It has now been over a week since the announcement of Kim Jong Il’s death. We learned the news in Seoul and observed shocked but calm South Koreans diligently following events.

The sense of calmness in Seoul reflects that there appears to be an orderly transition of power within North Korea. Of course, no one knows for sure what exactly is going on and what is going to happen in North Korea. That said, we hope, once an appropriate period of mourning is concluded, that steps toward positive engagement in such areas as humanitarian food assistance and nuclear talks that were underway at the time of Kim’s death will continue to move forward.

However, hope is not enough. We must recognize that even in places such as North Korea the future doesn’t simply happen. Rather, the future there as elsewhere is, to a significant degree, the result of a complex interplay of ideas and action. U.S. history provides a clear demonstration that among the most powerful of those ideas are notions of widely available education and open scientific inquiry. One need look only to the actions associated with U.S. support for these ideas in the countries of Western Europe following the Second World War. Or perhaps even more relevantly, consider programs such as the U.S. State Department funded Minnesota Project which developed sustained medical, engineering, and agricultural support to a South Korea suffering from the consequences of the Korean Conflict. Or the Fulbright Program which has served to help in the transformation of higher education throughout much of the world.

Nor have U.S. collaborative science and education programs been limited to countries with which it has enjoyed easy relations. Scientific engagement and exchanges with the Soviet Union went on throughout much of the Cold War and these were thought to be an important precursor to arms limitations treaties that followed. When President Nixon went to China he brought with him suggestions for science and technology engagement.

In the case of North Korea there have been relatively few sustained science and educational engagements with the U.S. One example is Syracuse University working with Kim Chaek University of Science and Technology in Pyongyang over the past ten years in the area of digital libraries. A result was the first digital library in the North. A nongovernmental organization, the US-DPRK Science Engagement Consortium has been working with U.S. universities and the North Korean State Academy of Sciences to encourage safe academic science cooperation between the two countries and, again, the focus has been on opening information resources through a virtual science library initiative. Interestingly, one of the last delegations to leave Pyongyang prior to the announcement of Kim’s death was a group working with the State Academy of Sciences on sustainable agriculture. In this context it is important to recognize that North Korea has engaged with other countries in academic science and education. Programs exist with many Asian countries as well as Germany, the U.K., and Canada.

Why is more not being done with the U.S.? At one level, the answer is painfully obvious. North Korean nuclear programs have led the U.S. (and the U.N.) to impose strict export controls against the North and these controls make it exceedingly difficult for U.S. academics to work with counterparts in the North. The difficulties range from an inability to share equipment and deemed export regulations which limit the sharing of knowledge with North Koreans to the almost complete lack of U.S. government financial assistance. Further, the lack of formal diplomatic relations makes travel and other sorts of exchanges difficult. And, of course, all of this takes place in an environment in which North Korea has been demonized by much of the Western press. This all makes it very difficult for a democracy such as the U.S. to constructively engage North Korea. Moreover, these constraints reflect real differences. There are aspects of North Korea that violate the sensibilities of most U.S. citizens.

Yet, as always, the challenge is what to do. Do we simply bemoan the fact that North Korea is not as we wish it to be? Or does the U.S. do as it has done with great pride in the past and trust that ideas such as the power of education and the freedom of inquiry will ultimately bring about enduring and positive change. Importantly, change resulting from ideas is most often change from within rather than change imposed from outside. Such change is likely to be robust and to reflect the culture and values of North Korea as well as those of the larger world.

So, in this spirit we urge that the U.S. once again consider trusting in the power of the great ideas that have helped to fashion increased opportunity and development in the past century and move to work with the new leadership in North Korea to open up bi-lateral educational and scientific engagement opportunities between the U.S. and North Korea. Through such exchanges we can learn from one another and, in so doing, build the trust and shared institutions that are so essential to building a more peaceful world.

Related posts:

1. Remembering India’s Henry Kissinger
2. Ambassador Linton Brooks Speaks on Nuclear Challenges
3. New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to Enter into Force Tomorrow

In an interview with Knoxville radio station, WUOT, Ambassador Brooks spoke on why the current global situation is much more complicated than the Cold War. Focusing on Iran and North Korea, Brooks noted that they pose a much different threat than the Soviet Union did because of their track records in supporting terrorism and their disinterest in playing by the normal rules of international relations. Brooks also shared that, in the case of Iran, its desire to become a regional hegemon also drives a continuous increase in arms stockpiling by its neighbors.

On the topic of nuclear energy, Brooks was much more optimistic noting that, despite the tragedy in Fukushima, nuclear energy will see a huge expansion.  Therefore, the U.S. will have to decide if it wants to lead in nuclear energy and set an example for responsible development of nuclear power, or let others assume the role.

To hear more, click here to listen to the interview or read Frank Munger’s blog post here.

Related posts:

1. Why EU Sanctions May Hurt the West More than Iran
2. New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to Enter into Force Tomorrow
3. William Cohen: What the U.S. Should Do About Iran

Retired Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral James Lyons argued in a Washington Times opinion piece on Monday that the US should “halt our participation in the START negotiations until we bring balance back into the equation.” The equation to which Lyons refers is that of nuclear deterrence: by maintaining the ability to destroy any potential nuclear-armed adversary, the logic runs, we can ensure that none will attack the United States. Unfortunately, a focus on the conventional logic of deterrence doesn’t fit in a world where the most urgent threats to US national security are posed by terrorists and other non-state actors who are difficult to identify, much less deter.

Lyons asserts that Russia has “embarked on an aggressive modernization program to field new nuclear weapons” and seeks a “breakout” capability, allegedly so that it could quickly build and deploy new weapons after withdrawing from any new arms control treaty. China, he adds, may be emboldened if the US commits to nuclear reductions, triggering a panic among our East Asian allies. Our looming nuclear weakness, the Admiral concludes, is exacerbated by the proliferation threats of North Korea and Iran.

Each of these assertions twists reality, but even if true, none would justify withdrawing from bilateral arms control, which is essential to protecting Americans from the clear and present danger posed by proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials to those most likely to use them against us. In recent Senate testimony, the Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, himself a retired four-star Admiral, called the possibility of terrorists acquiring nuclear capability a “top concern,” and noted that traditional means of deterrence would likely be of “less utility” against such a threat. For that reason the President has committed to stopping proliferation at its source, by halting the spread of nuclear weapons to new states, and securing fissile materials. These efforts depend greatly on US-Russian cooperation, since our two countries possess over 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons and material. A new agreement to replace the expired START treaty is an absolutely essential first step.

On the other hand, were the United States to give Russia and other nuclear powers a pass on nuclear security by withdrawing from bilateral arms control and expanding our own arsenal, the danger that terrorists could buy or steal what they need to build a nuclear weapon would expand exponentially. The simple fact is that the more nuclear weapons there are, and the more states have them, the more likely they are to fall into the wrong hands. It is hard to imagine how Admiral Lyons thinks such a scenario would benefit American national security, even if we built and deployed deadly new nuclear weapons, as he recommends. In fact, the most likely consequence of building a new US nuclear weapon would be to usher in a renewed global nuclear arms race, with all the dangers of Cold-War style mutually assured destruction and none of the multilateral cooperation that has helped to keep nuclear materials out of terrorists’ hands to date.

Of course, completing negotiation of a new START agreement by no means precludes sensible investments to upgrade the safety, security and reliability of the US nuclear arsenal. Lyons is absolutely right that new personnel will need to be trained, and new programs implemented to ensure that the US nuclear arsenal sets the global standard for safety and security, while continuing to effectively serve in the deterrent role assigned to it by our military planners. The brand new 2011 budget request already includes about three times as much for nuclear weapons activities as for nuclear non-proliferation programs. In reality, these categories are closely linked, because US nuclear security today is as much about advancing a comprehensive, multilateral approach to preventing proliferation as it is about maintaining the best possible nuclear arsenal.

Terrorists have declared time and again their intention to acquire a nuclear device and use it against us; even after the Cold War, governments from Pyongyang to Islamabad have crossed the nuclear threshold, while Iran’s iron-fisted dictators are pursuing a weapon of their own; and despite proof he sold nuclear technology on the black market, AQ Khan was released from house arrest last year. The equation is clear: If we fail to work with Russia, China and others to rein in and reduce global nuclear arsenals, we are far more likely to see a nuclear terror attack in the future.

Cartoon by Volha Charnysh.

No related posts.

This is my last post for 2009 I thought I would write about Afghanistan but on second thought I will, no doubt, be doing that quite a lot during 2010. Thanks to the Obama Administration’s surge strategy Afghanistan will, from a blogging viewpoint, be the gift that keeps on giving.

So, as we contemplate whether 2010 will be better or worse let’s take a moment to consider 2009. In the spirit of Dave Barry’s classic annual year in review column let’s acknowledge, albeit with some poetic license commentary by moi, a few of the significant events that made, however briefly, the headlines.

Although it started on Dec. 28 2008 the month of January saw massive Israeli air strikes and a ground force invasion of the Gaza Strip. Heavy fighting took place in Gaza City between the Israeli forces and Hamas. At least 1300 Palestinians were killed. On Jan. 17 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced a unilateral ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, declaring that Israel has achieved the goals it set when launching the military operation. On Jan. 21 Israel completes its troop withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

Also that month President Barack Obama signed executive orders closing the US detention camp at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, within a year; closing the CIA’s secret prisons; requiring a review of military trials for terror suspects; and requiring all interrogations to follow the non-coercive methods specified in the Army Field Manual.

Of course, nobody knew back then that the camp would end up in Illinois. One can only hope that the inmates are not too acclimated to the Caribbean climate to adjust to a midwest winter.

On Jan 27 Hama declared that it previously was just kidding and broke the ceasefire by attacking an Israeli frontier patrol. Israel immediately responded that it lacks a sense of humor and renewed its air strikes on the Gaza Strip border with Egypt.

On Feb. 3 Iran launched its first domestically built satellite into orbit. Iran stated that the satellite is meant for research and telecommunications purposes, but Western states express concern that the technology could be used in the development of ballistic missiles. The U.S. intelligence community, estimating that Iran will show the same swift progress with its missiles that it did with its nuclear program, predicted the next flight will be in 2040.

On Feb. 6, renewing their classic rivalry, a British and a French nuclear submarine collided in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Political leaders from both countries sighed in relief that it was merely submarines and not their respective football fans that collided.

On Feb. 17 President Barack Obama authorized the deployment of an additional 17,000 military personnel to Afghanistan. The troops will be deployed to ‘meet urgent security needs’ in southern Afghanistan.  Later in the year President Obama deploys 30,000 more troops to meet “super duper double urgent” security needs in Afghanistan.

On March 15 two US female journalists, together with their Chinese guide, are detained by North Korean soldiers at the China–North Korea border when reporting on North Korean refugees in northeastern China. In June the two women are sentenced to 12 years of hard labor. On 4 August the two are pardoned and released following mediation by former US President Bill Clinton, who stood in for the Rev. Jesse Jackson. Rev. Jackson subsequently mediated between Bill and Hillary Clinton.

On March 19 China and Viet Nam agree to set up a hotline between their foreign ministries, and to focus on negotiations to solve the outstanding maritime issues in order to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea. Britain and France send representatives from their submarine branches to offer their expertise.

On March 24 French Defence Minister Hervé Morin announces that France will compensate those suffering health problems linked to radiation and resulting from the more than 200 nuclear weapon tests that France carried out from 1960 to 1996 in Algeria and Polynesia. Whether any radiation was the result of a French-British submarine collision remains unknown.

On March 27 US President Barack Obama presents the new US strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke is appointed the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Citizens of both countries, remembering Amb. Holbrooke’s splendid efforts in the Balkan wars of the 1990s, riot in the streets.

On April 1 the new Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, states that the Israeli Government is not bound by the commitments made by its predecessors, such as the 2007 Annapolis Agreement for a two-state solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Lieberman subsequently says April Fools.

On May 25 North Korea carries out an underground nuclear weapon test in Kilju, Hamgyong province. The U.S. National Rifle Association condemns the test as an attempt by godless communists to violate American’s god given second amendment rights.

Following the presidential election in Iran on 12 June, in which President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is reelected, hundreds of thousands of people take to the streets to protest against what they perceive as a fraudulent election. At least eight people are killed and several wounded by security forces in the largest demonstrations since the 1979 Iranian revolution. Senator Lieberman, saying you can’t make democracy without breaking a few eggs, says this shows why the U.S. needs to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities.

On June 14 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announces that Israel is ready to endorse the creation of a Palestinian state as long as it is demilitarized and the Palestinians accept Israel as a Jewish state with Jerusalem as the capital. Foreign Minister Lieberman reminds people that this is not an April Fools joke.

On June 30 the withdrawal of US combat troops from cities and villages in Iraq is completed and the security duties are handed over to the new Iraqi forces. Approximately 131,000 US troops remain in Iraq. The remaining quarter million private military and security contractors working for the U.S., partying in the Green Zone, start crying in their beer.

On July 2 the US Army launches a major offensive against Taliban militants in southwestern Afghanistan, involving 4000 US soldiers and 650 Afghan troops. It is the first such operation under US President Barack Obama and differs from previous operations as the US forces will remain in the secured areas and build bases to provide security for the local population. Halliburton offers to help build the bases. Blackwater offer to help provide security. The residents of Helmand province start fleeing the country.

On July 16 British Prime Minister Gordon Brown issues a statement on nuclear non-proliferation together with the new British strategy, Road to 2010, outlining how the UK will play a leading role in tackling nuclear issues. Manchester United offers to tackle a British nuclear submarine to help promote nuclear disarmament.

On Sep. 25 US President Barack Obama, French President Nicholas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown accuse Iran of building a secret underground uranium enrichment facility. President Ahmadinejad denounces the accusation as a lie, saying he was spending all his free time cracking down on democracy protesters.

On September 28 the 2006 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms, Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials enters into force following Benin’s deposit of the ninth instrument of ratification. The NRA denounces convention as an attempt to take god-fearing American’s guns away.

On Oct. 16 the UN Human Rights Council endorses the recommendations made in Richard Goldstone’s report on the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip. The report accuses both Israel and Palestinian militants of war crimes and demands that the parties investigate the allegations, or the cases will be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Sen. Lieberman calls for the bombing of the United Nations.

On Oct. 17 the Pakistani Army launches a massive air and ground offensive against al-Qaeda and Taliban rebels in South Waziristan. At least 20,000 people flee the region. Amb. Holbrooke announces that this is proof President Obama’s strategy for the region is working.

On October 30 the UN First Committee agrees to set a timetable for the negotiation of an arms trade treaty. A UN conference on an arms trade treaty will be held in 2012 to elaborate a legally binding instrument for the transfer of conventional arms. Lockheed Martin, Smith & Wesson, Colt Industries, and Glock file a complaint with the Human Right Commission, claiming that liberal pinkos are imperiling their economic livelihood. Bob Geldorf announces the will organize a concert for laid off weapons brokers and promises a special guest appearance by Viktor Bout, currently enjoying the hospitality of the Thai government.

No related posts.

To succeed, a state should specialize in products in which it has a comparative advantage, according to economist David Ricardo. Ricardo focused on tangible goods traded in the international market. However, states also possess another, by no means less marketable characteristic – reputation. A cause of many conflicts and wars, international standing is a commodity by itself because it can be turned into commercial advantage. The importance of reputation goes beyond attracting potential investors and trade partners. Studies show that concerns over reputation can ensure a state’s compliance with treaties and international norms, including the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

No state can thrive on international standing alone. However, reputation can reinforce or undermine the value of other marketable commodities and even influence the state’s export decisions. While comparative advantage in manufacturing arms offers a great source of export income, selling wrong arms into wrong hands can tarnish a state’s international reputation and offset its profits with resulting sanctions and embargos.

What can North Korea export, given its lack in valuable resources and technological expertise? North Korea’s highest-valued commodities include armaments as well as minerals, metallurgical products, and textiles. Its main customers are South Korea and China.

North Korea does not have a comparative advantage in most of its exports. Years of underinvestment due to massive military spending depleted its industrial capital stock, and its highly centralized economy is hardly conducive to innovation. Not surprisingly, Pyongyang faces chronic economic problems and has no resources for improving the quality of its commodities.

The two commodities omitted from the official statistics are North Korea’s notoriety and its nuclear weapons expertise. Many people do not understand that having successfully tested a plutonium bomb in May 2009, North Korea turned its pariah status into an asset. Today, North Korea’s comparative advantage over so many other states is its ability to transgress law by trading prohibited goods on the shady markets with impunity. Even Pyongyang’s former comrade from the Axis of Evil, Iran, has more to lose from exporting sensitive nuclear technology than North Korea. The North’s customers are just as roguish, and trading with them offers the benefit of virtually no competitors because most Western suppliers avoid such markets.

According to Ricardo, the exchangeable value of all commodities rises as the difficulties of their production increase. The value of nuclear weapons is enormous because they are difficult to develop and few states have learned the nuclear secret. Powerful by virtue of their material characteristics alone, nuclear weapons can become commodities in the very logic of the deterrence theory. Nuclear weapons are unlikely to be used in combat and possessing them even in small numbers will deter most enemies. Just keeping them in stock makes little sense, given that they are costly to maintain and slowly lose their value as more states acquire nuclear expertise.

Pyongyang has exported conventional arms before and on occasion threatens to export sensitive nuclear technology. North Korea has attempted to transfer sensitive weapons technologies to Iran, Syria, and even Burma. Since North Korea’s successful nuclear test, potential profits from its nuclear capacities have skyrocketed; successfully tested technology will be in much higher demand. In May 2009, North Korea announced that it “satisfactorily settle[d] the scientific and technological problems arising in furthering increasing the power of nuclear weapons and steadily developing nuclear technology.” In other words, Pyongyang claims that technical glitches are eliminated, and this implies that the nukes are ready for sale.

Preventing North Korea from transferring critical materials and technologies should become a high-priority matter today. The international community can accomplish this through a two-pronged approach, which combines sticks and carrots. The sticks should create barriers to North Korea’s trade in nuclear commodities and punish it for noncompliance. The carrots should normalize discourse with Pyongyang and help it catch up with the rest of the world.

First, the Security Council must provide the UN member states with the means for enforcing restrictions on North Korea. According to Resolution 1874, Pyongyang’s ships can be inspected on the high seas only with its consent. A UN member state can also direct a vessel to “an appropriate and convenient port” for inspection by local officials. If North Korea refuses to divert the ship, a report to a UN committee can be filed. Unfortunately, such reports and other paperwork will hardly succeed in halting North Korea’s illegal activities.

More efficient ways to exert pressure on North Korea should be employed. For example, in May Pyongyang renounced the 1953 armistice that ended fighting in the Korean War. In effect, this opened the door for the use of force against North Korea’s vessels by all combatants in the conflict (including the United States, the leader of the UN Command in 1953). So far the stern warnings issued to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons have not been actualized, and it is time for the international community to act on its promises. The Proliferation Security Initiative, which provides for the interdiction of third-country ships on the high seas on the basis of carrying nuclear materials, is another step in the right direction. However, it is only half-effective without China’s participation.

Second, a potential North Korean move toward nuclear disarmament should be rewarded with incentives like the normalization of relationships with the outside world, assistance with developing non-nuclear energy sources, and modernization of the North’s agriculture with Western technologies and equipment. South Korea’s assistance with developing North Korea’s infrastructure, natural resources, and light industry is especially crucial. If the gap between the isolated and technologically inferior Pyongyang and its better faring neighbors is bridged, the state will be able to manufacture more commodities for export. At the same time, its reputation will become more vulnerable to the allegations of engagement in illegal arms sales. Tarnished reputations can recover over time, and this can eventually happen with North Korea. The opportunities may come to exist in the near future, given the imminent change of Pyongyang’s leadership.

No related posts.

Two recent blog posts by John Pomfret over at the Washington Post got me thinking about how much more complicated China’s position on North Korea has become since the beginning of the Obama Administration.

As Pomfret points out in his May 27 post, for many years the U.S. has been waiting for China to solve the North Korea problem without realizing that our goals are not aligned.

First, there’s a silly assumption in Washington that our interests (no nukes in North Korea) are the same as China’s. But they’re not. China’s first interest in North Korea is making sure the Kim regime doesn’t collapse. China’s second interest? Making sure the Kim regime doesn’t collapse. From Beijing’s perspective, nukes in North Korea rank somewhere around 10th.

Pomfret goes on to give a great explanation about why regime change is the real threat to China.  At the end of the day, as long as the DPRK could be coaxed to the negotiating table, China was satisfied that it was not falling apart.

Then, a few days later, in a June 6 post, we get the following from Pomfret:

There are surprising noises coming from China these days about North Korea. One influential Chinese academic thinks China’s policy — long supportive of the hermit kingdom — might be changing.

So, what happened in less than a week?  Has China finally realized that no nukes is their number one priority?  Not exactly.  Turns out China, as evidenced by the Zhu Feng article that Pomfret is referring to,  may be realizing that the regime in Pyongyang is not interested in negotiations and doesn’t care what Beijing thinks.

If in fact this is true, the Obama Administration should get the credit for forcing this incipient shift within China.  Not because of its own North Korea policy, of course.  I don’t think that Obama has any more of a clue about how to change North Korea than Bush or Clinton did before him.  The difference between this Administration and the previous two is a distinct disdain for drama.

Bottom line is that by not overreacting to the latest string of DPRK provocations, the Obama Administration is keeping the spotlight on North Korea where it belongs.  Let’s be honest — the Bush Administration was prone to answering the North Koreans’ insanity with a little crazy talk of its  own.  This gave China the cover it needed to consider the problem to be a case of two unreasonable sides that needed it to play peacemaker in the middle.  But when one side starts stops inciting the other, and the other reacts by increasing its irrational behavior, China starts to lose face in the process.  No longer is Beijing the reasonable party standing between two unreasonable countries — suddenly it is the patron of the only country unwilling to sit down at the table.

Like I said, none of this suggests that Obama knows how to solve the DPRK problem (or for that matter the Iran problem or the Cuba problem, etc.).  What it does suggest is that maybe the Administration has learned an important lesson from the last two Administrations:  the first step to solving these intractable problems may be to avoid any reasonable suggestion that the source of the problem is the U.S. itself.

No related posts.

In the 2008 Presidential Campaign, and in President Obama’s subsequent speeches, there has been a lot of very sensible and justified emphasis on diplomacy over military force. If nothing else, this Administration seems to have a much lower threshold for initiating diplomatic dialogue and a much higher threshold for cutting it off. But there must be times when Democrats and Republicans, conservatives, neocons, and liberals, can agree that diplomacy just isn’t enough.

The current crisis with North Korea (aka the DPRK) may be such a time. Let’s take a quick stroll down diplomatic memory lane:

• GOOD: In the 1970’s and 80’s, North Korea built the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which required international inspectors to have regular access to the country’s facilities for monitoring.
• TERRIBLE: Yet in 1993, it rejected International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors’ request to see two undeclared sites and threatened to withdraw from the NPT.
• GOOD: In October 1994 the Clinton Administration defused the crisis with an “agreed framework” requiring a freeze to the nuclear program in exchange for food aid.
• In 2001, President Bush named North Korea as a member of the “Axis of Evil,” and the Bush Administration presented evidence the North Koreans were covertly operating the reactor at Yongbyon.
• TERRIBLE: By 2003, the North Koreans had disabled IAEA inspection equipment at Yongbyon, and quit the NPT (for real this time).
• GOOD: In 2005, the “Six Parties” (North Korea, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States) held talks yielding an agreement on “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards.”
• TERRIBLE: In October 2006, the agreement crumbled when North Korea tested a small nuclear device in an underground explosion.
• GOOD: Following a renewal of the Six Party talks in 2007, North Korea agreed to permanently disable the Yongbyon reactor in exchange for $400 million in food and energy aid.
• In 2008, caving to North Korean pressure, the Bush Administration removed the country from the state sponsors of terrorism list, and the IAEA was back to work inspecting dismantled facilities.
• TERRIBLE: Then in April of this year, the North launched a multistage rocket, announced it was quitting the Six Party talks, again, and began reprocessing nuclear fuel. This month, North Korea successfully tested a much larger underground nuclear explosion (Russia estimates it at up to 20 KT, the size of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs), as well as defensive missiles.

The long and tortured history of negotiations with North Korea says just one thing: no agreement will ever satisfy the Kim regime. We have offered food aid, energy assistance, even help with light-water peaceful nuclear reactors. In exchange we have received promises not worth the paper they’re written on. Now there are some suggesting a complete US-DPRK peace and normalized relations will do the trick. It won’t. Instead, it is time to consider whether diplomacy has run its course with North Korea.

But an end to diplomacy does not have to mean military action. The threat posed by North Korea is not principally a direct threat of nuclear or conventional attack. Certainly, the US, Japan and South Korea must be prepared to defend against a direct attack, and to retaliate with overwhelming force should the North be so foolish as to deploy a nuclear device. But far more likely is that North Korea will continue its pattern of supplying nuclear materials and know-how to other rogue regimes and non-state groups who can act as proxies for its policies of irritating and threatening US and Western interests.

The smart response to this policy is not to offer more concessions, but to withhold all benefits of a negotiated settlement. Instead, we must impose tough, multilateral sanctions, a complete shipping embargo, and an absolute foreign energy blackout. It may sound cynical, but at least right now—summertime in the Northern hemisphere—the regime will suffer more than its people if we cut off the power. Food aid, medicine, and other essential products should keep coming, accompanied by clear messages to the North Korean people that this is a crisis brought on by the obstinate and reckless behavior of their own government.

This is not a positive outcome, or an appealing strategy. But that’s the problem with diplomacy—it can work miracles, but when you run up against completely intransigent regimes, sometimes there’s nothing to be done but wait them out.

No related posts.

At a meeting Tuesday with former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), and former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, President Obama summed up the group’s deliberations on the goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons:

“This is a reminder of the long tradition of bipartisan foreign policy that has been the hallmark of America at moments of greatest need, and that’s the kind of spirit that we hope will be reflected in our administration.”

It’s great to hear this from the President who also made “bipartisanship and openness” an official plank in his campaign platform, and now identifies it as a key to effective US national security and foreign policy for his Administration.

You might think Obama’s commitment to bipartisan consultation and cooperation on national security would win nothing but plaudits from a group of former leaders obviously assembled not just for their substantive expertise, but for their bipartisan credibility. So then what are we to make of George Shultz’s reply, in the role of spokesman for the elder statesmen? Not once, but twice, the former Reagan administration official remarked that President Obama was wrong about nuclear disarmament being a “bipartisan issue,” because:

“It’s really nonpartisan. This is a subject that ought to somehow get up above trying to get a partisan advantage. And it’s of such importance that we need to take it on its own merits. And that’s the way we’ve proceeded. And that’s the way, at least it seems to us, you’ve proceeded.”

I suppose Mr. Shultz has earned the right to disagree with the President on national television, but really, isn’t this a distinction without a difference? Why harp on nomenclature when the point is the same? The purpose of the meeting and the public statements afterward was to demonstrate that working toward a world without nuclear weapons is a goal on which current and former leaders from across the political spectrum can find consensus. It just doesn’t matter what you call that sort of agreement. What matters is getting it.

On the other hand, I think Secretary Shultz was pointing toward at least one legitimate objection to the term “bipartisan.” Over the past few months, as the President has fought to win Republican support for his major economic recovery initiatives, the media appropriated “bipartisanship” for a much more superficial purpose. Whether a policy action or legislative proposal was “bipartisan” became just a question of whether Republicans joined the Democratic majority in voting for it. Shultz is right when he says that our country’s commitment to nuclear disarmament needs to be bigger than politics.

My advice to the big shots at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue? Please don’t waste time and taxpayer dollars arguing over syntax. Pakistan is building more nuclear weapons even while tottering on the brink of state failure, North Korea has tested a bomb already, and Iran claims to have a nuclear-capable rocket with terrifying range and accuracy. These threats won’t wait while we hash out precisely the right definition for good national security policy. As long as you get the job done in a way that puts results ahead of politics, you will have the support of the American people.

No related posts.

Right on schedule, Sunday morning President Obama received the campaign trail’s notorious “3 a.m. phone call” that promised to test his mettle in the early days of his presidency.  Incidentally, “the call” happened to be a knock on the door of his Prague hotel room by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs at 4:30 a.m. local time, and Obama happened to be waiting with one hand on the receiver and the other on his foreign policy playbook.  Three hours later, after Japan had watched North Korea’s three-stage rocket fly ominously over the northern tip of its main island before plunging into the Pacific Ocean, President Obama took the stage in Prague for a scheduled speech on the fitting subject of nuclear non-proliferation.

North Korea’s bold defiance of international nuclear weapons regulations has been a matter of grave concern since the rogue state removed itself from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003.  Three years later, Pyongyang burrowed even deeper into the abyss of international alienation when it expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and conducted a test of a nuclear weapon, albeit ostensibly unsuccessfully.

Three days ago, North Korea’s alleged attempt to launch a satellite into orbit demonstrated its potential to carry a nuclear warhead as far as Alaska.  But amid the hawkish cries for preemptive action and the widespread calls for a “strong response” to North Korea’s “provocative” launch, one-third of the UN Security Council’s 15 members remain tentative.  In fact, the reluctance to take a firm stand — shared by two of the Council’s five permanent members, China and Russia — has led to a stalemate, with not even a modest warning yet agreed upon as a suitable punishment.   This indecisiveness has left many in the international community confused and frustrated.  After all, North Korea flagrantly violated UN Security Council resolution 1718, which explicitly banned it from testing ballistic missiles.  But China’s UN Ambassador Zhang Yesui pleaded with Council members to “refrain from taking actions that might lead to increased tensions” and Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin maintained that “the core element in this situation is the six-party talks” to denuclearize North Korea, which have been dormant for months.

President Obama’s response to Russian and Chinese leadership has been characterized as soft, especially since recent polling data indicates that a majority of the American public favors military action to eliminate North Korea’s ballistic missile capability.  Pyongyang’s actions, however, do not constitute a distinct nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, but rather represent just one piece of the global nuclear security puzzle.  Obama’s focus must continue to remain on the eventual goal of eliminating worldwide nuclear proliferation which requires, above all, a unified position held by all members of the Security Council.

An International Crisis Group briefing paper published last week by Gareth Evans reiterated the sentiment that “an overblown response would likely jeopardize the six-party talks to end North Korea’s nuclear program”, stating further that “what is needed is a calm, coordinated response from the key actors to raise pressure on Pyongyang to return to the talks rather than a divided reaction.”  Evans also appropriately likened North Korea’s launch to a “tantrum” — the stunt is irritating and disruptive, but not immediately threatening.  North Korea’s status as a sovereign state constrains it to the fundamental geopolitical model of nuclear deterrence.  Assuming just the slightest shred of rational thought on Kim Jong-Il’s part, a nuclear strike on Japan or South Korea is extremely unlikely as it would trigger North Korea’s immediate demise.  This line of reasoning should by no means be interpreted as a pardon to allow North Korea’s unchecked proliferation, however the true threat lies not in Kim Jong-Il’s hands, but rather in the hands of terrorist organizations that could fill the vacuum left behind should the unstable government collapse into a failed state or should Pyongyang become willing to sell nuclear material and technological know-how to prospective customers like Al-Qaeda.  In Prague, President Obama echoed this fear, calling terrorist possession of nuclear weapons “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.”  Malevolent non-governmental organizations like Al-Qaeda represent the only true overlap of the “capable” and the “willing” with regards to the use of nuclear weapons.  This fact makes the task of securing all vulnerable nuclear material around the world of paramount importance.  Obama announced his intention to achieve this goal, in cooperation with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, within the next four years.

Obama’s strategy for the containment of vulnerable material is only one phase of his broader trajectory toward a world free of nuclear weapons.  Regardless of whether or not such a future world lies within the realm of possibility, the most important stepping stone is a cooperative effort to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  But the NPT stands for more than just non-proliferation, and the treaty runs the risk of amounting to nothing more than the ultimate nuclear grandfather clause if the U.S. and Russia do not hold up their end of the bargain and make clear strides toward large-scale disarmament.  On cue, Obama and Medvedev unveiled their plans to renew the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which is due to expire in December, by this July.  Obama further demonstrated his dedication to renewed multilateral engagement with his hopes of making the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism durable international institutions, as well as promoting his plan for the U.S. to host a Global Summit on Nuclear Security this year.

Global security in the 21st century is only attainable through global cooperation.  Heavy threats and harsh rhetoric aimed at North Korea have only raised tensions and fueled its appetite for its increasingly isolated game of brinkmanship.  A strong response is important, but a unified response is essential.  The U.S. must stand shoulder to shoulder with the rest of the UN Security Council to pursue calm, responsible, and cooperative multilateral diplomacy designed to convince North Korea that its political and economic interests are best served under the protective international shelter of the NPT and the IAEA.  Soft power can be a very effective means of achieving hard security, especially when exercised in concert by the entire free world.

No related posts.

The latest trend in media coverage of the Obama Administration seems to be to ask variations on the question, “Is he doing too much?” Most of these stories focus on the ambitious domestic agenda, but the scope of the suggested foreign policy overhaul, particularly when it comes to rethinking bilateral relationships, is no less dizzying.

Less than two months into the Administration, President Obama and Secretary Clinton have telegraphed their intention to change the landscape surrounding some of our most troubled relationships.  Clinton went to China on her first trip and emphasized cooperation over conflict.  Just a couple of weeks later, she sat down with her Russian counterpart and pledged to “reset” the relationship, despite handing FM Lavrov a red button that read “overload” in Russian.  While in Israel, Clinton dispatched two envoys to talk to Syria.  Same trip — invitation extended to Iran to sit down in the same room with Clinton and discuss Afghanistan.  Now, throw in the Congressional changes to the Cuba travel policy that Obama has supported.

For those scoring at home, that’s one member of the Axis of Evil, two A of E wannabes and our two biggest headaches on the Security Council.  I’ve personally blogged about the need to reach out to Iran, Syria and Cuba, and PSA recently put out a statement about renewing the U.S.-Russia relationship.  So I would humbly suggest to the media that the question is not whether Obama is doing too much, it is whether any of the other countries will respond as he hopes they will.

There is a question of moral hazard here.  When presented with an open hand, will these countries see any consequences in responding with a clenched fist?  After Bush’s belligerence, will they view Obama’s openness as a free pass to do as they wish?  They may view the transition to Obama in the U.S. as insulation from any real risk regardless of their actions.

You may notice that I haven’t mentioned North Korea yet.  The DPRK is also on Obama’s to-do list and provides an early example of the pushback the Administration should expect.  Just the wiff of an olive branch in the air seems to have riled them up, leading to an announcement of a missile launch and accusations that the U.S. is planning to invade.  True, the DPRK is the crazy uncle of the Axis of Evil, so it’s hard to extrapolate anything from its behavior.  Still, while the other countries mentioned do a somewhat better job of presenting a diplomatic face to the world, all of them have also made political hay over the years out of being in opposition to the U.S.  Those habits will be hard to break.  Already, Cuba is reportedly considering letting Russia use its bases for strategic bombers.  Iran has said the U.S. must change to have successful negotiations.  All of these countries are testing the waters, trying to determine exactly what the Obama Administration will be willing to do if rebuffed.

For eight years, the world has dealt with a Bush Administration whose negotiating tactics managed to make carrots look like orange-colored sticks.  In contrast, the Obama Administration runs the risk of seeming a little too eager to please.  Their efforts are not going to be any more effective than Bush’s if the folks sitting on the other side of the table believe that there aren’t any sticks at all.

Threats and bullying did not change these countries over the past eight years, but four years of polite conversation won’t be any better.   When the Obama Administration gets these countries behind closed doors, the negotiators need to be a little more forthcoming about the consequences of refusing to play ball.  After all, we still want these countries to change.  And these countries still don’t want to change.  With the Bush Administration, there was always the implicit threat of military action against rogue states, a threat that became impotent after the mismanagement of Iraq.  Obama is going to need a different set of sticks.

Maybe the answer is that he can use his current popularity worldwide to push our allies (and almost-allies such as Russia and China) to join us in truly turning the screws on the rogue states through a unified front of sanctions and economic isolation.  Otherwise you may see most of these countries deciding that there is more benefit to saying no to the U.S. than yes.

No related posts.