nations that support the vision of true global nuclear security must encourage others to recognize the danger and take stronger action to mitigate it. If the United States and Russia could find common ground to collaborate on nuclear security in the wake of the Cold War, surely other nations can do the same today.

The Nuclear Security Summit process, initiated by the United States in 2010, has become a critical tool to raise global awareness of the threat of nuclear terrorism and strengthen preventive measures. It continues America’s legacy as a global leader in countering nuclear terrorism, which began with Nunn-Lugar and has spanned multiple administrations. The 47 heads of state attending the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit agreed that “nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to global security” and that “strong nuclear
security measures” are needed to prevent the threat from being realized. Many states made supplementary national commitments to further the Summit goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials by 2014.

To ensure that the world’s most dangerous terrorists are prevented from acquiring the world’s most dangerous weapons, unified American leadership must continue. Working together, we must move forward aggressively, leading the responsible community of nations behind the purposeful vision of a nuclear-secure world.

Rep. Fortenberry (R-Neb.) serves on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Rep. Schiff (D-Calif.) serves on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Related posts:

1. William Cohen: What the U.S. Should Do About Iran
2. Ambassador Linton Brooks Speaks on Nuclear Challenges
3. The U.S. Needs the U.N., and the U.N. Needs the U.S.

Add to this the announced retirements of Blue Dog Democrats, a group known for moderate positioning, Rep. Heath Shuler, D-NC, and Rep. Dennis Cardoza, D-CA, as well as uphill battles for many moderate Republicans and Democrats around the country facing difficult reelection bids, and next year may bring an even more polarized legislature.

The ever-changing sway of voter opinion will, of course, play a role in the makeup of the new Congress, as was the case in the last election where moderate Democrats were swept almost en masse from the House due to their vulnerability in moderate districts and blowback from discontent electorates. But it can be argued that this did not, overall, so drastically alter centrist numbers because Republican victors in moderate districts – such as Charles Bass, R-N.H., and Michael Grimm, R-N.Y., both members of the moderate Republican Main Street Partnership – answer to the same moderate voting population as their predecessors. And, as many new moderate members have demonstrated in their statements and votes over the last Congress, they are aware of this precarious position.

The House elections this fall, however, will be a much different story. For many states around the country, the popular trend in recent redistricting plans has been to toss out swing districts in favor of safe seats in newly-carved maps that will offer much more certainty from the November polls. While some states have been forced to redraw overly-partisan maps, others will likely be defined by clearly-divided delegations next year.

This may provide stability in the number of Representatives from each party, but it undercuts attempts made by moderates to bridge the partisan divide – a necessity for getting things done in a politically divided government. In swing districts, reaching across the aisle shows a willingness to negotiate with the other side which, in such districts, aligns politically with about half the constituency.

So Representatives in moderate districts are motivated to do just this. Gaining support from the political base won’t be enough. To get the votes they need – including from conservatives and independents – moderates have to work effectively with the other side of the aisle or at least give the impression that they are.

Without split-electorate districts, the motivation for working across the aisle is gone. In fact, in partisan districts, a candidate’s base, which wholly decides the election, is more likely to see this as a betrayal to the party and meaningful pursuits of bipartisanship put a candidate at risk in the primary phase. In moderate districts, there still may be a tendency for some primary voters to take their grievances to the polls, but for the most part, these voters will get behind someone they think has a chance in the general – typically the candidate that can pull votes from the other side.

Although most Americans rally around the idea of bipartisanship, it is a difficult pursuit for elected officials in partisan districts. Voters want dialogue and negotiation, but only if the other side is making the compromise.  In moderate districts, however, there is a different dynamic that allows and encourages this sort of crossing the divide.

If the latest blow to moderate sensibilities, Snowe’s retirement, is of concern, then the fallout from November’s elections may be nothing less than disastrous for the political center. As moderate districts become a dying breed, so too will the types of Members that used to represent them.

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Alliance with Egypt is Key for U.S.

As a result of foreign policy miscalculations, the United States may lose its historical leadership in the Middle East. While the unfolding tragedy in Syria, Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the war on terrorists absorb U.S. attention and resources, the unnecessary decline of U.S.-Egyptian relations could do the most damage to our national interests. Just as Britain’s domination of the region ended on the banks of the Suez Canal in 1956, Washington now appears determined to end our 30 years of regional dominance in a confrontation with the Egyptian people.

U.S. pre-eminence in the region since the 1970s was built on the strategic cooperation between Washington and Cairo. Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter strove to create this relationship, for they realized that the preceding 20 years of predominant Soviet influence in the region was due to the Egyptian-Soviet partnership.

Egypt was and remains the dominant force in the Middle East. Since World War II, the balance of power in the region has shifted twice. First in the 1950s, when Egypt led the region into a de facto alliance with the Soviet Union. Then, in the 1970s, when Anwar Sadat decided Egypt’s interests were better served by allying with the U.S.

In the 1950s, the Middle East underwent a political transformation with Arab nationalism’s emergence as the dominant political philosophy — radically changing the way Arabs perceived themselves. The West’s misunderstanding and mishandling of this change ended Britain’s moment and ushered in the Soviet era.

Now the region is undergoing a similar transformation. Sclerotic Arab nationalist regimes are being supplanted by governments with a more populist Islamic orientation. Egypt is at the forefront of this shift. Other Arab states are watching with concern because they know that how Egypt weathers this transformation will significantly affect the region.

Egypt, while the leader in the Arab world, is also unique. Across the Arab world, if one asks, “Who are you?” the majority answers, “I am a Muslim.” In Egypt, however, the majority answers: “I am an Egyptian.”

As a consequence, the rise of Islamic political forces in Egypt is tempered by a parallel rise in Egyptian nationalism. This dual Islamic and Egyptian identity presents both opportunities and challenges for U.S. policymakers.

The crisis in U.S.-Egyptian relations over the nongovernmental organization issue — including calls from some in Congress and the media to halt military assistance — creates a direct and unnecessary clash with this rising tide of Egyptian nationalism. Though Cairo eased tensions Thursday by allowing the seven detained U.S. citizens to leave, the problem remains unresolved.
Parallels with the 1950s are worrying. Attempts to blame an individual for the problem — President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and Minister Fayza Abul Naga today — can lead to a serious misreading of the underlying cause. These people reflect national feelings — they are not creating them.

Consider the Egyptian perspective. Under Egyptian law, foreign and domestic NGOs, including those with foreign funding, must be registered. The NGOs in question were not, and therefore operating illegally. The situation was worsened by the Obama administration’s post-revolution decision to increase exponentially the funding for these NGOs — though they were operating without Cairo’s approval and in violation of Egyptian law.

This situation was complicated when several employees of one U.S. NGO quit. One went on Egyptian television and accused that NGO of spying, discriminating against Muslims and violating other laws. Egyptian judges decided to prosecute these groups after months of investigation — a decision supported by the overwhelming majority of Egyptians.

U.S. pressure on Cairo, particularly the military leadership, to abrogate the legal proceedings and make an exception for Americans is widely seen in Egypt as proof that Washington is not truly interested in the rule of law and must have another agenda — as the Egyptian judges have alleged.

Cutting off military assistance could call into question the entire U.S.-Egyptian relationship and severely damage the national security interests of both countries for decades. In return for U.S. aid, Egypt waives its laws in allowing passage of U.S. Navy ships through the Suez Canal, military use of its facilities and the annual transit of many thousands of U.S. military aircraft. This loss to our military would be huge in terms of cost and efficiency for U.S. military operations in Southwest Asia and Northeast Africa.

Washington now has a choice. Either we find a way to work with the Islamists and nationalists or continue along the path of confrontation — which is likely to lead to an end of U.S. predominance in the Middle East.

Related posts:

1. An “Iron Hand” is No Substitute for Democracy
2. Graeme Bannerman: Libya, A Costly Victory
3. Rethink our Russian Relationship

While Election 2012 is still very much about the economy, foreign policy issues are increasingly making a comeback.  And as the conversation focuses more on Iran, foreign policy is emerging not because of a lack of news about the economy, but rather because of the increasing connection between the two topics.

The tensions between the U.S. and Iran illustrate the linkage.  In response to the European oil boycott, Iran recently announced that it was cutting off exports to Britain and France, which, in part, drove oil benchmarks to a nine-month high of nearly $123 a barrel.  This, in turn, “could prove worrisome for U.S. drivers since many U.S. refineries use imported oil to produce gas”.  Gas prices are already rising across the country – currently the national average is above $3.50 a gallon – and many worry that gas prices could rise beyond $4 a gallon by the summer.  There are even concerns that gas could spike to $5 a gallon if tensions surge.

Most of the Republican candidates for president have honed in on Iran, with Mitt Romney, Rick Santorum, and Newt Gingrich taking aim at President Obama’s reliance on sanctions to deter Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.  Romney has been particularly strident in his criticism, contending at the February 22^nd debate in Arizona that “nothing in my view is as serious a failure as his [the President’s] failure to deal with Iran appropriately.”  Yet, when explicitly asked during that debate about Iran and rising gas prices, Romney dismissed the question and went back to his promise that if America elects him as president, Iran will not have a nuclear weapon – a promise accompanied by few details other than that Romney would greater emphasize the threat of military action.

But campaign rhetoric, in its uncomplicated bluntness, can overlook how complicated the Iranian issue is.  Reports indicate the oil boycott and the sanctions on the Iranian Central Bank are starting to take a significant toll on the Iranian economy.  However, the situation remains a tinderbox and an escalation of tensions could spur an Israeli air strike, Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz, or lead to the eruption of  an accidental war.  In addition to the national security implications, such events could push oil prices to over $150 a barrel, and the fallout from that could severely curtail the economic recovery here at home.

Foreign policy – most notably, the issue of Iran – will remain an integral campaign issue through the fall.  The Republicans will keep hammering away; the President’s reelection campaign plans a robust defense of his national security credentials.  But because of its connection to the economic challenges we face, how the candidates talk about these issues will be important, too.  This time around, it is not enough for a candidate to simply assert that he will stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.   Instead, it will be necessary to consider how he will do so without stopping the American economy as well.

Related posts:

1. Why EU Sanctions May Hurt the West More than Iran
2. William Cohen: What the U.S. Should Do About Iran
3. Crossing the Rubicon

Envisioning a Deal With Iran

IF you deal in camels, make the doors high,” an Afghan proverb cautions. As the dangers mount in the confrontation between the United States and Iran, both sides will have to raise the doors high for diplomacy to work, and to avoid conflict.

A diplomatic strategy must begin with the United States’ setting its priorities and then defining a practical path to achieve them. To achieve its top priorities, it will have to learn what Iran needs. Since the United States will not get total surrender from Iran, it must decide what it can put on the table to assure that both sides can reach a deal that will be durable.

American leaders have been masterly at diplomatic strategies — “building high doors” — to make deals. Franklin D. Roosevelt opened relations with the Soviet Union in 1933 to balance the ascendance of menacing forces in Germany and Japan. He was acting for geopolitical reasons, and in spite of his objection to Communism. Richard M. Nixonopened relations with China to enhance American leverage in dealing with the Soviet Union. He re-framed — but did not give up on — the American commitment to Taiwan to accomplish his objective. In each case, the presidents were acting against the advice of most of their close advisers.

In our own time, President Obama’s initial instincts on Iran were correct: only he can lead the United States to agreements with Iran that advance American national interests.

The first question is how to get such diplomacy started, and on that, Nixon’s strategy toward China is instructive.

Before traveling to Beijing in 1972, Nixon outlined on his ubiquitous yellow pad three analytical pillars of his strategy: What do they want, what do we want and what do we both want? The Chinese, he continued, wanted to “build up their world credentials,” to recover control of Taiwan and to get the United States out of Asia, while the United States wanted to succeed in Indochina, establish communication “to restrain Chinese expansion in Asia” and, in the future, “reduce threat of confrontation by China Super Power.” The United States and China both wanted “to reduce danger of confrontation and conflict, a more stable Asia, a restraint on U.S.S.R.”

In the Shanghai Communiqué, issued at the culmination of the meeting in Beijing, the continuing differences were highlighted, but both sides agreed to expand the common ground between them.

In developing a diplomatic strategy toward Iran, President Obama might respond to Nixon’s three questions as follows: Iran wants recognition of its revolution; an accepted role in its region; a nuclear program; the departure of the United States from the Middle East; and the lifting of sanctions. The United States wants Iran not to have nuclear weapons; security for Israel; a democratic evolution of Arab countries; the end of terrorism; and world access to the region’s oil and gas. Both Iran and the United States want stability in the region — particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan; the end of terrorism from Al Qaeda and the Taliban; the reincorporation of Iran into the international community; and no war.

With those assumptions as a skeleton, the shape of a final agreement with Iran is imaginable. The United States would agree to full recognition and respect for the Islamic Republic, and Iran would agree to regional cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both sides would agree to address the full range of bilateral disputes.

The International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Security Council could accept an Iranian civil nuclear program in return for Iran’s agreeing to grant inspectors full access to that program to assure that Iran did not build a nuclear weapon. Once international agencies had full access to Iran’s nuclear program, there could be a progressive reduction of the Security Council’s sanctions that are now in effect. Iran would agree to cease making threats against Israel, and the United States would agree to support efforts toward achieving a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

It would be important to make arrangements for Israel’s security; the exact shape of those measures would have to be worked out in the negotiations. An agreement in which there would be full access to Iran’s nuclear program, with a monitored limitation of 5 percent enrichment, would offer Israel additional reasons for confidence in the deal.

Both sides would agree to cooperate in reducing the influence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan; in combating drug trafficking; and in keeping open the routes through which energy flows to the world from the Persian Gulf. Both sides would agree that while wide differences between the two nations remained, those differences must be resolved peacefully.

The China analogy for American-Iranian relations falls short in some areas. The most important is that Mao was ready for an American approach, while Iran’s supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is not. Instead, he is convinced that the United States will not work with Iran until his regime is gone.

For Iran’s leadership, the notion that the United States is bent on overthrowing its rulers is rooted in historical experience: the United States did overthrow Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, supported the Shah afterward, supported Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran in the 1980s, and now backs increasing efforts to weaken and isolate Iran.

Reducing the malign influence of this legacy on the thinking of Ayatollah Khamenei will be essential to achieving any deal. Simply “keeping the door open to diplomacy” will not be sufficient. So the Iranian leader must be approached directly, but discreetly, by someone he trusts who conveys assurances from President Obama that covert operations and public pressure have been demonstrably reduced. The interlocutor might be a leader from a country in the region, enlisted when the American president felt the time was right.

Ayatollah Khamenei will have to be convinced by actions, not just messages. Just as Nixon halted covert action in Tibet before approaching China, a similar signal will be needed with Iran.

There is no guarantee that diplomacy will succeed. But that is also true of war. And only diplomacy can offer Iran’s current rulers a stake in building a secure future without a nuclear bomb. Only diplomacy can achieve America’s major objectives while avoiding the mistakes committed in Iraq or Vietnam.

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KORUS Free Trade Agreement: An Agent of Stability

Almost sixty years ago at the end of the Korean War, the relationship between the United States and South Korea took on a new meaning.  The relationship was built on a cooperative framework between allied forces in order to promote stability on the peninsula through a strengthened commitment to the mutual goals of protecting democratic values, peace and economic security.

Within the past few months the United States Congress and the Korean Parliament took large steps in solidifying their commitment to these basic tenants of the U.S.-Korea relationship when they passed the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA).  Their support of this agreement is evidence that shared economic prosperity is a strong part of the U.S.-Korean relationship.  As the political dynamics on the Asian continent continue to change, it is critical that the U.S. maintain and build its relationship with Korea as a means to enhance America’s position to promote political and economic stability in the region.

Most of those who have been following the debate and progress of the long-stalled KORUS FTA have heard most about how the reduction or removal of several tariff and non-tariff barriers will lead to greater economic opportunity through increased market access for American goods and services.  Korean duties on major agricultural products like meat and dairy products and cotton and soybeans will be eliminated and many U.S. businesses will experience simplified and expedited customs procedures that will allow them to reach customers in South Korea with less red tape.  Overall, the U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that tariff cuts alone to a variety of U.S. goods could amount to an increase of $10 billion to $11 billion of U.S. goods exports alone.  KORUS is mutually beneficial to the South Korean economy and its competitiveness.  Reducing tariffs and increasing exports will increase the country’s gross domestic product by an estimated five percent.

The KORUS FTA was negotiated and signed by the United States and South Korea on June 30, 2007; however, the George W. Bush Administration did not submit legislation to the then Democratically-controlled Congress due primarily to partisan differences over autos and beef.  The often referenced case is the American automobile industry, which originally opposed the agreement, but after the Obama Administration achieved key concessions that soothed the concerns of the industry, not only did the auto industry itself welcome the opportunity to compete on a level playing field, the United Autoworkers also joined to support.  Their support came as a result of Korean commitments to immediately reduce their eight percent tariff on U.S.-built passenger cars, including electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids, to four percent and to immediately reduce their ten percent tariff on trucks to zero.  After five years, tariffs on U.S.-made motor vehicles, including electric cars and plug-in hybrids, will be reduced to zero.

Though these tariff reductions and concessions are important and positive elements, they should not overshadow the FTA’s equally positive effects on strengthening the U.S.-Korea relationship and how U.S. trade policy can function as a key diplomatic tool.  As North Korea pursues a misguided nuclear weapons strategy, it threatens the tenants of the U.S-Korean relationship.  The tensions on the Korean Peninsula are heightened by the growth of China’s influence in the region while other nations have grown increasingly wary of the foreign and military policy goals of the communist-led countries of Asia.  The KORUS FTA provides opportunities for greater economic security and emboldens the democratic institutions of a key partner in the region since the end of the Korean War.  Our growing economic relationship will empower both the United States and Korea to be active agents for stability.

Growing trade relations with our allies is rarely easy to achieve; however, with the mutual goal of fairness to our businesses, workers and consumers, the KORUS FTA will not only benefit our economic well-being but also support our longstanding relationship with Korea that has sought to maintain peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.

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