Crossing the Rubicon

Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently visited Israel and called for greater engagement between our two countries. Given the fact that it’s difficult to find a closer political bond between two countries anywhere in this galaxy, one would surmise that there’s little distance to travel to cement the relationship between our two democracies. After all, we share similar values, ideals and interests.

There exists, however, a singular and important difference within this triangle of bonded friendship. Israel lives in a neighborhood that is far more unstable than that enjoyed by the United States. The geographic proximity of those whose stated goal is to vanquish the state of Israel — and who could soon have the capacity to do so — causes the Israelis to view threats through a different prism.

Patience and diplomacy might be the virtues of statecraft, but when an avowed enemy is close to placing a nuclear knife on your throat, well, the demands for action are likely to override the pleas for restraint.

Iran has used deceit and obfuscation to paint over the window into their activities. The world is left to speculate whether Iran is a year or more away from putting a nuclear genie into the head of a missile or into the headquarters of a pharmaceutical production facility.

So what is Israel, or the United States, to do? President Obama has intensified former President George W. Bush’s policy of imposing economic sanctions against Iran, and the European Union could cut off future purchases of Iranian oil. Yet many question whether the international community’s imposition of economic hardship on the Iranian oil sector will be sufficient to persuade Iran’s leaders to alter their current uranium-enrichment activities.

In the past, Israelis have not hesitated to attack those whom they believed posed an existential threat to their state. The destruction of Iraqi and Syrian nuclear plants offers proof enough of their determination never to face the threat of a second Holocaust.

Iran, however, presents a far more difficult challenge than those once posed by Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Assad. The elements of Iran’s nuclear program are dispersed over a large geographical area. Many of its research and development facilities are buried underground. Israel might decide to launch an attack against Iran’s facilities, but such an operation would quickly lose the surprise advantage and would likely take many days, not just hours, to complete.

As we assess the threat that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to Israel, it’s important to remember that Iran’s leadership is not entirely irrational. It’s possible, but I believe unlikely, that they would consider conducting a nuclear strike against Israel. The real danger, I think, that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose is that other countries in the region would feel compelled to either develop or purchase nuclear weapons as a deterrent. With more countries joining the nuclear fraternity, the risk that an extremist group would acquire one of these weapons is greatly enhanced. If this were to happen, there is a good chance that Armageddon would play at a theater near you.

Although Israel remains on the front line of nightmare scenarios, it’s important to be mindful that it is not the only nation that would face both the predictable and untoward consequences of a military attack against Iran.

If such a strike were carried out, it would probably succeed in rallying virtually all of the Iranian people to the defense of their country. Any hope that the West might hold for the ripening of Iran’s Green Revolution would quickly dissipate, as Iranian citizens would turn red with hatred for those who supported such an attack. American military and civilian personnel deployed throughout the Gulf region would likely be victims of those who are masters in the dark art of terrorism.

President Obama has asked Israel not to take preemptive, unilateral action. According to news reports, the Israelis have chosen to remain silent. Fair enough — no country is required to disclose to others the place and timing of its military options should a decision be made to exercise them.

Privately, however, the Israelis have an obligation to keep American leadership fully informed of its plans. Israel’s actions have consequences for the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other countries in the region. A regional conflict would affect much of the industrialized world.

Israel’s defense minister, Ehud Barak, has offered public assurances that any plans to take military action against Iran are very “far off.” But “far off” is a relative term and can easily become “lift off” if the Israelis decide that diplomacy has failed and they have no other option. But Israel also must understand that if it resorts to military action, it will be taking its friends across the Rubicon with them.

Related posts:

1. William Cohen: What the U.S. Should Do About Iran
2. Why EU Sanctions May Hurt the West More than Iran
3. The Iranian Challenge and Implications for U.S. Policy

The range of possible outcomes include the following:

1. The EU oil embargo holds and the Iranian economy takes a huge hit hurting the Iranian middle class and the Green Movement more than the regime;
2. Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz prompting a US military response and potentially a military exchange between the US, NATO, and Iran;
3. Iran refuses to give in causing a spike in oil prices that cause the price of gas and food to soar in the US and EU;
4. The oil embargo is successful and Iran abandons its nuclear program.

Obviously the fourth option is the one that the EU is hoping for; however, it is the least likely and the other three possible outcomes should be of great concern to the US, Europe, and NATO. The driving force behind Iran’s nuclear ambitions lies in its desire to assert regional hegemony in the Middle East and build the strategic power necessary to counter US influence in Iraq and Northern Africa. Giving into the pressure of sanctions would destroy the image of military strength and political influence that the Iranian regime has attempted to cultivate over the past ten years. At the same time, Tehran has been very clear that they are willing to, and capable of, closing the Strait of Hormuz; recent military exercises in the Strait should be considered a clear indication that interference with their oil exports will result in the closing of the most strategically important trade route for the West

If Tehran decides that it does not want to risk a war over the Strait of Hormuz, we could be left with a combination of outcomes one and three, both of which hurt middle class, working citizens of Iran and the EU more than anyone else. In some EU countries 12-30% of the imported oil comes from Iran. An abrupt cessation of that trade would cause a huge shortage and therefore, an increase in the  price of oil for EU citizens. This leads to price increases in heating oil, gasoline, transportation, food, and the general cost of living. In the already troubled and depressed economies of the EU, this could lead to even more public discontent and economic volatility. While EU officials have said that they would be able to replace Iranian imports, they have not described their alternatives with specificity.   New agreements involving oil often require lengthy negotiations and the increased output necessary from potential suppliers like Saudi Arabia and Russia may incur new costs of their own. Also, Russia has been an ally to Iran and it is not inconceivable that they would refuse to supply the extra oil to the EU in an effort to pressure them to reverse the sanctions.

In Iran, where the government subsidizes energy prices along with bread, sugar, medicine, cooking oil, rice, and other necessities, a drop in government revenue could mean that these essential items are no longer available to those who need them. Furthermore, a worsening of the Iranian economy due to actions by the European Union only bolsters the regime who will spin the issue to convince the public that the development of a nuclear weapon and the bargaining power and deterrence ability that follows is essential to Iran’s national security and sovereignty.

Iran has consistently claimed that its nuclear program is for civilian purposes only. While IAEA inspectors have reported that Iran does have the capability to create a nuclear weapon within a short period of time, they have found no evidence of Iran actually weaponizing uranium. Also, despite bellicose statements about Israel, Iran has been careful to avoid suggesting it would actually detonate a nuclear weapon if it did possess one. Discounting the power of diplomacy could severely hinder the possibility of a peaceful solution with Iran. The first step in this process should not be an increase in sanctions, but a diplomatic effort to convince Iran to stop producing highly enriched uranium and stick with low-enriched uranium which is sufficient for energy production but not easily weaponized.

Related posts:

1. William Cohen: What the U.S. Should Do About Iran
2. Crossing the Rubicon
3. The Limits of Iran’s Reach

Washington (CNN) — Longtime observers of the Middle East are baffled by allegations that high-ranking officials in the Iranian government approved a plan to assassinate Saudi Arabia Ambassador, Adel al-Jubeir, and blow up the Saudi and Israeli embassies in Washington. Commentators have described the plan as “brazen,” but “bizarre” and ‘bone-headed” might be more appropriate adjectives.

It’s difficult to comprehend either the motives or the means selected to carry out the plan outlined by the Justice Department in its criminal indictment of Manssor Arbabsiar and Gholam Shakuri. Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are not new, but Iran has been both cautious and clever enough to restrain its ambitions for regional dominance.

If the allegations of the assassination and bombing plot are true, and the covert operation had proved successful, Iran’s leaders would have invited retaliation on a scale far more vigorous than any they might have contemplated. Indeed, I think it’s fair to say that the Iranian landscape would likely have been substantially altered.

Assuming, however, that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad never authorized the action or were ever aware of it, both have great cause for concern. Elements in their covert, black bag, assassination/ terrorist unit were planning an attack that could have brought about the decapitation of their leadership, the obliteration of their ambitions to enter the nuclear weapons club and quite possibly have precipitated a global depression by engulfing the region in war. Rather than dismissing the plot as a Zionist fabrication, these leaders should be looking inward and holding accountable those who were responsible for undertaking such a dangerous and destructive mission.

While awaiting greater clarification from those responsible for moving forward with the prosecution against Arbabsiar and Shakuri, the United States should explore several options:

1. Bring the assassination and bombing plan to the United Nations Security Council and seek much tougher sanctions against Iran;

2. Encourage Saudi Arabia to review and revise its contractual arrangements with any country that refuses to support the imposition of tougher sanctions against Iran;

3. Intensify the effort to expose the activities of those nations who are circumventing the existing sanctions against Iran;

4. Make it clear to all members of the U.N. that Iran’s nuclear weapons program poses a serious threat to global stability. If a non-nuclear Iran initiated an assassination plan through a Mexican drug cartel, what would it be tempted to do once it possess a nuclear weapon?

5. Strengthen our ability to keep the Persian Gulf open should hostilities ever break out;

6. Force the administration and Congress to move forward on improving the defense posture of our friends and allies who are threatened by Iran;

7. Urge Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States to move more aggressively in constructing coordinated, regional defense and security policies; and

8. Release intelligence information, to the maximum extent possible, which exposes those in the Iranian regime responsible for this act — as a means of galvanizing support for the actions, such as additional sanctions, mentioned above.

The above options are illustrative only. Others may have more punitive measures in mind. But right now, the United States and Saudi Arabia should proceed with vigor and not permit Iran to hide its dagger behind its back in its left hand, while professing its innocence with the right.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of William S. Cohen.

Related posts:

1. Why EU Sanctions May Hurt the West More than Iran
2. Crossing the Rubicon
3. No-Fly Zone Over Libya: A Case for Multilateralism

In an interview with Knoxville radio station, WUOT, Ambassador Brooks spoke on why the current global situation is much more complicated than the Cold War. Focusing on Iran and North Korea, Brooks noted that they pose a much different threat than the Soviet Union did because of their track records in supporting terrorism and their disinterest in playing by the normal rules of international relations. Brooks also shared that, in the case of Iran, its desire to become a regional hegemon also drives a continuous increase in arms stockpiling by its neighbors.

On the topic of nuclear energy, Brooks was much more optimistic noting that, despite the tragedy in Fukushima, nuclear energy will see a huge expansion.  Therefore, the U.S. will have to decide if it wants to lead in nuclear energy and set an example for responsible development of nuclear power, or let others assume the role.

To hear more, click here to listen to the interview or read Frank Munger’s blog post here.

Related posts:

1. Why EU Sanctions May Hurt the West More than Iran
2. William Cohen: What the U.S. Should Do About Iran
3. The Limits of Iran’s Reach

Related posts:

1. The Limits of Iran’s Reach
2. Why EU Sanctions May Hurt the West More than Iran
3. Crossing the Rubicon

Last week, as the unrest in the Middle East raged on, Iran and Senegal broke up.  At the heart of the matter was the seizure of a shipment of weapons from Iran allegedly headed to the separatist Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces (MFDC) movement, which has engaged in a low-level insurgency against the Senegalese government for three decades.  Outraged, Senegal ended diplomatic ties with Iran, a move that Iran labeled “illogical.”

Regardless of the logic involved, the split could significantly set back Iranian efforts to push into Africa – efforts which Senegal, a 95 percent Muslim majority country with friendly ties to the United States, had been central to.  In the last several years, Iran, keen to spread its influence into Africa as it faced increased diplomatic pressure from the West, proposed major economic projects in the West African nation, ranging from infrastructure modernization to plans for a car plant that would sell the Iranian Khodro car.  In return, Senegal expressed support for the Iranian nuclear program.

But last fall the Iranian soft power story turned on its head when it morphed into a weapons caper.  In October, Nigerian officials seized 13 containers of weapons – including mortars, ammunition, and rockets – from Iran en route to Gambia, sparking suspicion that MFDC was the intended recipient of the cache.  Initially, Senegal recalled its Ambassador from Tehran despite Iran’s explanation that the arms shipment was bound for Gambia as part of a bilateral agreement (Gambia, which has a strained relationship with neighboring Senegal, broke diplomatic relations with Iran over the incident as well).  Then, on February 23^rd, after evidence showed that Iranian weapons were used by the MFDC to kill Senegalese soldiers, the diplomatic break became official.

For Iran, several political, economic, and security implications may result from this.  Although Senegal is roughly the size of South Dakota, it commands diplomatic influence in Africa.  And, as an August 2010 Congressional Research Service report pointed out, Iranian interest in Senegal also appeared to focus on “Iran’s attempt to foster cohesion with Muslim leaders while countering Arab cultural and political influence in Africa, and the perceived potential for Senegal to serve as a base for Iranian exports to the region.”  The incident has now jeopardized those strategic priorities.  Furthermore, if, as suggested by a new U.S. intelligence report quoted by the Associated Press, Iran is looking to gain a foothold in Africa in order to tap into its large uranium reserves, the fallout from this incident could hinder that aim as well.

On a larger scale, the Iran-Senegal split also raises important questions about the extent of Iran’s overall economic influence.  Even prior to the split, major Iranian-sponsored projects in Senegal had yet to come to fruition.  For example, few of the highly publicized Iranian Khodro cars have been sold.  Moreover, as Afrik-News described, the most important projects have not taken shape:

“In 2006, faced with an unprecedented energy crisis, [President Abdoulaye] Wade called his Iranian friends to the rescue. It was time for the Iranians to prove their worth in times of need. Numerous projects were to be embarked upon: The purchase of crude oil at unprecedented rock-bottom prices; A partnership between the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC) and the Société Africaine de Raffinage (SAR); The construction of a mega oil tank farm. Projects that looked good on paper, but were never to see the light of day.”

As Iran tries to spread its influence in Middle East power vacuums, the challenges it currently faces with in Senegal are instructive with regard to the constraints of the Islamic Republic’s reach.  Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad once proclaimed that there are “no limits to the expansion of [Iran’s] ties with African countries.”  Now it has become clear that limits do exist.  And when they are pushed, serious ramifications may be around the corner.

Related posts:

1. Why EU Sanctions May Hurt the West More than Iran
2. The Iranian Challenge and Implications for U.S. Policy
3. The Dragon Comes to Africa

As we watch the current demonstrations in Egypt and Jordan, and as Tunisia moves to a new phase in its history, much is being made of American ties to these leaders.  As the “Arab street” watches what is transpiring, it should note that the US and other western countries are letting these events play out even given real concerns over the impact this will have on geopolitics, global security and a shaky world economy.

Yet, as the governments and militaries of Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan show some restraint in handling these protests, one has to reflect on the fact that one of the most sophisticated populaces in the world, the Iranian people, were not shown the same courtesy by their regime.  Rather, the Supreme Leader, his allies, and his loyal guardsman and militias used and continue to use every opportunity to shut down peaceful protests and threaten the opposition.

Let’s hope the Supreme Leader and his allies realize that what is transpiring in the region is a revolt against autocracies writ large.  If Iran wants to become a real regional power and take what it believes is its rightful place in the international order, then it should unleash the greatest power it has – the power of its people.  After all, it is this Persian power that has contributed so much to world civilization and continues to garner international respect today.

Related posts:

1. Reason for hope in Egypt
2. Brian J. Davis: SYRIA – What do we do now?
3. Yemen: Widening the Scope

Visitors to Turkey are warned about developing a “Turkish muscle” – the extra belly fat that you get from eating too much Turkish food. Yet it’s the country’s desire to flex its foreign policy muscle that has, at times, proved worrisome. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s “Zero-Problems” foreign policy, which emphasizes regional engagement and outlines an active role in promoting Turkey’s interests on the world stage, is a far cry from Turkey’s past practice of isolating itself from its neighbors. But some of its recent diplomatic forays under this policy, especially the nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran and renewed relations with Syria, have led some in the West to query whether we are losing Turkey.

Earlier this month, I traveled to Turkey on a trip sponsored by the Rumi Forum and discussed the zero-problems policy with officials, parliamentarians, and community leaders, among others. Equally as interesting as learning more about the goals of this new assertiveness, though, was hearing about some of the speed bumps in the process of carrying it out – namely the challenge of working with coalition governments.

At the heart of the zero-problems policy is a desire for peace and stability, goals which political and business leaders alike understandably embrace with vigor. During the trip, contentious issues like Iran and Syria were explained in this context; its diplomacy with Iran helps prevent war in the region, engagement with Syria has economic benefits. Turkey’s desire for stability, though, also requires having stable partners to work with. Divided governments carry an inherent risk of being quite the opposite, and, as such, they constitute a significant impediment for Turkey.

This is clearly apparent in Turkey’s relationship with Israel. With tensions on the rise since the Israeli raid on a Gaza-bound flotilla killed nine (most of whom were Turks), many of those I met with griped about how hard it is for Turkey to work with Israel’s coalition government. One Middle East analyst asserted that Israel currently has the “most radical government in its history” and posited that an undivided Israeli government would result in a more cooperative one. In fact, he added that things are currently more diplomatic with Iran because it has an undivided government (in a later meeting, however, it was pointed out by another speaker that conducting diplomacy with Iran was hard precisely because the Iranian power structure has “a lot of different people to talk to.”).

The aversion to coalition governments is not surprising given Turkey’s past domestic experiences with unstable ones. Before the ruling AK Party took power in 2002, Turkey endured a decades-long multi-party era marred by military coups, political unrest, and a destabilized economy. According to one political leader, coalition governments “destroyed” Turkey.

While the degree to which the reflection of the past impacts Turkey’s conduct of today’s foreign policy is hard to accurately estimate, the fallout is considerably more measurable. Escalating tensions have led to a diplomatic war between Turkey and Israel since the flotilla incident. The strains, however, are also hampering Turkey’s ability to play a constructive role in the Middle East Peace Process. And as one journalist noted, as long as the Israeli-Palestinian issue remains unresolved, Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s vision of global peace can’t be accomplished.

The more Turkey takes an active approach in the region, the more it will encounter coalition governments – or worse – that, at present, might seem less than ideal to work with. Playing a pivotal role in key issues, however, will require that it do so. There are likely to be future growing pains, but how Turkey navigates through those process-related challenges will go a long way in determining how pivotal of a role it plays as well as the eventual product of its zero-problems foreign policy.

Related posts:

1. The Value of Being There in Syria

Saturday, Iran celebrated their great victory over the “arrogant powers” by opening their first nuclear power plant at Bushehr. The opening coincided with dynamic conversation on Jeff Goldberg’s recent article in The Atlantic painting a picture of military action as a foregone conclusion, and prominent foreign policy leaders such as former UN Ambassador John Bolton fanned the flames by renewing calls for a preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

Dangerously, the discussion on how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program has moved away from the case for bombing Iran to who and when, ignoring the painful lessons learned from depicting military action as a clean and straightforward solution. We are still reeling from the burdensome commitments of Iraq and Afghanistan: a military response by either the United States or Israel will take much more than just bombs and have major potential consequences beyond Iran, realities noticeably absent from much of the conversation.

The most obvious and immediately damaging example is world oil supply. Iran could block the Strait of Hormuz, and therefore an astounding 20% of the world’s oil supply. Its estimated oil prices would shoot from $80-$100 to $400-$500, creating a devastating strain on the world economy and possibly result in increased military action.

Beyond the economic blow, the United States would face a whole new set of challenges with the ensuing shifts in the regional power balance, and with decreased leverage to confront them. Many of the advances in foreign policy goals laid out in Obama’s Cairo speech would be discredited, and while Arab heavyweights such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia might privately condone an attack on a regional threat, the public rebuke would support the goals of Islamic extremists by playing right into their rhetoric of the American aggressor.

Another likely consequence is exacerbated regional instabilities through attacks by proxies: Hizbullah would threaten Lebanon’s fragile state, and Israel would face increased attacks from Hamas and destroy any chance of a Middle East peace deal. Iran could leverage their growing regional authority and connections to terrorist groups, even cause complete breakdown in Iraq and Afghanistan. If a decision to bomb occurs before IAEA inspectors are removed from Iran or before verification that Iran violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States risks condemnation from Turkey, Russia, China, and other regional powers, effecting a broad set of policy issues and their willingness to cooperate on regional priorities beyond Iran. It would be a stinging and debilitating blow to our diplomatic and strategic goals.

Further, since Bushehr, Arak, Natanz, and other known nuclear sites are jointly run by Russia or monitored by the IAEA, the development of weapons-grade uranium would likely occur at a secret site, similar to Qom. An effective military strike would require bombing multiple locations over an extended period of time, including nuclear sites, research facilities, and military installations, resulting in an inevitably high number of Iranian and international civilian casualties. Moreover, the lack of knowledge on the exact nature of the targets could result in extensive civilian and environmental devastation due to nuclear fallout. There is also a possibility bombing could be futile, and Iran would pursue a nuclear weapon with fervor under the guise of legitimatized self-defense.

On a domestic front, the degree to which the election protests took the United States by surprise reveals our limited understanding of Iran’s politics. The country’s rising prominence in the region increases the significance of their domestic situation to the outside world. The protests, while harshly contained, indicated the hard-liners’ hold on the country is not absolute. A time-tested result of outside military intervention in the region is a surge of national unity: if there is a bomb Iran policy would likely drive Iranian’s moderates into the arms of the regime, snuffing out any potential future generation of leaders and reforms.

A nuclear weaponized Iran is a real and pressing threat. But before we resort to a military option, calculating what would happen the next day, the following week, and subsequent years is equally critical to our security priorities. We need to ask questions about the challenges and the capability of meeting them. Attacking Iran’s nuclear ambitions may seem like an easy short-term response for a militarily dominant United States, but the last ten years of American involvement in the Middle East demonstrate the extensive commitments required beyond just a few bombs.

Related posts:

1. Yemen: Widening the Scope
2. The Limits of Iran’s Reach

I am reminded of the old saying, “Be careful what you ask for as you might just get it” regarding the recent news about the breakthrough in the long running deadlock over Iran’s nuclear program, Thanks to an agreement brokered by Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan Iran has agreed to send the bulk of its nuclear material to Turkey as part of an exchange meant to ease international concerns about Iran’s aims and provide fuel for an ailing medical reactor.

The essential details are that after a final agreement is signed between Iran and the Vienna group, Iran’s nuclear fuel will be shipped to Turkey under the supervision of Iran and the IAEA. Iran we will send 1,200 kilograms [2,640 pounds] of 3.5% enriched uranium to Turkey to be exchanged for 120 kilograms [264 pounds] of 20% enriched uranium from the Vienna group to replace the nearly exhausted fuel of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) that makes medical isotopes. This represents more than half of the 2065 kg of LEU that Iran had produced as of February according to the IAEA, and it greatly reduces Iran’s capability to produce enough fissile material for a bomb. The Vienna group refers to Russia, France, the U.S. and the IAEA.

But Iran would not suspend sensitive atomic activities which the West suspects are aimed at making bombs, including work to enrich uranium to a level of 20 percent it launched in February.

“Iran expressed its readiness to deposit its LEU within one month. On the basis of the same agreement the Vienna Group should deliver 120 kg fuel required for Tehran research reactor in no later than one year,” a joint declaration said.

Turkey does not enrich uranium itself although it has agreed to serve as the venue for the fuel exchange. It remains unclear whether it would serve as a guarantor for the low-enriched uranium or whether the material would be shipped to a nation with refinement capacity such as Russia, Brazil or France.

The deal appears to build upon an IAEA proposal last year that was endorsed by the Obama administration and Western powers. Back then Iran was to send around 2,640 pounds of its low-enriched uranium to Russia to be further refined and afterward to France to be converted into 20%-enriched fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor. The compromise was to serve as a way of drawing Iran’s supply of nuclear material below the threshold for building a bomb and to create an atmosphere for a broader deal between the West and Iran.

That deal broke down when Iran appeared to back away, with political factions in Tehran accusing the West of trying to swindle Iran out of its stockpile. A few months ago, Iran began producing its own 20% enriched uranium, a move that nonproliferation experts worried could bring Iran closer to the highly enriched uranium needed to fuel an atom bomb.

One would think that the U.S. and Western allies would welcome this. At the very least it could ease the international standoff over Iran’s disputed nuclear program and deflate the U.S.-led push for tougher sanctions.

Of course, predictably and sadly, one would be wrong. On May 17 the White House Press Secretary issued a statement that said, “We acknowledge the efforts that have been made by Turkey and Brazil. The proposal announced in Tehran must now be conveyed clearly and authoritatively to the IAEA before it can be considered by the international community. Given Iran’s repeated failure to live up to its own commitments, and the need to address fundamental issues related to Iran’s nuclear program, the United States and international community continue to have serious concerns.”

It is true that the deal is hardly a resolution to all the issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The deal is not as good as it would have been last October (because Iran’s stockpile of LEU is much larger now, making 1200kg a less significant portion of the whole; and because Iran continues to enrich up to 20%). And, the deal is only a short-term measure which does not address long-lasting concerns regarding Iran’s history of secret nuclear activities and its lack of transparency with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Yet, at the end of the day, this deal moves Iran farther away from a nuclear weapon.

Still, it is significant. Gary Sick, a former member of the National Security Council staff and executive director of the Gulf/2000 Project at Columbia University wrote on his blog:

We should all be reminded of the original purpose of the agreement. It was intended as a confidence-building measure that would open the way to more substantive discussions of other issues. The original offer that Iran provisionally accepted in October tacitly accepted Iran’s right to enrich uranium; in return Iran would give up control over a significant portion of its existing stash of LEU. Even low enriched uranium can be further enriched to create bomb-grade (roughly 90+ percent) highly enriched uranium (HEU) that is required for a bomb. The October agreement would have created an environment conducive to at least minimal mutual trust and the beginning of serious negotiations.

Note to negotiators: In the past six months, Iran has not used its LEU to build a bomb, even without an agreement.

Iran has set up a special line of centrifuges to enrich uranium to the 20 percent required for the TRR. But that line is small, separated from its other enrichment facilities, and under inspection of the IAEA. The move to enrich some uranium to 20 percent was obviously intended as a pressure tactic to drive the West back into negotiations, since Iran does not have the capability to manufacture fuel cells for the TRR.

We should also be reminded that Iran did not reject the original deal: they proposed amending it. Basically, when the Iranian negotiators came home with the proposed deal, they were attacked from all sides – including members of the Green Movement – for being suckers. Their opponents pointed out that they were going to rely on the word and good will of Russia (where the LEU would be enriched to 20 percent) and France (where the fuel cells would be fabricated). Iranians from left to right argued that both of these countries had repeatedly cheated Iran on nuclear issues: Russia by delaying endlessly the completion of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, and France by refusing to grant Iran rights to the Eurodif enrichment facility partially owned by Iran since the days of the shah. Why, they asked, should we believe that this agreement will be any different?

Instead, they proposed that the swap of LEU for the fuel cells should happen on Iranian soil, probably in stages and within a fixed period of time. That idea was rejected by the United States and its negotiating partners.

The new bargain appears to be a compromise in which the LEU would physically be removed from Iran and held in escrow in Turkey for up to a year, in which time the fuel cells would be manufactured and delivered to Iran. The new bargain also appears to go much further in formally recognizing the legitimacy of Iran’s independent enrichment program. That should not be a surprise given the fact that Brazil, one of the parties to the bargain, has its own enrichment facility similar to Iran’s and in fact concealed its details for some time.

So where does that leave us?

Essentially, it takes us back to last October. The one big difference is that Iran has more LEU now than it did then. But the reality is that Iran will keep producing LEU unless a new agreement is reached to persuade them to stop. If we had completed the agreement of a swap in October, Iran would have the same amount of LEU as it has now. If we wait another six months for negotiations, Iran will have still more LEU.

In short, this agreement is largely symbolic and limited in its practical effects. If the West accepts the deal as worked out by Brazil and Turkey, and if a new round of negotiations begins – on both the nuclear and other major issues – then this could be a breakthrough. If the West turns it down, or if the two sides do not use it to negotiate some of the major issues that separate them, then nothing much will have been accomplished.

The next step is up to the United States and its negotiating partners.

Although angst is high among the sanctions-at-all-costs crowd, this path to a nuclear swap deal was fully endorsed by the United States and was the centerpiece of the justification for sanctions. One way to respond at this point may just be to declare that our threat of sanctions worked: Iran has capitulated and we accept yes as an answer.

Hmmm…are we that smart?

So, the ball is in the U.S. and its allies court. But so far we seem determined to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. The usual suspects, Washington talking heads, are falling all over themselves condemning Iran for actually taking up the American offer to move LEU to a third country. Let’s see: Iran actually accepted the American offer just as it was presented, and had the audacity to accept it while it was still on the table. And then Iran went ahead and kept on enriching uranium so the American offer looked a lot less attractive to the West then it did in October. This left the White House sputtering about how untrustworthy they were, and no one believed their intentions anyway. This begs the question, if the U.S. thinks that this is a bad bargain now, why did they offer it in the first place?

This New York Times headline “Uranium Offer by Iran May Hinder Efforts on Sanctions“ and the “teaser” for it on the NYT home page–”Monday’s agreement between Iran, Brazil and Turkey could undermine efforts in the U.N. to impose new sanctions on Iran”– speaks volumes. The sanctions cart is obviously being held firmly in place, in front of the non-proliferation horse, by those shaping the interests narrative and who are determined not to let the “horse” move forward.

In fact, if a fraction of the effort that the US has brought to bear, in drumming up support for sanctions for nearly three decades had gone into serious diplomacy directed toward Iran rather than against it, the current confrontational climate would not have been nurtured by either side.

People need to keep their eyes on the prize. The objective here is not to continue holding a grudge against Iran for the Iranian revolution or the hostage crisis. The point as Cliff Kupchan, research director of the Eurasia Group said on the May 17 PBS NewsHour said:

I think we, potentially, the United States, potentially, gets something out of this, too. Look, the prize here is not to sanction Iran. The prize here is to find a diplomatic solution to this very worrisome crisis. Now, it’s just possible that, through this swap, we could build more confidence than we have now, which is virtually none, and more…

Related posts:

1. The Limits of Iran’s Reach