This month, on February 2, 2011, India lost one of its greatest strategic thinkers, K Subrahmanyam.

Known affectionately to many people as “Subbu,” K Subrahmanyam was considered the father of strategic studies in India. Over four decades, he helped to shape Indian foreign and defense policy in critical ways, both inside and outside of government.  He was Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Defense from 1962-65; Secretary of Defense Production from 1979-80; and Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee from 1977-79.  He built India’s first and foremost defense policy think tank, the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA) and served as its director from 1966 to 1975 and again from 1980 to 1989.  He was the principle author of India’s nuclear doctrine and strongly backed the India-U.S. civil nuclear agreement.  After the Kargil war, he headed the Kargil Review Committee, which recommended an overhaul of India’s national security apparatus and led to the creation of several new agencies, including the National Security Advisory Board, which he chaired. After leaving government, Subrahmanyam became a contributing editor to The Economic Times and The Times of India and taught as a visiting professor at Cambridge University.  Whether you agreed with him or not, he was a giant of the Indian national security establishment.  Stephen Cohen of The Brookings Institution and a long time friend of Subrahmanyam said, “Subbu was a guru to me and many others, but he did not insist that I share his views, and his most endearing quality was his love of argument and debate, which irritated some, but which on balance made him a great teacher.”

On a recent trip to Delhi, I had the fortunate opportunity to meet Subrahmanyam for tea one afternoon at the Oberoi Hotel.  He struck me as one of those revered elder statesmen whose impact on national policy will long be remembered by future generations. Yet I didn’t find him the least bit intimidating.  He was warm and affectionate.  In fact, I saw immediately why so many young people considered him a mentor. We had a wonderful and wide ranging conversation about the many challenges facing India today, from education and governance to economic reform and foreign policy.  Subrahmanyam explained to me why he was such an ardent supporter of the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership — more so than many of his compatriots. He believed it was key to defending Indian pluralism, secularism and democracy from what he called “a one party oligarchical system allied to jihadism” — China.  Equally important, he believed the United States would need India and its vast pool of scientists, engineers, technicians, and medical personnel to compete with China and maintain its position as the world’s predominant economic power. English speaking India, with a large and growing diaspora in the U.S., was a natural partner.

Upon Subrahmanyam’s death, we have much to reflect upon, from the role of nuclear weapons to the rise of China and India’s place in the emerging international order. For sure, we need to deepen the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership, especially in the areas of education and training.  This is absolutely critical.  But we also need to think about how India relates to China and how the U.S. as a Pacific power relates to both.  India and China still have unresolved border disputes and remain suspicious of one another.  The U.S. arguably has better relations with both nations than the two have with each other. While it may be tempting for the U.S. to maintain a strategic edge by encouraging that tension, thereby “cementing its own presence in Asia as an offshore balancer,” as Kishore Mahbubani has written, it would also be prudent long term to promote cooperation among all three nations.  Without appearing to meddle, the U.S. should take the lead and launch a broad-based trilateral discussion on the big issues of the day with different stakeholders from all three nations –gov’t officials, business, the military, scholars, journalists, artists and others.  Such an initiative would encourage regional cooperation, reduce Chinese fears of encirclement and give the U.S. a new voice in Asia.  As Subrahmanyam might say, it is an idea worth considering.

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In a room full of computer screens, a US civilian with a joystick on the console kills a man thousands of miles away. Having aced a course on drones with ferocious names like Reaper, Hunter, and Tigershark, he is competent to take down a target — a dangerous terrorist, a drug lord connected with the Taliban, a farmer planting IEDs, or, accidentally, an innocent civilian, as the drones are liable to targeting errors. The drones often save American lives and tax dollars at the expense of the lives of innocent civilians: just last month, an air strike mistake led to 23 civilian deaths in Afghanistan.

However, instead of addressing the targeting failures or keeping the drones in the combat zone, the United States sometimes dismisses problems by defining its enemies as “unlawful combatants” and keeping the drone operations secret. If Washington continues to excuse itself from the rule of law in this manner, the use of armed unmanned vehicles may create more problems than it solves.

Last week, a 29-page report to the United Nations Human Rights Council called on the United States to exercise greater restraint in its use of drones outside of war zones because the use of drones undermined global constraints on the use of military force.  The report stressed that the drone technology is changing the rules of conflict and undermining the foundations of humanitarian behavior in war. Here are just some grounds on which the US use of drones could be challenged.

First, although the drones have become a prominent feature of US counterterrorism efforts, Washington keeps the limits and the justification of drone killings secret. Such secrecy stifles public debate on the use of drones, prevents the investigation of civilian casualties, and allows the United States to avoid following the rules of combat.

Second, while it views its own right to self defense in a very expansive and open-ended manner, the United States denies such a right to the suspect targeted by the drone. Frequently operated outside of combat zones, the drones target not only terrorists, but also those who help them and, depending on the nature of the help, may deserve a punishment far less severe than killing.

Third, the use of drones violates Washington’s own 1947 National Security Act, which separates intelligence and military functions. The drones in Pakistan are operated by the CIA – a civilian agency tasked with intelligence gathering that has no privileged combatant status under the Geneva Conventions-  and are exempt from the well-established protocols that cover military operations.

To maintain its legitimacy when conducting military operations abroad, the United States must fully comply with international humanitarian law and adhere to the standards of the so-called ‘just war against terror’ not only in motivation, but also in execution. This means establishing clear limitations and rules for drone targeting, removing the CIA from drone operations, lifting the veil of secrecy from the issue, keeping drone use within the limits of the acknowledged battlefield, and protecting civilians from drone attacks more rigorously. Simply admitting that accidents do happen despite the highest levels of standards and practices is not enough.

Next time it contemplates the need for establishing rules for drone use and lifting the surrounding secrecy, Washington should imagine a lawless world where Iran and North Korea have acquired armed drones. Today, the United States is only one of over 40 states that have invested in the drone technology. Each of these nations has a long list of enemies and would find that when it comes to targeted killings, the more secrecy and the fewer rules, the better. One of the states whose use of drones is likely to rise in the near future is Russia, which currently has 18 drone programs and is also training personnel to operate Israeli-made drones. Having killed its enemies by means as exotic as Polonium poisoning in the past, the Kremlin will be able to take its assassination practices to a whole new level by using drones. Thus, to ensure that the drone programs of other countries don’t take a dangerous turn, the United States should set and abide by high standards while it still leads in drones technology.

By avoiding international law, the United States agrees to the absence of the rules not only for other sovereign states, but also for the very terrorists it targets. While Washington claims to attempt to win hearts and minds abroad, its actions stoke anti-Americanism and inspire more terrorist attacks, and the Taliban could well argue that the US drones are not that different from its remote control IEDs. It is important that the feeling of outrage at terrorist acts does not weaken American ethical considerations regarding the use of drones because even the so-called “unlawful combatants” should be fought in accordance with the law.

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In the hours after Congress acted last Sunday, the White House announced that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was one of the first two global leaders to call and congratulate Obama on his domestic victory.

Now, it is reasonable to assume that the Saudi leader was not particularly concerned about health care reform itself but recognized that its passage would strengthen Obama domestically and perhaps reignite his desire to be remembered as a transformative President not simply at home but also abroad.

In 2008 Obama ran a campaign that, in part, portrayed his very election as a step towards resetting U.S. relations with the international community. Further more, by illustrating his understanding of specific hot button issues ranging from Indo-Pakistani disagreements in Kashmir to the harm caused by the Bush administrations “war on terror”, Obama suggested that he would prioritize tackling the policy matters that had corroded relations between the U.S. and the Muslim world and thus undermined U.S. national security.

His early actions as President, from the appointment of Middle East envoy Mitchell to his historic Cairo speech, collectively suggested that Obama was looking to move beyond simply the reset offered by his election and was seeking a fundamental realignment between the U.S. and the Muslim world that would transform the international arena.

Unfortunately, this early promise has not, thus far, been realized and for many ordinary citizens and policy analysts alike there has been a growing skepticism as to whether Obama would be able to achieve such a realignment and, in some quarters, a questioning of whether he wished to use his Presidency to pursue it.

However, some foreign policy experts and U.S. political observers, including Abdullah, may have identified something else at play that explains the Obama administrations inability to advance its national security agenda thus far. 

Upon taking office Obama faced, perhaps inevitably, opponents willing to test his mettle at home and abroad. By initially failing to secure significant policy and political victories, the new President was pushed back on his heels and arguably lost the focus and transformative desire on display during the campaign. Abdullah, and others, have recognized that with the health care victory Obama has another opportunity to set and implement an ambitious global agenda.

Of course, no one can claim to know whether Obama wishes to prioritize a true transformation of US-Muslim world relations. While his campaign rhetoric and initial Presidential actions suggest that he has such instincts, and unquestionably U.S. national security would benefit from such a move, the end of the story has yet to be written.

Clearly, the passage of health care provides the political boost to such efforts and his year and a half as President may have provided Obama with a picture of what he will have to do and sacrifice to realign relations between the US and the Muslim world. The question now is whether he will choose to follow this difficult path.

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This is my last post for 2009 I thought I would write about Afghanistan but on second thought I will, no doubt, be doing that quite a lot during 2010. Thanks to the Obama Administration’s surge strategy Afghanistan will, from a blogging viewpoint, be the gift that keeps on giving.

So, as we contemplate whether 2010 will be better or worse let’s take a moment to consider 2009. In the spirit of Dave Barry’s classic annual year in review column let’s acknowledge, albeit with some poetic license commentary by moi, a few of the significant events that made, however briefly, the headlines.

Although it started on Dec. 28 2008 the month of January saw massive Israeli air strikes and a ground force invasion of the Gaza Strip. Heavy fighting took place in Gaza City between the Israeli forces and Hamas. At least 1300 Palestinians were killed. On Jan. 17 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced a unilateral ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, declaring that Israel has achieved the goals it set when launching the military operation. On Jan. 21 Israel completes its troop withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

Also that month President Barack Obama signed executive orders closing the US detention camp at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, within a year; closing the CIA’s secret prisons; requiring a review of military trials for terror suspects; and requiring all interrogations to follow the non-coercive methods specified in the Army Field Manual.

Of course, nobody knew back then that the camp would end up in Illinois. One can only hope that the inmates are not too acclimated to the Caribbean climate to adjust to a midwest winter.

On Jan 27 Hama declared that it previously was just kidding and broke the ceasefire by attacking an Israeli frontier patrol. Israel immediately responded that it lacks a sense of humor and renewed its air strikes on the Gaza Strip border with Egypt.

On Feb. 3 Iran launched its first domestically built satellite into orbit. Iran stated that the satellite is meant for research and telecommunications purposes, but Western states express concern that the technology could be used in the development of ballistic missiles. The U.S. intelligence community, estimating that Iran will show the same swift progress with its missiles that it did with its nuclear program, predicted the next flight will be in 2040.

On Feb. 6, renewing their classic rivalry, a British and a French nuclear submarine collided in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Political leaders from both countries sighed in relief that it was merely submarines and not their respective football fans that collided.

On Feb. 17 President Barack Obama authorized the deployment of an additional 17,000 military personnel to Afghanistan. The troops will be deployed to ‘meet urgent security needs’ in southern Afghanistan.  Later in the year President Obama deploys 30,000 more troops to meet “super duper double urgent” security needs in Afghanistan.

On March 15 two US female journalists, together with their Chinese guide, are detained by North Korean soldiers at the China–North Korea border when reporting on North Korean refugees in northeastern China. In June the two women are sentenced to 12 years of hard labor. On 4 August the two are pardoned and released following mediation by former US President Bill Clinton, who stood in for the Rev. Jesse Jackson. Rev. Jackson subsequently mediated between Bill and Hillary Clinton.

On March 19 China and Viet Nam agree to set up a hotline between their foreign ministries, and to focus on negotiations to solve the outstanding maritime issues in order to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea. Britain and France send representatives from their submarine branches to offer their expertise.

On March 24 French Defence Minister Hervé Morin announces that France will compensate those suffering health problems linked to radiation and resulting from the more than 200 nuclear weapon tests that France carried out from 1960 to 1996 in Algeria and Polynesia. Whether any radiation was the result of a French-British submarine collision remains unknown.

On March 27 US President Barack Obama presents the new US strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke is appointed the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Citizens of both countries, remembering Amb. Holbrooke’s splendid efforts in the Balkan wars of the 1990s, riot in the streets.

On April 1 the new Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, states that the Israeli Government is not bound by the commitments made by its predecessors, such as the 2007 Annapolis Agreement for a two-state solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Lieberman subsequently says April Fools.

On May 25 North Korea carries out an underground nuclear weapon test in Kilju, Hamgyong province. The U.S. National Rifle Association condemns the test as an attempt by godless communists to violate American’s god given second amendment rights.

Following the presidential election in Iran on 12 June, in which President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is reelected, hundreds of thousands of people take to the streets to protest against what they perceive as a fraudulent election. At least eight people are killed and several wounded by security forces in the largest demonstrations since the 1979 Iranian revolution. Senator Lieberman, saying you can’t make democracy without breaking a few eggs, says this shows why the U.S. needs to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities.

On June 14 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announces that Israel is ready to endorse the creation of a Palestinian state as long as it is demilitarized and the Palestinians accept Israel as a Jewish state with Jerusalem as the capital. Foreign Minister Lieberman reminds people that this is not an April Fools joke.

On June 30 the withdrawal of US combat troops from cities and villages in Iraq is completed and the security duties are handed over to the new Iraqi forces. Approximately 131,000 US troops remain in Iraq. The remaining quarter million private military and security contractors working for the U.S., partying in the Green Zone, start crying in their beer.

On July 2 the US Army launches a major offensive against Taliban militants in southwestern Afghanistan, involving 4000 US soldiers and 650 Afghan troops. It is the first such operation under US President Barack Obama and differs from previous operations as the US forces will remain in the secured areas and build bases to provide security for the local population. Halliburton offers to help build the bases. Blackwater offer to help provide security. The residents of Helmand province start fleeing the country.

On July 16 British Prime Minister Gordon Brown issues a statement on nuclear non-proliferation together with the new British strategy, Road to 2010, outlining how the UK will play a leading role in tackling nuclear issues. Manchester United offers to tackle a British nuclear submarine to help promote nuclear disarmament.

On Sep. 25 US President Barack Obama, French President Nicholas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown accuse Iran of building a secret underground uranium enrichment facility. President Ahmadinejad denounces the accusation as a lie, saying he was spending all his free time cracking down on democracy protesters.

On September 28 the 2006 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms, Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials enters into force following Benin’s deposit of the ninth instrument of ratification. The NRA denounces convention as an attempt to take god-fearing American’s guns away.

On Oct. 16 the UN Human Rights Council endorses the recommendations made in Richard Goldstone’s report on the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip. The report accuses both Israel and Palestinian militants of war crimes and demands that the parties investigate the allegations, or the cases will be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Sen. Lieberman calls for the bombing of the United Nations.

On Oct. 17 the Pakistani Army launches a massive air and ground offensive against al-Qaeda and Taliban rebels in South Waziristan. At least 20,000 people flee the region. Amb. Holbrooke announces that this is proof President Obama’s strategy for the region is working.

On October 30 the UN First Committee agrees to set a timetable for the negotiation of an arms trade treaty. A UN conference on an arms trade treaty will be held in 2012 to elaborate a legally binding instrument for the transfer of conventional arms. Lockheed Martin, Smith & Wesson, Colt Industries, and Glock file a complaint with the Human Right Commission, claiming that liberal pinkos are imperiling their economic livelihood. Bob Geldorf announces the will organize a concert for laid off weapons brokers and promises a special guest appearance by Viktor Bout, currently enjoying the hospitality of the Thai government.

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Last week, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari surrendered control of the country’s nuclear weapons to Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani and the Pakistani military.  This occurred amid ongoing controversy ignited by a New Yorker article claiming that a “highly classified” US expert squad was prepared, if necessary, to enter Pakistan and secure vulnerable nuclear weapons components in case of a military coup by Islamists.  While the Pakistani government insists that fears about its nuclear arsenal are “nothing more than a concoction to tarnish the image of Pakistan,” any risk that these weapons may fall into the wrong hands is too great. A coordinated “threat reduction” response, with US leadership, is now more urgently needed than ever.

A recent spate of violent attacks on Pakistani military and police targets, including a direct assault on Army headquarters in Rawalpindi that killed more than thirty people, emphasize the urgency of the threat.  Because of their proximity to Taliban-held territory and to sites of previous successful attacks, Pakistan’s nuclear facilities at Wah Cantonment and Chashma Kundian appear especially vulnerable to large-scale terrorist assault.*  Even hardened physical security measures at known nuclear sites cannot protect weapons and components from being stolen or sold by insiders, or from a pinpoint attack while in transit during an exercise or a crisis-driven redeployment.

Despite assurances from Islamabad that “Pakistan’s strategic assets are completely safe and secure” and that foreign assistance is not needed and will not be tolerated, the US government should offer Pakistan a coordinated assistance program based on the successful model of Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) assistance to the former Soviet Union.  For such assistance to be palatable to Pakistani leaders and the general public, it must include clear assurances that sovereign control over Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent rests with Islamabad, and that a new CTR program is not the first step toward disarming Pakistan.

When the Soviet system collapsed in the early 1990s, Russia and other successor states were left to deal with a massive legacy of unconventional weapons with a vastly diminished resource base.  A dangerous quantity of former Soviet nuclear weapons, materials and expertise was available for theft or black market sale to the highest bidder.  In the face of that potential proliferation crisis, the United States launched an ambitious collaborative threat reduction initiative. Today, the so-called Nunn-Lugar program has eliminated more than 7,000 nuclear warheads, and 387 metric tons of highly enriched uranium, enough for more than 15,000 bombs, while more than 100,000 former Soviet scientists have been engaged in peaceful collaborative research with the West. In short, these programs have proven an unparalleled foreign policy success.

In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the exposure of the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market network, the Bush Administration sought to replicate the successes of the Nunn-Lugar programs by offering similar support to Pakistan. Between 2001 and 2007, more than $100 million in CTR-type assistance was appropriated by the United States government for a wide variety of activities. These included sharing best practices and technical measures to prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, supplying nuclear detection equipment, and an array of other nuclear and radiological anti-trafficking assistance. In addition, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security measures and taken a number of steps to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials, including strengthening its export control laws and implementing systems to scan containers for radiological and nuclear materials at Port Qasim.  But the Bush Administration’s assistance program was only the first step toward ensuring the security of the Pakistani nuclear complex.  Opportunities for theft or diversion of critical nuclear components are growing in Pakistan, not receding.

To date, cooperation with Islamabad on the nuclear issue has not been easy. For Washington’s part, Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee have continually sought to make assistance to Pakistan conditional on American access to A.Q. Khan. Furthermore, S.1707, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009,a $7.5 billion aid package, would limit certain military assistance and arms transfers to Pakistan until the US Secretary of State certifies that Pakistan’s security forces are working to prevent al Qaeda and the Taliban from basing attacks in Afghanistan from Pakistan’s territory, or interfering in Pakistan’s political or judicial processes.

Such efforts at linkage proved counterproductive with Russia, whose CTR assistance was hampered by all manner of conditions related to human rights, progress on meeting chemical and biological arms control obligations, and military cooperation with Iran. These conditions were highly contentious in Moscow and other former Soviet satellites, and little evidence suggests that these conditions ever promoted their intended objectives.

As instability continues to spread across South Asia, the US should aim to ensure that the government of Pakistan has all the tools at its disposal to prevent the proliferation of its nuclear weapons, materials, and secrets. For Pakistan, that means, at a minimum, promoting physical protection in and around sensitive weapons or weapons-component storage sites, protecting spent fuel at the Karachi and Chashma nuclear power plants, and managing civilian stockpiles of highly enriched uranium throughout the country.

But these immediate security concerns are only a first step. Ultimately, the enduring value of CTR efforts in the former Soviet Union went beyond the physical protection of weapons and materials. Collaborative science efforts between the United States and Russia promoted transparency and trust between the two governments. Already in Pakistan, mistrust of US motives has been a significant barrier to wider CTR collaboration. As in the former Soviet Union, science engagement should be promoted as a central component of Washington’s overall security strategy with Pakistan, not strictly—or even principally—as a measure of transparency, but as a broader tool to encourage peaceful collaborative exchanges and mutual scientific benefit. This “dual use” cooperation was consistently undervalued in the wider US-Russian relationship. The US should not replicate those mistakes with Pakistan.

Like the former Soviet states in the 1990s, Pakistan is a society in transition, with acute physical vulnerabilities and unique political sensitivities.  US nuclear security assistance, though badly needed, should be offered carefully, with emphasis on cooperation to ensure Pakistanis see CTR as the transparent, win-win opportunity it has been for other US partners.

*For more information, please see the Yale Global article by Matthew Rojansky and Daniel Cassman on nuclear threat reduction in Pakistan.

Brian Finlay is Director of Stimson’s Managing Across Boundaries Program. His full biography is available here.

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During Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to India last week, Indian environmental minister Jairam Ramesh expressed India’s views on climate change policy: “There is simply no case for the pressure that we, who have been among the lowest emitters per capita, face to actually reduce emissions.” Other less-developed countries (LDCs) have similar, though perhaps less aggressive, attitudes. The problem is, developing countries now make up a significant portion of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions (China emits the most carbon dioxide of any country, and India is fourth). While it’s true that LDCs still emit greenhouse gases at much lower per capita rates than developed nations, a successful policy to combat climate change will require their cooperation.

The arguments about whose responsibility it is to curb climate change are well-worn by this point, but they still threaten to thwart meaningful international collaboration. Developed nations point out that the LDCs will soon account for a large majority of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. LDCs shoot back that industrialized nations created the climate change problem and that it’s only fair that LDCs also get a chance to modernize their economies without environmental restrictions. Both sides have valid points. But the developing world’s unwillingness to address the problem will have devastating consequences that will harm LDCs far worse than the developed world.

As an example, take Ramesh’s claim that fears about receding Himalayan glaciers are a “preconceived notion … based on western media.” Not only is Ramesh’s allegation entirely untrue—an Indian research institute predicted last year that, at the current rate of melting, the glaciers may disappear entirely by 2035—but it is grossly irresponsible for India’s government to take that position. Unless the world does something soon, climate change and environmental damage caused by reckless development policies will cripple developing economies and create a massive humanitarian crisis.

Himalayan glaciers feed major rivers including the Ganges, Barahmaputra, Mekong, and Yangtze, which provide fresh water to billions of people in South and East Asia. When the glaciers are gone, those mighty rivers will shrink dramatically, and some may even become seasonal water sources. Already, droughts in India are causing wars over water, reduced precipitation has caused grain shortfalls in Pakistan, and 500 million Chinese lack access to clean water. If the glaciers melt, water shortages could affect over one billion people. LDCs claim that environmental regulation is prohibitively expensive, but a humanitarian disaster wrought by climate change will cost them far more.

Frustratingly, the parameters of an agreement have existed for years. Any successful international climate change policy will be based on a system of cash transfers from rich countries to fund LDC’s environmental programs. Indeed, developed nations admitted their historical responsibility for most greenhouse gas emissions in the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Developed countries must also acknowledge that, as the world’s richest nations by far, they have the capacity and responsibility to bear the brunt of solving a global problem. At the same time, LDCs need to recognize their own crucial role in reducing future emissions. More importantly, though, they must realize that climate change threatens their very existence. Developed nations should make it clear that they are willing to fund meaningful and effective environmental measures in LDCs. But unless the LDCs get on board, they will face an environmental catastrophe that will more than erase the economic gains they’ve made over the past few decades.

In December, representatives from over 170 countries will meet in Copenhagen to discuss the future of international climate agreements. These efforts have the potential to significantly advance environmental policy, but only if the world stops playing the blame game and recognizes climate change as a global problem that everyone must help to solve. Progress in preparation for Copenhagen has reached an impasse in the form of bickering over financing for the LDC’s efforts to cut emissions. But something has to give. Either the world will reach a compromise to share the burdens of climate change policy, or we risk a future of environmental disasters and state failure triggered by severe natural resource shortages.

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Are there other experts, with recent on the ground South Asia experience, who you think would add to such a hearing?

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At a meeting Tuesday with former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), and former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, President Obama summed up the group’s deliberations on the goal of achieving a world without nuclear weapons:

“This is a reminder of the long tradition of bipartisan foreign policy that has been the hallmark of America at moments of greatest need, and that’s the kind of spirit that we hope will be reflected in our administration.”

It’s great to hear this from the President who also made “bipartisanship and openness” an official plank in his campaign platform, and now identifies it as a key to effective US national security and foreign policy for his Administration.

You might think Obama’s commitment to bipartisan consultation and cooperation on national security would win nothing but plaudits from a group of former leaders obviously assembled not just for their substantive expertise, but for their bipartisan credibility. So then what are we to make of George Shultz’s reply, in the role of spokesman for the elder statesmen? Not once, but twice, the former Reagan administration official remarked that President Obama was wrong about nuclear disarmament being a “bipartisan issue,” because:

“It’s really nonpartisan. This is a subject that ought to somehow get up above trying to get a partisan advantage. And it’s of such importance that we need to take it on its own merits. And that’s the way we’ve proceeded. And that’s the way, at least it seems to us, you’ve proceeded.”

I suppose Mr. Shultz has earned the right to disagree with the President on national television, but really, isn’t this a distinction without a difference? Why harp on nomenclature when the point is the same? The purpose of the meeting and the public statements afterward was to demonstrate that working toward a world without nuclear weapons is a goal on which current and former leaders from across the political spectrum can find consensus. It just doesn’t matter what you call that sort of agreement. What matters is getting it.

On the other hand, I think Secretary Shultz was pointing toward at least one legitimate objection to the term “bipartisan.” Over the past few months, as the President has fought to win Republican support for his major economic recovery initiatives, the media appropriated “bipartisanship” for a much more superficial purpose. Whether a policy action or legislative proposal was “bipartisan” became just a question of whether Republicans joined the Democratic majority in voting for it. Shultz is right when he says that our country’s commitment to nuclear disarmament needs to be bigger than politics.

My advice to the big shots at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue? Please don’t waste time and taxpayer dollars arguing over syntax. Pakistan is building more nuclear weapons even while tottering on the brink of state failure, North Korea has tested a bomb already, and Iran claims to have a nuclear-capable rocket with terrifying range and accuracy. These threats won’t wait while we hash out precisely the right definition for good national security policy. As long as you get the job done in a way that puts results ahead of politics, you will have the support of the American people.

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On a daily basis news reports suggest that the democratically elected government of Pakistan is struggling to contain militancy within its borders. The Taliban’s recent march into the Buneer district 60 miles from the capital Islamabad fed these fears and led Secretary of State Clinton to note:

“I think we cannot underscore [enough the seriousness of the existential threat posed to the state of Pakistan by the continuing advances…”

As tensions rise in the region, Americans and Pakistanis alike are waiting to see how the new U.S. policy, outlined in late March by President Obama, impacts the crisis.

There is a feeling within the administration that sustained U.S. and international focus is needed because the militant groups that grew so rapidly under the military government of General Musharraf are threatening the internal security of nuclear-armed Pakistan. This instability is also harming efforts to bring peace and security to bordering Afghanistan.

Despite the fact that many counter insurgency, security and South Asia experts and Pakistani gov comments have been urging the administration to curtail the use of strike drones in the Pakistani tribal region, the Obama plan seems to include an escalation.

U.S. government officials, speaking to the media on background, have suggested that the use of drones will increase and will move beyond the tribal areas of Pakistan into other provinces. This determination has been made despite the fact that misdirected attacks from these drones have led to civilian deaths,undercut efforts to build bridges with the people of the tribal region and are destabilizing broader Pakistani society.

The drone attacks are said to be fueling instability in part because they are leading to such high civilian losses. As top U.S. counter insurgency advisor, and author of the superb book Accidental Guerilla, David Kilcullen noted on the blog Small Wars Journal, the drone attacks “…increase the number and radicalism of Pakistanis who support extremism, and thus undermine the key strategic program of building a willing and capable partner in Pakistan…”

Kilcullen believes that the drones should be used as an “absolute, and rarely invoked, last resort” but it seems that his advice, and that of many other regional experts has been, at least for now, ignored by the administration.

The decision to press on with the drone strategy is confounding, particularly when one considers the data pulled together by Amir Mir, writing for The News International (a popular Pakistani English language paper). Amir Mir noted that:
“Of the 60 cross-border predator strikes carried out by the Afghanistan-based American drones in Pakistan between January 14, 2006 and April 8, 2009, only 10 were able to hit their actual targets, killing 14 wanted al-Qaeda leaders, besides perishing 687 innocent Pakistani civilians. The success percentage of the US predator strikes thus comes to not more than six per cent.”

This Wednesday, President Obama will be hosting trilateral talks with Afghanistan and Pakistan. We strongly urge the President to use that opportunity to change course and, at a minimum, adopt the Kilcullen test and stop the escalation in drone use.

In the speech announcing his new Pakistan-Afghanistan plan, President Obama stated that the U.S. “will seek lasting partnerships with Afghanistan and Pakistan that serve the promise of a new day for their people.” Such relationships are harmed by the use of strike drones and we believe a new and better way forward should focus on development aid, political dialogue and protection of civilians.

To help make the case to President Obama we have launched an advertisement urging an end to escalation in drone use. To view it you can click here.

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I know the topic de jour these days is America’s torture policy, amplified by the recent release of Bush administration torture memos, but let’s not dwell on the past, as rightwing torture apologists, like to phrase it.

Instead let’s return to Afghanistan and Pakistan or Afpak in Washington jargon. Because if it is bad news in war zones that provide flimsy pretexts for torture, then Afpak seems likely to produce plenty in the future.

Let’s start with the under covered statement by Gen. David Petraeus, head of the US Central Command, who spoke at the John F. Kennedy School of Government on April 21. He said, “”We do believe we can achieve progress, but it’s going to get worse before it gets better,” said Petraeus. “When you go into the enemy’s sanctuaries, they will fight you for it. There will be tough months ahead, without question,” he said.

“Tough months?” Uh, General Petraeus? You meant tough years, didn’t you? Politico reported April 21 that the Pentagon’s senior military leaders are worried that the security situation in Afghanistan is stalemated or deteriorating, and now are preparing a far-reaching plan that would prepare the U.S. military for a war that could last three to five more years, officials said.

The effort, which is being coordinated by the Joint Staff and is still in its early stages, is designed to create an experienced cadre of officers and senior enlisted soldiers, who would rotate between assignments in Afghanistan and at their home stations until the end of hostilities.

The article goes on to say that “Until now, officers involved say, the Afghanistan war has been a secondary concern for the Pentagon, which has tended to view it as a short-term mission that took a back seat to the war in Iraq.”

Say what? 679 fatalities, and counting, in Operation Enduring Freedom since 2001, for a back seat “short-term mission?” If that really reflects the thinking of the past U.S. military and civilian leadership someone needs to be fired and perhaps court martialed or indicted for gross dereliction of professional responsibility.

Speaking of gross dereliction two weekends ago Afghanistan’s President Harmid Karzai asked Gen. David McKiernan, the top U.S. general in Afghanistan, to explain allegations of six civilian deaths in two recent incidents. It was the second time in three days Karzai brought up the topic with Gen. David McKiernan.

The United Nations has said a record 2,118 civilians died in the Afghan war last year, a 40 percent increase over 2007. The U.N. said U.S., NATO and Afghan forces killed 829 civilians, or 39 percent of the total. Of those, 552 deaths were blamed on airstrikes.

Even, if, for the sake of argument, you grant that the U.S. has an effective strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, it still has a people problem, not enough of them, and I don’t just mean soldiers. The New York Times reported last week that the Obama administration is finding that it must turn to military personnel and contractors to fill hundreds of posts in Afghanistan that had been intended for civilian experts.

Meanwhile, over in Pakistan, it was reported last week that Taliban militants had established effective control of Buner, a strategically important district just 70 miles from the capital, Islamabad. Buner, home to about one million people, is a gateway to a major Pakistani city, Mardan, the second largest in North-West Frontier Province, after Peshawar.

Just last Wednesday heavily armed Taliban militants were patrolling villages, and the local police had retreated to their station houses in much of Buner.

It did not go unnoticed that the Taliban advance came 10 days after Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari agreed to the imposition of Islamic law, or Shariah, in Swat, as part of a deal with the Taliban. Swat is both a valley and an administrative district in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan located 100 miles from Islamabad.

No doubt that was why Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told Congress on April 21 that the Pakistani government “is basically abdicating to the Taliban and to the extremists.”

Even more depressing was the fact that when the Taliban first began their assault on Buner the people spiritedly fought back, assembling assembled a volunteer force and reportedly killing 17 Taliban fighters.

But then, a local commissioner, Javed Mohammad, who is also the senior official in Swat, and who was appointed on the recommendation of the Taliban, ordered the local armies to dissolve. The order led many of those who had been willing to stand up to the Taliban to either flee or give up.

Subsequently, most, if not all of the Taliban left Buner. But they left of their own accord, not because they were drive out. What should disturb people is that the tactics the Taliban used there can be used elsewhere.

And why, you ask, should we care about Pakistan? Duh, as Homer Simpson would say. Here is what Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in an April 22 interview on NBC, “Pakistan, it’s a country that has nuclear weapons. My long-term worry is that dissent, you know, if it should continue, gives us the worst possible outcome there.”

As the New York Times editorialized yesterday:

If the Indian Army advanced within 60 miles of Islamabad, you can bet Pakistan’s army would be fully mobilized and defending the country in pitched battles. Yet when the Taliban got that close to the capital on Friday, pushing into the key district of Buner, Pakistani authorities sent only several hundred poorly equipped and underpaid constabulary forces.

…

And — most frightening of all — if the army cannot or will not defend its own territory against the militants, how can anyone be sure it will protect Pakistan’s 60 or so nuclear weapons?

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