Robert McFarlane is a PSA Advisory Board member and served as President Reagan’s national security adviser. The original article appeared in The Washington Times.
The means of coercing Iran
How would the prospects for stability in the Middle East be affected if Iran were to succeed in its effort to become a nuclear power? In what ways might we expect Iran to behave differently?
The behavior of the Soviet Union in the late 1970s is instructive on this point. Despite signing the 1972 SALT I Agreement with the United States, which put restraints on strategic nuclear forces, the USSR soon began to violate several of its tenets and to establish an advantage in ICBM warheads. Before long it had established a comfortable margin of superiority over the United States. Then, secure against any plausible threat, it became more willing to take risks to expand its influence in various parts of the world. We recall well those years from ‘75 to ‘80 in which the Kremlin’s support for so-called wars of national liberation enabled them to exert a prevailing influence in country after country — Angola, then Ethiopia, South Yemen, Mozambique, Afghanistan (following an invasion by more than 100,000 troops), and ultimately, Nicaragua. Not until the early ‘80s, as the United States restored its will to oppose Soviet expansion, did the Kremlin change course.
Frank G. Wisner is a member of PSA’s Board of Advisors as well as a former Under Secretary of State and of Defense and a former Ambassador to Zambia, Egypt, the Philippines, and India. The article was co-authored by Leslie H. Gelb, a former New York Times columnist and senior government official. Original article posted at the Daily Beast.
Face the Assad Reality In Syria
U.S. policy is going down the drain in Syria diplomatically and militarily. The choice: deal with Assad or fail.
The Syria conference underway in Geneva to transition from the rule of President Assad will fail, and the Obama team knows it. There is no incentive now in the Assad or rebel camps for diplomatic compromise, and the U.S. knows that. Nothing the U.S. and its allies are doing or planning on the military front will compel President Assad to step aside, and the White House understands that full well. The reality on the ground today is that American-helped moderate rebels continue to flounder, while Assad’s forces and those of the jihadi extremists prosper. Obama officials see this as well and realize that nothing they are doing or are likely to do will alter those facts.
So, if President Obama understands what he is doing will fail, why is he doing it?
Tara Sonenshine is former undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs, a former PSA Board of Directors member, and currently a distinguished fellow at George Washington University’s School of Media and Public Affairs. This article was originally published in the Washington Times
Pseudo-states and Strange Bedfellows Blur Borderlines
Were it not so deadly serious, it would be satirical. The United States is losing its sense of geospatial positioning. We may be one of the few “countries” left in the world — replaced by a series of pseudo-states, groups and strange bedfellows.
Imagine having to teach geography in 2014, let alone understand it. That spinning globe we used to use, with color-coded countries and bright borders, national flags and easy-to-pronounce places hardly seems useful. We may need a 2014 Guide to Groups within Countries.
After President Obama delivered his speech in Cairo last week, some skeptics complained that he didn’t speak clearly enough about the importance of democracy in U.S. foreign policy. Of course, any such message would have been undermined by the mere fact of the United States’ decades long support for an undemocratic government in Egypt, and an even less democratic one in Saudi Arabia. Beyond that, the irony of delivering a speech in Cairo, and of Obama’s visit to Riyadh a day earlier, would have been too rich for most commentators to ignore. (For precisely this reason, several commentators both here and elsewhere questioned Obama’s choice of Egypt as a venue for his speech in the first place).
But the cognitive dissonance of those who would have the U.S. government actively promote democracy around the world, and who would have the President of the United States speak openly of his desire to overturn the established political order in dozens of places around the world, goes deeper still. Bush apparently never figured out that full-throated American support for would-be reformers often undermined their standing in the eyes of voters. Under the pro-democracy Bush, the relatively more pro-American politicians in, for example, the Palestinian Authority, Iraq, and, Lebanon, all fared poorly.
Bush speeches were often marked by sweeping assertions and moral clarity. Obama, however, is the master of subtlety. He mentioned neither Lebanon nor Hezbollah in his Cairo speech. Likewise, the name “Ahmadinejad” never passed his lips, and yet, when the president accurately characterized Holocaust denial as “baseless”, “ignorant”, “hateful” the obvious mental image in the minds of hundreds of millions of listeners was of a certain skinny, bearded man in a Members Only jacket, arguably the most famous Holocaust denier in the world.
While the news from the Annapolis conference has been mixed, there was one positive development for American foreign policy in the region. The attendance of Syria (even though it was at the deputy foreign minister level) signals a willingness on behalf of the Assad regime to perhaps work its way out of the Iranian orbit in the region (Iran wanted them to stay at home). This is welcome news for those who seek to reduce the influence of Iran and a more peaceful Middle East. Rapprochement with Syria would yield significant dividends in various arenas in the Middle East, and, if this opening is real, it is an opportunity to pry an ally away from Iran and make strategic inroads into Damascus.
The recent news from Beirut is also promising. The Syrians and Americans have apparently agreed on a presidential candidate for Lebanon, army commander Michael Suleiman. Apparently there has been serious cooperation on this front for some time and hopefully it can continue into other areas. The overlap between American policy and Syrian influence is considerable. Syria shares a large border with Iraq and has accepted a large number of Iraqi refugees. Unfortunately, refugees are not the only things crossing the Syrian border. Weapons and insurgents have been coming into Iraq from Syria since 2003, sometimes with tacit support with Syrian regime. (more…)
The upshot of Wednesday’s open letter from six PSA Advisory Board members and two other distinguished former officials to President Bush and Secretary Rice is to urge them to think hard if they’re going to bet the farm on Middle East peace at Annapolis next month. According to the authors, if the upcoming summit fails, there will be “devastating consequences” for the US and the region. In fact, Annapolis represents a dangerously big gamble on a very long shot for lasting peace.
The pressure on the Administration to call for a new round of top-level Middle East peace talks is substantial. A few of the main drivers are: (1) that the bipartisan Iraq Study Group correctly identified Israeli-Palestinian peace as a potential linchpin of a larger Middle East settlement, which could calm Iraq while effectively containing Iran; (2) that any serious conversation with Arab or Muslim leaders about the US role in the Middle East invariably includes a diatribe against our support for the “Israeli occupation;” (3) that the longer Palestinians live without a single, sovereign, responsible government, the more their political life comes to resemble Iraq’s civil war; and (4) that the Israelis themselves have for the first time put partitioning Jerusalem on the table.
I’ve blogged before about my skepticism about the effectiveness of foreign aid, especially to conflict-ridden countries: sending money often breeds conflict over who gets it, and parties to the conflict can use the money to fight harder. And in my last post, I questioned whether post-conflict reconstruction is a good strategy for building friendships, because the local politics of infrastructure investment are complex, fraught with over-promising and under-performance, and impossible for foreigners to understand and manipulate.
So one might infer that I would be pleased to hear that Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA) has placed a hold on the bill that would give $236 million in aid to Lebanon (for the story from Beirut, see the Daily Star; for the counterpart story from Jerusalem, see the Jerusalem Post). But there are big problems with what Lantos has done. M. J. Rosenberg at the TPM Cafe says he’s “speechless” in response, but I have a few comments to offer. (more…)
Major newspapers ran front-page stories today on the reconstruction of Lebanon. The New York Times and the Washington Post both emphasized details of Hezbollah’s efforts, while the Wall Street Journal mainly emphasized the Lebanese government’s official reconstruction investment. In each case, much of the story was about who would get political credit for taking care of Lebanon’s people — within Lebanon, would reconstruction strengthen weak government institutions or help Hezbollah’s informal government? outside Lebanon, would reconstruction help Iran or the United States? That political competition is surely important for many reasons. So far, the Lebanese government and Hezbollah seem to be cooperating although perhaps not coordinating their efforts, and maybe the “two parallel lines” of effort (to cite the Post‘s translation from Hezbollah leader Nasrallah’s speech after the cease fire) can help relax internal tensions that some people fear could renew the Lebanese civil war.
On the other hand, the Post also quoted a fighter from a rival (weaker) militia, Amal. The gist of what he said was that others (besides Hezbollah) helped the people displaced by Hezbollah’s fight while the war was going on, but now it’s time for Hezbollah to pay up. That is, at least some people in other groups expect Hezbollah to take care of fixing all the war damage, because Hezbollah owes the rest of Lebanon. That sounds to me like a recipe for dissatisfaction: when the government taxes other parts of Lebanon to pay for reconstruction, or concentrates its spending of new aid money in some parts of Lebanon (say, the war-damaged south) without giving a share to other groups, some people might start to complain about how Hezbollah gets “preferential treatment.” And if Hezbollah is not quick to compensate its political rivals, they may get upset. Even hoping for compensation seems forlorn: Hezbollah is probably less likely to happily “pay” Amal or to spend its Iranian money in Amal-controlled territory than the old American political machines were to spend civic funds on patronage for their partisan rivals. There’s still plenty of potential for division in Lebanon.
And in fact that’s the main problem with all post-conflict reconstruction: local politics. Local politics are likely to undermine the Lebanese effort, just as they have undone the American funding of Iraqi reconstruction. (more…)
Last week’s show of diplomacy by the United States in working towards a UN resolution for the crisis in Lebanon was impressive, both in and of itself, and in contrast to the earlier behavior of the administration. Although it is sad to consider how many things might have turned out differently had the administration utilized a more collaborative approach for the past six years, this new development provides an opening first step towards reestablishing a bipartisan foreign policy that seeks to strengthen rule of law and multilateral organizations instead of undermining and sidelining them. Building on this opening will require openness on both sides of the isle – from Democrats whose critique of the administration’s approaches to many foreign policy and national security issues have proven prescient, as well as from certain Republicans who might feel that shifting course now might make it look as if their earlier approaches were inadequate, always tough to do in a politicized environment.
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I want to begin by saying that I support US engagement in the Middle East. However, I remain concerned about the impact, both intended and unintended, of our image around the world. I remain concerned, not only about the mood toward the US on the streets of Amman, but also on the streets of London.
It is obvious that the events of September 11, 2001 forced the Administration to be immediately reactive to the situation, and no one can fault us for that. However, since that day we have continued as principally a reactionary force in the Middle East, particularly in our reconstructive efforts in Iraq. Today, as we approach the 5th anniversary of 9/11 and find ourselves on a threatening front, it seems vital to US interests and the interests of that region to be increasingly proactive. Victory and success, as I would define them in this context, are all but impossible from a reactive position.
Successive administrations have found political will thwarted again and again with Iran, and now we find ourselves facing that issue once more. However, on this occasion the Administration has been more forward-thinking in its approach as it has sought to allow other countries to take the diplomatic lead and to maintain as much as possible within the context of the United Nations. This has led to headway in what would otherwise be a stalemate between East and West. In some ways, the recent activity of Iran and its engagement with Hezbollah may even reflect the ultimate frustration of the Iranian government as it seeks to derail not only a US initiative, but also a multi-national one. (more…)
All blog posts are independently produced by their authors and do not necessarily reflect the policies or positions of PSA. Across the Aisle serves as a bipartisan forum for productive discussion of national security and foreign affairs topics.