Guns, Butter, And Band-Aids: A Three-Tiered Approach to Foreign Policy

In the early hours of a tropical morning in January 2010, the Baltimore-based U.S. Navy hospital ship Comfort docked two kilometers off the coast of Port-au-Prince, Haiti equipped with military, U.S. Public Health Service, nongovernmental organization, and international organization personnel ready to respond to the raw wounds of the island nation still trembling from a 7.0 magnitude earthquake that had struck only days earlier. Despite initial doubts from the Pentagon that the ship was needed as another member of a swiftly-deployed fleet of similarly-equipped Navy and Marine vessels to the island[1], the U.S.N.S. Comfort quickly became a household name for U.S. military relief efforts due to the ship’s remarkable capability to quickly provide wounded Haitians a stable, secure place to receive desperately needed medical care. Not to be understated were the colossal efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development.  This agency was designated to spearhead the U.S. intergovernmental agency response to the tragedy, which deployed disaster assistance personnel within a day of the crisis’ occurrence and continues to rebuild Haiti nearly two years later. Monitoring on-the-ground developments in Haiti, the U.S. Department of State preserved its strong tradition of diplomacy with the Haitian government and the international community; thereby assuring the distressed country that it had an ally in its long fight to recover, rebuild, and thrive.

The confluence of missions on the ground in Haiti reflects the latitude of the U.S. military, diplomatic, and humanitarian aid communities that ultimately advance overall U.S. goals in a positive light. Prior to the disaster, the U.S. gave over $200 million through USAID to Haiti in FY 2009. In FY 2010, the U.S. gave Haiti over $350 million through USAID and $450 million through DOD. Additionally, the U.S.N.S. Comfort’s response to the earthquake was not its first trip to the island, having stopped there in April 2009 en route through Latin America on another humanitarian mission. During an emergency, our military has the ability to respond instantaneously and provide a secure working environment for humanitarian assistance to occur. Without trusted diplomatic relations, the Haitian government wouldn’t have known who to help lead them toward normalcy. Even in non-emergency situations, U.S. foreign aid ensures continuity of leadership so that when crises do occur, the world looks to the U.S. as the Haitian government did in its time of catastrophe.

Crises like the earthquake in Haiti emphasize the critical role foreign aid has in a robust national security agenda that is earnest and proactive through a well-rounded approach, and not a reactionary, single-approached strategy. Unfortunately, cutting foreign aid has become a catchphrase proposal in conversations about solving our country’s debt and deficit crisis. In a tight budget environment, this notion can be appealing. Why continue to send funds overseas that could be used to better the lives of Americans at home? This, however, is a short-sighted solution to a multi-pronged problem. Foreign aid is an investment in the present and the future. The solution is not to cut foreign aid simply because it holds a line on the national checkbook; rather, the key rests in finding common operational themes with the military, diplomatic, and development communities to ensure our foreign aid dollars are maximized, our values are promoted abroad, and our leadership maintains its trustworthiness.

By having our military, diplomacy, and humanitarianism complement each other, the U.S. can achieve not only the goals of both the military and foreign policy, it can come together to provide a platform for the U.S. to do more globally. This is far easier said than done. Operationally, the military, diplomatic, and foreign aid communities have experienced turf wars over competing foreign policy objectives. The military’s inherent role is to defend the country while the foreign aid community’s objective is to enhance quality of life. Diplomacy remains the chief non-coercive method to advance U.S. interests overseas; however, the field has experienced deepened ties to both defense and foreign aid since September 11, 2001 that don’t particularly please members of the defense or aid communities.

Still, foreign aid as national security is here to stay, and this point has been acknowledged and supported by our military leadership. On June 9, 2011, then CIA Director and our current Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, in his confirmation hearing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, testified that foreign aid through education, agriculture, health, and justice programs are assets in the national security agenda. Specifically addressing the acquisition of weapons from terrorist groups in Pakistan, Secretary Panetta stated, “I know the U.S. Department of Defense is our primary military weapon in terms of securing weapons, but if we don’t follow it up with these other important assets, we will never be able to fully secure these countries.”[2] U.S. national security is not simply our military capacity; it is our value-projection through diplomacy and humanitarianism, without which, the globe will come to fear and distrust the U.S.

Any time an event of such magnitude to destabilize an already weak society occurs, like the humanitarian emergency in Haiti or even the sociopolitical uprisings in Libya, the U.S. must consider the interests it has at stake on the ground because intervention into every emergency is not feasible. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell outlined a rubric against which defense, diplomatic, and development officials can determine whether a situation is worth intervention in what is termed the “Powell Doctrine.” The core aspects of the Powell Doctrine include an accurate determination that vital national security interests are in jeopardy, an analysis of risk, consequence, and cost, a clearly-defined and attainable objective and a strategy to achieve that objective to ultimately avoid an endless engagement, and the strength of support at home and abroad. These decisions cannot—and should not—be made by one branch of national security and foreign policy communities.

Despite the stark differences between the three extensions of foreign policy, there is common ground to be found. Military personnel can provide security in an unstable situation for diplomats, aid workers, and American citizens caught in a crisis. At times, military personnel can even engage in distributing relief aid and supplies if the situation warrants, and they can do so indefinitely should the stability of a situation call for this commitment. The military ensures speed of access because it has the equipment needed to enter a situation quickly. Diplomacy, however, is contextual in nature. Diplomats specialize in understanding the culture, society, and general environment of a country and work tirelessly to ensure the preservation of congenial relations with foreign governments. Diplomats can facilitate on-the-ground activity not only with their U.S. counterparts but also with other governments and their counterparts in those bodies.

Development workers possess the strength of longevity, ensuring action on the U.S. core values with the citizens of a foreign country. Development workers are flexible and motivated by the results they see on the ground, ensuring that U.S. values are understood and promulgated. Ultimately, the military has the resources to create stability, diplomats have the knowledge to provide stability, and development workers possess the stamina to preserve stability.

The cases of Libya and Haiti show how the U.S. is developing a humanitarianism policy as a means to promote its values and assert its leadership abroad. While this may not entirely be the planned course of action, it is the direction in which the U.S. is heading. There are three main ways for the U.S. to ensure the success of this route and recognize the strength of each foreign policy community. First, the U.S. must maintain its foreign aid program. Foreign aid allows the U.S. to proactively seek a stable world instead of being reactive with force. Problems are increasingly becoming global in nature and do not always require the military to solve. Further, it is expensive in both terms of human lives and money. Second, the U.S. must maintain its force projection. Force projection allows the U.S. to maintain its values while keeping the ability to act on them swiftly if needed. Finally, the U.S. needs to encourage a more engaged civil society through strengthened funding for the Peace Corps, Foreign Service, and nongovernmental organizations. Without an engaged civil society, the support for U.S. foreign policy dries up and discourages the public and international support needed to intervene in a crisis.

Among our most pressing national security priorities, leadership is one of the most critical. If the U.S. is going to intervene when our values of democracy, human rights, equality, and opportunity are at stake, we need to show an example of leadership at home. Furthermore, a foreign policy that doesn’t give equal respective weight to the contributions of its three tiers is destined to chip away at the world’s perception of the U.S.’s capabilities to lead. The long-term cost of a destabilized world in which disengagement is the currency between nations is higher than the cost of current U.S. investments in foreign aid, which account for less than 1% of our federal budget.

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2. Crossing the Rubicon
3. Too Important to Fail: The Least Bad Call on Afghanistan

After America

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America’s decline and China’s rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: “But, please, let America not decline too quickly.” Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader’s expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America’s demise.

For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor — not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes.

While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system — for instance, another financial crisis — would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue.

The leaders of the world’s second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America’s uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America’s leading role.

China, invariably mentioned as America’s prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system’s dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America’s role in the world. Beijing’s leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership.

At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China’s international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China’s key neighbors — India, Japan, and Russia — is ready to acknowledge China’s entitlement to America’s place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China’s neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century — violent and bloodthirsty.

At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America’s global preeminence — and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America’s decline. The states in that exposed position — including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East — are today’s geopolitical equivalents of nature’s most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist.

A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America’s economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others’ development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents.

Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons — shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America’s decline would generate global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America’s collapse would probably come to regret it. And as the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy — or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.

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A subdued but respectful ceremony marked the end of combat operations in Iraq.  A flag was rolled and encased, and speeches respectful of the fallen and hopeful for the future were made.  Signs of friendship between the two countries were left in the hearts of both peoples and policies are in place to continue non-military support to a continually developing democracy in Iraq.  A joyous America will see her military members return celebrating a job well done and remembering those who paid the ultimate price.

This is in stark contrast to the images scared into the American psyche of a helicopter rising from the roof of the embassy in Saigon in April of 1975, an event that most recognize as the end of a terrible chapter in America’s history.

The Vietnam experience still reflects one of the worse times in our history.  The failed political policies that resulted in only marginal military successes during this time period are only rivaled in grandeur by the incense of the American public for the war.  The nightly reports on a budding television news medium of the American dead, eventually summing over 58,000, brought the graphic images of war to the American public for the first time.

This American public, already gushing with disdain for an unpopular war was further galvanized by events such as the My Lai Massacre and the shooting of students at Kent State University.  The resulting wave of anti-war protest reflecting the overall feeling of the country produced not only a backlash against the politicians involved and their failed policies, but also contempt for the very soldiers that were fighting and dying in the war.

As the military returned home, their limited tactical successes were dwarfed in the public eye by the view of the military as a failure, albeit due to numerous factors beyond its control.  Thousands of military members with lifelong mental or physical scars were practically discarded by a disinterested public.  There were no ceremonies, no parades, only a country ready to bury this memory and forget all things associated with Vietnam.  A single helicopter flying away from an overrun embassy seemed to be a fitting end.

As the Iraq war comes to a close, so much is different about this ending than the ending of the Vietnam experience.  Some may question the policies and politicians that brought us into the war, but by in large no one questions the way the military has performed its duties.

This is not to say that the military has escaped this lengthy conflict unscathed by controversy.  The events such as the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, the killings in Haditha, friendly fire incidents and the recent controversy of the handling of the remains of the war dead all call into questions tactics used by military members, but never the overall conduct of the military during the conflict.

American public’s support has endured these controversies as well as other tough times throughout the war.    It has endured a persistent conflict despite President Bush’s declaration of “mission accomplished,” an Iraqi insurgency that expanded our involvement, a 2007 call for a troop surge, continued reports of Improvised Explosive Devices killing U.S service members and the reports of the bloody conflicts in places like Fallujah and Anbar.  All of these were challenging times for the military, yet support for the troops remained.

There were, however, events along the way that highlighted the courage of our service members and produced recognition by Americans of the contributions the military was making to a free Iraq.  The capture of Saddam Hussein and the elimination of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, are just two examples of the courage and valor of our military displayed every day during this conflict.  One of the most poignant moments celebrated by our country was when an Iraqi woman stood from her seat in the U.S. Capitol during a State of the Union speech proudly displaying an ink stained finger having just voted in an Iraqi election for the first time.  A proud moment made possible by the sacrifices of our military.

As military members have returned home from Southwest Asia over the years (sometimes after 2, 3 or more deployments) they arrive to a different reception from the members that served in Vietnam.  Rousing applause by Americans on airplanes and in airports, a reception that moves most military members to tears, replaced being spat upon, harassed and jeered in airports when military members returned from service in Vietnam.  Overwhelming support for our wounded warriors, as exemplified by enormous contributions to programs like the Wounded Warrior Project, is common place versus the neglect experienced by the wounded returning from Vietnam.

There will be no national victory parade recognizing the end of the Iraq War, like the one seen after Operation Desert Storm.  However, there will be celebrations across America, much as we’ve seen over the past 10 years, to recognizing military men and women for their sacrifices as they return home.   A free and independent Iraq exists today because of the valor displayed by the U.S. military and our allies, another reason to celebrate as we welcome our troops home.

A simple ceremony and a grateful nation mark the end of the Iraq War.  The goodbye to the Iraq War is different in so many ways from the goodbye we said to the Vietnam War so many years ago.  For the veterans who endured the sacrifices during any war, thank you.  For an American public who persevered the Iraq War – job well done.

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The great debt-ceiling fight of 2011 produced partisan politics at its finest.  It also produced a congressional Super Committee tasked to identify $1.5 trillion in deficit reduction by late 2011.  With this daunting task at hand, where does one think the Super Committee will go pursue budget cuts?   One answer is the U.S. government department that has a $680 billion budget.  Thus, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has his top captains scouring the department for cuts – anywhere.

Rather than addressing the Department of Defense (DOD) economic condition with relatively small budget cuts as it has done over the past several years, the DOD and the nation would better be served by going after first order assumptions.  Specifically, asking the hard question: Are the military Services really a joint force and, if so, can the DOD nix expensive duplication of the tools of warfare?  Can Secretary Panetta go beyond merely cutting programs that are deemed outdated or ineffective, and look deeper into the fundamental questions about Service core competencies, missions and responsibilities?

For years, the DOD has operated in the same manner, with Service parochial budget fights being the norm in the programming process.  Every force sustainment dollar has been disputed, and most modernization programs developed in a Service-centric vacuum with only peripheral crosstalk between the Services regarding missions. The result:  monumental fights for funds and minimal momentum for change.  While this practice has produced an armed force that is beyond compare, it has also forged a dogmatic budgetary process where service rice bowels take precedent over the nation’s budget.

So where does that leave Mr. Panetta as he considers how to continue to sustain our superior fighting force into the future while not putting the nation’s bottom line at risk?  Does the DOD continue to address Service budgets program by program, dollar by dollar?  Do they continue in the endless cycle of funding the Department then cutting around the edges?  Or do they take a different approach – one that readdresses the core functions of each Service and eliminates funding for duplicative missions.

Much has been made of the nation’s ability to fight “jointly” since the 1986 Goldwater Nichols Act required the Services to play nicely together – one team, one fight.  Either the DOD and Services are committed to this joint fight or they are not.  Currently, words do not match deeds.  Each of the Services possessing its own air forces suggests a lack of trust amongst them to provide core functions when the bullets or bombs are flying.

So one question Secretary Panetta should ask is why does DOD have four air forces?  That is, why does each Service have an air component and why do so many of the missions overlap?  Aircraft are programmed for, and fielded by, each Service that perform similar missions, the obvious example being fighter aircraft like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter currently under development.  A fundamental relook at Services’  air missions, with, for example the Air Force providing that function to all services, could save the Navy, Army and Marine Corps the requirement for many air assets allowing them to better focus resources on their own core missions.

The same logic could be used for the enormous proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles and other intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets.  This has not only produced a crowded airspace over the battlefield, but also led to the same platforms being operated by different services.

Another example of overlap can be found in the counterinsurgency mission where DOD has leaned toward the Army and Marine Corps as the likely choices to lead irregular and hybrid campaigns in the future.  This makes sense given the ground intensive nature of these missions.  If this role is cast to these two Services, Air Force and Navy resources currently spent on counterinsurgency should be reallocated to the Army and Marine Corps.

By taking a fundamental look at these high-demand missions, it would make more sense to pin these missions on one Service to organize, train and equip a force to support the whole joint warfighting team, reaping economies of scale and efficiencies that such a consolidation would provide.

This different way of approaching funding challenges would be the next step in the evolution of a Joint Force, where all Services operate in full complement of each other without expensive duplication of mission or effort.  Over the last 30 years, Services have evolved into a Joint force able to operate seamlessly in any battlespace.  However, the “Jointness” quickly fades when it comes to funding Service specific programs.

By defining Service responsibilities that do not overlap, the DOD could realize a Joint force that is not only able to operate jointly, but at its core, also be able to operate within a budget that maximizes every dime of the tax payer’s dollar.

The DOD is working hard to find savings where it can, but the Super Committee could soon come calling looking for more.  To truly propel the services into the 21st century and not break the U.S. budget, Mr. Panetta must go further.  To effect true change, one must not simply shift the clay within the mold, but break the mold and start anew.

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Among the many issues that Defense Secretary Leon Panetta must ponder in the coming months will likely be whether to recommend shifting U.S. strategy in Afghanistan from counterinsurgency to counterterrorism.

Some critics argue that our current policy of deploying large numbers of ground troops puts more of our men and women at risk for questionable gain and even encourages more Afghans to join the Taliban, fighting against what they claim is an invasion force. Yet the recent gains in clearing out Taliban strongholds and helping to build schools, medical facilities and other civic institutions argue, instead, for staying the course for several more years.

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Last week, as the unrest in the Middle East raged on, Iran and Senegal broke up.  At the heart of the matter was the seizure of a shipment of weapons from Iran allegedly headed to the separatist Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces (MFDC) movement, which has engaged in a low-level insurgency against the Senegalese government for three decades.  Outraged, Senegal ended diplomatic ties with Iran, a move that Iran labeled “illogical.”

Regardless of the logic involved, the split could significantly set back Iranian efforts to push into Africa – efforts which Senegal, a 95 percent Muslim majority country with friendly ties to the United States, had been central to.  In the last several years, Iran, keen to spread its influence into Africa as it faced increased diplomatic pressure from the West, proposed major economic projects in the West African nation, ranging from infrastructure modernization to plans for a car plant that would sell the Iranian Khodro car.  In return, Senegal expressed support for the Iranian nuclear program.

But last fall the Iranian soft power story turned on its head when it morphed into a weapons caper.  In October, Nigerian officials seized 13 containers of weapons – including mortars, ammunition, and rockets – from Iran en route to Gambia, sparking suspicion that MFDC was the intended recipient of the cache.  Initially, Senegal recalled its Ambassador from Tehran despite Iran’s explanation that the arms shipment was bound for Gambia as part of a bilateral agreement (Gambia, which has a strained relationship with neighboring Senegal, broke diplomatic relations with Iran over the incident as well).  Then, on February 23^rd, after evidence showed that Iranian weapons were used by the MFDC to kill Senegalese soldiers, the diplomatic break became official.

For Iran, several political, economic, and security implications may result from this.  Although Senegal is roughly the size of South Dakota, it commands diplomatic influence in Africa.  And, as an August 2010 Congressional Research Service report pointed out, Iranian interest in Senegal also appeared to focus on “Iran’s attempt to foster cohesion with Muslim leaders while countering Arab cultural and political influence in Africa, and the perceived potential for Senegal to serve as a base for Iranian exports to the region.”  The incident has now jeopardized those strategic priorities.  Furthermore, if, as suggested by a new U.S. intelligence report quoted by the Associated Press, Iran is looking to gain a foothold in Africa in order to tap into its large uranium reserves, the fallout from this incident could hinder that aim as well.

On a larger scale, the Iran-Senegal split also raises important questions about the extent of Iran’s overall economic influence.  Even prior to the split, major Iranian-sponsored projects in Senegal had yet to come to fruition.  For example, few of the highly publicized Iranian Khodro cars have been sold.  Moreover, as Afrik-News described, the most important projects have not taken shape:

“In 2006, faced with an unprecedented energy crisis, [President Abdoulaye] Wade called his Iranian friends to the rescue. It was time for the Iranians to prove their worth in times of need. Numerous projects were to be embarked upon: The purchase of crude oil at unprecedented rock-bottom prices; A partnership between the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC) and the Société Africaine de Raffinage (SAR); The construction of a mega oil tank farm. Projects that looked good on paper, but were never to see the light of day.”

As Iran tries to spread its influence in Middle East power vacuums, the challenges it currently faces with in Senegal are instructive with regard to the constraints of the Islamic Republic’s reach.  Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad once proclaimed that there are “no limits to the expansion of [Iran’s] ties with African countries.”  Now it has become clear that limits do exist.  And when they are pushed, serious ramifications may be around the corner.

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Since the Afghan war began, NATO and Afghanistan have become inextricably intertwined.  The linkage culminated at last year’s NATO summit where the 60^th anniversary of the alliance sparked the assertion that Afghanistan could be the alliance’s make-or-break test of the 21^st century, despite other looming challenges.

This year’s summit in Lisbon, Portugal, meanwhile, was billed as a turning point in the war and the beginning of the transition process.  This past weekend, members formally agreed to the end of combat operations in Afghanistan by 2014.  But setting a timetable is only one key component of this process; having a competent security force to hand responsibility off to is the other.  Thus, NATO’s mission to train the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) is just as integral to the endgame.

Earlier this month, the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), which provides and better coordinates existing training of the ANA and ANP, celebrated its first anniversary.  Over the first year of the mission, there have been some notable positive outcomes, namely substantial growth in number of both the ANA and the ANP.  But there have also been some notable challenges, like corruption and illiteracy, which are hindering the effort.  All in all, a robust effort is still needed to create a viable Afghan security force.  Yet the program still needs nearly 1,000 more trainers to be able to fully complete the development of the forces.

The importance of getting the training component of the Afghan strategy right was made even clearer by the findings of the Asia Foundation’s poll “Afghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People,” which is the broadest public opinion poll in the country.  Among them, this year’s poll showed the continuing influence that the security situation is having on the attitudes of the Afghan public, especially when it comes to whether they think Afghanistan is headed in the right direction.  The 47 percent of respondents who said the country is moving in the right direction (which was up from 38 percent in 2008 and 42 percent in 2009) mainly attributed that view to a “the perception of good security.”  Conversely, though, 44 percent of the respondents who said that the country was headed in the wrong direction cited insecurity as the main reason.

The ANA and ANP get mixed reviews as well.  While the majority of respondents believe they are largely effective, they also think that the ANA and ANP are “unprofessional and poorly trained and require the support of foreign troops.”

NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has expressed regret that a formal training effort did not begin sooner.  The challenge of that, though, may not be the time wasted as much as the momentum that could be lost.  In particular, our European allies, who are considered the best able to contribute more resources to training the army and police, have been growing skeptical about continuing their missions in Afghanistan.  Now, working with smaller defense budgets, and facing a new age of austerity and increasing domestic unease over the Afghan war, it may become even more difficult for these countries to keep their training commitments.

The Economist characterized the abundance of agreement at the Lisbon meeting as “a rowless summit.” Symbolically, this was important.  But just after the summit ended, a NTM-A review reportedly warned that transitioning control to Afghan forces “would not happen with the current shortfall of hundreds of experts needed to train the local police and army.” Thus, there are likely rows to come, and NATO’s mettle will be tested by its ability to secure continued commitments for Afghanistan from its reluctant members.

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Kay King, Vice President of Washington Initiatives at the Council on Foreign Relations, recently released a report entitled Congress and National Security arguing Congress’s increasing inability to effectively address major domestic and international challenges has severe ramifications for U.S. national security.

King points to contributing factors which have led to a decline in Congressional effectiveness, including amplified partisanship, abuse of rules and procedures, outdated committee structures, decreased expertise, and competition with domestic programs. She specifically addresses how the toxic partisan atmosphere has contributed significantly to Congress’s mixed performance on its national security responsibilities:

…the nation’s political landscape has been realigning since the 1970’s, ushering in deep partisanship, severe polarization, a combative 24/7 media, and diminished civility. Over time, this environment has given lawmakers greater incentive to advance personal and partisan agendas by any means, including the manipulation of congressional rules and procedures. It has politicized the national security arena that, while never immune to partisanship, more often than not used to bring out the “country first” instincts in lawmakers. It has also driven foreign policy and defense matters, short of crises, off the national agenda, marginalizing important issues like trade. Combining this increasingly toxic political climate with an institutional stalemate in the face of mounting global challenges and it is not surprising that Congress has struggled for years to play a consistent and constructive role as a partner to as well as check and balance on the executive branch on international issues.

King then goes on to recommend reform in five critical areas: prompt and inclusive action on budgets and legislation, timely and knowledgeable advice and consent on treaties and nominees, realistic and effective oversight, closing the expertise gap, and bolstering the congressional-executive branch partnership on national security policy.

The entire report can be found here.

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This public support for New START reflects the strong bipartisan backing the treaty has from top national security leaders such as the thirty signatories of PSA’s statement on New START, who include ten former Senators, four Secretaries of State, four Secretaries of Defense, and three National Security Advisors, as well as the Chair and Vice-Chair of the 9/11 Commission among others.

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As one of the final priorities for the 111th Congress, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty has  the “unanimous support of the United States military” and enjoys strong, bipartisan support from our nation’s most respected national security experts.

New START is an urgent national security priority—and should be divorced from partisan bickering and the electoral process.  As Secretary Clinton reminded reporters yesterday, “When it comes to foreign policy, it is important to remember that politics stops at the water’s edge.”  Key Republicans and Democrats from the past seven administrations have strongly endorsed this treaty.   The Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of the service chiefs, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, six former secretaries of state, five former secretaries of defense, the chair and vice chair of the 9/11 Commission, seven former heads of U.S. Strategic Command and Strategic Air Command—and countless others, all agree that the Senate must ratify New START.  The elections do not alter this support.

New START reinstates a stringent verification regime that allows U.S. inspectors to once again monitor Russia’s nuclear arsenal.  It has already been 333 days and counting since we’ve had boots on the ground in Russia.  Lt. General Dirk Jameson, former Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff of STRATCOM has urged the Senate to ratify New START and reinstate these critical verification procedures, warning that, “Every day that we delay is another day we aren’t getting the security and intelligence benefits we urgently need.”  Gen. Jameson concluded, “Without prompt Senate action, American national security will be at risk.”

When Congress returns to Washington on November 15, Senators need to respect the advice of our military and national security leadership and ratify this important treaty.

Yesterdat, Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell echoed the calls to ratify New START, saying:

“The previous START pact has lapsed, and along with it, the provisions for verification also have lapsed, Morrell noted.  “So we hope the … Senate will address this as quickly as possible when they reconvene after … the recess for the elections,” he said. “There’s no sense in putting off what we need now to the next Congress.”  Morrell said urging action to be taken soon doesn’t mean Pentagon officials think ratification stands a better chance in the current Congress than it would with the next Congress. “We’re advancing this now because we think it is the right thing to do,” he said. “It is what’s needed by our country at this time.”

As Lt. Gens. John Castellaw, Arlen Jameson, Donald Kerrick and Brig. Gen. John Adams advised: “When the Senate reconvenes after the elections, its top priority should be taking the advice of our military leadership and ratifying the treaty.”

Ratifying New START is not just something that the Senate can do; it’s something that it must do.

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