Saturday, Iran celebrated their great victory over the “arrogant powers” by opening their first nuclear power plant at Bushehr. The opening coincided with dynamic conversation on Jeff Goldberg’s recent article in The Atlantic painting a picture of military action as a foregone conclusion, and prominent foreign policy leaders such as former UN Ambassador John Bolton fanned the flames by renewing calls for a preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

Dangerously, the discussion on how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program has moved away from the case for bombing Iran to who and when, ignoring the painful lessons learned from depicting military action as a clean and straightforward solution. We are still reeling from the burdensome commitments of Iraq and Afghanistan: a military response by either the United States or Israel will take much more than just bombs and have major potential consequences beyond Iran, realities noticeably absent from much of the conversation.

The most obvious and immediately damaging example is world oil supply. Iran could block the Strait of Hormuz, and therefore an astounding 20% of the world’s oil supply. Its estimated oil prices would shoot from $80-$100 to $400-$500, creating a devastating strain on the world economy and possibly result in increased military action.

Beyond the economic blow, the United States would face a whole new set of challenges with the ensuing shifts in the regional power balance, and with decreased leverage to confront them. Many of the advances in foreign policy goals laid out in Obama’s Cairo speech would be discredited, and while Arab heavyweights such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia might privately condone an attack on a regional threat, the public rebuke would support the goals of Islamic extremists by playing right into their rhetoric of the American aggressor.

Another likely consequence is exacerbated regional instabilities through attacks by proxies: Hizbullah would threaten Lebanon’s fragile state, and Israel would face increased attacks from Hamas and destroy any chance of a Middle East peace deal. Iran could leverage their growing regional authority and connections to terrorist groups, even cause complete breakdown in Iraq and Afghanistan. If a decision to bomb occurs before IAEA inspectors are removed from Iran or before verification that Iran violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States risks condemnation from Turkey, Russia, China, and other regional powers, effecting a broad set of policy issues and their willingness to cooperate on regional priorities beyond Iran. It would be a stinging and debilitating blow to our diplomatic and strategic goals.

Further, since Bushehr, Arak, Natanz, and other known nuclear sites are jointly run by Russia or monitored by the IAEA, the development of weapons-grade uranium would likely occur at a secret site, similar to Qom. An effective military strike would require bombing multiple locations over an extended period of time, including nuclear sites, research facilities, and military installations, resulting in an inevitably high number of Iranian and international civilian casualties. Moreover, the lack of knowledge on the exact nature of the targets could result in extensive civilian and environmental devastation due to nuclear fallout. There is also a possibility bombing could be futile, and Iran would pursue a nuclear weapon with fervor under the guise of legitimatized self-defense.

On a domestic front, the degree to which the election protests took the United States by surprise reveals our limited understanding of Iran’s politics. The country’s rising prominence in the region increases the significance of their domestic situation to the outside world. The protests, while harshly contained, indicated the hard-liners’ hold on the country is not absolute. A time-tested result of outside military intervention in the region is a surge of national unity: if there is a bomb Iran policy would likely drive Iranian’s moderates into the arms of the regime, snuffing out any potential future generation of leaders and reforms.

A nuclear weaponized Iran is a real and pressing threat. But before we resort to a military option, calculating what would happen the next day, the following week, and subsequent years is equally critical to our security priorities. We need to ask questions about the challenges and the capability of meeting them. Attacking Iran’s nuclear ambitions may seem like an easy short-term response for a militarily dominant United States, but the last ten years of American involvement in the Middle East demonstrate the extensive commitments required beyond just a few bombs.

Related posts:

1. Will arming the Gulf solve the Iranian problem?
2. Time to Islamicize the condemnation of Iran
3. Winning Turkey’s Support on Iran

There is much bipartisan agreement about the nature of the struggle against terrorism.  Many have said that this is a war of ideas and will not be won just on the battlefield.

In George Bush’s 2002 national security strategy he wrote, “We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism.”

Barack Obama spoke in 2007 in a similar manner when he said, “Bin Ladin and his allies know they cannot defeat us on the field of battle or in a genuine battle of ideas.”

Finally, in 2005 John McCain McCain wrote, “To prevail in this war we need more than victories on the battlefield. This is a war of ideas, a struggle to advance freedom in the face of terror in places where oppressive rule has bred the malevolence that creates terrorists.”

The battle we are waging is not just about guns and tanks.  It’s not just about overpowering and overwhelming the enemy.  Although those are certainly elements of the struggle, the battle is about something much greater.  It’s about competing visions of how the world should be.  The vision that the United States seeks to promote is a world where differences are settled not through violence but through the rule of law.  It’s a society that celebrates diversity and promotes tolerance.  It’s a society where Muslims and Christians can live together and worship in their own manner.  These are the ideas that so many Americans are fighting and dying for.

That is why the debate that is happening today surrounding the proposed mosque at ground zero in New York is particularly tragic.

In this war of ideas we are seeking to prove to the Islamic world that we are not against their religion.  The society we promote is one in which Muslims can practice their faith amidst Christians, Jews, and atheists, peacefully.    Yet, this mosque debate is presenting the exact opposite vision of America.

I won’t argue the legality or wisdom of building this mosque.  Much has already been said about that.  Rather, I think that it’s important to view this debate through the lens of the war of ideas. From that perspective, tremendous damage has been done to the ideal of tolerance and plurality we seek to promote in the Muslim world.  Here’s just one example:

Newt Gingrich said the proposed mosque would be a symbol of Muslim “triumphalism” and that building the mosque near the site of the Sept. 11 attacks “would be like putting a Nazi sign next to the Holocaust Museum.”

Intended or not, this linking of Nazis and Muslims is disgusting and tremendously harmful.  Mr. Gingrich implies that all Muslims will feel triumphant that a mosque is overlooking ground zero…. as if the attacks on 9/11 were conducted on behalf of all Muslims.  Perhaps this is not Mr. Gingrich’s intent.  Unfortunately, the nuance of that position and the explanation by some that they don’t seek to attack ALL Muslims, gets lost in the weeds.  In such cases intent doesn’t really matter.  Perception is reality.

Al Qaeda’s narrative is that the West is in a war against Islam.  It is justifiable to use all available means in its defense.  America’s response is that we are not in a war against Islam.  Rather, we are against the violence and extremism promoted by terrorists.  Ours is a pluralistic society where we welcome those of all faiths.  This was the message that George W. Bush regularly repeated.  He said, “Ours is a war not against a religion, not against the Muslim faith. But ours is a war against individuals who absolutely hate what America stands for…”  Unfortunately, the fight that the mosque opponents are waging falls quite neatly into the terrorist narrative.  The reports now emerging that more cities across the country are rejecting the construction of mosques further reinforces that position.  Nick Kristof makes the point here that Bin Laden is probably reveling in this mosque debate.  The longer it goes on, the more Al Qaeda benefits.

Some argue that the whole debate is simply political theater in an election year.  If that’s the case, it’s political theater that will ultimately cost us lives.

Related posts:

1. After Healthcare: U.S. – Muslim World Strategic Realignment in the time of Obama
2. On Honoring the First Amendment
3. What Not to Do About Yemen

Days before the Senate dispersed for its August recess, Harry Reid announced that a vote would not be held on a “bare minimum” energy-only bill, just weeks after the Senate gave up on comprehensive climate and energy legislation. The inability of the Senate to gain any traction on even the most modest of energy bills in the wake of one of the most devastating environmental disasters in history is a clear indicator that there is still a long road ahead toward a strong U.S. climate change policy. There is no better time to reexamine the debate, and the debate begins with the science.

The science of climate change is sound but complex. Climate change will affect different parts of the planet in very different ways, and it is impossible to precisely quantify the physical impacts on Earth’s surface, let alone the social, political, and economic implications of those physical impacts. But ‘uncertainty’ in climate models – the expected variability in data – is too often mistaken for uncertainty about the science itself, and the well-funded lobbyists wishing to cast doubt on the science have made an almost effortless practice of manipulating the statistics and skewing the facts. Still, much of the public’s misunderstanding about climate change persists because of serious flaws in messaging by the science community to counter the misinformation. In many ways, the purpose of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is to bridge this communication gap with the public. But with recent polling suggesting that the U.S. public increasingly perceives climate change as a very low-priority issue, the IPCC – and the science community as a whole – needs to overhaul its communication strategy.

The IPCC’s communication problems have spurred plenty of controversy in the past. Last month, IPCC Chairman Rajendra Pachauri sent an ill-conceived letter to the scientists participating in the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), advising them to “keep a distance from the media.” The letter was widely criticized by scientists for seemingly encouraging a “bunker mentality.” In recent months, questions have also swirled around the validity of conclusions reached in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), particularly concerning the projected timeframe for the melting of Himalayan glaciers. Although a review by The Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency found “no errors” that would impact any of the report’s 32 main conclusions, the agency did raise a concern that “the foundation for some of these conclusions could have been made more transparent.” But while the IPCC’s transparency may need improvement, its process does not. The IPCC has always had a very meticulous assessment process. The AR4 Summary for Policymakers was “approved line-by-line by all WMO and UN member governments” in a thorough three-day conference that was open to members of the media. And yet, due largely to its uncoordinated communication strategy, the IPCC has been unable to allay widespread criticism of its process. Even Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary-General, has requested an independent review of the IPCC due for release next week.

David Ropeik, a risk communication consultant, offered the following perspective on the science community’s apparent communication gap in an exchange with Andrew Revkin of The New York Times:

“The passionate debate over why people don’t seem to “get” science is the newest chapter in an old discussion. Are people too stupid? Is our education system failing? Do scientists not “get” people, or communicate poorly? It’s time to move past those rather tired questions, because they are predicated on the assumption that there is an “It” to “Get”… some ideal truth that perfect reason can reach, if only the communication gap were bridged and “the facts” were made clear. That fails to acknowledge, as Drs. Jasanoff and Brulle have noted, that human perception of facts is not just a fact-based process. It is an affective mix of fact and feeling. We JUDGE facts. We INTERPRET facts. We run facts through our values and instincts and life circumstances and a host of other affective lenses that produce our beliefs. The gap isn’t scientists from Mars and people from Venus. It’s the gap between people from the mythical land we’ll call Rationalia ignoring evidence of how the real people of Earth actually behave.”

As journalist Chris Mooney has pointed out, polling shows that political ideology weighs heavier on an individual’s views about climate change than education level. Better educated Republicans are actually less likely to accept climate science than those who are less educated, while the correlation among Democrats is reversed. This appears to support Ropeik’s conclusion that information is not simply evaluated in a fact-based way, but rather that climate science is interpreted, first and foremost, in a “politically driven” way. To engage the public at a more “human” level, the IPCC and the wider climate science community needs to call on social scientists and communication experts to drive its messaging strategy, contributing to what American University School of Communication Professor Matthew Nisbet has called “a cultural shift in how leaders in U.S. science view public engagement.”

For many, climate change is just an abstract concept – a hazy set of possible scenarios that will play out gradually and often subtly in the all-too-distant future. In a sense, climate change will always be abstract, often guided just as much by faith as by tangible evidence because it is impossible to definitively attribute any specific environmental event to rising temperatures (the recent flooding in Pakistan, for example). But it is important to approach the issue in new and creative ways to make the theoretical more practical. Some skeptics will likely remain intransigent regardless of how irrefutable the evidence becomes. But when climate change is presented as a public health issue, as a national security issue, or as a moral issue, the message appeals to a much broader audience that would otherwise be unwilling, for purely political reasons, to accept the scientific consensus. The leap from science to policy will always be difficult because politics inevitably gets in the way. But if communication experts take on the challenge of overcoming the political obstacles with new messaging techniques and perspectives, climate change can eventually rise from a bottom-tier issue in the public’s eyes and real policy solutions can finally begin to take shape.

Related posts:

1. Copenhagen Conference Kicks Off
2. Hazy Reasoning on Black Carbon
3. Bipartisan breakthrough on climate change

I just made it through Hitch 22, Christopher Hitchen’s memoir.  For those of you unacquainted with Mr. Hitchens, he – and please, never call him “Chris” – is a journalist and political dissident of the first rank who deploys with unequalled deft the English language to challenge tyranny in all its varied guises and disguises.  Mr. Hitchens has engaged in spirited struggle against a wide array of ghouls and scoundrels, from Saddam Hussein (for inflicting terror on his own people) to the Ayatollah Khomeini (for issuing a fatwa on Salman Rushdie’s head) to our own Henry Kissinger (for a range of offenses too long to list).

While reading this brilliant memoir, a thought kept haunting me about the way we think about achieving foreign policy goals with military means and methods.  We tend to think of these goals as ones that can be achieved scientifically.  For example, if you want to dethrone an insipid dictator, you must simply determine what is necessary to remove him.  Regime change, then, is a scientific problem that can be addressed with the tools of an amateur’s logic:  identify the problem, formulate a strategy, and then execute that strategy carefully.  A reasonably clever schoolboy could work it out, we seem to believe.

The problem with this little tradition of ours is not just that the military is not an institution structured to win over the hearts and minds of those who live in a life world far from our own – though this is certainly true.  The real bugbear is that many foreign policy objectives are not well suited to being achieved through bloody military campaigns.  And it’s not that the military needs to change, far from it; we must stop expecting our soldiers to handle problems best addressed through other means.Consider, the following observations, using the ongoing conflict in Iraq as an illustrative (though certainly not singular) example of why bullets and bombs are, by themselves, poor instruments of foreign policy:

1. (formulating the problem) If one were to endeavor to describe the “simple” goal of ousting Saddam Hussein, isn’t the presence of a megalomaniacal dictator evidence of a crisis within a culture, and that, preliminarily, ousting dictator would create significant social, economic and political challenges that the American military is ill-equipped to handle? If such a crisis is acknowledged, then one must assume that it is a blunder of the first order to deploy military forces to remove a dictator with no clear sense of how to deal with the fallout of a successful military campaign
2. (strategy creation) Again, if the goal were not just to oust an insipid and ghoulish dictator, but to also revitalize a country socially and politically, why in the world would the military be charged with the primary responsibility of making that happen?  And, more to the point, which specific departments or agencies of the American government are now charged with figuring out how to help Iraq revitalize itself so that it may be transformed into the democratic or “democratic-friendly” haven we wish it to be? The shocking answer is that when the Iraq invasion was planned, these questions were never addressed.  This is a clear failure on the part of the Bush Administration given that it costs (a) at least $390,000 per year to deploy one American soldier in Iraq and (b) $900 billion of U.S. taxpayer dollars has been spent or allocated for spending in Iraq through 2010.
3. (strategy execution) Most thoughtful observers of what has happened in Iraq would concede, if grudgingly, that things have not gone as well as were expected.  But this tepid concession will not do.  The Iraq situation has gone badly because the non-military aims that are inherent in the goal of deposing Saddam – i.e., the aim of stabilizing the country – cannot be executed by the military.

This is not meant to detract from the talents and abilities of the sapient and dedicated top brass of the American military; these folks surely face daily burdens that civilians such as this author cannot possibly comprehend.  Nor do I mean to take away from the sacrifices that are made daily by American soldiers who have willingly placed their physical and emotional health in peril.

Yet it is beyond question that our military personnel are neither prepared nor able to properly undertake the counter insurgency efforts and the other essential tasks necessary to create stable, healthy political and social institutions in Iraq.

I do not want to leave the gentle reader with the impression that I loathe our intervention in Iraq, nor do I desire to suggest that Saddam should somehow still be sitting in the seat of power.  In all honesty, I think true humanitarians everywhere should rejoice in the fact that this craven fiend has been expired.  My principal point is that deposing a foreign dictator, even an execrable one such as Mr. Hussein, requires a comprehensive plan that will necessarily include components that cannot be executed by the military.  And it follows from this that we ought to stop thinking of the American military as a lissome tool for accomplishing all of our foreign policy objectives.  Though it may sound surprising, the military is just one arrow in our quiver.

Related posts:

1. Getting History Right
2. Blood in the Streets of Bangkok: Thailand’s Need for a New Political Future
3. Time to Think Creatively About Burma

To understand how perverse the perennial debate, which in itself is a weak word for what passes as supposed scrutiny and argumentation over U.S. military spending, always deliberately and euphemistically called defense spending, one has only to read the “Statement on Department Efficiencies Initiative”  delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on August 9 when he proposed some modest changes in military command structures, such as the proposed closing of the Joint Forces Command,  l along with other organization adjustments which theoretically, in aggregate, could save billions of dollars over five years.

To read the subsequent whining and rhetorical rending of government by corporate CEOs and their Congressional allies one might think Mahatma Gandhi had been brought back from the dead and been made Secretary of Defense.

The fact that the prospect of “Thousands Of Defense Jobs To Be Eliminated,” as the Washington Post headlined it the following day, in a military-industrial corporate sector which employs hundreds of thousands in the most limited definition of the phrase, excited so much whining is the very epitome of farce.

First, considering Gates called for finding more than $100 billion in overhead savings over the next five years, when combined direct military spending is likely to total over $3.5 trillion dollars is what you call having very low expectations. Note this does not include other military related spending which would jack the total even higher. For detail see the newly released Report of the Task Force on A Unified Security Budget for the United States.

Second, in no way whatsoever can what Gates proposed be considered a cut, as happened in most press accounts. As Gates took pains to note, “Let me be clear, the task before us is not to reduce the department’s top line budget.  Rather, it is to significantly reduce its excess overhead costs and apply the savings to force structure and modernization.”

Third, it is a sign of how utterly dependent government is on private military contractors that Gates’ call for a 10 percent annual reduction in spending on contractors who provide support services to the military, including money for intelligence-related contracts, and he placed a freeze on the number of workers in the office of the secretary of defense, other Pentagon supervisory agencies and the headquarters of the military’s combat commands brought about cries of anguish. Why, anyone should possibly think this is a significant impediment to ongoing military outsourcing is beyond understanding. As Winslow Wheeler, Director, Straus Military Reform Project, Center for Defense Information, noted:

(The total number of these contractors appears to be unknown. One estimate is that the DOD contractors number 790,000; other numbers are higher. In any case, the denominator for this 10% reduction appears to be unknown. Also, it is unclear if this 10% reduction pertains to all contractors or a subset. If the correct number is 790,000, will there actually be three years of reductions of 79,000 of these people?)

Note what this recent Congressional Research Service report said:

The largest savings appear likely to come from a 30% reduction over three years in funding for ‘service support contractors.’… [but] There appears to be some significant overlap in the proposals, so their impact may not be cumulative….. Aside from the overlaps, several of the initiatives involve only relatively small amounts…. Many of the potentially larger savings appear to involve scrubbing the recent very large increases in intelligence spending.”

None of Gates initiatives has anything to do with a rational military budgeting process; something which has been AWOL for decades. What it means, as all people conversant with military spending issues understand, is that by trimming the Defense Department’s  civilian and military bureaucracies, Gates is hoping to persuade Congress and outside critics that the department is eliminating waste on its own to head off future reductions in overall military spending. Gates still sees military spending increasing in real terms; only by a somewhat lesser amount due to projected cuts.

Yet paltry as they are, even these very limited initiatives have the regular military ritualistically outraged. Perhaps it is because they see it as an affront to the magical illusion that military spending is the most efficient and least corrupt of all government spending. Note to readers; that particular illusion would not be possible without massive, witting assistance from a largely compliant, and usually clueless, mainstream media establishment.

As Michael Brenner, Professor of International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, recently wrote on the National Journal Security Expert Blog:

For the past decade they have a deep sense of entitlement.  Their presumed entitlement has no basis in law as do the much maligned Social Security programs funded through dedicated withholdings entirely separate from the tax revenues that keep the Pentagon machine well lubricated.  There indeed does exist a defense establishment whose self-interested thinking pervades what passes for strategic planning in Washington these days.  That was demonstrated when the Congress called upon the United States Institute of Peace to conduct an ‘independent’ review of needs and programs juxtaposed to the Quadrennial Defense Review made public this spring.  The USIP project had as co-chairs Bush administration National Security Advisor Steven Hadley and Clinton administration Secretary of Defense William Perry.  They led a twenty member panel chosen by DoD and Congress whose distinctive trait was that all but one had some financial stake in the Pentagon’s activities.

So it came as little surprise that the panel’s advisory report solemnly pronounced that the QDR understated America’s defense requirements and that spending substantially above that requested by DoD was imperative.

For those wanting to see a useful critique of the utter vapidity of the panel see this column by Winslow Wheeler, one of the relatively few analysts who actually understands its utter dysfunctional nature.

All in all, Gates pronouncement is just another reminder of the prescience of President Eisenhower’s farewell address:

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Too bad we didn’t take it to heart when we still had the chance.

Related posts:

1. Gates Confronts Ike’s Wisdom About the Clearly Necessary and the Comfortably Desirable
2. 30 Top National Security Leaders Come Out in Support of New START Treaty
3. Contractors and Government: Till Death Do Them Part

Yesterday the Washington Post reported that Pakistan has requested more immediate assistance from the United States to help in the flood relief effort there.  Floods have been inundating the northwest region of Pakistan, affecting more than 14 million people according to Pakistani officials.  This is the same region of Pakistan that is home to many of the militants that continue to threaten American troops in Afghanistan and seek to maintain that area as a safe haven for al Qaeda.  Although these floods are a tremendous humanitarian disaster, they also provide an opportunity to both assist those in need and demonstrate to the Pakistani people that the United States is a partner that they can count on.

A recent Pew poll shows that that this will be a steep hill to climb.  Only 17 percent of Pakistanis had a positive view of the U.S. and 59 percent described the U.S. as an enemy.  Recognizing that our efforts in Afghanistan will not succeed unless Pakistani militant safe havens are eliminated, this lack of support by the population is enormously troubling.  There are a number of reasons for their negative views ranging from U.S. support for previous military dictators to the sporadic nature of U.S. engagement with the country.

The question now is, will we respond quickly enough? The Pakistani government has been unable to address this humanitarian disaster on its own.  In this vacuum, militant groups have been rushing to seize this opportunity.  So far the United States has sent six helicopters and pledged $55 million.  Considering the task at hand and short time available to save lives, I question if this is the best effort we could muster.  An important comparison case study is worth examining – the 2004 Asian tsunami. 

In 2004 on the day after Christmas, the second largest earthquake ever recorded on a seismograph launched a massive tsunami off the coast of Indonesia.  A tranquil sea was transformed into an enormous wave of water that traveled quickly to the coasts of Indonesia, Thailand, India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.  The tremendous power of this wave was hidden from sight until it reached the shore.  At that point, the water crested upwards and rose to a height of nearly 80 ft as it approached coastal villages in Indonesia.  The destruction it unleashed was tremendous.  Entire villages were wiped away.  Fishermen who had been out to sea returned to find their homes completely destroyed and their family members swept away. Some estimates put the death toll in Indonesia alone at more than 200,000.

Although the destruction caused by this natural disaster was unprecedented, there also was a tremendous outpouring of support from around the world. The United States military sprang into action.  The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier battle group was dispatched from Japan to the coast of Sumatra.  A total of 48 navy and marine helicopters were utilized and a 1000 bed naval hospital ship was sent to the area.  Ten C-130 military transport aircraft ferried relief supplies.  By February 2005, then President Bush had pledged $950 million to be used for the humanitarian response and rebuilding.

The justification for this tremendous mobilization of U.S. resources was purely humanitarian, yet the impact on the U.S. reputation in the Muslim majority country of Indonesia was noteworthy.  Although it is impossible to determine the true national security benefit of the dramatic change in Indonesia public opinion, it is important to remember that in the several years before the tsunami there was increasing concern about the development of terrorist cells based in Indonesia.  Such cells were responsible for numerous deaths in a Bali nightclub bombing.  What is clear is that the humanitarian assistance dramatically improved many Indonesians’ view of the United States that had sunk to incredible lows in the post-Iraq invasion period.  In May 2003, 15 percent of Indonesians had a favorable view of the United States.  By 2006, this had increased to 44 percent.  63 percent of Indonesian reported that the humanitarian assistance improved their view of the United States.  Support for Osama bin Laden decreased from 58 percent to 12 percent during the same time period. Today the threat from terrorism in Indonesia has decreased.

When asked about the humanitarian effort in Pakistan, a senior U.S. military official said transfer of additional helicopters, which are in short supply in Afghanistan, would require a political decision in Washington. “Do they exist in the region? Yes,” he said. “Are they available? No.”

It seems that perhaps now is the time to be making that political decision.  Such a decision was made to provide immediate humanitarian assistance in Southeast Asia – 48 helicopters and 1000 bed naval hospital ship.  Granted, the U.S. has pledged more money than any other country to the flood relief effort in Pakistan.  Yet, pledges of aid do little to assist a villager stranded on a rooftop.  It’s also a matter of actually getting hardware and people quickly in place to save lives.  In that regard, it seems that, so far, we’ve come up short.  Is this disaster any less tragic than the tsunami?  It’s not just the right thing to do. The tsunami example shows that it can also be a smart strategic move.

Related posts:

1. Time to get the Pakistani public on board
2. Pakistan development held hostage by partisan bickering
3. Addressing the “God-gap” in U.S. foreign policy

One of the most striking statistics from the U.S. war in Vietnam doesn’t concern Vietnam at all, but its neighbor, Laos.  Between 1964 and 1973, the U.S. dropped over 2.5 million tons of ordnance on Laos.  This works out to the equivalent of one B-52 load of bombs every 8 minutes, 24 hours a day, for nine years. The sheer tonnage of explosives dropped on Laos makes the tiny, land-locked nation the most heavily-bombed country in history, with half a ton of bombs dropped for every inhabitant.

This dubious distinction carries a terrible legacy. According to U.S. estimates, approximately 30% of ordnance dropped over Laos failed to detonate upon impact. This unexploded ordnance, or UXO, remains scattered and buried throughout an area that covers one third of the country. In the past five decades over 50,000 Laotians – a fifth of them children – have been killed or maimed by American UXO. Currently, around 300 Laotians needlessly die every year from accidents involving UXO. Particularly deadly have been cluster bombs, which consist of sub-munitions that scatter over a wide area and are notorious for causing indiscriminate civilian casualties. Experts estimate that of the 260 million cluster bombs, or “bomblets” American forces dropped on Laos, 80 million remain unexploded.

This situation constitutes a severe humanitarian issue for which the U.S. is ultimately responsible. Due to the ubiquity of UXO, difficult economic conditions, and lack of education, reducing the damage by UXO has proved a formidable task for the Lao government. It is almost impossible for Laotians to avoid living and working in areas contaminated by UXO, making de-mining the only viable option for addressing the problem. Laos’s economy is heavily dependent on farming: 80% of the population is involved in agriculture, which makes up 30% of the national GDP. Unfortunately, UXO has rendered 37% of agricultural land unsafe for farming. Farmers who ignore or are unaware of UXO contamination are injured or killed by UXO that has sunk underground over time and is then detonated by digging.

In addition to farmers accidentally uncovering UXO, injuries and fatalities are caused when people actively seek out UXO for scrap metal.  Laos is an extremely poor country, ranking 133rd on the UNDP’s Human Development Index. The scrap metal of UXO and bomb shells are often seen as a valuable addition to low-income farmers, prompting many people to ignore the risks of UXO in favor of meager fiscal benefits.

Ironically, the UXO that some Laotians collect to relieve their personal poverty is also partially responsible for the poverty of the entire country. Besides constituting a severe humanitarian problem, UXO is also a significant impediment to Lao’s economic development. As the UNDP has reported,

“High levels of poverty in rural [Laotian] communities often correlate with high levels of UXO contamination. UXO/Mine Action is the absolute pre-condition for the socio-economic development of Lao PDR and for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and National Socio Economic Development Plan (NSEDP).”

In short, UXO directly inhibits the health and development of the Lao economy. Much of Laos’ economic development depends on its ability to exploit its abundant natural resources for mining, hydropower, forestry and tourism. The presence of UXO in over a third of the country renders efforts to grow these industries unsafe. Thus, clearing UXO is not only a humanitarian priority but an economic one.

The U.S. has recognized the terrible impact of UXO on Laos, most recently in an April 22, 2010 hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment.  However, American financial assistance in rectifying the problem has been less than satisfactory, to put it mildly.  The Lao government’s National Regulatory Authority (NRA), which is responsible for de-mining along with UXO Laos, has been spending between $12 and $14 million a year to clear UXO. Only a small part of that cost is covered by U.S. donations. According to a State Department representative, from 1993 to 2009 the U.S. contributed $25 million to de-mining efforts, or an average of $1.5 million a year. In 2009 that number rose slightly, to $3.7 million, and FY 2010 has seen the highest contribution so far, at $5 million. Unfortunately, the State Department’s proposed FY 2011 allotment for de-mining in Laos is significantly smaller at $1.9 million. As Channapha Khamvongsa, Executive Director of the nonprofit Legacies of War, has pointed out, the U.S. spent more money in three days of dropping bombs on Laos than it has in the past fifteen years cleaning those bombs up.

The lack of U.S. fiscal assistance to Laos is both embarrassing and wrong. Laos already receives very little in the form of generalized American foreign assistance- $5 million in 2009. Regionally, this is in comparison to Thailand’s $15 million, Burma’s $17 million, Cambodia’s $65 million, and Vietnam’s $102 million.  Since de-mining activities in Laos began in 1994, only 500,000 bomblets (out of an estimated 80 million) have been destroyed and only 1% of contaminated land cleared. A significant hindrance to progress is related to the lack of funding, particularly for equipment. Were the U.S. to commit to greater levels of funding, progress could be faster, thus reducing the unnecessary loss of life and stagnation of development in Laos.

The U.S. has no excuse for not taking full financial responsibility for clearing UXO in Laos. On the rather rare occasions when the problem of UXO Laos is discussed by the American government and media, it is done so in a way that fails to adequately accept responsibility for the problem. This is unacceptable. Secretary Clinton may have told Southeast Asia that “the U.S. is back,” but when it comes to Laos, that remains to be seen. Let’s hope she means it.

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Kenya captured headlines in December 2007 when the former beacon of stability and growth in East Africa descended into political and social chaos after elections heightened ethnic and tribal divisions. Yet despite over 1,300 deaths, 300,000 displaced, and fears of a second Rwanda, Kenya has pulled back from the brink with the creation of a fragile power-sharing government between the two major rival parties, facilitated by the collaborative efforts of multiple stakeholders locally, nationally, and internationally.

Today, Kenyans return to the polls for the first time since the post-election violence to usher in a new constitution and drastic political and judicial reforms. As Kenya takes a step in a positive direction, its trajectory from violence and complete institutional breakdown to slow but constructive change should be an opportunity for the international community and United States to evaluate the potential and limitations of preventive diplomacy as a concrete foreign policy tool.

International involvement in Kenya did not involve boots on the ground, but focused on rigorous negotiations and external economic and political pressure from international institutions and countries. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania, the African Union, and others were all key in the process, threatening punitive measures and pushing both sides towards compromise.

The effective and calibrated response of the international community following the diplomatic intervention was touted as a successful example of preventive diplomacy, where outside actors addressed both the security and humanitarian concerns. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe at a recent Brookings Institution briefing  stated,

We quickly deployed political officers, electoral, constitutional and security experts that became the main support staff for the mediator [former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan] as he helped the parties forge the agreements to end the crisis. I think few would contest that prompt international mediation in Kenya helped prevent an even larger catastrophe.

Further, international support for Kenya’s already robust civil society was key in the process, and continues to be so today. The international Commission on Inquiry on Post Election Violence, also known as the Waki Commission; the involvement of the International Criminal Court; and President Obama purposefully skipping Kenya on his trip to Africa; are a few examples of how the international community remained engaged in nudging Kenya forward. For the referendum, the United States has taken an active financial role by “supporting the process, not the outcome,” and the threat of ICC investigations has tempered the hate speech that fueled violence in 2008.

Getting involved in the internal politics of other countries can be messy, counterproductive, and costly, as Americans today know well.  Yet developments in Kenya demonstrate that by engaging strategically, early, and with local ownership, there is a way to walk the fine line of effective outside involvement. As we continue to address the threat of failing and failed states, we need to identify and strengthen tactics that work. Replicating Kenya is by no means an exact science: Kenya benefits from a robust civil society, free press, business sector interested in stability, and strategic importance internationally, all of which heavily contributed to the resolution of the conflict, and all of which are more rare in other conflict-prone countries.  Nevertheless, by engaging directly and purposefully early rather than too late, lives are saved, long-term costs are cut, and there is one less failed state threatening international security. The United States and the international community have a strong strategic interest in engaging quickly and early in rigorous preventive diplomacy to keep instability from taking root.

Today, Kenyans will take their own future into their hands to bring about long needed reforms to address their many economic, social, and political ills. They are a long way from the finish line, and there is still much to be done to ensure violence does not reoccur on the level it did in 2008. Two years ago, they got another chance and the safe space needed to move forward. It is in the interest of all to be prepared and ready to offer the right tools for others to have that chance.

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If nothing else, the Wikileaks release of the Afghanistan War Diaries has had the positive effect of focusing public attention back of Afghanistan. Of course, there has increasing coverage this year, as the surge of troops ordered by President Obama last fall has been implemented. But the war there has not received nearly the coverage it deserves, given the intensified fighting and increased brittleness of American strategy and goals.

Let there be no mistake, the costs are high. The United States, as this Congressional Research Service report details will, most likely, suffer more killed and wounded this year, than in any year since it invaded Afghanistan in 2001. As of July 12 that was 218 killed and 2000 wounded. In 2009, by comparison the numbers were 311 killed and 2,131 wounded. Total U.S. military deaths thus far from Oct. 11, 2001 are 1,154 and wounded is 6,773.

We should note that the deaths of at least 66 soldiers, Marines, sailors and airmen have made July the deadliest-ever month for American troops in the nine-year war in Afghanistan. The tally includes six American service members who died in four separate attacks in southern Afghanistan last Thursday and Friday.

One of the salutary effects of the Wikileaks documents is to illustrate the incoherent response of the federal government when it comes to dealing with the reality of its policies. As the Project On Government Oversight noted:

There is no doubt this episode also exposes the ridiculous problems created by the overclassification of government information. The Administration cannot have it both ways—they claimed that there was nothing important in the 92,000 documents, then also claimed that this was a terrible breach of national security. There is no doubt that the release produced a better-informed populace about one of our most important public policy issues, the ongoing war in Afghanistan. But at what cost?

This, by the way, is a realistic appraisal of Wikileaks, as opposed to the predictable hysteria from such rightwingers as Marc Thiessen of the American Enterprise Institute.

Maybe people think that much of this is moot; that come next year the U.S. will redeploy its troops back home from Afghanistan. If so, they should ponder this exchange from the interview that ABC’s This Week with Christine Amanpour did with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates on August 1:

Let me put something up that David Kilcullen, the counter-insurgency expert, a former adviser to General Petraeus, said about the timetable.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

DAVID KILCULLEN:  They believe that we had stated a date certain, that we were going to leave in the summer of 2011.  And they immediately went out and spoke to the population and said, the Americans are leaving in 18 months, as it was then.  What are you doing on the 19th month?  Who are you backing?  Because we’ll still be there and they won’t be.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

AMANPOUR:  So that question is out there.  So many people are arranging their schedules for 2011 — the summer of 2011.

But my question to you is this, what can General Petraeus do to defeat the Taliban at their own game?

What can he do now in Afghanistan to avoid this deadline that they’re setting for themselves?

GATES:  Well, first of all, I think we need to re-emphasize the message that we are not leaving Afghanistan in July of 2011.  We are beginning a transition process and a thinning of our ranks that will — and the pace will depend on the conditions on the ground.  The president has been very clear about that.  And if the Taliban are waiting for the nineteenth month, I welcome that, because we will be there in the nineteenth month and we will be there with a lot of troops.

As the New York Times reported on Sunday when President Obama announced his new war plan for Afghanistan last year, the centerpiece of the strategy was to safeguard the Afghan people, provide them with a competent government and win their allegiance. But the counterinsurgency strategy has shown little success; that counterinsurgency strategy has shown little success, as demonstrated by the flagging military and civilian operations in Marja and Kandahar and the spread of Taliban influence in other areas of the country.

The alternative approach is targeted killings of insurgents from Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It is not clear that killing enemy fighters is sufficient by itself to cripple an insurgency.

But even if it works well the best that can be hoped for is a political settlement with the Taliban. That is pretty thin beer, considering the past, present, and future American sacrifices in Afghanistan.

One sign of rationality, despite all the conservative grumbling and spinning, is that the American public is leading, not following the politicians and pundits. As Frank Rich pointed out in the New York Times:

the logs won’t change the course of our very long war in Afghanistan, but neither did the Pentagon Papers alter the course of Vietnam.

What Ellsberg’s leak did do was ratify the downward trend-line of the war’s narrative. The WikiLeaks legacy may echo that. We may look back at the war logs as a herald of the end of America’s engagement in Afghanistan just as the Pentagon Papers are now a milestone in our slo-mo exit from Vietnam.

…

Yet the national yawn that largely greeted the war logs is most of all an indicator of the country’s verdict on the Afghan war itself, now that it’s nine years on and has reached its highest monthly casualty rate for American troops. Many Americans at home have lost faith and checked out. The war places way down the list of pressing issues in every poll.

Nearly two-thirds of those asked recently by CBS News think it’s going badly; the latest Post-ABC News survey finds support of Obama’s handling of Afghanistan at a low (45 percent), with only 43 percent deeming the war worth fighting.

The bottom line of Afghanistan is that the U.S. not fighting to win. Instead it is fighting not to lose. What is the difference? Here is how Leslie Gelb, former president of the establishment Council on Foreign Relations explains it. He starts with the situation President Lydon Johnson found himself in with respect to Vietnam:

“I can’t win, and I can’t get out.” He was trapped between his awareness that victory was impossible at any reasonable price, and his fear that losing would be catastrophic for the United States, and himself. LBJ was stuck, and so was the United States.

…

Though President Obama himself and General Petraeus, the NATO commander in Afghanistan, still call for victory there, it is probably true that Obama and maybe even the general have come to LBJ’s conclusion: “I can’t win, and I can’t get out.”

Like Voltaire’s Candide, Gelb tries to see the best of all possible worlds:

Like President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Obama and his team can drown the aftereffects of Afghanistan in powerful diplomacy and continued, focused commitment to Afghans. In these ways, he can both continue to protect against terrorism in Afghanistan and start strengthening efforts against the new homes for terrorists-in Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, and in American cities.

This approach is not a cop out. It is a way to redefine victory. It was done in Vietnam. And people forget that the president of Vietnam visited George W. Bush in the White House during his last year in office. People hardly noticed that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton just visited there. People hardly noticed that Vietnam now looks to the United States as a protector against China.

If President Obama is also creative in the use of America’s power, we can mostly withdraw from Afghanistan-and not lose.

So when all is said and done and the last U.S. troops leave Kabul the American public can rejoice for not having lost.  Good luck in selling that to the American Gold Star Mothers.

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Nowhere have the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity clashed more persistently and tragically than in the Balkans, which remain unsettled after the genocidal Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. Kosovo is one of the major loose ends left to tie up in the region. Eleven years after the 78-day NATO bombing campaign against Serbia, Kosovo has yet to win recognition as an independent state. In 2008 Kosovo declared independence and passed a new constitution, issued passports, established 19 embassies, formed a military, and chose a national anthem. However, its international status remains ambiguous to this day. Bloody conflicts still erupt between Albanians, who comprise nearly 95 per cent of the population, and Serbs despite the presence of 9,900-member international peacekeeping force. Ironically, its presence may be all the more needed since the International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced that Kosovo’s declaration of independence “did not violate general international law.” Although publicized as a victory for Kosovo, the ICJ July 22 ruling has only increased ambiguity over Kosovo’s sovereignty.

The international community cannot continue to sit on the fence about the Balkan problem as it had for disturbingly long while Slobodan Milosevic’s forces rampaged from Slovenia and Croatia to Bosnia and Kosovo. It is time the world recognizes Kosovo, which has suffered from Serbian genocide and accepted compromise after compromise while its international status was being debated, and establishes clear rules for negotiating ethno-national conflicts in the future to ensure Kosovo’s recognition does not set a dangerous precedent. Until then, the lack of clarity on evaluating the antithetical principles of self-determination and territorial integrity will continue to be politically exploited in the Balkans and elsewhere.

Although the ICJ did note that international law recognizes “a right to self-determination for the peoples of non-self-governing territories” and that “the principle of territorial integrity applies only to the sphere of relations between states,” its ruling was so carefully worded and narrowly put that it left Kosovo in limbo. The question posed at Serbia’s request to the Court by the UNGA allowed the Court to say nothing about Kosovo’s final status, and its ruling will hardly sway anyone’s decision on recognizing Kosovo as a full independent state.

In short, Kosovo’s status remains unclear. Kosovo still views itself as independent. Belgrade has sworn to never recognize Kosovo as an independent state. Because of the ICJ’s ambiguity, the task of conferring legitimacy to Kosovo remains with individual states. Currently 69 countries recognize Kosovo, but the recognition of at least 100 is needed for Kosovo to join the UN. China has confirmed that it will not recognize Kosovo, as has Russia, which gets both a boost to its interests in Georgia and a chance to reiterate its support for Belgrade. The five EU states that did not recognize Kosovo in the past did not change their position either: after all, the ICJ ruling is a view on nothing more than the occurrence of Kosovo’s declaration, as the Court itself did not neglect to mention. Thus, the ruling has turned out to be politically convenient to all: those concerned about separatism; those involved in the Kosovo war in the 1990s; those recognizing Kosovo and those who do not – in short, for all those who don’t live in this long-suffering region.

The ruling and the excuses it allows others to make result from the contradictory provisions and the lack of clarity on how to reconcile self-determination with state sovereignty in international law. For example, under the Helsinki Final Act, both self-determination and territorial integrity seem to be equally important. The UN Charter of 1945 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 both stress the right to self-determination. Additionally, the developing norm of Responsibility to Protect establishes that if the state manifestly fails to protect its citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, the international community has the responsibility to “take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner”.

At the same time, the centuries-old Westphalian principle that a state controls its territory and citizens remains a cornerstone of the modern state system. Upholding this principle is the natural urge of all states dealing with separatist movements. In the wave of post-Cold-War disintegration that broke the Soviet Union into many pieces, the principle of self-determination, strengthened by the reluctance to shed blood on behalf of the Soviet central authorities, has triumphed. But on the whole, states’ concerns about their territorial integrity were much more often heard and sympathized with by the international community; states’ views on sovereignty have been driven home with far more force than could be mustered by any group striving for self-determination.

The United States currently maintains around 1,600 troops in Kosovo and will have to keep its forces in the Balkans for much longer unless it takes the lead in urging a resolution of Kosovo’s disputed status. Until Kosovo’s problem is resolved one way or another, meek moves like the one by the ICJ last week will only make the lives of the 120,000 Serbs in Kosovo harder, the region’s economic plight worse, and the relations between the Albanians and the Serbs tenser. Given the atrocities they suffered from the Serbs, Kosovo’s Albanians won’t accept anything less than independence, and it’s time their aspirations are honored.

The concern about the precedent Kosovo’s recognition may set is legitimate. Today’s Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdnestria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tibet, and many other regions present difficult challenges to the international community. However, establishing clear rules for evaluating the legality of a people’s claims to self-determination and a state’s claims to territorial integrity will help minimize whatever the reverberations of deciding Kosovo’s fate may be. Until the relationship between these two conflicting principles of self-determination and territorial integrity is clarified, participants of ethno-political conflicts will continue exploiting the aspects of the international law that best serve them, and the international community will continue hiding behind whatever provisos allow it to shirk responsibility best.

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