Obsession with Nuclear Deterrent Doesn’t Add Up

by Matthew Rojansky | February 3rd, 2010 | |Subscribe

Volha Charnysh

Retired Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral James Lyons argued in a Washington Times opinion piece on Monday that the US should “halt our participation in the START negotiations until we bring balance back into the equation.” The equation to which Lyons refers is that of nuclear deterrence: by maintaining the ability to destroy any potential nuclear-armed adversary, the logic runs, we can ensure that none will attack the United States. Unfortunately, a focus on the conventional logic of deterrence doesn’t fit in a world where the most urgent threats to US national security are posed by terrorists and other non-state actors who are difficult to identify, much less deter.

Lyons asserts that Russia has “embarked on an aggressive modernization program to field new nuclear weapons” and seeks a “breakout” capability, allegedly so that it could quickly build and deploy new weapons after withdrawing from any new arms control treaty. China, he adds, may be emboldened if the US commits to nuclear reductions, triggering a panic among our East Asian allies. Our looming nuclear weakness, the Admiral concludes, is exacerbated by the proliferation threats of North Korea and Iran.

Each of these assertions twists reality, but even if true, none would justify withdrawing from bilateral arms control, which is essential to protecting Americans from the clear and present danger posed by proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials to those most likely to use them against us. In recent Senate testimony, the Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, himself a retired four-star Admiral, called the possibility of terrorists acquiring nuclear capability a “top concern,” and noted that traditional means of deterrence would likely be of “less utility” against such a threat. For that reason the President has committed to stopping proliferation at its source, by halting the spread of nuclear weapons to new states, and securing fissile materials. These efforts depend greatly on US-Russian cooperation, since our two countries possess over 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons and material. A new agreement to replace the expired START treaty is an absolutely essential first step. (more…)

Goodbye to 2009: The year in review

by David Isenberg | December 22nd, 2009 | |Subscribe

This is my last post for 2009 I thought I would write about Afghanistan but on second thought I will, no doubt, be doing that quite a lot during 2010. Thanks to the Obama Administration’s surge strategy Afghanistan will, from a blogging viewpoint, be the gift that keeps on giving.

So, as we contemplate whether 2010 will be better or worse let’s take a moment to consider 2009. In the spirit of Dave Barry’s classic annual year in review column let’s acknowledge, albeit with some poetic license commentary by moi, a few of the significant events that made, however briefly, the headlines.

Although it started on Dec. 28 2008 the month of January saw massive Israeli air strikes and a ground force invasion of the Gaza Strip. Heavy fighting took place in Gaza City between the Israeli forces and Hamas. At least 1300 Palestinians were killed. On Jan. 17 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced a unilateral ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, declaring that Israel has achieved the goals it set when launching the military operation. On Jan. 21 Israel completes its troop withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

Also that month President Barack Obama signed executive orders closing the US detention camp at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, within a year; closing the CIA’s secret prisons; requiring a review of military trials for terror suspects; and requiring all interrogations to follow the non-coercive methods specified in the Army Field Manual.

Of course, nobody knew back then that the camp would end up in Illinois. One can only hope that the inmates are not too acclimated to the Caribbean climate to adjust to a midwest winter.

On Jan 27 Hama declared that it previously was just kidding and broke the ceasefire by attacking an Israeli frontier patrol. Israel immediately responded that it lacks a sense of humor and renewed its air strikes on the Gaza Strip border with Egypt.

On Feb. 3 Iran launched its first domestically built satellite into orbit. Iran stated that the satellite is meant for research and telecommunications purposes, but Western states express concern that the technology could be used in the development of ballistic missiles. The U.S. intelligence community, estimating that Iran will show the same swift progress with its missiles that it did with its nuclear program, predicted the next flight will be in 2040.

On Feb. 6, renewing their classic rivalry, a British and a French nuclear submarine collided in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Political leaders from both countries sighed in relief that it was merely submarines and not their respective football fans that collided. (more…)

Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons for sale

by Volha Charnysh | September 14th, 2009 | |Subscribe

Charnysh_NK

To succeed, a state should specialize in products in which it has a comparative advantage, according to economist David Ricardo. Ricardo focused on tangible goods traded in the international market. However, states also possess another, by no means less marketable characteristic – reputation. A cause of many conflicts and wars, international standing is a commodity by itself because it can be turned into commercial advantage. The importance of reputation goes beyond attracting potential investors and trade partners. Studies show that concerns over reputation can ensure a state’s compliance with treaties and international norms, including the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

No state can thrive on international standing alone. However, reputation can reinforce or undermine the value of other marketable commodities and even influence the state’s export decisions. While comparative advantage in manufacturing arms offers a great source of export income, selling wrong arms into wrong hands can tarnish a state’s international reputation and offset its profits with resulting sanctions and embargos.

What can North Korea export, given its lack in valuable resources and technological expertise? North Korea’s highest-valued commodities include armaments as well as minerals, metallurgical products, and textiles. Its main customers are South Korea and China. (more…)

DPRK: China Loves Me, China Loves Me Not

by Michael Landweber | June 8th, 2009 | |Subscribe

Two recent blog posts by John Pomfret over at the Washington Post got me thinking about how much more complicated China’s position on North Korea has become since the beginning of the Obama Administration.

As Pomfret points out in his May 27 post, for many years the U.S. has been waiting for China to solve the North Korea problem without realizing that our goals are not aligned.

First, there’s a silly assumption in Washington that our interests (no nukes in North Korea) are the same as China’s. But they’re not. China’s first interest in North Korea is making sure the Kim regime doesn’t collapse. China’s second interest? Making sure the Kim regime doesn’t collapse. From Beijing’s perspective, nukes in North Korea rank somewhere around 10th.

Pomfret goes on to give a great explanation about why regime change is the real threat to China.  At the end of the day, as long as the DPRK could be coaxed to the negotiating table, China was satisfied that it was not falling apart.

Then, a few days later, in a June 6 post, we get the following from Pomfret:

There are surprising noises coming from China these days about North Korea. One influential Chinese academic thinks China’s policy — long supportive of the hermit kingdom — might be changing.

So, what happened in less than a week?  Has China finally realized that no nukes is their number one priority?  Not exactly.  Turns out China, as evidenced by the Zhu Feng article that Pomfret is referring to,  may be realizing that the regime in Pyongyang is not interested in negotiations and doesn’t care what Beijing thinks.

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The Good, Bad and Terrible on DPRK

by Matthew Rojansky | May 27th, 2009 | |Subscribe

The Dear Leader
The “Dear Leader”

In the 2008 Presidential Campaign, and in President Obama’s subsequent speeches, there has been a lot of very sensible and justified emphasis on diplomacy over military force. If nothing else, this Administration seems to have a much lower threshold for initiating diplomatic dialogue and a much higher threshold for cutting it off. But there must be times when Democrats and Republicans, conservatives, neocons, and liberals, can agree that diplomacy just isn’t enough.

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Bipartisanship by any other name

by Matthew Rojansky | May 21st, 2009 | |Subscribe

Obama and Shultz at the White House on May 19 (AP photo)
Obama and Shultz at the White House on May 19 (AP photo)

At a meeting Tuesday with former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), and former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, President Obama summed up the group’s deliberations on the goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons:

“This is a reminder of the long tradition of bipartisan foreign policy that has been the hallmark of America at moments of greatest need, and that’s the kind of spirit that we hope will be reflected in our administration.”

It’s great to hear this from the President who also made “bipartisanship and openness” an official plank in his campaign platform, and now identifies it as a key to effective US national security and foreign policy for his Administration.

You might think Obama’s commitment to bipartisan consultation and cooperation on national security would win nothing but plaudits from a group of former leaders obviously assembled not just for their substantive expertise, but for their bipartisan credibility. So then what are we to make of George Shultz’s reply, in the role of spokesman for the elder statesmen? Not once, but twice, the former Reagan administration official remarked that President Obama was wrong about nuclear disarmament being a “bipartisan issue,” because:

“It’s really nonpartisan. This is a subject that ought to somehow get up above trying to get a partisan advantage. And it’s of such importance that we need to take it on its own merits. And that’s the way we’ve proceeded. And that’s the way, at least it seems to us, you’ve proceeded.”

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A Call From Arms

by John Prandato | April 8th, 2009 | |Subscribe

http://knowledgenews.net/moxie/moxiepix/a1393.jpg

Right on schedule, Sunday morning President Obama received the campaign trail’s notorious “3 a.m. phone call” that promised to test his mettle in the early days of his presidency.  Incidentally, “the call” happened to be a knock on the door of his Prague hotel room by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs at 4:30 a.m. local time, and Obama happened to be waiting with one hand on the receiver and the other on his foreign policy playbook.  Three hours later, after Japan had watched North Korea’s three-stage rocket fly ominously over the northern tip of its main island before plunging into the Pacific Ocean, President Obama took the stage in Prague for a scheduled speech on the fitting subject of nuclear non-proliferation.

North Korea’s bold defiance of international nuclear weapons regulations has been a matter of grave concern since the rogue state removed itself from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003.  Three years later, Pyongyang burrowed even deeper into the abyss of international alienation when it expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and conducted a test of a nuclear weapon, albeit ostensibly unsuccessfully.

Three days ago, North Korea’s alleged attempt to launch a satellite into orbit demonstrated its potential to carry a nuclear warhead as far as Alaska.  But amid the hawkish cries for preemptive action and the widespread calls for a “strong response” to North Korea’s “provocative” launch, one-third of the UN Security Council’s 15 members remain tentative.  In fact, the reluctance to take a firm stand — shared by two of the Council’s five permanent members, China and Russia — has led to a stalemate, with not even a modest warning yet agreed upon as a suitable punishment.   This indecisiveness has left many in the international community confused and frustrated.  After all, North Korea flagrantly violated UN Security Council resolution 1718, which explicitly banned it from testing ballistic missiles.  But China’s UN Ambassador Zhang Yesui pleaded with Council members to “refrain from taking actions that might lead to increased tensions” and Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin maintained that “the core element in this situation is the six-party talks” to denuclearize North Korea, which have been dormant for months.

President Obama’s response to Russian and Chinese leadership has been characterized as soft, especially since recent polling data indicates that a majority of the American public favors military action to eliminate North Korea’s ballistic missile capability.  Pyongyang’s actions, however, do not constitute a distinct nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, but rather represent just one piece of the global nuclear security puzzle.  Obama’s focus must continue to remain on the eventual goal of eliminating worldwide nuclear proliferation which requires, above all, a unified position held by all members of the Security Council. (more…)

Moral Hazard and the Olive Branch

by Michael Landweber | March 16th, 2009 | |Subscribe

The latest trend in media coverage of the Obama Administration seems to be to ask variations on the question, “Is he doing too much?” Most of these stories focus on the ambitious domestic agenda, but the scope of the suggested foreign policy overhaul, particularly when it comes to rethinking bilateral relationships, is no less dizzying.

Less than two months into the Administration, President Obama and Secretary Clinton have telegraphed their intention to change the landscape surrounding some of our most troubled relationships.  Clinton went to China on her first trip and emphasized cooperation over conflict.  Just a couple of weeks later, she sat down with her Russian counterpart and pledged to “reset” the relationship, despite handing FM Lavrov a red button that read “overload” in Russian.  While in Israel, Clinton dispatched two envoys to talk to Syria.  Same trip — invitation extended to Iran to sit down in the same room with Clinton and discuss Afghanistan.  Now, throw in the Congressional changes to the Cuba travel policy that Obama has supported.

For those scoring at home, that’s one member of the Axis of Evil, two A of E wannabes and our two biggest headaches on the Security Council.  I’ve personally blogged about the need to reach out to Iran, Syria and Cuba, and PSA recently put out a statement about renewing the U.S.-Russia relationship.  So I would humbly suggest to the media that the question is not whether Obama is doing too much, it is whether any of the other countries will respond as he hopes they will.

There is a question of moral hazard here.  When presented with an open hand, will these countries see any consequences in responding with a clenched fist?  After Bush’s belligerence, will they view Obama’s openness as a free pass to do as they wish?  They may view the transition to Obama in the U.S. as insulation from any real risk regardless of their actions.

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Testing the New President

by David Isenberg | October 30th, 2008 | |Subscribe

This is the last post I will write before the presidential election. I do not pretend to know what the outcome will be but if the polls are right it appears that Senator Obama will be the next U.S. president. If so, it is likely that it won’t be long before, as his running mate Sen. Joe Biden said, that he will be tested. The same thing could be said even if Sen. McCain wins.

The truth is that in respect to many different foreign policy and military issues the United States has been acting like a not very proficient juggler, tossing balls into the air in an effort to keep them from falling to the ground.

The truth is that the time that some dubbed the “unipolar moment” which all the neoconservatives were crowing about years ago, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and U.S. victory in Operation Desert Storm, is long gone.

Just consider what the next president of the United States will confront. In respect to Iraq there might not be an accepted Status of Forces Agreement, meaning U.S. troops will lack legal authority to remain there. U.S. officials say they would have to cease operations and confine troops to bases unless some other arrangement, such as an extension of the U.N. mandate, could be worked out.

In respect to Iran, aside from its nuclear program, a new president will have to deal with what seems to be an ongoing program of U.S. sponsored covert violence to bring about regime change. A new paper by the Century Foundation detailing this program concludes that:

We can expect more incidents, and we can expect the risk of retaliatory incidents to increase. As that happens, the point resurfaces. When does Iran reach its tipping point and begin to fight back, not with words, but with expanded terrorist acts?

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U.S. Military Spending: Too Much Bipartisanship

by David Isenberg | October 6th, 2008 | |Subscribe

One might think that the current crisis roiling the American economy might be an opportunity for Senators Obama and McCain to spell out their differences on one important issue; U.S. military spending.

Consider the fact that on September 24th, during the fight over the Wall Street bail out, the House of Representatives passed, bill passed by a vote of 392-39, a $612 billion defense authorization bill for 2009 without any public protest or meaningful press comment. This show there is unlikely to be any significant pressure to cut military or related national security spending.

Instead, Senators Obama and McCain seem to be reading off the same page. That is the kind of bipartisanship we do no need. The time is long past for someone to stand up and say the obvious; that both military and associated “national security” spending is out of control and continually getting more outrageous.

The latter category includes nuclear weapons spending at the Energy department, plus the State department, as well as Veterans Affairs, and the intelligence agencies. All together that totals exceeds a trillion dollars annually.

Let’s stipulate that there are multiple factors which impact U.S. military spending. And yes, while the financial crisis will increase pressure to reduce military spending, other countervailing political factors will ensure that there likely will be no significant reduction.

Why is this? The primary reason is that the United States is at war, even if is an undeclared one and one which the country is largely disengaged and removed from. And no politician dares cutting military spending for fear of being accused being ‘soft on defense” or not “supporting the troops.”

Unlike the situation at the end of the 1980s and early 19980s there is nothing comparable to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, which drove significant reduction in U.S. military spending.

Today the situation is reversed. The United States is fighting the “long war” (formerly known at the global war on terror) and politically both the incumbent administration and the opposition party are reluctant to cut military spending at such a time.

Sadly, there is nothing in the campaign platforms of either Sen. John McCain or Barrack Obama to suggest that they would significantly reduce military spending.

In fact McCain says the United States must enlarge the size of its armed forces. That alone will guarantee that operation and support costs, traditionally one of the highest categories of U.S. military spending will stay high.

Likewise Sen. Obama supports plans to increase the size of the Army by 65,000 soldiers and the Marines by 27,000 troops.

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