Senator McCain, the presumptive Republican candidate for President, has, over the years, made a virtue out of inconsistency when the logic of consistency has not always been a virtue. This has been part of his appeal to independents and to others who gaze at the political world not from partisan eyes but through analytical lenses. What some observers may interpret as an inconsistency or paradox, others view as logical and well-formulated understanding. In this context, it is difficult to separate campaign rhetoric from serious policy, to differentiate politics from policy.

One apparent inconsistency in the campaign that involves U.S.-Russian relations is worth exploring. Earlier this year, the Senator surprised some observers by proposing that Russia be excluded from the G-8 group of industrial democracies. Then, on May 27^th, in a speech outlining a comprehensive U.S. approach to foreign policy and proliferation that revealed clearly his internationalist mind-set, he urged continuation of cooperation with Russia on programs of mutual interest such as cooperative threat reduction (aka Nunn-Lugar or “loose nukes” program) and a host of related nonproliferation and anti-terrorist programs. How punitive action depriving Russia of the status among the G-8 would advance cooperation on nonproliferation has puzzled more than one observer. Senator McCain has since distanced himself from his G-8 statement on Russia, but the motive underlying his initial thinking merits some analysis and can shed light on his national security thinking.

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According to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in an article in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs, China’s reluctant and belated concession to allow a skeleton UN-AU peacekeeping force in Sudan represents a newly “cooperative approach on a range of problems.” But the reality is that some newfound sense of Chinese responsibility on the world stage had nothing to do with Beijing’s decision to “cooperate.” The concession on Darfur (if you want to call it that) was entirely about the Beijing Olympics. Given that it took a threatened boycott by Western leaders for China to stop arms sales to Sudan and drop its veto of the peacekeeping resolution, I am dubious that we’ll see any further “responsible” behavior after the Olympic Games have come and gone. At this point, the Games are going ahead—with or without protesting Western leaders—and the leverage a coordinated boycott might have provided will be a mere memory.

But I’m not writing this to bemoan a missed opportunity or cast aspersions on Rice’s diplomatic optimism. I’m writing this to call some attention to the next opportunity down the road: Sochi 2014.

China and Russia are both rising powers, economically, militarily and diplomatically. Secretary Rice referred to both as carrying “special responsibility and weight as fellow permanent members of the UN Security Council.” Translation: they both have lots of nuclear weapons, so our military power doesn’t really scare them. China is also not the only rising power we’d love to see adopt a more cooperative stance as it claims (or reclaims) “full membership in the international community.”

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Many observers, inside and outside the U.S. Government, believe we are at a critical juncture, some say a tipping point, in global efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles materials, technology and expertise associated with them.  While much progress has taken place over the past few years, the trend lines are not very promising and we may be falling behind where we need to be.  The next administration will be tested the first day it takes office.  It will need to prepare itself for the long haul with a policy agenda, an organizational structure, skilled leadership and adequate staffing to rally our country and our friends and allies to the cause, if it hopes to reverse this trend.

Controlling the spread of WMD is a bipartisan national priority. Improving the way we organize our arms control and nonproliferation structure to prevent WMD proliferation should be a bipartisan challenge as well. Dispassionate discourse on the strengths and weaknesses of past and current organizational practices can help shape the next administration’s strategy on stemming and reversing the proliferation of WMD.

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This morning, the Stimson Center hosted a small group to speak on a fascinating topic: jointly promoting US national security and commercial interests in the fields of defense and science through private-public partnerships. Experts from the Department of Energy, Boeing, The US-Russia Business Council, and others spoke on the innovative business and trade strategies United States firms and federal agencies seek to implement bilaterally and multilaterally, specifically designed to reduce the risks of global nuclear proliferation.

The talk naturally centered on US-Russia relations, given the FSU still presents a myriad of obstacles (weapons, loose fissile material, Cold War attitudes and structural obstacles) to successfully diminish the threat of nuclear terrorism. However, panelists focused on one specific and often overlooked subcomponent of the issue: human expertise. Namely, how can US firms and agencies channel the scientific expertise of Russian engineers to transform a labor force, once employed in offensive nuclear weapons production, into a civilian body capable of best contributing to Russia’s national economy? And how can we eke out the most lucrative trade policies and business relationships in the process?

Stimson’s Cooperative Nonproliferation Team, sponsoring the event, also touched on an important point related to nonproliferation strategy, and more broadly, US national security issues; namely, that our foreign policies are multifaceted, and our strategies must mirror this complexity. Issues like nuclear terrorism should be addressed by a variety of players, using a variety of tactics. The Stimson Center’s experts noted this:

“What has been….underappreciated is that the unique scientific talent of the FSU also affords potential commercial opportunities that could support US foreign policy goals by contributing to the containment of extremism, increasing stability in an oil-rich region of the world, fostering democracy and the rule of law by encouraging free enterprise, and promoting innovation in critical sectors like public health, energy, and national security. While underemployed scientific talent continues to represent a proliferation challenge to security experts, it also presents tremendous, though poorly understood, commercial opportunities that would benefit the for-profit sector and advance sustainability of our threat reduction investments.”

PSA, in tandem with other non-proliferation experts, advocacy organizations, and think tanks like the Stimson Center, continues to search for the best way to convey the continued imperative in developing and implementing a national nonproliferation strategy, as well as evolving our current international nonproliferation practices to meet the geopolitical challenges posed in 2008 and beyond.

As a follow up to PSA’s Public Discourse Project, The Partnership for a Secure America will publish critical sections of the 9/11+6 Project this June. Brian Finlay, a member of Stimson’s Cooperative Nonproliferation Project, has authored a subsection of the project, addressing the WMD threat. Stay tuned for upcoming details regarding public release of the 9/11+6 Project.

Admiral Fallon’s resignation as CENTCOM commander is pretty fresh news, and I’m sure we’ll learn more with time. For now, Fallon apparently resigned because of the appearance of disagreement with the president over the appropriate level of belligerence in U.S. policy towards Iran — or at least in his statement issued at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, he blamed it on the appearance rather than an actual conflict over Iran policy (reported widely, including here).

The appearance of policy conflict is nothing new for ADM Fallon. Rumors have been flying more or less since the admiral moved from his billet as commander of Pacific Command (where his policy views were controversial, too, but perhaps more quietly controversial because they were over longer-range China policy rather than an ongoing war). When Fallon took his current position at the head of U.S. Central Command, people began to talk about his sharp disagreements with Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. Commander in Iraq, over both substance (on the surge) and style (Gen. Petraeus’ high-profile comments that sometimes seem to defend the Bush administration in political battles). Of course, Gen. Petraeus is extremely popular with ADM Fallon’s boss and with many other politicians. And that disagreement has been compounded, in the rumors, with an ongoing disagreement over Iran policy (perhaps principally with Vice President Chenney, if the rumors are to be believed). The Iran disagreement perhaps came to a head with the publication of a story in last week’s Esquire.

On Iran, ADM Fallon’s statement says, “I don’t believe there have ever been any differences about the objectives of our policy in the Central Command area of responsibility….” It’s easy to see through this comment: even people who think “we can live with an Iranian nuclear bomb” agree that the U.S. should prefer a non-nuclear Iran to a nuclear-armed one. So we all agree on the objectives of our policy. That statement, though, can certainly cover up intense disagreement about the means of trying to achieve that objective and about whether we’re likely to succeed.

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What’s that you ask? What does Barack Obama have to do with A.Q. Khan, the “father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb?  Excellent question; I’m glad you asked.  Give me a few moments and I’ll get around to answering it.

But first, let’s consider Pakistan. In the aftermath of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto the media has been full of stories in which dutifully concerned experts wring their hand and wrinkle their brows about the prospects of Pakistan descending into anarchy and its nuclear arsenal falling into the “wrong hands (code for al-Qaeda).

Such stories are inevitably accompanied by references to A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani metallurgist who quit his job in Europe, working for a uranium enrichment consortium, and brought back plans and blueprints that enabled Pakistan to master the uranium enrichment process and develop nuclear weapons.

While Khan was not actually the “father” of Pakistan’s bomb his help was critical and he subsequently became a wealthy and important man. That lead to his eventual downfall, because after setting up a global black market network to import the equipment and materials necessary for Pakistan’s enrichment program he eventually branched out into the export business, providing nuclear technology and equipment to other countries trying to develop nuclear weapons, such as North Korea and Libya. And some of his equipment was also purchased by Iran. So successful was he in this that his network became known as the one stop shopping center for nuclear wannabees; a “Nuclear Wal-Mart” as the IAEA referred to him. (more…)

Dash it all! One goes away for a quick business trip to Geneva and returns to find that holy geopolitical heck has broken lose in one’s absence, what with the publication of the latest National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear program.

Doubtlessly interested PSA readers have been inundated with commentary, including excellent posts by Chris Preble and Brian Vogt.

But at the risk of appearing self-serving I think there are still some useful things to be said. Namely, that it is premature to rejoice.  Let’s remember that there are still many unanswered questions. As the NIE itself stated:

This Estimate focuses on the following key questions:

What are Iran’s intentions toward developing nuclear weapons?

What domestic factors affect Iran’s decisionmaking on whether to develop nuclear weapons?

What external factors affect Iran’s decisionmaking on whether to develop nuclear weapons?

What is the range of potential Iranian actions concerning the development of nuclear weapons, and the decisive factors that would lead Iran to choose one course of action over another?

What is Iran’s current and projected capability to develop nuclear weapons? What are our key assumptions, and Iran’s key chokepoints/vulnerabilities?

The truth is that the NIE did not answer those questions. As Anthony Cordesman, the Mr. Net Assessment of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote, “it is very important for anyone using or making judgments about the document to actually read the full text of the judgments the NIE makes about Iran’s nuclear program. Press summaries and outside commentary are not a substitute for responsible literacy and attentions to details.”  Or as George Orwelll once wrote, “sloppy language breeds sloppy thinking.”

Cordesman notes that the “summary does not address what the US intelligence community does and does not know about Iran’s efforts in each of the five areas the NIE addressed.” (more…)

As I watched my beloved Washington Redskins get pummeled by the New England Patriots on Sunday, I began to think about the Patriots’ coach Bill Belichick. Belichick has been a defensive mastermind, both as a defensive coordinator and as a head coach, for decades in the NFL by adhering to the philosophy that he is going to take away what the offense does best and force it to adapt. After watching the game on Sunday and reading the current hysteria over Iran this week, I began to envision a foreign policy inspired by Coach Belichick. Let’s take away what Ahmadinejad and the Iranian hard-liners do best, namely confrontation, and force them to adapt to a world where the United States and Iran can cooperate on a range of issues.

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Iran was a main topic of conversation across shows yesterday.  I guess we can thank President Bush’s remarks about World War III for that.

Let’s go right to the videotape. First up, CNN’s Late Edition:

WOLF BLITZER: Joining us now from New York for a “Late Edition” exclusive is the man who’s been monitoring Iran’s moves on the nuclear front. Mohamed ElBaradei is the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
 
I want you to respond to this overall threat that the U.S. perceives comes from Iran, and listen to how President Bush the other day phrased it. Listen to this.
 
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH: If you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon. I take the threat of Iran with a nuclear weapon very seriously.  (END VIDEO CLIP)
 
BLITZER: Is Iran, Dr. ElBaradei, building a nuclear bomb?
 
ELBARADEI: Well, Wolf, let me say three facts to put the Iranian nuclear issue in proper perspective. We are not talking about Iran today having a nuclear weapon as Secretary Rice said recently. Second, even if Iran were to be working on nuclear weapons, according to John Negroponte and Mike McConnell, they at least few years away from having such weapon.
 
Thirdly, what we are doing right now is, through the IAEA and the European Union, Javier Solana, is to try to make sure that we control the nascent enrichment capability in Iraq and create the conditions for Iran and the European, particularly the U.S., to go into negotiation.

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One might think, given everything that has happened since the United States invaded Iraq, and what we’ve found out since, in regard to how the Bush administration manipulated intelligence and spun the facts to make the case for war that, if nothing else, they would feel, at least somewhat circumspect, about doing it all over again in regard to a Middle East country.

Of course, like so many other assumptions concerning the Bush administration you would be wrong. As a case in point let’s look at this excerpt from yesterday CNN’s Late Edition: 

WOLF BLITZER, HOST:  Congressman Hoekstra, I want to start with you on this mystery, this bombing that the Israelis undertook of some sort of facility in Syria. You and a handful of your colleagues have been briefed by the Bush administration what exactly happened.
 
And yesterday in The Wall Street Journal, you and Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen wrote a provocative article saying, among other things, this — and both of have you been briefed: “The Bush administration, however, has thrown an unprecedented veil of secrecy around the Israeli air strike. We are prepared to state based on what we have learned that it is critical for every member of Congress to be briefed on this incident as soon as possible.”
 
Why is it so important, Congressman?
 
REP. PETER HOEKSTRA (R), MICHIGAN: What happened in northern Syria clearly can be described potentially as an act of war. I mean, you’ve got Israeli planes going into northern Syria and bombing some type of facility. Yes, we’ve been briefed.
 
A number of countries that may be on our radar screen, Iran, North Korea, other countries. You know, we should know what their role in this activity or what was going on in Syria. And the most important thing at this point in time, Wolf, is that, you know, the president and administration have decided that they are going to make this information public. But what they’re doing is they’re going through and leaking parts of this story to the media. We call that “spot declassification.”
 
Jane and I had a discussion about this towards the end of last week. She thought maybe information should stay classified. I disagreed with her.
 
But I think we both would agree that if the administration is going to start leaking bits and pieces of this story to the media, at that point all members of Congress should be briefed. And I think the American people should know what has gone on.
 
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BLITZER: But you’re the chair of this important intelligence subcommittee of the House Homeland Security Committee. Have they briefed you?
 
HARMAN: No, they have not briefed me on what went on in northern Syria. All I know is what I’ve read in the media.