Guns, Butter, And Band-Aids: A Three-Tiered Approach to Foreign Policy

In the early hours of a tropical morning in January 2010, the Baltimore-based U.S. Navy hospital ship Comfort docked two kilometers off the coast of Port-au-Prince, Haiti equipped with military, U.S. Public Health Service, nongovernmental organization, and international organization personnel ready to respond to the raw wounds of the island nation still trembling from a 7.0 magnitude earthquake that had struck only days earlier. Despite initial doubts from the Pentagon that the ship was needed as another member of a swiftly-deployed fleet of similarly-equipped Navy and Marine vessels to the island[1], the U.S.N.S. Comfort quickly became a household name for U.S. military relief efforts due to the ship’s remarkable capability to quickly provide wounded Haitians a stable, secure place to receive desperately needed medical care. Not to be understated were the colossal efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development.  This agency was designated to spearhead the U.S. intergovernmental agency response to the tragedy, which deployed disaster assistance personnel within a day of the crisis’ occurrence and continues to rebuild Haiti nearly two years later. Monitoring on-the-ground developments in Haiti, the U.S. Department of State preserved its strong tradition of diplomacy with the Haitian government and the international community; thereby assuring the distressed country that it had an ally in its long fight to recover, rebuild, and thrive.

The confluence of missions on the ground in Haiti reflects the latitude of the U.S. military, diplomatic, and humanitarian aid communities that ultimately advance overall U.S. goals in a positive light. Prior to the disaster, the U.S. gave over $200 million through USAID to Haiti in FY 2009. In FY 2010, the U.S. gave Haiti over $350 million through USAID and $450 million through DOD. Additionally, the U.S.N.S. Comfort’s response to the earthquake was not its first trip to the island, having stopped there in April 2009 en route through Latin America on another humanitarian mission. During an emergency, our military has the ability to respond instantaneously and provide a secure working environment for humanitarian assistance to occur. Without trusted diplomatic relations, the Haitian government wouldn’t have known who to help lead them toward normalcy. Even in non-emergency situations, U.S. foreign aid ensures continuity of leadership so that when crises do occur, the world looks to the U.S. as the Haitian government did in its time of catastrophe.

Crises like the earthquake in Haiti emphasize the critical role foreign aid has in a robust national security agenda that is earnest and proactive through a well-rounded approach, and not a reactionary, single-approached strategy. Unfortunately, cutting foreign aid has become a catchphrase proposal in conversations about solving our country’s debt and deficit crisis. In a tight budget environment, this notion can be appealing. Why continue to send funds overseas that could be used to better the lives of Americans at home? This, however, is a short-sighted solution to a multi-pronged problem. Foreign aid is an investment in the present and the future. The solution is not to cut foreign aid simply because it holds a line on the national checkbook; rather, the key rests in finding common operational themes with the military, diplomatic, and development communities to ensure our foreign aid dollars are maximized, our values are promoted abroad, and our leadership maintains its trustworthiness.

By having our military, diplomacy, and humanitarianism complement each other, the U.S. can achieve not only the goals of both the military and foreign policy, it can come together to provide a platform for the U.S. to do more globally. This is far easier said than done. Operationally, the military, diplomatic, and foreign aid communities have experienced turf wars over competing foreign policy objectives. The military’s inherent role is to defend the country while the foreign aid community’s objective is to enhance quality of life. Diplomacy remains the chief non-coercive method to advance U.S. interests overseas; however, the field has experienced deepened ties to both defense and foreign aid since September 11, 2001 that don’t particularly please members of the defense or aid communities.

Still, foreign aid as national security is here to stay, and this point has been acknowledged and supported by our military leadership. On June 9, 2011, then CIA Director and our current Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, in his confirmation hearing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, testified that foreign aid through education, agriculture, health, and justice programs are assets in the national security agenda. Specifically addressing the acquisition of weapons from terrorist groups in Pakistan, Secretary Panetta stated, “I know the U.S. Department of Defense is our primary military weapon in terms of securing weapons, but if we don’t follow it up with these other important assets, we will never be able to fully secure these countries.”[2] U.S. national security is not simply our military capacity; it is our value-projection through diplomacy and humanitarianism, without which, the globe will come to fear and distrust the U.S.

Any time an event of such magnitude to destabilize an already weak society occurs, like the humanitarian emergency in Haiti or even the sociopolitical uprisings in Libya, the U.S. must consider the interests it has at stake on the ground because intervention into every emergency is not feasible. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell outlined a rubric against which defense, diplomatic, and development officials can determine whether a situation is worth intervention in what is termed the “Powell Doctrine.” The core aspects of the Powell Doctrine include an accurate determination that vital national security interests are in jeopardy, an analysis of risk, consequence, and cost, a clearly-defined and attainable objective and a strategy to achieve that objective to ultimately avoid an endless engagement, and the strength of support at home and abroad. These decisions cannot—and should not—be made by one branch of national security and foreign policy communities.

Despite the stark differences between the three extensions of foreign policy, there is common ground to be found. Military personnel can provide security in an unstable situation for diplomats, aid workers, and American citizens caught in a crisis. At times, military personnel can even engage in distributing relief aid and supplies if the situation warrants, and they can do so indefinitely should the stability of a situation call for this commitment. The military ensures speed of access because it has the equipment needed to enter a situation quickly. Diplomacy, however, is contextual in nature. Diplomats specialize in understanding the culture, society, and general environment of a country and work tirelessly to ensure the preservation of congenial relations with foreign governments. Diplomats can facilitate on-the-ground activity not only with their U.S. counterparts but also with other governments and their counterparts in those bodies.

Development workers possess the strength of longevity, ensuring action on the U.S. core values with the citizens of a foreign country. Development workers are flexible and motivated by the results they see on the ground, ensuring that U.S. values are understood and promulgated. Ultimately, the military has the resources to create stability, diplomats have the knowledge to provide stability, and development workers possess the stamina to preserve stability.

The cases of Libya and Haiti show how the U.S. is developing a humanitarianism policy as a means to promote its values and assert its leadership abroad. While this may not entirely be the planned course of action, it is the direction in which the U.S. is heading. There are three main ways for the U.S. to ensure the success of this route and recognize the strength of each foreign policy community. First, the U.S. must maintain its foreign aid program. Foreign aid allows the U.S. to proactively seek a stable world instead of being reactive with force. Problems are increasingly becoming global in nature and do not always require the military to solve. Further, it is expensive in both terms of human lives and money. Second, the U.S. must maintain its force projection. Force projection allows the U.S. to maintain its values while keeping the ability to act on them swiftly if needed. Finally, the U.S. needs to encourage a more engaged civil society through strengthened funding for the Peace Corps, Foreign Service, and nongovernmental organizations. Without an engaged civil society, the support for U.S. foreign policy dries up and discourages the public and international support needed to intervene in a crisis.

Among our most pressing national security priorities, leadership is one of the most critical. If the U.S. is going to intervene when our values of democracy, human rights, equality, and opportunity are at stake, we need to show an example of leadership at home. Furthermore, a foreign policy that doesn’t give equal respective weight to the contributions of its three tiers is destined to chip away at the world’s perception of the U.S.’s capabilities to lead. The long-term cost of a destabilized world in which disengagement is the currency between nations is higher than the cost of current U.S. investments in foreign aid, which account for less than 1% of our federal budget.

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A subdued but respectful ceremony marked the end of combat operations in Iraq.  A flag was rolled and encased, and speeches respectful of the fallen and hopeful for the future were made.  Signs of friendship between the two countries were left in the hearts of both peoples and policies are in place to continue non-military support to a continually developing democracy in Iraq.  A joyous America will see her military members return celebrating a job well done and remembering those who paid the ultimate price.

This is in stark contrast to the images scared into the American psyche of a helicopter rising from the roof of the embassy in Saigon in April of 1975, an event that most recognize as the end of a terrible chapter in America’s history.

The Vietnam experience still reflects one of the worse times in our history.  The failed political policies that resulted in only marginal military successes during this time period are only rivaled in grandeur by the incense of the American public for the war.  The nightly reports on a budding television news medium of the American dead, eventually summing over 58,000, brought the graphic images of war to the American public for the first time.

This American public, already gushing with disdain for an unpopular war was further galvanized by events such as the My Lai Massacre and the shooting of students at Kent State University.  The resulting wave of anti-war protest reflecting the overall feeling of the country produced not only a backlash against the politicians involved and their failed policies, but also contempt for the very soldiers that were fighting and dying in the war.

As the military returned home, their limited tactical successes were dwarfed in the public eye by the view of the military as a failure, albeit due to numerous factors beyond its control.  Thousands of military members with lifelong mental or physical scars were practically discarded by a disinterested public.  There were no ceremonies, no parades, only a country ready to bury this memory and forget all things associated with Vietnam.  A single helicopter flying away from an overrun embassy seemed to be a fitting end.

As the Iraq war comes to a close, so much is different about this ending than the ending of the Vietnam experience.  Some may question the policies and politicians that brought us into the war, but by in large no one questions the way the military has performed its duties.

This is not to say that the military has escaped this lengthy conflict unscathed by controversy.  The events such as the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, the killings in Haditha, friendly fire incidents and the recent controversy of the handling of the remains of the war dead all call into questions tactics used by military members, but never the overall conduct of the military during the conflict.

American public’s support has endured these controversies as well as other tough times throughout the war.    It has endured a persistent conflict despite President Bush’s declaration of “mission accomplished,” an Iraqi insurgency that expanded our involvement, a 2007 call for a troop surge, continued reports of Improvised Explosive Devices killing U.S service members and the reports of the bloody conflicts in places like Fallujah and Anbar.  All of these were challenging times for the military, yet support for the troops remained.

There were, however, events along the way that highlighted the courage of our service members and produced recognition by Americans of the contributions the military was making to a free Iraq.  The capture of Saddam Hussein and the elimination of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, are just two examples of the courage and valor of our military displayed every day during this conflict.  One of the most poignant moments celebrated by our country was when an Iraqi woman stood from her seat in the U.S. Capitol during a State of the Union speech proudly displaying an ink stained finger having just voted in an Iraqi election for the first time.  A proud moment made possible by the sacrifices of our military.

As military members have returned home from Southwest Asia over the years (sometimes after 2, 3 or more deployments) they arrive to a different reception from the members that served in Vietnam.  Rousing applause by Americans on airplanes and in airports, a reception that moves most military members to tears, replaced being spat upon, harassed and jeered in airports when military members returned from service in Vietnam.  Overwhelming support for our wounded warriors, as exemplified by enormous contributions to programs like the Wounded Warrior Project, is common place versus the neglect experienced by the wounded returning from Vietnam.

There will be no national victory parade recognizing the end of the Iraq War, like the one seen after Operation Desert Storm.  However, there will be celebrations across America, much as we’ve seen over the past 10 years, to recognizing military men and women for their sacrifices as they return home.   A free and independent Iraq exists today because of the valor displayed by the U.S. military and our allies, another reason to celebrate as we welcome our troops home.

A simple ceremony and a grateful nation mark the end of the Iraq War.  The goodbye to the Iraq War is different in so many ways from the goodbye we said to the Vietnam War so many years ago.  For the veterans who endured the sacrifices during any war, thank you.  For an American public who persevered the Iraq War – job well done.

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Now that direct peace talks have officially collapsed Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has threatened to take unilateral steps towards statehood, including appealing to the United Nations. His hope is to achieve independence by the end of 2011. So far, the United States has been wary of any unilateral actions, preferring a comprehensive peace deal. To help achieve a negotiated peace, however, President Obama must dramatically increase security assistance to the Palestinian Authority and exert significant pressure on the Netanyahu administration.

President Abbas is dangerously close to being labeled a failure. The Palestinian Authority has effectively lost control of the Gaza Strip since Hamas’ takeover in 2007. In the West Bank, Israel continues to build settlements on disputed lands and has nearly completed its security barrier. The Palestinian economy is weak and dependent on freedom of movement allowed by Israeli security forces. Peace negotiations, meanwhile, have little prospects for success given Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition. At the age of 75 and with no clear successor, Abbas could use a unilateral declaration of independence as a means to overcome the current deadlock and establish a legacy as the father of a nation.

Yet President Abbas understands this approach is fraught with peril. Israel has made it clear that it will not recognize a Palestinian state without a negotiated peace deal. Should Abbas unilaterally declare independence, Israel has threatened to formally annex large parts of the West Bank and annul past peace agreements. Given its near complete control over the Palestinian economy, Israel could effectively prevent any independent state from becoming viable. Abbas knows unilateral independence will make him the father of a failed state and an alternative path for progress must be found.

Distressing as it may seem, this situation presents an opportunity for the United States to advance the peace process. A key prerequisite for any lasting peace is a Palestinian security force that can maintain internal stability and prevent attacks against Israel. To help achieve this end, the US Security Coordinator, LTG Keith Dayton, has spent over $500 million since 2005 to reform the Palestinian security services while training over 400 Presidential Guardsmen and 2,200 National Security forces. All parties, including Israel, have been impressed by the ability of these forces to help restore law and order in Jenin and other key Palestinian cities.

By rapidly expanding this initiative, the Obama Administration can offer Abbas the alternative path he needs to avoid a unilateral declaration yet present clear evidence to the Palestinian people that progress is being made towards statehood.

At the same time, building Palestinian Authority security capacity has a multiplying effect on Abbas’ stature and ability to secure a final peace deal.  To begin with, establishing a competent security force negates a central Israeli negotiating position that only Israeli troops can dismantle terrorist networks and prevent attacks against Israel. Perhaps more importantly, a competent security force gives Abbas the capability to prevent an increasingly assertive Hamas from assuming power in the West Bank. With the West Bank firmly under his control, Abbas can better pressure Hamas to accept his national leadership and reconcile with Fatah, thereby removing internal Palestinian divisions as a major obstacle to peace negotiations. Should the reconciliation process between Hamas and Fatah fail, as it appears it will given the groups’ divergent ideologies and leadership, Abbas could also use a stronger security force to retake the Gaza Strip militarily if required.

None of the above will occur, of course, unless the US pressures Israel to permit the Palestinian Authority forces to receive increased training, equipment, manpower and authority. Israel legitimately fears that any weapons or training given to Palestinian forces could ultimately be used against Israel. The United States, drawing from lessons on building security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, must make it clear to Israel that the potential rewards for building Palestinian security capacity far outweigh potential risks. If Israel wants to eventually end its occupation and achieve a lasting peace, it must allow the Palestinian Authority to assume greater capabilities and flexibility of operations in the West Bank. No longer can the Palestinian Authority forces be restricted to day-time operations using only outdated AK-47s.

Israel is unlikely to see a future Palestinian leader as committed to a negotiated peace as President Abbas.  With the near completion of the security barrier and Iron Dome missile defense system, Israel should feel confident enough to accept an expanded Palestinian Authority security role. If Israel is serious about pursuing a comprehensive peace deal, it should support a US-led initiative to strengthen the Palestinian Authority security forces and help strengthen Abbas’ position vis-à-vis Hamas. The risks of such an approach are truly great, but without taking such risks Israel allows Abbas and the Palestinians to proceed down a path of unilateral statehood from which no party benefits.

“The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.”

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Past midnight, our wait for a flight at  Camp Bastion, Helmand, had an eerie surreal feel.  In the passenger lounge, scores of Marines, Brits, contractors and Afghans waited in relative quiet.  Screams and dark music blared from the big flatscreen showing a grisly horror movie — a disturbing choice given the setting and the audience.   The flight was delayed because of a repatriation ceremony — a Marine’s remains were going home via C-17.  Finally, a young blond girl dressed in British fatigues cheerfully ordered us to put on helmets and flak vests for the walk to an old Afghan bus that would take us to the plane.

The wait and the flight gave me time to consider all I’d heard from the many fine professionals working to stabilize southern Afghanistan.  People mostly believed in their work and that they were making a difference at the local level.  But nobody has a good answer when we ask about the corrupt power brokers like Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK), Abdul Rahman Jan (ARJ), Gul Agha Sherzai, and Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, not to mention President Karzai himself.

These men wield immense power in Afghanistan, controlling large economic enterprises, political patronage organizations, private militia, local security forces, narcotics trade, and official government posts.  They are often protected by Karzai himself, due to their relationships or their danger to the Afghan President (or both).  They live in huge garish mansions and own dozens of firms that scoop up American aid contracts while also (allegedly) fueling corruption, intimidation, and narcotics trafficking.  They are feared and despised by much of the population, sapping the legitimacy of both GiROA (for whom they work) and ISAF (who showers them with money).  Some of them may have ties to the Taliban and collaborate when it suits their interests.

Afghanistan’s so called leaders seem to value greed and short term power over the long term peace and prosperity for the Afghan people. So what can be done?  This is where tough political work is necessary.  My experience is in the Balkans where the generation of post-Dayton leaders were just as unsavory as those in Afghanistan.  What we did was to offer a very clear vision of post-Dayton integration into Europe and backed it with political, economic, and military leverage on each group.   Leaders in the Balkans had a choice: 1) get with the program and become a post-war leader of their nation, 2) obstruct and find political isolation (at best) or be detained for war crimes (at worst). Biljana Plavsic is one example.  An extreme Serb Nationalist and war criminal, Plavsic responded in a pragmatic way to this choice (and the more moderate political mood in her political base of Banja Luka),  helping to pass some key measures to strengthen the new Bosnian government.

Leverage in Afghanistan appears harder to come by, but perhaps we’re just not willing to use what we have.  Money is an obvious one.  We currently throw assistance money at parts of Afghanistan that need help.  And we’re giving the money to contractors owned/controlled by the power brokers in these areas that are generally not helping.  Maybe we want to spend money in areas and on companies controlled by leaders that are helping.  Cancel some contracts tied to a guy that is being obstructionist.   Let’s see if that changes the behavior in Afghanistan.   We need to balance some of the structural and community based objectives with this political approach but that is doable — having political leadership that knows we will use leverage is worth that sacrifice.  We also need to better leverage political relationships.  It starts with establishing leverage on Karzai who can then put pressure on provincial level officials .  For both Karzai and others, we can leverage our influence with neighboring states, global business interests, and global media.    Finally, we have have all the tools and influence of our military and intelligence presence in Afghanistan.  There have to be ways we can better leverage our hard power advantage.

This is not to imply that we should try to remove these guys.  Much better to co-opt or push these guys into being constructive than to challenge their survival.  But we need to be willing to do that if they are an enemy of the peace.  Being part of the solution offers its own advantages: political recognition, access to US and international officials, direct and indirect financial rewards, an most important, the chance to be remembered in Afghan history as a leader not a criminal.  Until Afghanistan gets more leaders and less criminals, our mission there is difficult.

CO-PUBLISHED WITH SMALL WARS JOURNAL

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At the same time the United States is scaling back its goals for Afghanistan, women in the country are scaling up their own ambitions. In arenas ranging from medicine to the military, from small business to civil society, women are speaking up for themselves and tackling ever-larger aspirations. While problems loom large in a country in which female literacy rates struggle to top 15 percent and rampant insecurity leads many families to keep their daughters and wives indoors, women are making progress. Though their efforts are often overlooked as the world trains its focus on the exits in Afghanistan, they are, quietly and slowly, creating change in their families and their country.

In a box of a building on an Afghan Army base, 29 young women in olive-green uniforms study finance and logistics. They are part of the Afghan National Army’s first Officer Candidate School class for women.

Coming from provinces all across the country, including those in the grip of an increasingly strong anti-government insurgency, these aspiring Army officers say they are determined to serve their country — and to prove to men that women can contribute.

“We have faced so many wars and so many restrictions on women and now the day has come where women have joined the military,” said Shima, a young woman from the Taliban stronghold of Ghazni. “We have to think about the equality of men and women just like other nations where women fight for their countries.”

On Wednesday a group of women will gather at the Women’s Garden in Kabul to “promote women’s participation in the upcoming election.” Despite security risks and threats to their campaigns, more than 400 women are running in Saturday’s parliamentary vote, a figure that is up twenty percent from five years ago.

Women leaders won a hard-fought battle to be heard at July’s Kabul Conference. Now their goal is to keep the pressure on their own government and the international community, which has promised that peace with the Taliban will not come at the price of their rights.

“We are not going to be silent,” said Suraya Pakzad, a women’s rights activist and founder of Voice of Afghan Women. “We don’t want to lose things to gain things — to lose the rights of women, the right to education, the rights of media.”

Meanwhile, as the discussions about Taliban negotiations and graceful exit strategies wind on, plans for the future push forward. The Ministry of Public Health is now launching a study to judge just how much maternal health progress Afghanistan has made these past eight years. The hope is that the study will show a significant drop in maternal mortality thanks in large part to the nation’s 2500 midwives whose training program has now become a regional role model.

On the business front, Afghan women entrepreneurs are fighting to find access to lucrative foreign markets. One Kabul clothing exporter is now regularly shipping her shawls to the United States, while two soccer ball makers are preparing to send their wares to New York in time for the holiday season. And the fashion firm Kate Spade and the non-governmental organization Women for Women International are coming together to create jobs for more than 1,000 women by the end of 2013.

This, of course, assumes that the international community will still be able to do business in Afghanistan in 2013. While many wonder just what the country will look like and by how much more the world’s aspirations for the nation will have shrunk by then, the young Army officer candidates say they have faith that the world will stand by Afghanistan as the nation’s women serve their country on an ever-larger scale.

“We hope the military can defeat the Taliban, but we also have to look to the international community,” said Shima. “We have mentors and we have coalition forces helping us and standing side by side with us, so with all this help we will be able to defend Afghanistan.”

This piece originally appeared in the Huffington Post on September 17, 2010.

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In so many ways, Gaza and the West Bank seem to be drifting farther apart.  Recently, though, one place where Palestinians have come together is on the pitch – that is to say, the soccer field.  In fact, the Palestinian national team has emerged as “a rare point of unity for the fiercely-divided Palestinian factions.”

At the heart of the harmony around the national team may be soccer’s revitalization in Gaza. Some of the best Palestinian soccer players are from Gaza.  But until recently, the professional league there had been in dire straits. When Hamas took control in 2007, it also took control of the league, including the 16 teams sponsored by Fatah. Competitive soccer in Gaza came to a standstill.  The so-called “beautiful game” wasn’t so beautiful anymore; it was just gone.

The game, though, did not lose its popularity and months of negotiations between the two factions took place to resolve the rift.  As a result, in perhaps a “baby step toward Palestinian reconciliation,” Hamas and Fatah agreed to restore the league earlier this spring, placing the 16 disputed Fatah teams under a joint Fatah-Hamas committee, and the Gaza league finished its first full season this summer.  Not only are the fans happy, but it also sends a positive message.  Said the head of soccer in Gaza, “We know we can’t solve all of the political problems, but maybe soccer will bridge the gap.”

So too, other soccer-related initiatives that took shape this past summer supported this progress by using the game to expand horizons for Gazans.  With the 2010 FIFA World Cup as an impetus, the United Nations Development Program sponsored a “Gaza World Cup,” in which 16 Gazan soccer teams, represented different international countries that were competing in the actual World Cup.  Overall, the cup involved 400 players – 200 Palestinian nationals and 200 from other countries – allowing Gazans to interact with different people of different backgrounds.  This is particularly important given the age demographics of Gaza. As a recent National Public Radio report showed, nearly three-quarters of the population is under the age of 30, yet many have never had the opportunity to experience life outside of the 140-square mile strip.  The isolation has, in turn, inspired indifference. But if soccer can, even in a small sense, help to shatter the some of the misconceptions that exist and create a new environment with more opportunities and more optimism, it may the groundwork to write a better, alternative narrative for the future.

Professional soccer in the West Bank came back into form in 2008.  But recently, coinciding with Gaza’s revitalization, similar efforts are taking place in the West Bank, using soccer as a lens onto the wider world.  This August, a week-long soccer camp sponsored by the Soccer for Peace organization brought together 40 kids from the West Bank town of Jenin and 40 Arab-Israeli and Israeli kids.  At the camp, participants also visited new places, such as going to the seashore for the first time.  And on the entertainment front, a new drama on Palestinian TV called “The Team,” centered on a fictional soccer team as it depicted the challenges of daily life in the West Bank “with a strong inclination toward resolving those problems creatively and peacefully.”

A game where you can’t use your hands is certainly not the silver bullet for a major foreign policy challenge.  But soccer does provide an important prism through which to look at the situation in the Palestinian territories, primarily because the sport has managed to transcend the difficult realities of the political situation.  With continued progress, over time, relationships built on and around the pitch could relay into healthy impacts off the pitch.  And as a new round of peace talks gets underway, how Palestinians get along on the pitch may tell us a lot about the prospects for a future state – and a stable peace.

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Kenya captured headlines in December 2007 when the former beacon of stability and growth in East Africa descended into political and social chaos after elections heightened ethnic and tribal divisions. Yet despite over 1,300 deaths, 300,000 displaced, and fears of a second Rwanda, Kenya has pulled back from the brink with the creation of a fragile power-sharing government between the two major rival parties, facilitated by the collaborative efforts of multiple stakeholders locally, nationally, and internationally.

Today, Kenyans return to the polls for the first time since the post-election violence to usher in a new constitution and drastic political and judicial reforms. As Kenya takes a step in a positive direction, its trajectory from violence and complete institutional breakdown to slow but constructive change should be an opportunity for the international community and United States to evaluate the potential and limitations of preventive diplomacy as a concrete foreign policy tool.

International involvement in Kenya did not involve boots on the ground, but focused on rigorous negotiations and external economic and political pressure from international institutions and countries. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania, the African Union, and others were all key in the process, threatening punitive measures and pushing both sides towards compromise.

The effective and calibrated response of the international community following the diplomatic intervention was touted as a successful example of preventive diplomacy, where outside actors addressed both the security and humanitarian concerns. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe at a recent Brookings Institution briefing  stated,

We quickly deployed political officers, electoral, constitutional and security experts that became the main support staff for the mediator [former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan] as he helped the parties forge the agreements to end the crisis. I think few would contest that prompt international mediation in Kenya helped prevent an even larger catastrophe.

Further, international support for Kenya’s already robust civil society was key in the process, and continues to be so today. The international Commission on Inquiry on Post Election Violence, also known as the Waki Commission; the involvement of the International Criminal Court; and President Obama purposefully skipping Kenya on his trip to Africa; are a few examples of how the international community remained engaged in nudging Kenya forward. For the referendum, the United States has taken an active financial role by “supporting the process, not the outcome,” and the threat of ICC investigations has tempered the hate speech that fueled violence in 2008.

Getting involved in the internal politics of other countries can be messy, counterproductive, and costly, as Americans today know well.  Yet developments in Kenya demonstrate that by engaging strategically, early, and with local ownership, there is a way to walk the fine line of effective outside involvement. As we continue to address the threat of failing and failed states, we need to identify and strengthen tactics that work. Replicating Kenya is by no means an exact science: Kenya benefits from a robust civil society, free press, business sector interested in stability, and strategic importance internationally, all of which heavily contributed to the resolution of the conflict, and all of which are more rare in other conflict-prone countries.  Nevertheless, by engaging directly and purposefully early rather than too late, lives are saved, long-term costs are cut, and there is one less failed state threatening international security. The United States and the international community have a strong strategic interest in engaging quickly and early in rigorous preventive diplomacy to keep instability from taking root.

Today, Kenyans will take their own future into their hands to bring about long needed reforms to address their many economic, social, and political ills. They are a long way from the finish line, and there is still much to be done to ensure violence does not reoccur on the level it did in 2008. Two years ago, they got another chance and the safe space needed to move forward. It is in the interest of all to be prepared and ready to offer the right tools for others to have that chance.

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Kyrgyzstan, a former Soviet state in Central Asia, has made many headlines after its corrupt President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was toppled in April. On June 10th, riots erupted between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbek minority in Bakiyev’s stronghold Osh, leaving hundreds dead and sending a flood of refuges to neighboring Uzbekistan. The June 27th constitutional referendum ratifying a new constitution was deemed successful, but true peace is elusive in southern Kyrgyzstan. The violence continues as the Kyrgyz police abuse ethnic Uzbeks, and the unrest threatens to spread to neighboring countries. Riots may flare up anew when the local clans start vying for power in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Kyrgyzstan’s weak central authorities are unable to rein in the violence.

During this time, only the lazy refrained from opining about the Kyrgyz misfortune, but nevertheless world governments have not followed words with actions. Russia and the United States have limited their response to Kyrgyz pleas for help to providing humanitarian relief. Their continued inaction may have dire consequences. Even in the unlikely scenario that the conflict resolves itself, the indecisiveness of the two world powers will leave a bitter aftertaste in the former Soviet republics.

Just recently, Moscow and Washington were so anxious about securing their military bases that they were cutting deals with Bakiyev’s authoritarian regime: in 2008, Bakiyev threatened to close the U.S. military base to secure a Russian loan, changed his mind when the U.S. more than tripled its rent for the base, and appeased Russia by allowing it a second base in the country. Now that their bases are secured, both countries are indifferent to Kyrgyz problems. To be sure, Russia fears chaos in its backyard, and the United States hopes for a stable Kyrgyzstan as it wages war in Afghanistan. However, Moscow and Washington have so far shunned responsibility for stabilizing the region.

When asked to send peacekeeping troops by both sides in the conflict in June, the Kremlin refused, citing the “internal” nature of the unrest. Russia has never hesitated to use force in the past; twenty years ago the Soviet troops were sent to Kyrgyzstan’s Osh to quell a very similar conflict. Russia’s recent foray into Georgia proves the Kremlin is willing to go far to achieve its objectives in the region. Moscow’s objectives may also explain – though not excuse – its current inertia. The international opprobrium after the August 2008 war has made Russia wary of sending its troops to intervene in the affairs of other states, whatever the reason.  Today, any presence of Russian peacekeepers in Kyrgyzstan could be criticized by neighboring Uzbekistan, if not by the international community. Russia sees no need to interject itself between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek, potentially angering both sides. If anything, the unrest between the two pro-Russian ethnic groups could, conveniently for Moscow, put the U.S.’s feet to the fire by endangering the Manas transit hub for Afghanistan supplies, even more crucial after Uzbekistan closed a US base in 2005, making it more dependent on Russia’s cooperation.

Hiding its inaction with an image of a law-abiding state that shuns unilateral action, Russia called a summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and had CSTO  uncover an excuse for inaction in its own charter, which allows for collective military actions only in response to a threat from another state. As a leader of CSTO, which also includes Belarus (which sheltered the deposed Bakiyev), Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Russia could easily find an appropriate chapter in the U.N. Charter allowing it to deploy CSTO troops, had it wanted to do so. However, inaction is what Russia has consciously chosen.

The United States has no less responsibility in maintaining stability in the region. After all, it was among the supporters of the Tulip revolution that had brought the now deposed Bakiyev to power. Where the previous U.S. administration may have not thought twice before intervening, the Obama administration called for multilateral action and is demurely exchanging “opinions on potential solutions to the crisis” with Uzbekistan, which it had once criticized for human rights violations and authoritarianism.

Not unwisely, the United States seeks to coordinate its security response with Moscow. Washington hopes Russia takes the lead. There is only one difference between the U.S.’s and Russia’s equally passive approaches to the problem: Russia shields its inaction behind CSTO, while the United States covers up with the Organization for Security and Cooperation for Europe (OSCE). Washington favors sending in an OSCE police force – a measure that is being decided by the OSCE Security Council this week. Clearly, an unarmed mission will not be able to stop another outbreak of violence, and only a strong dose of peacekeeping and mediation can fix the problem. While the United States cannot act too boldly in a post-Soviet state like Kyrgyzstan, it can surely be more active in advocating multilateral action beyond humanitarian aid.

The United States and Russia have a shared responsibility in stabilizing Kyrgyzstan, and the costs of their inaction are growing. The two countries cannot ignore ethnic conflicts in the region and should work on developing a common approach to security problems in Central Asia. If neither Moscow nor Washington take the lead in Kyrgyzstan (which may become the first parliamentary republic in Central Asia, if the fall elections succeed), China (which is far less tolerant of democratic developments) may have to step up to fill their roles. If they continue to stand idle, Russia and the United States may miss an opportunity to strengthen their positions in the region and instead allow the suffering of many innocent people.

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1. New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to Enter into Force Tomorrow

For those of us who have been frustrated by the delays in this process the President’s remarks today were very welcome. In particular I was encouraged by this portion of his statement:

Simply put it is past time to talk about starting negotiations — it is time to move forward. It is time to show the flexibility and common sense and sense of compromise that’s necessary to achieve our goals. Permanent status negotiations must begin and begin soon. And more importantly, we must give those negotiations the opportunity to succeed. And so my message to these two leaders is clear. Despite all the obstacles, despite all the history, despite all the mistrust, we have to find a way forward. We have to summon the will to break the deadlock that has trapped generations of Israelis and Palestinians in an endless cycle of conflict and suffering. We cannot continue the same pattern of taking tentative steps forward and then stepping back. Success depends on all sides acting with a sense of urgency. And that is why I have asked Secretary Clinton and Senator Mitchell to carry forward the work that we do here today. Senator Mitchell will meet with the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators next week. I’ve asked the Prime Minister and the President to continue these intensive discussions by sending their teams back to Washington next week. And I’ve asked the Secretary of State to report to me on the status of these negotiations in mid-October.

There is little doubt that the path to a final status agreement will be a tough one but I agree with the President that it is a national security imperative. The question to be answered is whether supporters of a two state solution can provide the political support needed to allow the negotiations to be completed. With that in mind I was encouraged by this letter from prominent faith leaders (see below).

Letter in Support of a Comprehensive Middle East Peace:

An American National Interest Imperative

We come from varied ethnic backgrounds and religious faiths that are diverse.   We are Democrats and Republicans.  We are veterans of war and of the struggle for peace.  Together, we are all Americans.

We find common cause in supporting strong U.S. leadership to achieve a negotiated, sustainable resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – a fundamental American interest that crosses racial, ethnic and religious lines.

We support President Obama’s determination to provide sustained, hands-on diplomatic leadership to bring the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to an end through the creation of two viable, secure and independent states living side by side in peace and security.

The President has made resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a top priority since his very first day in office, and we commend his leadership.  We applaud the vision the President has laid out for peace in the Middle East and the challenge he has laid down to all of us to help work for peace and a more positive future for the people of the region and the world.

This is a moment of great opportunity and urgency.  After decades of tragic conflict, many Israelis and Palestinians despair of the possibility of peace.  While the international community and majorities of the Israeli and Palestinian people are committed to a two-state solution as the best option for achieving peace and security, the window of opportunity is rapidly closing.

We express our support for U.S. leadership to chart a path to a better future and to the following principles:

• We support both Israel’s right to exist in security and the right of the Palestinian people to a viable, sovereign and secure state of their own.

• A peace agreement will need to fulfill UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and resolve critical issues of importance to the parties including refugees, borders, Jerusalem, settlements, and security.

• The Israelis and Palestinians, however, have not – on their own – been able to reach agreement.  After nearly two decades of negotiations, we believe bold American leadership can help Israelis and Palestinians make the difficult decisions necessary to achieve lasting peace and hold the parties to account should they fail to honor their commitments.

• We support the sense of real urgency that the President brings to the issue and his determination to reach a negotiated resolution to the conflict during his first term in office.

• At the appropriate time, we will support the Administration if it decides to present proposals for a just and equitable solution that provides dignity, security and sovereignty for both peoples.

• Finally, we believe a peace agreement should be comprehensive – encompassing Syria and Lebanon as well as normalization of relations between Israel and the countries of the Arab world.  We support the idea of a comprehensive regional peace that builds on the Arab Peace Initiative, with its offer of recognition and normalization of relations between Israel and all Arab nations in exchange for resolution of all outstanding issues.

Both sides must take steps to move the process forward, and we support the President’s efforts to end Israeli settlement growth and to halt Palestinian violence and incitement. It is now time to move to the next stage of diplomacy and to address the tough issues that must be resolved to bring this conflict to an end.

There are many who will attempt to block the path to peace.  They may believe that the status quo favors their interests or that time is on their side.  The President should know that we understand the status quo is unsustainable and time is of the essence.  We will stand with him as he promotes a fair and just resolution to this long-standing conflict and asks all parties to make the difficult but ultimately necessary compromises for peace.

We pledge to work with the President, to forge the path to peace and security for the Middle East.  We also pledge to work with those in both societies who seek peace, justice, and security, and to stand up for those who hope for a better future for themselves and for the generations that follow.

Sincerely,

Frank Anderson
Former Chief, Southeast Asian Division, CIA
President, Middle East Policy Council

Dr. Ziad Asali

President, American Task Force on Palestine

Robert Barkin

President, Jewish Reconstructionist Federation

Jeremy Ben-Ami

Executive Director, J Street

Ambassador Warren Clark

Executive Director, Churches for Middle East Peace

Debra DeLee

President, Americans for Peace Now

The Rev. Mark Hanson

Presiding Bishop, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

President, Lutheran World Federation

Father Theodore Hesburgh

President Emeritus, Notre Dame University

The Most Rev. Howard J. Hubbard

Bishop of Albany

Chairman, Committee on International Justice and Peace

United States Conference of Catholic Bishops

Dr. Joel C. Hunter

Senior Pastor, Northland Church

Member, Executive Committee of the National Association of Evangelicals

Rev. Bill Hybels

Senior Pastor, Willow Creek Community Church

Lynne Hybels

Advocate for Global Engagement, Willow Creek Community Church

Rev. Dr. Michael Kinnamon

General Secretary, National Council of Churches

Rabbi Peter Knobel

Former President, Central Conference of American Rabbis

Rabbi Charles Kroloff

Former President, Central Conference of American Rabbis

Imam Mohamed Magid

Imam and Executive Director, All Dulles Area Muslim Society, ADAMS Center, in Sterling, Virginia

Salam Al-Marayati

Executive Director, Muslim Public Affairs Council

Rev. John McCullough

Executive Director and CEO, Church World Service

Rev. Peter Morales

President, United Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations

Cardinal Theodore McCarrick

Archbishop Emeritus of Washington

David Neff

Editor in Chief, Christianity Today

Rev. Gradye Parsons

Stated Clerk of the General Assembly, Presbyterian Church (USA)

Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf

Imam of Masjid al-Farah, New York City

Dr. Bob Roberts, Jr.

Senior Pastor, NorthWood Church, Dallas, TX

Hon. George R. Salem, Esq.

Chairman, Arab-American Institute

Strategic Advisor, DLA Piper LLP

Roland Santiago

Executive Director, Mennonite Central Committee

The Most Rev. Katharine Jefferts Schori

Presiding Bishop and Primate, The Episcopal Church

Ron Sider

President, Evangelicals for Social Action

Rev. John Thomas

General Minister and President, United Church of Christ

Dr. James Zogby

President, Arab American Institute

**This letter reflects the opinions of the individual signatories. Institutions are listed for identification purposes only**

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The SENSE simulation is unique in the breadth of stakeholders included in the scenario. I played a parliamentarian (one of six), but there was also a president with a cabinet of ministers covering all the major governance areas, a central bank, international donors, international and local NGO’s, private domestic firms and a multi-national corporation.

SENSE is also unique in that it uses computers to process the decisions of these many actors to constantly update the status of Akrona. Depending on your role, you are able to update certain elements of the simulation based on the decisions you make, and you can track the decisions made by other players. For instance, while I was sitting at a parliament computer yesterday, I was quite pleased to see the Minister of Finance cut spending in the civil budget and start paying down the national debt.

You do learn about dryer things like the elements of GDP, the interplay between the central bank’s discount rate, the import tariff rate, and the national debt. But the simulation excels at teaching what cannot be learned in a book, and I came away from the simulation with a new appreciation of the human factors of reconstruction. As a parliamentarian who controlled the pace at which sectors of the economy were privatized, the corporate tax rate, import and export tariffs, and the overall budget allocation to defense and civilian spending, there were constant requests made of me. Either government ministers were asking me to privatize the telecommunications sector, or a domestic firm was asking me to lower corporate taxes and raise import tariffs on agriculture, or the Ministry of Defense was pushing me to raise the portion of the budget spent on defense. Through all this haze, I was trying to figure out what was the right policy for the country and for my ethnic group (the Akroni), and I soon realized that any decision I made might make one or two groups happy, and make everyone else angry and think I was incompetent. When adding that psychological element into the chaotic and fast-paced environment we were faced with, I came to a new appreciation of what post-conflict governments face.

There is no easy solution, there is no solution that makes everyone happy, and there is rarely a “right” policy or solution. It’s a series of tradeoffs and compromises and reactions to unfolding events. And morale flags. Feeling that you have no power to effect the change you want is demoralizing, as is realizing that you are losing battles that you think are important. On the flip side, seeing your goals achieved is an exhilarating feeling. These human elements affect how the different stakeholders interact, and getting stuff done relies so much more on that than one might expect without having done the simulation. I highly recommend this experience to anyone who can participate, and I also look forward to continuing the NSC simulations with the PSA Congressional Fellows.

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