Bipartisanship has its advantages. A bipartisan process is more likely to get policy based on values that Americans broadly agree on, and a bipartisan process is less likely to accept mistaken evidence because many eyes will have examined the evidence from different perspectives.

But we need to remember, especially at Across the Aisle, that bipartisanship should rarely, if ever, be a goal for its own sake. The United States in recent years has made all sorts of “bipartisan” foreign policy errors.

And we’re on our way to another one, if the House-led effort to crack down on oil market speculators makes it into law.

In recent years as a New York Times columnist, Paul Krugman has often opined based on his values, and his columns can sometimes seem partisan and shrill. But when he writes as an economist, he is almost always sharp and clear and insightful (who am I to offer broad criticism of one of the leading international economists of our time? I once tried to get him to join my committee of advisors on my Ph.D. dissertation, but since I studied graduate international economics at MIT when he was on leave, meaning that I took the class with another great contemporary international economist, Avinash Dixit, Krugman demurred.  Bottom line: I have my personal views about Krugman’s economics writings, but a dispassionate observer would be perfectly justified in taking his views much more seriously than mine.).

Krugman’s column in today’s Times about speculation in the oil market seems solidly on point, based on well-argued economics. And he offers much more detailed analysis on his blog (here is the most recent post in a series, which started here). Blaming “speculators” for the run-up in oil prices and passing bipartisan legislation to crack down on speculators in hopes of driving down the price of gas in the U.S. is misguided.

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Actually, it’s tahadiya, as opposed to hudna, which means calm or cease fire (sometimes spoken of as a truce). It’s interesting that in the Middle East, even a temporary, grudging condition-laden cessation in the fighting has to be negotiated. For the amount of time Israelis and Arabs (not to mention a host of other intermediaries, including US presidents) have spent at the negotiating table, they could have gotten through a lull, a calm, a cease fire, a truce, an armistice, a treaty, and moved on to solving world hunger, the energy crisis, and working out deals for Brad Pitt’s next dozen movies. They could have, that is, if it were anywhere other than the Middle East. But at least the latest round of Israeli-Palestinian negotiation (this time under Egyptian auspices) has given rise to what experts are calling a “lull” in the fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Inshala.

I’m not just writing this to highlight the absurdity of drawn out negotiations over something as pessimistically titled as a “lull”—it almost invites speculation about who’ll manufacture a violation first, and take advantage of it to catch the other side off guard—but rather to offer you, dear reader, a bit of detail about the nature of this agreement that I find infinitely more revealing than the reams of colorful descriptions coming from the mainstream press. So, here goes. (These details, by the way, are courtesy of the loosely IDF affiliated Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center in Tel Aviv—hardly an impartial source, but their information is generally solid.)

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Last week the Supreme Court of the United States ruled for the first time in Boumediene v. Bush on whether “noncitizens detained by our Government in territory over which another country maintains de jure sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution.”

Specifically, the court ruled in a 5 to 4 split decision that unlawful enemy combatants captured overseas and transferred to the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay (GITMO) have habeas corpus rights under the U.S. Constitution.

Translation: the 270 remaining detainees held at Guantanamo can now legally challenge their detentions in a civilian court.

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Well, as regular as the return of cliff swallows to the San Juaan Capistrano mission in California, the International Atomic Energy Agency has issued its latest quarterly report on Iran’s nuclear program. 

Predictably, administration officials try to see the worst. “”I think right now the Iranians have a lot of explaining to do about the IAEA report, which essentially sees them as not cooperating on some very important dark questions that the international community has about their programmes,” said  Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. 

It is true that the report states (in paragraph 23, page 4) that “Iran has not provided the agency with all the information, access to documents and access to individuals necessary to supports Iran’s statements and access to individuals necessary to support Iran’s statements.” But that is hardly a smoking gun. 

Remember that the IAEA’s investigative mandate means that every issue it looks into, which has not been settled one way or the other, must be regarded as un unresolved. But the absence of conclusive evidence does not mean that Iran is proceeding with a nuclear weapons program. It means exactly what it says; that there are issues yet to be resolved. 

In the meantime Iran is, to some substantial degree, continuing to cooperate with the IAEA, which is no small thing, considering the sheer amount of misreporting and deliberate distortion on its nuclear program. As the IAEA report states, “The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.  Iran  has  provided  the Agency with  access  to  declared  nuclear material  and  has  provided  the required  nuclear  material  accountancy  reports  in  connection  with  declared  nuclear  material  and activities.” 

One might recall that it was exactly this perverse logic, i.e., we haven’t conclusively proved the absence of a negative, that allowed the Bush administration to short circuit UN inspections of Iraq in 2002, allowing the United States to invade Iraq on a spurious weapons of mass destruction pretext in 2003.

And just as predictably the major media huffs and puffs about the alleged threat Iran presents to world peace and security. (more…)

I’m going to do something not a lot of people outside the Clinton campaign have been willing to do: I’m going to defend Hillary Clinton’s threat to “obliterate” Iran if it should attack Israel. I’d take issue with Senator Obama’s dismissive response, too: Hillary’s clear, tough message is exactly the language that’s needed right now, and as for sounding like George W. Bush, who cares? The Bush Iran policy is defunct and dysfunctional, and what matters now is what the next President is going to do about it.

Here’s what Hillary actually said:

“Well, the question was, if Iran were to launch a nuclear attack on Israel, what would our response be. And I want the Iranians to know that if I’m the president, we will attack Iran. And I want them to understand that, because it does mean that they have to look very carefully at their society, because at whatever stage of development they might be in their nuclear weapons program, in the next 10 years during which they might foolishly consider launching an attack on Israel we would be able to totally obliterate them. That’s a terrible thing to say, but those people who run Iran need to understand that, because that perhaps will deter them from doing something that would be reckless, foolish and tragic.” (more…)

We hosted a dinner for Andy Worthington, the author of Guantánamo files, a few weeks ago and something he said struck a cord with everyone in attendance. During a back and forth pertaining to the positive statements made by Senator McCain, Senator Obama and Senator Clinton vis-à-vis Guantánamo – all seem keen to close it - Andy asked us to consider the end game for the U.S. Specifically he asked what would happen to the prisoners.

Of course the first reaction of most of the individuals in attendance was predictable – these prisoners would be repatriated back to their home countries. However, as Andy prodded us to consider that assumption we all stumbled upon the problem that he was grappling with. It became clear that there would be many countries that would refuse to take back their citizens. After all, the U.S. has been stating since the first prisoner transfer to Guantánamo that it is holding the worst of the worst. With that statement on the record it seems fair to assume that some countries will choose to wash their hands of the matter. Why risk internal strife by bringing back someone who is a radical, has become radicalized or is likely to embarrass his home government by questioning why they did not do more to seek the release of an innocent national. What will the U.S. do if it ends up with a group of prisoners who have no where to go and are not deemed to have committed acts that warrant a trial?

The three candidates for President seem to understand that Guantánamo is a blot on the U.S. image in the world and I am convinced that all of them would like to close it. However, in an incredible irony, it seems possible that the next U.S. President may find that closing Guantánamo proves to be harder than it was for the Bush Administration to open it.

I am going to start making a few calls on this issue to see what the latest thinking is within Defense department circles and will report back in the days ahead.

Admiral Fallon’s resignation as CENTCOM commander is pretty fresh news, and I’m sure we’ll learn more with time. For now, Fallon apparently resigned because of the appearance of disagreement with the president over the appropriate level of belligerence in U.S. policy towards Iran — or at least in his statement issued at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, he blamed it on the appearance rather than an actual conflict over Iran policy (reported widely, including here).

The appearance of policy conflict is nothing new for ADM Fallon. Rumors have been flying more or less since the admiral moved from his billet as commander of Pacific Command (where his policy views were controversial, too, but perhaps more quietly controversial because they were over longer-range China policy rather than an ongoing war). When Fallon took his current position at the head of U.S. Central Command, people began to talk about his sharp disagreements with Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. Commander in Iraq, over both substance (on the surge) and style (Gen. Petraeus’ high-profile comments that sometimes seem to defend the Bush administration in political battles). Of course, Gen. Petraeus is extremely popular with ADM Fallon’s boss and with many other politicians. And that disagreement has been compounded, in the rumors, with an ongoing disagreement over Iran policy (perhaps principally with Vice President Chenney, if the rumors are to be believed). The Iran disagreement perhaps came to a head with the publication of a story in last week’s Esquire.

On Iran, ADM Fallon’s statement says, “I don’t believe there have ever been any differences about the objectives of our policy in the Central Command area of responsibility….” It’s easy to see through this comment: even people who think “we can live with an Iranian nuclear bomb” agree that the U.S. should prefer a non-nuclear Iran to a nuclear-armed one. So we all agree on the objectives of our policy. That statement, though, can certainly cover up intense disagreement about the means of trying to achieve that objective and about whether we’re likely to succeed.

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Last week, John McCain became the Republican nominee for President of the United States. Because of his early and unwavering support, the war in Iraq is sure to be a central theme. McCain will trumpet the security gains of last year’s surge, while the Democratic nominee will argue for withdrawal (in Obama’s case, within 16 months of inauguration day). While the campaign rhetoric is sure to fly fast and loose, one thing Americans should know is that there will be no easy answers. Since the end of the invasion, American policy makers have been flummoxed about how to pacify and build Iraq after decades of tyranny and a mismanaged occupation. American voters, and eventually policy makers, will have to make difficult choices and these choices will be based on how we prioritize the mission in Iraq in relation to both foreign and domestic policy. (more…)

Yesterday the Bush administration formally announced the proposed $120 million sale of 900 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) to Saudi Arabia. It was formally notified to Congress on January 14.

This is the latest in a series of arms sales by the United States to various Persian Gulf countries that was first announced at the end of July 2007 and worth at least $20 billion to Saudi Arabia and five other Persian Gulf states, as well as new 10-year military and economic aid packages to Israel and Egypt. The other Gulf states receiving weapons are Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman; all six Gulf States make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

This is all part of what the Bush Administration calls the Gulf Security Dialog (GSD), which is supposed to be the principal security coordination mechanism between the United States and the GCC.  Part of the rationale for the sale is to reassure GCC nations that the United States stands by their side ready to face common threats.

I suppose I can see it. After all, nothing says I love you quite like sending hundreds of GPS satellite-aided inertial guidance kits to help upgrade your pokey, frumpy MK-82 or BLU-109 conventional bombs. No doubt Martha Stewart heartily approves. (more…)

NPR’s “On the Media” had an interesting interview with Bill Arkin this morning about the conflicting videotapes released by the U.S. and Iran that showed different perspectives on the interaction between three U.S. Navy ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz and a set of five speedboats from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps that “buzzed” the Americans early on the morning of January 6 (Gulf time). To review, the U.S. issued a press release followed by some commentary at an off-the-record briefing early on the morning of Jan. 7 (Washington time, 10 hours behind the Strait of Hormuz, meaning that some 31 hours had passed to consider what to say in Washington) explaining that Iranian speedboats had menaced the American warships by charging, pushing boxes with unknown contents overboard near the path of the American ships, and making the threatening statement that the American ships would soon “explode” over an open radio channel (see initial coverage, for example, here). The incident set the backdrop for some of President Bush’s comments about Iran — specifically, how dangerous Iran might be — during his trip to the Middle East, which immediately followed the indicent. When the tapes turned out to have been modified, and when people began to learn that Iranian boats had interacted with American warships before, talk of a conspiracy — or at least biased spinning for political ends — swept the policy world and blogosphere (see, for example, often astute and interesting analysts like Gareth Porter, here and here, and Justin Raimundo, here). Arkin’s NPR interview baldly stated that the Pentagon created the dust-up to prepare the ground for President Bush’s trip, to make it easier for him to build an anti-Iranian coalition among the Gulf States.

Arkin is an expert on technical aspects of military affairs who currently writes an online column for the Washington Post, but he has also been a well-known guy in the security studies community for a long time. What he has to say has a certain credibility, and his explanation of the controversy over “doctoring” of the videos was very clear: both the Americans and the Iranians released video of a real incident, and the audio that accompanied both tapes was real and from the morning of Jan. 6, too, but neither the American tape’s audio nor the Iranian tape’s audio matched the video — that is, on each tape, two events were mashed together for political effect. It is unlikely that the threatening audio on the American tape was a broadcast from the Iranian speedboats (it probably came from a prankster), but the peaceful radio interchange on the Iranian tape actually came from a separate interaction between the Iranian Navy and the American warships that had taken place two hours before the speedboat incident. Note that the Iranian Navy is a different organization, with different commanders and different interests, from the highly ideological and zealous Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which commanded the speedboats.

So what should we make of the incident? I was actually on a trip to the Gulf from January 4-11 precisely to do research about how to assess the potential that military conflict in the Strait of Hormuz might disrupt oil tanker traffic — a nightmare scenario often discussed in the press (including in the aftermath of the Jan. 6 incident, for example, here). Of course, I don’t have a complete picture: I didn’t see the incident, and I only met with relatively few people, but at least they were informed people interested in exactly the kind of questions bandied about in the discussion of the incident.

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