For the vast majority of Americans, watching the last American boot leave Iraqi soil is nothing short of good riddance. The numbers have become seared in Americans minds: Nearly nine years. Nearly a trillion dollars spent. Nearly 35,000 US soldiers wounded. Nearly 4,500 US soldiers dead.

The long-term effect of the Iraq War is pretty obvious—a national sentiment for retrenchment—a streak of isolationism that is being espoused by both sides of the political spectrum. It’s hard not to watch Texas Republican Governor Rick Perry warn against “military adventurism” without comparing him to his predecessor.

But despite the desire to go inward, the simple fact is that if there was any hope for the US to go on the sidelines, that’s changed forever with the onset of the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring has reminded the world of the danger of failed states. With long-time dictators losing power, militant Salafists (not solely Al Qaeda) are looking to fill the vacuum.

But the Arab Spring also comes with a new challenge—a new type of interventionism.

That new interventionism will not look like Afghanistan of 2009-2011—where we put boots on the ground in order to take out a ruling, rogue power. It will also not look like Pakistan—where our intervention will largely rely on airpower (unmanned predator drones in particular) with a small, light on-the-ground footprint to conduct reconnaissance and special operations, but with no motive to change the leadership.

The new interventionism will be a mix of two factors. Like Pakistan, it will be heavy on airpower, light on boots. Like Afghanistan in 2001, the effort will involve removing a rogue power, but with a slight difference. The intervention will not lead the effort to remove a rogue power, but will enable an indigent rebel to do the job.

In other words, it’s the fullback strategy of foreign intervention. The new intervention does not mean playing the halfback, taking the ball to the endzone for the touchdown. It means playing the full-back, creating the hole for the indigenous rebel groups to score the winning touchdown.

In this case, the main objective is very different. The hope is helping enable a victory on the ground that forestalls a long, drawn out war that creates the type of environment where a terrorist group can take hold.

The merits of the new (or fullback) approach to interventionism contrasts, for example, how the Iraq War was executed.  Because the new interventionism does not do the heavy lifting, it doesn’t overrule the will of the people in a given country.

Also, because the interventionism largely relies on airpower, with limited if any boots on the ground, it makes it easier and more likely to develop the type of multilateral coalition that is associated with legitimate and successful interventionist endeavors. And because of the airpower focus and multi-lateralist character of the intervention, the result is greater political legitimacy, a substantially decreased likelihood of casualties, and, therefore, staying power to finish the job.

In short, the new paradigm of successful intervention is not Afghanistan or Pakistan, but Libya. Heavy on firepower, multi-lateralism, and a limited mandate that paves the way for a rebel victory, not a Western one. While the removal of Qaddafi is an enormous immediate benefit, the long-term goal is preventing the drawn-out civil war that would make Libya a terrorist launchpad.

But ignoring the inclination towards isolationism is not only good for the Middle East. Successful, limited intervention also benefits the United States. When the US is involved in liberation that increases US influence in the world. This is not only an upside in the Arab World, but it means improving our soft power in other parts of the world, including areas where we are competing for influence with China.

And it also revives the notion of American humanitarian sway. The greatest casualty of the Iraq War is that it dampened our ability in the eyes of the world. We were distracted from ongoing operations in Afghanistan. We had a slow response to atrocities in Darfur. Now, the fullback humanitarian approach is attached to the heightened likelihood of intervention. That could have a deterrent effect on would be genocidaires and reinvigorates the idea of American power.

It’s not easy to ignore a nine-year war where America lost valuable blood and treasure. But isolationism is the easy approach. Isolationism was the approach after 1919 and the world was in the midst of another world war twenty years later. The goal is not taking the ball and going home. The goal is finding a pragmatic approach that means greater political stability, the return of American influence, and the preservation of innocent life. Just don’t call it leading from behind.

Related posts:

1. A Time to Lead
2. No-Fly Zone Over Libya: A Case for Multilateralism
3. Graeme Bannerman: Libya, A Costly Victory

The recent killing of Osama Bin Ladin revealed at best, a Pakistani regime either unwilling or unable to be an effective ally in our ongoing battle against Al Qaeda. Troubling questions need to be answered. What did Pakistani officials know about Bin Ladin’s presence and when did they know it? How effectively have Pakistani national security officials used $20 Billion in US aid to combat Al Qaeda and the Taliban? Why is the main debate in Pakistan today focusing on the US “violation” of their sovereignty in attacking Bin Ladin instead of on their own failure to find him? Is Pakistan worthy of the designation of major non-NATO ally and the steady stream of financial assistance provided by the American people?

To answer these questions and fashion a long term and sustainable approach to relations with Pakistan, Congress should authorize and the President should support the creation of a “Commission on US-Pakistan Relations”. Precedents are available for quickly moving forward with just such an effort.

The 9/11 Commission served as a thorough and credible fact finder concerning the events of 9/11. Its factual findings provided a necessary narrative on the events and raised questions that then could be answered with future policy action. The Iraq Study Group trained consistent attention on one national security challenge and provided a series of potential options for policy makers. In each of these instances the national security challenge to be confronted needed sustained focus and bi-partisan engagement. In a world of rapidly changing events demanding many responses, the President and the US Congress need the assistance of just such a Commission to provide the answers and options regarding our past and future relationship with Pakistan.

A “Commission on US-Pakistan Relations” should be provided with sufficient resources to gain a high level expert staff that is able to conduct interviews, investigations and support hearings that could culminate in a Final Report to be delivered within six months. The Commission Membership should be appointed by a combination of the President and Congress; two from the Speaker of the House, one from the Democratic Leader of the House, two from the Senate Majority Leader, one from the Senate Minority Leader, and five from the President of the United States.

Our relationship with Pakistan is too important for the security of our nation, and for the peace of the South Asia region, to let it be shaped by the pressures of cable talk shows and the necessarily shifting attention of senior policy makers. The creation of a “Commission on US-Pakistan Relations” can go far toward letting the American people know that policymakers are not satisfied with the status quo, are committed to finding answers and charting a new and sustainable way forward for protecting our interests in this most challenging part of the world.

Scott Bates is the former Senior Policy Advisor for the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee. Bates is currently Vice-President of the Center for National Policy and can be reached at sdbates66@hotmail.com.

Related posts:

1. Bin Laden and the Rocky Road to Islamabad
2. A New Approach to Interventionism
3. PSA Advisory Board member Marc Grossman named Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Nearly ten years ago, on a clear blue morning in New York City, the beginning acts of the worst terrorist attack on American soil were set in motion.  The air filled with smoke, debris, and the endless sound of sirens as nearly 3,000 were killed.  This past Sunday, with night already descended on the city, the air instead filled with the sounds of crowds cheering upon hearing the news that Osama bin Laden, the man responsible for those attacks, had been killed.  As President Obama summed it up, “Justice has been done.”  The New York Post put it more bluntly:  “the son of a bitch is dead.”

The story behind the death of Osama bin Laden is exciting in itself:  a small team of Navy Seals conducts a daring 40-minute raid, gets the most wanted man in the world, and scores a major victory against al Qaeda.  But we should also be proud of the way our government worked for years, across administrations and agencies, to ultimately carry out this critical mission.  The intelligence community, though much maligned, tirelessly spent six years unraveling OBL’s courier network to track him down.  Once he was found, the military did its job with surgical precision.  And the President exhibited decisive leadership when given the opportunity to take OBL out, choosing, after careful deliberation, a riskier operation than others on the table to make sure the job was finally done.

OBL’s death clearly carries immense symbolism, but where he was eventually located did not fit the prevailing narrative.  Far from a remote cave in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, he was instead living in a million-dollar compound in Abbottabad, a city within driving distance of Islamabad and home to the Pakistani Military Academy. The discovery of OBL so close to the capital city and Pakistan’s West Point again raises questions about the sincerity of the country’s commitment to counterterrorism cooperation.  In a Washington Post op-ed, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari hit back, arguing that “The war on terrorism is as much Pakistan’s war as it is America’s.”  Yet, given where bin Laden was found and the fact that the U.S. opted for a unilateral raid out of concern that Pakistan might alert bin Laden, the line doesn’t quite ring true for many.

American officials are quick to reassert that Pakistan is a valuable partner in the overall counterterrorism fight, and in the short-term, an investigation into how OBL could be “hiding in plain sight” and the upcoming U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue at the end of this month may offer good answers and good ways to diffuse the increasing tensions.  But the incident underscores the inherent difficulty at the core of the complicated U.S.-Pakistani relationship:  Pakistan acts like the member of the team that, at best, never seems capable of doing enough and at worst, may compromise operations.  As frustrating as it may be, however, the alternative options could be worse; the terrain we are playing on now in Pakistan and the team we’re playing with may be the best bet we can make.

As such, the same type of low-key, long-term effort across government used to catch OBL will be increasingly necessary in the post-OBL paradigm for maintaining a workable relationship with Pakistan, even as things are bound to get harder.  Keeping the groundwork that is already in place there is important, and continuing this smart approach is the best way to work within the limitations of what Pakistan wants to and can do while simultaneously dealing with a jihadist threat that still remains dangerous.  From a military and intelligence standpoint, it means having to find ways to operate when needed within Pakistan in the face of mounting criticism that the U.S. is violating its sovereignty.  Diplomatically, it means managing expectations on both sides while facing more abundant and ingrained conspiracy theories and negative feelings on both sides.  These efforts must also be complimented with ongoing review of U.S. aid packages to Pakistan to ensure that corruption and incompetence do not jeopardize key goals.

All of the tools of government will have to be implemented to maximize the results of even the most minimal level of Pakistani cooperation.  The death of OBL is certainly something to be celebrated, but it is not the closing act.  Challenges still lie ahead, including a rocky road to Islamabad.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Partnership for a Secure America.

Related posts:

1. Too Important to Fail: The Least Bad Call on Afghanistan
2. 9/11 Style Commission Needed to Review US Policy on Pakistan
3. A New Approach to Interventionism

Related posts:

1. Drones Can’t Change War
2. Too Important to Fail: The Least Bad Call on Afghanistan
3. A New Approach to Interventionism

Over the past week, Taliban militants in western Pakistan have bombed and set fire to dozens of tankers carrying oil to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The seemingly daily trend of attacks on NATO fuel supply convoys has been ongoing since Pakistan closed a key border crossing in retaliation to a U.S. helicopter strike within its airspace. This recent surge in violence highlights the increasingly precarious reliance on fossil fuels as the single most critical strategic linchpin of U.S. military success. With the soaring costs – in both dollars and lives – of the military’s dependence on oil becoming ever more apparent, there has never been a more urgent time to accelerate the transition to renewable energy use on the battlefield.

Even before the recent wave of attacks, a study by the Army Environmental Policy Institute found that for every 24 fuel convoys to Iraq or Afghanistan, one soldier or civilian involved in the transport was killed. On top of the risk, the economic costs of the military’s dependence on oil are staggering. Although the military purchases gasoline at a relatively cheap price, transporting a gallon of fuel to a forward operating base can cost up to $400. Moreover, the sheer scale of the military’s energy expenses ($20 billion in 2008) leaves it particularly vulnerable to oil price volatility, as just a $10 uptick in the price of a barrel of oil costs the Department of Defense about $1.3 billion. These factors, in addition to the strategic challenges and indirect costs associated with importing foreign-produced oil rather than using American-made renewables, make the military’s current energy practices dangerous, inefficient, and ultimately unsustainable.

Although the Pentagon has taken strong strides in developing and deploying clean energy technologies, it still has plenty of untapped potential. In a report released in July, the CNA Military Advisory Board suggested that increased collaboration between DOD, DOE, and the private sector can spur the innovation necessary to make renewable energy technology more viable in the military. In FY 2010, DOD received $80.5 billion in funding for research and development alone – more than the entire operating budget of nearly any other government agency. A reallocation of some R&D funding from weapons systems to energy innovation would likely increase long-term U.S. national security significantly.

The military is also uniquely positioned to be a catalyst for economy-wide clean and renewable energy development, creating markets and driving down costs as its technological innovations are adapted for civilian use. The military has a long history of pioneering technologies that later found wide commercial success, from nuclear power to GPS systems to the Internet. As the nation’s largest single consumer of energy – accounting for roughly three quarters of the entire U.S. government’s energy usage – the impact of DOD’s investments could ripple throughout the economy. With the current legislative stalemate in the Senate, the military just might be the best vehicle to propel the U.S. economy toward a clean energy future.

Related posts:

1. OP-ED: How to Weaken the Power of Foreign Oil
2. A High-Risk, Low Reward Strategy Could Lose the Future
3. National Security Experts Launch Energy Initiative

Yesterday the Washington Post reported that Pakistan has requested more immediate assistance from the United States to help in the flood relief effort there.  Floods have been inundating the northwest region of Pakistan, affecting more than 14 million people according to Pakistani officials.  This is the same region of Pakistan that is home to many of the militants that continue to threaten American troops in Afghanistan and seek to maintain that area as a safe haven for al Qaeda.  Although these floods are a tremendous humanitarian disaster, they also provide an opportunity to both assist those in need and demonstrate to the Pakistani people that the United States is a partner that they can count on.

A recent Pew poll shows that that this will be a steep hill to climb.  Only 17 percent of Pakistanis had a positive view of the U.S. and 59 percent described the U.S. as an enemy.  Recognizing that our efforts in Afghanistan will not succeed unless Pakistani militant safe havens are eliminated, this lack of support by the population is enormously troubling.  There are a number of reasons for their negative views ranging from U.S. support for previous military dictators to the sporadic nature of U.S. engagement with the country.

The question now is, will we respond quickly enough? The Pakistani government has been unable to address this humanitarian disaster on its own.  In this vacuum, militant groups have been rushing to seize this opportunity.  So far the United States has sent six helicopters and pledged $55 million.  Considering the task at hand and short time available to save lives, I question if this is the best effort we could muster.  An important comparison case study is worth examining – the 2004 Asian tsunami. 

In 2004 on the day after Christmas, the second largest earthquake ever recorded on a seismograph launched a massive tsunami off the coast of Indonesia.  A tranquil sea was transformed into an enormous wave of water that traveled quickly to the coasts of Indonesia, Thailand, India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.  The tremendous power of this wave was hidden from sight until it reached the shore.  At that point, the water crested upwards and rose to a height of nearly 80 ft as it approached coastal villages in Indonesia.  The destruction it unleashed was tremendous.  Entire villages were wiped away.  Fishermen who had been out to sea returned to find their homes completely destroyed and their family members swept away. Some estimates put the death toll in Indonesia alone at more than 200,000.

Although the destruction caused by this natural disaster was unprecedented, there also was a tremendous outpouring of support from around the world. The United States military sprang into action.  The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier battle group was dispatched from Japan to the coast of Sumatra.  A total of 48 navy and marine helicopters were utilized and a 1000 bed naval hospital ship was sent to the area.  Ten C-130 military transport aircraft ferried relief supplies.  By February 2005, then President Bush had pledged $950 million to be used for the humanitarian response and rebuilding.

The justification for this tremendous mobilization of U.S. resources was purely humanitarian, yet the impact on the U.S. reputation in the Muslim majority country of Indonesia was noteworthy.  Although it is impossible to determine the true national security benefit of the dramatic change in Indonesia public opinion, it is important to remember that in the several years before the tsunami there was increasing concern about the development of terrorist cells based in Indonesia.  Such cells were responsible for numerous deaths in a Bali nightclub bombing.  What is clear is that the humanitarian assistance dramatically improved many Indonesians’ view of the United States that had sunk to incredible lows in the post-Iraq invasion period.  In May 2003, 15 percent of Indonesians had a favorable view of the United States.  By 2006, this had increased to 44 percent.  63 percent of Indonesian reported that the humanitarian assistance improved their view of the United States.  Support for Osama bin Laden decreased from 58 percent to 12 percent during the same time period. Today the threat from terrorism in Indonesia has decreased.

When asked about the humanitarian effort in Pakistan, a senior U.S. military official said transfer of additional helicopters, which are in short supply in Afghanistan, would require a political decision in Washington. “Do they exist in the region? Yes,” he said. “Are they available? No.”

It seems that perhaps now is the time to be making that political decision.  Such a decision was made to provide immediate humanitarian assistance in Southeast Asia – 48 helicopters and 1000 bed naval hospital ship.  Granted, the U.S. has pledged more money than any other country to the flood relief effort in Pakistan.  Yet, pledges of aid do little to assist a villager stranded on a rooftop.  It’s also a matter of actually getting hardware and people quickly in place to save lives.  In that regard, it seems that, so far, we’ve come up short.  Is this disaster any less tragic than the tsunami?  It’s not just the right thing to do. The tsunami example shows that it can also be a smart strategic move.

Related posts:

1. 9/11 Style Commission Needed to Review US Policy on Pakistan
2. Bin Laden and the Rocky Road to Islamabad
3. PSA Advisory Board member Marc Grossman named Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

Today, partisan bickering is taking precedence over sensible solutions to the AfPak conflict.  Apparently, even the safety of American citizens is considered a side concern when it comes to the labor versus business debate that characterizes much of our domestic – and now foreign policy – discourse.  Democrats say that they are on the side of the workers and Republicans say that unduly constraining business hurts us all.  This debate between the parties has been going on for decades.  Unfortunately, this debate is spilling over into the national security realm and we’re less safe because of it.  It’s time for D’s and R’s to come together on a simple trade issue that can make a difference in the struggle against extremism.

Here’s what is happening.  The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region of Pakistan borders Afghanistan. It’s the home base of Al Qaeda and the many of the Taliban insurgents that stream across the porous border with Afghanistan and attack our troops and destabilize Afghanistan.  Osama Bin Laden is thought to be hiding away in this remote tribal region.  Many believe that if a future 9/11-type attack happens on the United States, its origin will likely be this remote tribal region in Pakistan.

FATA is also one of the poorest and most disenfranchised regions of Pakistan.  The literacy rate in FATA is just 17.42 percent, compared to 43.92 percent in the rest of the country.   It scores quite poorly on most all socioeconomic indicators – and that’s in comparison to the rest of Pakistan, which is not particularly wealthy to begin with.  FATA residents are also marginalized from the political life of their country.  They have no elected representatives in a provincial or national assembly who can legislate on local concerns.  In this environment, it’s not surprising that extremists have had an easy time recruiting for their cause.  No, poverty and marginalization don’t cause terrorism, but they can contribute to an environment where extremism is more likely to take hold.

One step that would help bring FATA residents into the mainstream and out of the recruiting camps of terrorists is economic development.  No, it’s not the only answer.  Political reforms are also key.  I’ve written before on this issue here. But, providing opportunities for FATA residents to improve their lives would be small step in the right direction.  Problem is, economic opportunities are scarce in this remote tribal region.  Workers are generally poorly skilled and infrastructure is severely lacking.

So, how to give a leg up for these workers who already have the cards stacked against them?  Many developing countries rely on textiles to start the climb up the economic ladder.  One suggestion that was put forward by the Bush administration was to demarcate Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in the FATA region that would eliminate U.S. import duties on goods produced there – textiles in particular.  This could, very quickly, give a distinct advantage to textiles produced in the tribal area  – a potential economic boost to workers in this region who so sorely need it.

This is where U.S. partisan bickering comes into play.  Democrats have put forward a House bill that sets up these ROZs that includes a number of labor protections.  In the Senate, Republicans and Democrats are feuding over whether those protections should be included.  You can guess who is on which side.  David Ignatius describes the debate here. Rather than taking the big picture national security view, both sides seem determined to make this issue the model for future trade arrangements.  That view is short sighted.

Granted, Kim Elliott argues here that this legislation could be much improved if it were expanded to all exports (not just textiles) and expanded beyond just the FATA region.  This is all true.  This makes our failure to even enact this limited legislation even more tragic. Surely there is a way to move beyond this tired old debate between labor and business for the sake of national security?  It’s time for a rationale compromise on this issue.  No, this legislation alone won’t eliminate the threat of terrorism or solve the conflict in Afghanistan/Pakistan.  But, it’s a small part of the long-term solution.

Related posts:

1. 9/11 Style Commission Needed to Review US Policy on Pakistan
2. Bin Laden and the Rocky Road to Islamabad
3. PSA Advisory Board member Marc Grossman named Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

In the hours after Congress acted last Sunday, the White House announced that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was one of the first two global leaders to call and congratulate Obama on his domestic victory.

Now, it is reasonable to assume that the Saudi leader was not particularly concerned about health care reform itself but recognized that its passage would strengthen Obama domestically and perhaps reignite his desire to be remembered as a transformative President not simply at home but also abroad.

In 2008 Obama ran a campaign that, in part, portrayed his very election as a step towards resetting U.S. relations with the international community. Further more, by illustrating his understanding of specific hot button issues ranging from Indo-Pakistani disagreements in Kashmir to the harm caused by the Bush administrations “war on terror”, Obama suggested that he would prioritize tackling the policy matters that had corroded relations between the U.S. and the Muslim world and thus undermined U.S. national security.

His early actions as President, from the appointment of Middle East envoy Mitchell to his historic Cairo speech, collectively suggested that Obama was looking to move beyond simply the reset offered by his election and was seeking a fundamental realignment between the U.S. and the Muslim world that would transform the international arena.

Unfortunately, this early promise has not, thus far, been realized and for many ordinary citizens and policy analysts alike there has been a growing skepticism as to whether Obama would be able to achieve such a realignment and, in some quarters, a questioning of whether he wished to use his Presidency to pursue it.

However, some foreign policy experts and U.S. political observers, including Abdullah, may have identified something else at play that explains the Obama administrations inability to advance its national security agenda thus far. 

Upon taking office Obama faced, perhaps inevitably, opponents willing to test his mettle at home and abroad. By initially failing to secure significant policy and political victories, the new President was pushed back on his heels and arguably lost the focus and transformative desire on display during the campaign. Abdullah, and others, have recognized that with the health care victory Obama has another opportunity to set and implement an ambitious global agenda.

Of course, no one can claim to know whether Obama wishes to prioritize a true transformation of US-Muslim world relations. While his campaign rhetoric and initial Presidential actions suggest that he has such instincts, and unquestionably U.S. national security would benefit from such a move, the end of the story has yet to be written.

Clearly, the passage of health care provides the political boost to such efforts and his year and a half as President may have provided Obama with a picture of what he will have to do and sacrifice to realign relations between the US and the Muslim world. The question now is whether he will choose to follow this difficult path.

No related posts.

Last week the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations released a new report that called on the U.S. to better engage religious communities in the conduct of its foreign policy.  Although foreign policy analysts frequently acknowledge the integral role of religion in conflicts and peacemaking around the world, the reality is that too often religious communities are not engaged in U.S. policy decisions.   Last Tuesday task force members met with Obama administration representatives to present the findings of the report.  If heeded by this administration, this advice could, in the long run, substantially strengthen our hand in achieving our national security goals.  This report’s prescriptions are particularly applicable to how the United States deals with madrassas in the Muslim world.

The report states

Religion has been a major force in the daily lives of individuals and communities for millennia. Yet recent data show that the salience of religion is on the rise the world over. Once considered a “private” matter by Western policymakers, religion is now playing an increasingly influential role—both positive and negative—in the public sphere on many different levels….. What is needed is an informed and coherent framework that allows actors within and outside government to better understand and respond to religiously inspired actors and events in a way that supports those doing good, while isolating those that invoke the sacred to sow violence and confusion.

This inability to fully understand religion and the role it plays in international relations has been characteristic of both Democratic and Republican administrations.  When speaking of her 2006 book, the Mighty and the Almighty, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said,

As a practitioner of foreign policy, I certainly come from the generation of people who used to say, “X problem is complicated enough. Let’s not bring God and religion into it.” But through my being in office, and as I explored the subject much further in writing “The Mighty and the Almighty,” I really thought that the opposite is true. In order to effectively conduct foreign policy today, you have to understand the role of God and religion.

President Bush can also be faulted for referring to the war on terrorism as a “crusade”.  Although this was surely a slip of the tongue, such religiously-loaded words can have tremendous consequences and this fit all too well into Bin Laden’s narrative of a grand clash of civilizations.

The report presents a number of recommendations for how U.S. policy makers can better integrate religion into their decision making process.  These range from making adjustments to the training that diplomats receive to naming an ambassador to the Organization of Islamic Conference.  Just today the Obama administration announced that Rashad Hussain would take up this post.

Another change that ought to be considered is a rethinking of how the United States addresses madrassas in the Muslim world.  Madrassas are private Islamic religious schools that many point to as a source of extremist ideology and terrorism.  Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld famously said, “Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?”  Others such as Peter Bergen discount the role that madrassas play in promoting terrorism.  Although proving a direct causal link may be difficult, I think that it’s safe to say that some madrassas do promote to a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam that can contribute to a mindset that encourages extremism and sometimes violence.

So, what is the United States doing about this?  Very little, it turns out.  In Pakistan, for example, the bulk of U.S. assistance for strengthening education goes to secular schools.  On this face of it, this makes sense.  Why should U.S. taxpayers be supporting religious schools that are teaching students to adopt a version of Islam that preaches violence?  Of course, we should continue supporting the secular education system, but it would be wrong to completely ignore the madassa system.  There is much that could be done to provide training and materials to madrassa teachers and administrators to promote a more tolerant version of Islam.  This sort of assistance is not particularly expensive and can make a big difference.

If you say it can’t be done, I’d encourage you to take a look at the work of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy.  Last week I attended a presentation by this organization that has engaged a number of Pakistan’s madrassas for the last five years.  They have trained more than 2,200 madrassa leaders and senior faculty from some 1,450 madrassas, including a sizable number in the more radical areas of the country.  The training emphasizes critical thinking skills, religious tolerance and human rights — especially women’s.  This type of program should be expanded and would complement the important work that the U.S. is already doing to improve the secular education system in Pakistan.

Just as the recent Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs report encouraged policy makers not to ignore the religious facets of U.S. foreign policy, we must be ready to engage these religious schools.  What is particularly ironic is that during the Afghan war with the Soviet Union, the U.S. supported such religious schools and their radical views when it suited the purpose of the overthrow of the Soviets.  It’s not too late to return to those schools with a new message of tolerance and respect for human rights.   I can’t think of a better way to seriously address the God-gap in U.S. foreign policy.

No related posts.

Last week the State Department released its Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy.  There is much to like in this comprehensive document that seeks to elevate development and diplomacy efforts alongside that of defense.  Although the troop increase announced in December by President Obama will be integral to success, for too long the military has overshadowed development and diplomacy in this part of the world.  They are all part of the solution.  We’re now moving in the right direction, but there’s more to be done to get the Pakistani public on board.

The strategy in Afghanistan focuses on reconstruction and development, improved governance, rule of law, and an expanded civilian presence.  The Pakistan component deals with the recently passed Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation that devotes $7.5 billion over 5 years to Pakistan.  It also emphasizes security assistance, communications, and strengthening people-to-people ties.   The strategy isn’t just a list of impressive goals, but rather it lays out measurable milestones that we should all use to hold the U.S. government accountable.

This all sounds great.  So what’s missing?  Here’s my concern, particularly related to Pakistan.  Poll after poll reports that the Pakistani public continues to harbor strong anti-American sentiment.  For example, in an August poll by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 64% of Pakistanis viewed the U.S. as an enemy.  Only 22% of Pakistanis felt that the U.S. takes their interests into account when making foreign policy decisions.  There were many references in the strategy about the commitment to a long-term partnership with Pakistan.  Although the Pakistani government might have agreed, I’m quite concerned that the Pakistani people are not yet convinced.

This was particularly evident last fall with the huge debate in Pakistan over the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill that provided an unprecedented amount of aid to Pakistan.  Rather than being a huge public relations boon to the U.S., the ensuing debate in Pakistan ended up having the exact opposite effect.  There was tremendous concern about conditions being placed on the aid.  When a country’s economy is in tatters and its people consider rejecting a huge assistance windfall, you know that there are real problems brewing.  Although the uproar was largely based on misperceptions, if our strategy is based on a long-term partnership, this is not a good way to start.

Fortunately, the strategy highlighted an enhanced communication effort and stronger people-to-people ties.  These should help.  In the long run, the disbursal of aid will hopefully make a real difference.  However, there are a few things that the U.S. could do right now that could have a tremendous impact:

1.  Show Blackwater the door. The Pakistani press has been obsessed with Blackwater’s presence in the country.  No one knows how many Blackwater operatives are on the ground, but Secretary Gates, on his recent visit to Islamabad confirmed the firm’s presence.  The costs of having Blackwater employees pack up their bags is probably relatively low.  The cost in terms of continued negatives public perception of the U.S. is quite high if their operatives continue to be in the headlines. It’s about perception here, and that really matters.

2.  Think seriously about the costs of drone attacks. The U.S. military considers drones its most effective weapon against Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and they have been successful in eliminating some high value targets.  At the same time, there is huge backlash from the Pakistani public.  They are concerned both with the collateral civilian deaths and the infringement on Pakistani sovereignty.  In the Pew poll, 95% of Pakistanis had a negative view of the drone attacks.  If you ask ordinary Pakistanis, this will be the one issue that comes up again and again.  Perhaps the drone attacks are a tactical victory and a strategic mistake.  The problem is that there aren’t good alternatives.   Other than completely eliminating the attacks, we may want to place an even greater emphasis on reducing civilian casualties or hand more control over to the Pakistani government.  Each of those options has costs, but we’re already paying a tremendous price with our current course of action.  What’s clear is that as long as these attacks are in the headlines, the harder the overall development and diplomacy strategy will be to implement.

3.  For long term development, invest in social entrepreneurs and learn from them. There will be millions of dollars in development aid pouring into Pakistan.  If used effectively, this could be a tremendous benefit to Pakistan and strengthen its people’s confidence in the U.S. long-term commitment.  However, it could also be a setback if improperly distributed.  Figuring out how to utilize this money effectively is going to be key.  Many Americans are now familiar with Greg Mortenson, the author of Three Cups of Tea, who has built or supported over 130 schools in the Pakistan/Afghanistan region over the past 16 years.  What can we learn from him?  Understanding and appreciating the local culture and needs is critical to success.  Aid workers need to get out in the communities they are serving. There are plenty of social entrepreneurs in Pakistan who are finding local solutions to pressing social problems.  Ashoka is finding and supporting many of them.   Social entrepreneurs like Greg Mortenson can be a key part of that effort and we should be learning from their successes.

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