Crossing the Rubicon

Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently visited Israel and called for greater engagement between our two countries. Given the fact that it’s difficult to find a closer political bond between two countries anywhere in this galaxy, one would surmise that there’s little distance to travel to cement the relationship between our two democracies. After all, we share similar values, ideals and interests.

There exists, however, a singular and important difference within this triangle of bonded friendship. Israel lives in a neighborhood that is far more unstable than that enjoyed by the United States. The geographic proximity of those whose stated goal is to vanquish the state of Israel — and who could soon have the capacity to do so — causes the Israelis to view threats through a different prism.

Patience and diplomacy might be the virtues of statecraft, but when an avowed enemy is close to placing a nuclear knife on your throat, well, the demands for action are likely to override the pleas for restraint.

Iran has used deceit and obfuscation to paint over the window into their activities. The world is left to speculate whether Iran is a year or more away from putting a nuclear genie into the head of a missile or into the headquarters of a pharmaceutical production facility.

So what is Israel, or the United States, to do? President Obama has intensified former President George W. Bush’s policy of imposing economic sanctions against Iran, and the European Union could cut off future purchases of Iranian oil. Yet many question whether the international community’s imposition of economic hardship on the Iranian oil sector will be sufficient to persuade Iran’s leaders to alter their current uranium-enrichment activities.

In the past, Israelis have not hesitated to attack those whom they believed posed an existential threat to their state. The destruction of Iraqi and Syrian nuclear plants offers proof enough of their determination never to face the threat of a second Holocaust.

Iran, however, presents a far more difficult challenge than those once posed by Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Assad. The elements of Iran’s nuclear program are dispersed over a large geographical area. Many of its research and development facilities are buried underground. Israel might decide to launch an attack against Iran’s facilities, but such an operation would quickly lose the surprise advantage and would likely take many days, not just hours, to complete.

As we assess the threat that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to Israel, it’s important to remember that Iran’s leadership is not entirely irrational. It’s possible, but I believe unlikely, that they would consider conducting a nuclear strike against Israel. The real danger, I think, that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose is that other countries in the region would feel compelled to either develop or purchase nuclear weapons as a deterrent. With more countries joining the nuclear fraternity, the risk that an extremist group would acquire one of these weapons is greatly enhanced. If this were to happen, there is a good chance that Armageddon would play at a theater near you.

Although Israel remains on the front line of nightmare scenarios, it’s important to be mindful that it is not the only nation that would face both the predictable and untoward consequences of a military attack against Iran.

If such a strike were carried out, it would probably succeed in rallying virtually all of the Iranian people to the defense of their country. Any hope that the West might hold for the ripening of Iran’s Green Revolution would quickly dissipate, as Iranian citizens would turn red with hatred for those who supported such an attack. American military and civilian personnel deployed throughout the Gulf region would likely be victims of those who are masters in the dark art of terrorism.

President Obama has asked Israel not to take preemptive, unilateral action. According to news reports, the Israelis have chosen to remain silent. Fair enough — no country is required to disclose to others the place and timing of its military options should a decision be made to exercise them.

Privately, however, the Israelis have an obligation to keep American leadership fully informed of its plans. Israel’s actions have consequences for the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other countries in the region. A regional conflict would affect much of the industrialized world.

Israel’s defense minister, Ehud Barak, has offered public assurances that any plans to take military action against Iran are very “far off.” But “far off” is a relative term and can easily become “lift off” if the Israelis decide that diplomacy has failed and they have no other option. But Israel also must understand that if it resorts to military action, it will be taking its friends across the Rubicon with them.

Related posts:

1. William Cohen: What the U.S. Should Do About Iran
2. Why EU Sanctions May Hurt the West More than Iran
3. The Iranian Challenge and Implications for U.S. Policy

The range of possible outcomes include the following:

1. The EU oil embargo holds and the Iranian economy takes a huge hit hurting the Iranian middle class and the Green Movement more than the regime;
2. Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz prompting a US military response and potentially a military exchange between the US, NATO, and Iran;
3. Iran refuses to give in causing a spike in oil prices that cause the price of gas and food to soar in the US and EU;
4. The oil embargo is successful and Iran abandons its nuclear program.

Obviously the fourth option is the one that the EU is hoping for; however, it is the least likely and the other three possible outcomes should be of great concern to the US, Europe, and NATO. The driving force behind Iran’s nuclear ambitions lies in its desire to assert regional hegemony in the Middle East and build the strategic power necessary to counter US influence in Iraq and Northern Africa. Giving into the pressure of sanctions would destroy the image of military strength and political influence that the Iranian regime has attempted to cultivate over the past ten years. At the same time, Tehran has been very clear that they are willing to, and capable of, closing the Strait of Hormuz; recent military exercises in the Strait should be considered a clear indication that interference with their oil exports will result in the closing of the most strategically important trade route for the West

If Tehran decides that it does not want to risk a war over the Strait of Hormuz, we could be left with a combination of outcomes one and three, both of which hurt middle class, working citizens of Iran and the EU more than anyone else. In some EU countries 12-30% of the imported oil comes from Iran. An abrupt cessation of that trade would cause a huge shortage and therefore, an increase in the  price of oil for EU citizens. This leads to price increases in heating oil, gasoline, transportation, food, and the general cost of living. In the already troubled and depressed economies of the EU, this could lead to even more public discontent and economic volatility. While EU officials have said that they would be able to replace Iranian imports, they have not described their alternatives with specificity.   New agreements involving oil often require lengthy negotiations and the increased output necessary from potential suppliers like Saudi Arabia and Russia may incur new costs of their own. Also, Russia has been an ally to Iran and it is not inconceivable that they would refuse to supply the extra oil to the EU in an effort to pressure them to reverse the sanctions.

In Iran, where the government subsidizes energy prices along with bread, sugar, medicine, cooking oil, rice, and other necessities, a drop in government revenue could mean that these essential items are no longer available to those who need them. Furthermore, a worsening of the Iranian economy due to actions by the European Union only bolsters the regime who will spin the issue to convince the public that the development of a nuclear weapon and the bargaining power and deterrence ability that follows is essential to Iran’s national security and sovereignty.

Iran has consistently claimed that its nuclear program is for civilian purposes only. While IAEA inspectors have reported that Iran does have the capability to create a nuclear weapon within a short period of time, they have found no evidence of Iran actually weaponizing uranium. Also, despite bellicose statements about Israel, Iran has been careful to avoid suggesting it would actually detonate a nuclear weapon if it did possess one. Discounting the power of diplomacy could severely hinder the possibility of a peaceful solution with Iran. The first step in this process should not be an increase in sanctions, but a diplomatic effort to convince Iran to stop producing highly enriched uranium and stick with low-enriched uranium which is sufficient for energy production but not easily weaponized.

Related posts:

1. William Cohen: What the U.S. Should Do About Iran
2. Crossing the Rubicon
3. The Limits of Iran’s Reach

As an American with more than average interest and experience in Russia, it is a mystery to me why, unlike virtually every other country on earth, U.S. policy has tended to be so dependent on the personal relationship between the respective leaders.

This was especially true of Presidents Clinton, with the late Boris Yeltsin, and George W. Bush, with then-President Vladimir Putin (“I looked the man in the eye.”). This mystery of Russian relations is not totally confined to U.S. leaders: Remember Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s famous report to President George H.W. Bush on Mikhail Gorbachev as “a man we can do business with.” A humorist might call it the vodka syndrome, except Clinton was never known as a drinker and, of course, the second President Bush had sworn off alcohol.

This is a cause for reflection, when the question is raised as to how the United States might go about organizing its Russian relationship if Vladimir Putin were to be driven to the sidelines by an emerging, though putative, Russian Spring. Recent weeks have witnessed virtually unprecedented (for Russia) mass rallies in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other cities of what journalists have described as emerging middle-class Russians.

Those of us who have a history of frequenting Russia and keeping in touch with developments there are increasingly asked about what this means, whether it will continue or go away, and who is behind it. None of these questions is authoritatively answerable, at least for the time being. Like much of the uprisings of 2011 in the Middle East and North Africa, the Russian movement includes a number of factions and profiles. Together with middle-class protesters who seem, at least for now, not to have a cohesive ideology, there are Russian nationalist and aging communists, disgruntled pensioners and groups flying the banners of disparate causes.

At a distance they seem united, for now, by an attitude toward Putin that ranges from mild distrust to outright antipathy, even hatred. And again, like the Arab Spring, no single leader or small coterie of leaders has emerged to champion the uprising and give it direction. You can’t beat something with nothing, as the old saying goes. And the Arab Spring has given way to faction fighting, sectarian struggles, and citizen- versus-security-forces clashes. To be charitable, the hard work of democracy has begun … and without a Jefferson, Madison or Hamilton among them.

Those Russophiles among us, driven much less by dreamy nostalgia for Tolstoy and Tchaikovsky than by the certain realization that the United States and Russia have many more interests in common than we have differences, choose to believe that the incipient movement toward democracy embraces demands for multiple party elections; media freedom including protection from violence of reporters who uncover corruption; transparency in government operations; an end to cronyism; an independent and honest judicial system; and many of the other basic qualities and institutions normally characterizing democratic societies.

Even during the worst Cold War days, and certainly during the Gorbachev era of glasnost and perestroika, everyday Russians would tell Westerners: “We simply want an ordinary life; we want to live like everyone else.” That could be this movement’s anthem.

But if the Russophobes among us could let up for a time (and there are more of those in foreign policy circles than we would like to imagine), we might have a chance to institute a far-reaching bilateral policy emphasizing our mutual interests, minimizing our differences and seeking Russian support where it would be welcome and meaningful. That includes dealing with Iran and its nuclear potential; quarantining North Korea; managing the five Muslim republics on Russia’s southern border; isolating and crushing terrorism; countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; stabilizing world energy distribution systems; and a host of similarly important problems.

This agenda, including lending moral support for the nominally democratic movement in the Russian streets, should operate regardless of whether Vladimir Putin is reelected Russia’s president. Great powers, it has been said even before the arch-realist Henry Kissinger came along, do not have permanent friendships — they have permanent interests. In the great scheme of things, it matters less how Barack Obama (or for that matter, even Newt Gingrich) gets along with Putin or his successor and much more on whether we can identify and pursue, over several successive American administrations, those real and important permanent and mutual interests.

It is manifestly in the interest of the United States to do so. Years from now it will finally come to our understanding that our relationship with Russia is one of our most important.

Related posts:

1. An “Iron Hand” is No Substitute for Democracy
2. Why EU Sanctions May Hurt the West More than Iran
3. A Time to Lead

For the vast majority of Americans, watching the last American boot leave Iraqi soil is nothing short of good riddance. The numbers have become seared in Americans minds: Nearly nine years. Nearly a trillion dollars spent. Nearly 35,000 US soldiers wounded. Nearly 4,500 US soldiers dead.

The long-term effect of the Iraq War is pretty obvious—a national sentiment for retrenchment—a streak of isolationism that is being espoused by both sides of the political spectrum. It’s hard not to watch Texas Republican Governor Rick Perry warn against “military adventurism” without comparing him to his predecessor.

But despite the desire to go inward, the simple fact is that if there was any hope for the US to go on the sidelines, that’s changed forever with the onset of the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring has reminded the world of the danger of failed states. With long-time dictators losing power, militant Salafists (not solely Al Qaeda) are looking to fill the vacuum.

But the Arab Spring also comes with a new challenge—a new type of interventionism.

That new interventionism will not look like Afghanistan of 2009-2011—where we put boots on the ground in order to take out a ruling, rogue power. It will also not look like Pakistan—where our intervention will largely rely on airpower (unmanned predator drones in particular) with a small, light on-the-ground footprint to conduct reconnaissance and special operations, but with no motive to change the leadership.

The new interventionism will be a mix of two factors. Like Pakistan, it will be heavy on airpower, light on boots. Like Afghanistan in 2001, the effort will involve removing a rogue power, but with a slight difference. The intervention will not lead the effort to remove a rogue power, but will enable an indigent rebel to do the job.

In other words, it’s the fullback strategy of foreign intervention. The new intervention does not mean playing the halfback, taking the ball to the endzone for the touchdown. It means playing the full-back, creating the hole for the indigenous rebel groups to score the winning touchdown.

In this case, the main objective is very different. The hope is helping enable a victory on the ground that forestalls a long, drawn out war that creates the type of environment where a terrorist group can take hold.

The merits of the new (or fullback) approach to interventionism contrasts, for example, how the Iraq War was executed.  Because the new interventionism does not do the heavy lifting, it doesn’t overrule the will of the people in a given country.

Also, because the interventionism largely relies on airpower, with limited if any boots on the ground, it makes it easier and more likely to develop the type of multilateral coalition that is associated with legitimate and successful interventionist endeavors. And because of the airpower focus and multi-lateralist character of the intervention, the result is greater political legitimacy, a substantially decreased likelihood of casualties, and, therefore, staying power to finish the job.

In short, the new paradigm of successful intervention is not Afghanistan or Pakistan, but Libya. Heavy on firepower, multi-lateralism, and a limited mandate that paves the way for a rebel victory, not a Western one. While the removal of Qaddafi is an enormous immediate benefit, the long-term goal is preventing the drawn-out civil war that would make Libya a terrorist launchpad.

But ignoring the inclination towards isolationism is not only good for the Middle East. Successful, limited intervention also benefits the United States. When the US is involved in liberation that increases US influence in the world. This is not only an upside in the Arab World, but it means improving our soft power in other parts of the world, including areas where we are competing for influence with China.

And it also revives the notion of American humanitarian sway. The greatest casualty of the Iraq War is that it dampened our ability in the eyes of the world. We were distracted from ongoing operations in Afghanistan. We had a slow response to atrocities in Darfur. Now, the fullback humanitarian approach is attached to the heightened likelihood of intervention. That could have a deterrent effect on would be genocidaires and reinvigorates the idea of American power.

It’s not easy to ignore a nine-year war where America lost valuable blood and treasure. But isolationism is the easy approach. Isolationism was the approach after 1919 and the world was in the midst of another world war twenty years later. The goal is not taking the ball and going home. The goal is finding a pragmatic approach that means greater political stability, the return of American influence, and the preservation of innocent life. Just don’t call it leading from behind.

Related posts:

1. A Time to Lead
2. No-Fly Zone Over Libya: A Case for Multilateralism
3. Graeme Bannerman: Libya, A Costly Victory

A subdued but respectful ceremony marked the end of combat operations in Iraq.  A flag was rolled and encased, and speeches respectful of the fallen and hopeful for the future were made.  Signs of friendship between the two countries were left in the hearts of both peoples and policies are in place to continue non-military support to a continually developing democracy in Iraq.  A joyous America will see her military members return celebrating a job well done and remembering those who paid the ultimate price.

This is in stark contrast to the images scared into the American psyche of a helicopter rising from the roof of the embassy in Saigon in April of 1975, an event that most recognize as the end of a terrible chapter in America’s history.

The Vietnam experience still reflects one of the worse times in our history.  The failed political policies that resulted in only marginal military successes during this time period are only rivaled in grandeur by the incense of the American public for the war.  The nightly reports on a budding television news medium of the American dead, eventually summing over 58,000, brought the graphic images of war to the American public for the first time.

This American public, already gushing with disdain for an unpopular war was further galvanized by events such as the My Lai Massacre and the shooting of students at Kent State University.  The resulting wave of anti-war protest reflecting the overall feeling of the country produced not only a backlash against the politicians involved and their failed policies, but also contempt for the very soldiers that were fighting and dying in the war.

As the military returned home, their limited tactical successes were dwarfed in the public eye by the view of the military as a failure, albeit due to numerous factors beyond its control.  Thousands of military members with lifelong mental or physical scars were practically discarded by a disinterested public.  There were no ceremonies, no parades, only a country ready to bury this memory and forget all things associated with Vietnam.  A single helicopter flying away from an overrun embassy seemed to be a fitting end.

As the Iraq war comes to a close, so much is different about this ending than the ending of the Vietnam experience.  Some may question the policies and politicians that brought us into the war, but by in large no one questions the way the military has performed its duties.

This is not to say that the military has escaped this lengthy conflict unscathed by controversy.  The events such as the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, the killings in Haditha, friendly fire incidents and the recent controversy of the handling of the remains of the war dead all call into questions tactics used by military members, but never the overall conduct of the military during the conflict.

American public’s support has endured these controversies as well as other tough times throughout the war.    It has endured a persistent conflict despite President Bush’s declaration of “mission accomplished,” an Iraqi insurgency that expanded our involvement, a 2007 call for a troop surge, continued reports of Improvised Explosive Devices killing U.S service members and the reports of the bloody conflicts in places like Fallujah and Anbar.  All of these were challenging times for the military, yet support for the troops remained.

There were, however, events along the way that highlighted the courage of our service members and produced recognition by Americans of the contributions the military was making to a free Iraq.  The capture of Saddam Hussein and the elimination of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, are just two examples of the courage and valor of our military displayed every day during this conflict.  One of the most poignant moments celebrated by our country was when an Iraqi woman stood from her seat in the U.S. Capitol during a State of the Union speech proudly displaying an ink stained finger having just voted in an Iraqi election for the first time.  A proud moment made possible by the sacrifices of our military.

As military members have returned home from Southwest Asia over the years (sometimes after 2, 3 or more deployments) they arrive to a different reception from the members that served in Vietnam.  Rousing applause by Americans on airplanes and in airports, a reception that moves most military members to tears, replaced being spat upon, harassed and jeered in airports when military members returned from service in Vietnam.  Overwhelming support for our wounded warriors, as exemplified by enormous contributions to programs like the Wounded Warrior Project, is common place versus the neglect experienced by the wounded returning from Vietnam.

There will be no national victory parade recognizing the end of the Iraq War, like the one seen after Operation Desert Storm.  However, there will be celebrations across America, much as we’ve seen over the past 10 years, to recognizing military men and women for their sacrifices as they return home.   A free and independent Iraq exists today because of the valor displayed by the U.S. military and our allies, another reason to celebrate as we welcome our troops home.

A simple ceremony and a grateful nation mark the end of the Iraq War.  The goodbye to the Iraq War is different in so many ways from the goodbye we said to the Vietnam War so many years ago.  For the veterans who endured the sacrifices during any war, thank you.  For an American public who persevered the Iraq War – job well done.

Related posts:

1. Guns, Butter, And Band-Aids: A Three-Tiered Approach to Foreign Policy
2. A New Approach to Interventionism
3. Will Senators Have the Midas Touch?

Two decades ago, our opinion survey of the Soviet Union during perestroika showed a huge divide between hardline communists and the young, urban Russians who backed Boris Yeltsin and favoured a free market economy. Last weekend’s election results show how the divide endures 20 years on.

Just 50 per cent of Russians approve of multi-party politics according to the Pew Global Attitudes Survey and half consider it a misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists. By a margin of 57 to 32 per cent, Russians believe that having a “strong leader” is more important than a democratic government. This is the conviction that, for more than a decade, fuelled the popularity of Vladimir Putin, but is now beginning to pall. His “look-at-me” style appeared when the economy was on the rise but a combination of inflation and stagnant living standards is prompting many Russian voters once again to signal their unhappiness with the status quo. This search for leaders who will deliver economically holds an important lesson for the Middle East where the democratic tide still swells despite panicked opposition from some and the efforts of others to regulate its tempo.

When people take to the streets, they want to believe that a new government will lead to greater prosperity, but this is often a triumph of hope over experience. Russians remember Boris Yeltsin not as the hero who freed them from communism, but as the bumbler who presided over the free fall of their economy and failed to pay their pensions. Even today, 61 per cent of Russians believe the 20-year-old political transformation has had a negative impact on prosperity. There is a widespread perception that elites have enjoyed the spoils of “democracy”, while ordinary citizens have been left behind.

Our survey in Egypt – conducted after Hosni Mubarak’s departure -– found hopes similar to those once existing in Russia. A 56 per cent majority expected the economy to improve. Instead, it has sagged amid continuing political uncertainty. What is clear is that revolutions tend to create unsettled conditions, which, at least in the short-term, retard economic growth.

Decades of communist propaganda, emphasising social conformity over private initiative, left the newly-independent Russian Federation ill-prepared for capitalism. The Yeltsin government’s version of economic reform was rushed, plundered by profiteers, and implemented at a time when record low oil prices drained revenue from the national treasury. Many Russians saw their social safety nets disappear while the well-connected few became obscenely rich – all under the mantle of democracy. So there is little wonder that the majority rushed to embrace Mr Putin when he arrived on the scene in 1999, promising a strong hand and the restoration of lost benefits. People like to vote, but they need to eat, and Mr Putin, more than Mr Yeltsin, seemed able to deliver what mattered most. But just as Mr Putin received credit for the Russian Federation’s resurgence, so now he is blamed by many for its recent sluggishness and for the government’s failure to share the benefits of oil wealth.

Arabs will have an easier time than ex-Soviets did in supporting privatisation and decentralisation. Calls for reform are stronger in the Arab world than they were in Russia 20 years ago. But the overriding question remains whether newly-democratic governments can meet expectations. Economic restructuring can take years to yield dividends. As Russia’s experience shows, haste is not a solution. But revolutionaries are not known for patience.

Russia’s trajectory and our Middle Eastern surveys suggest three principles for nurturing democracy. First, economic progress is vital. Vibrant political parties matter, and so do competent administrators, transparent laws for business, a stable climate for investment and policies aimed at developing a middle class. Second, fairness counts. New leaders will have more time to succeed if they are given credit for insisting on equitable treatment. That means collecting taxes from rich and poor, creating courts free from political influence, protecting minority rights and providing basic services to slums and suburbs alike.

Finally, it is essential to do everything possible to prevent the idea of democracy from being hijacked by those promising an easier way. The “iron hand” is an illusion, not a solution. One can readily imagine an Arab version of Mr Putin arising, offering a platform that exploits economic yearnings and cultural pride, and that uses democratic means to seize power but then refuses to relinquish it.

Arab protestors have not raised the banner of democratic reform so that their countries may one day revert to autocracy. That danger exists, but so does the chance to build something far greater. Even at its best, democracy can be frustrating, and slow, but it remains the superior means for uniting disparate populations, resolving disputes, and generating prosperity. We can but hope Arab populations will learn – not repeat – the Russian experience.

Related posts:

1. Rethink our Russian Relationship
2. Graeme Bannerman: Libya, A Costly Victory
3. A Time to Lead

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta asserted recently that critics of the Libyan mission “have been proven wrong.” Now, with the death of dictator Muammar Qadhafi, the secretary’s view is supported by the overwhelming majority of Washington’s foreign policy establishment.

But this won’t be the first time that Washington may be proven wrong. Even conceding the unlikely outcome that the Libyans overcome their tribal, regional, and political differences to establish a democratic state, the long-term costs of U.S. involvement are likely to far outweigh the benefits.

Related posts:

1. No-Fly Zone Over Libya: A Case for Multilateralism
2. Yemen: Widening the Scope
3. A New Approach to Interventionism

Washington (CNN) — Longtime observers of the Middle East are baffled by allegations that high-ranking officials in the Iranian government approved a plan to assassinate Saudi Arabia Ambassador, Adel al-Jubeir, and blow up the Saudi and Israeli embassies in Washington. Commentators have described the plan as “brazen,” but “bizarre” and ‘bone-headed” might be more appropriate adjectives.

It’s difficult to comprehend either the motives or the means selected to carry out the plan outlined by the Justice Department in its criminal indictment of Manssor Arbabsiar and Gholam Shakuri. Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are not new, but Iran has been both cautious and clever enough to restrain its ambitions for regional dominance.

If the allegations of the assassination and bombing plot are true, and the covert operation had proved successful, Iran’s leaders would have invited retaliation on a scale far more vigorous than any they might have contemplated. Indeed, I think it’s fair to say that the Iranian landscape would likely have been substantially altered.

Assuming, however, that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad never authorized the action or were ever aware of it, both have great cause for concern. Elements in their covert, black bag, assassination/ terrorist unit were planning an attack that could have brought about the decapitation of their leadership, the obliteration of their ambitions to enter the nuclear weapons club and quite possibly have precipitated a global depression by engulfing the region in war. Rather than dismissing the plot as a Zionist fabrication, these leaders should be looking inward and holding accountable those who were responsible for undertaking such a dangerous and destructive mission.

While awaiting greater clarification from those responsible for moving forward with the prosecution against Arbabsiar and Shakuri, the United States should explore several options:

1. Bring the assassination and bombing plan to the United Nations Security Council and seek much tougher sanctions against Iran;

2. Encourage Saudi Arabia to review and revise its contractual arrangements with any country that refuses to support the imposition of tougher sanctions against Iran;

3. Intensify the effort to expose the activities of those nations who are circumventing the existing sanctions against Iran;

4. Make it clear to all members of the U.N. that Iran’s nuclear weapons program poses a serious threat to global stability. If a non-nuclear Iran initiated an assassination plan through a Mexican drug cartel, what would it be tempted to do once it possess a nuclear weapon?

5. Strengthen our ability to keep the Persian Gulf open should hostilities ever break out;

6. Force the administration and Congress to move forward on improving the defense posture of our friends and allies who are threatened by Iran;

7. Urge Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States to move more aggressively in constructing coordinated, regional defense and security policies; and

8. Release intelligence information, to the maximum extent possible, which exposes those in the Iranian regime responsible for this act — as a means of galvanizing support for the actions, such as additional sanctions, mentioned above.

The above options are illustrative only. Others may have more punitive measures in mind. But right now, the United States and Saudi Arabia should proceed with vigor and not permit Iran to hide its dagger behind its back in its left hand, while professing its innocence with the right.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of William S. Cohen.

Related posts:

1. Why EU Sanctions May Hurt the West More than Iran
2. Crossing the Rubicon
3. No-Fly Zone Over Libya: A Case for Multilateralism

Ford’s actions certainly eased his road to Senate confirmation, but it is worth remembering that the idea of sending an Ambassador back to Syria was a contentious one only less than a year ago.  The post had been vacant since 2005 after Washington withdrew its ambassador following the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and some contended that filling the post again was a bad move.  When President Obama appointed Ford to a recess appointment last December, incoming Foreign Affairs Committee Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen argued that it sent the “wrong message” and that “making undeserved concessions to Syria tells the regime in Damascus that it can continue to pursue its dangerous agenda and not face any consequences from the US.”  Rather than a sign of strength, an American ambassador there was seen as a sign of weakness.

Instead, though, Ford has shown the benefit of having an American diplomatic presence on the ground, especially at a time like this.  And it has certainly unsettled regime loyalists in the process.  Ford has been attacked by pro-regime hooligans with everything from rocks to tomatoes to eggs, accused by Syrian TV of leading anti-regime protests, and essentially threatened by the pro-regime Al Baath newspaper, which asserted just days ago that “as long as the ambassador believes that diplomacy is the art of instigation against national regimes, he should anticipate unpleasant treatment.”  If they viewed Ford as being a concession, their actions indicate otherwise.

Through his use of social media, Ford is also generating discussion about the situation on the US Embassy Damascus Facebook page.  Even more importantly, allowing broad viewpoints to be represented within this space has, in turn, drawn an even starker contrast between the free speech treasured in American society and the lack of it under the Assad regime.  As Ford recently posted:

“Outside the Embassy demonstrators complained about U.S. policy towards the Syrian government and my trip to Hama.  As I have said before, we respect the right of all Syrians – and people in all countries – to express their opinions freely and in a climate of mutual respect. We wish the Syrian government would do the same – and stop beating and shooting peaceful demonstrators.”

Related posts:

1. Brian J. Davis: SYRIA – What do we do now?
2. Crossing the Rubicon
3. Ambassador Linton Brooks Speaks on Nuclear Challenges

In an interview with Knoxville radio station, WUOT, Ambassador Brooks spoke on why the current global situation is much more complicated than the Cold War. Focusing on Iran and North Korea, Brooks noted that they pose a much different threat than the Soviet Union did because of their track records in supporting terrorism and their disinterest in playing by the normal rules of international relations. Brooks also shared that, in the case of Iran, its desire to become a regional hegemon also drives a continuous increase in arms stockpiling by its neighbors.

On the topic of nuclear energy, Brooks was much more optimistic noting that, despite the tragedy in Fukushima, nuclear energy will see a huge expansion.  Therefore, the U.S. will have to decide if it wants to lead in nuclear energy and set an example for responsible development of nuclear power, or let others assume the role.

To hear more, click here to listen to the interview or read Frank Munger’s blog post here.

Related posts:

1. Why EU Sanctions May Hurt the West More than Iran
2. William Cohen: What the U.S. Should Do About Iran
3. The Limits of Iran’s Reach