KORUS Free Trade Agreement: An Agent of Stability

Almost sixty years ago at the end of the Korean War, the relationship between the United States and South Korea took on a new meaning.  The relationship was built on a cooperative framework between allied forces in order to promote stability on the peninsula through a strengthened commitment to the mutual goals of protecting democratic values, peace and economic security.

Within the past few months the United States Congress and the Korean Parliament took large steps in solidifying their commitment to these basic tenants of the U.S.-Korea relationship when they passed the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA).  Their support of this agreement is evidence that shared economic prosperity is a strong part of the U.S.-Korean relationship.  As the political dynamics on the Asian continent continue to change, it is critical that the U.S. maintain and build its relationship with Korea as a means to enhance America’s position to promote political and economic stability in the region.

Most of those who have been following the debate and progress of the long-stalled KORUS FTA have heard most about how the reduction or removal of several tariff and non-tariff barriers will lead to greater economic opportunity through increased market access for American goods and services.  Korean duties on major agricultural products like meat and dairy products and cotton and soybeans will be eliminated and many U.S. businesses will experience simplified and expedited customs procedures that will allow them to reach customers in South Korea with less red tape.  Overall, the U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that tariff cuts alone to a variety of U.S. goods could amount to an increase of $10 billion to $11 billion of U.S. goods exports alone.  KORUS is mutually beneficial to the South Korean economy and its competitiveness.  Reducing tariffs and increasing exports will increase the country’s gross domestic product by an estimated five percent.

The KORUS FTA was negotiated and signed by the United States and South Korea on June 30, 2007; however, the George W. Bush Administration did not submit legislation to the then Democratically-controlled Congress due primarily to partisan differences over autos and beef.  The often referenced case is the American automobile industry, which originally opposed the agreement, but after the Obama Administration achieved key concessions that soothed the concerns of the industry, not only did the auto industry itself welcome the opportunity to compete on a level playing field, the United Autoworkers also joined to support.  Their support came as a result of Korean commitments to immediately reduce their eight percent tariff on U.S.-built passenger cars, including electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids, to four percent and to immediately reduce their ten percent tariff on trucks to zero.  After five years, tariffs on U.S.-made motor vehicles, including electric cars and plug-in hybrids, will be reduced to zero.

Though these tariff reductions and concessions are important and positive elements, they should not overshadow the FTA’s equally positive effects on strengthening the U.S.-Korea relationship and how U.S. trade policy can function as a key diplomatic tool.  As North Korea pursues a misguided nuclear weapons strategy, it threatens the tenants of the U.S-Korean relationship.  The tensions on the Korean Peninsula are heightened by the growth of China’s influence in the region while other nations have grown increasingly wary of the foreign and military policy goals of the communist-led countries of Asia.  The KORUS FTA provides opportunities for greater economic security and emboldens the democratic institutions of a key partner in the region since the end of the Korean War.  Our growing economic relationship will empower both the United States and Korea to be active agents for stability.

Growing trade relations with our allies is rarely easy to achieve; however, with the mutual goal of fairness to our businesses, workers and consumers, the KORUS FTA will not only benefit our economic well-being but also support our longstanding relationship with Korea that has sought to maintain peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.

Related posts:

1. Academics Suggest Science Diplomacy Strategy with North Korea
2. Will Senators Have the Midas Touch?
3. The Dragon Comes to Africa

The Dragon Comes to Africa

Africa’s development has been a focus of goodwill for the American people for decades, and a central topic of geostrategic importance for policy makers. China is working to develop Africa too—but how they aid and invest in the continent is different. This is leaving Africans with a choice about how to develop and where they end up. The countries of sub-Saharan Africa are learning quickly that even free money can come with negative effects.

China, the source of a massive influx of cash into the sub-Saharan continent, is offering sub-Saharan Africa money and technical support, ostensibly with no conditions.  This is the opposite of most Western trade and aid which comes with a number of conditions for transparency, good governance, and encourages sound economic planning.

China is taking a modern version of the mercantilist approach towards its trade, aid, and investment in Africa.  While the easy money may seem attractive to African leaders now, they may yet rue the day they fell under the sway of the Chinese.  Most Chinese loans to African governments and private firms for infrastructure projects are offered under agreements that require Chinese firms to do much of the work involved and in which African natural resources are often used as a source of collateral or payment.  So the Africans not only lose out by forgoing opportunities to  build technical expertise (because the Chinese are importing labor from mainland China), but also by depleting their natural resource stocks and failing to use them locally to modernize their own economies.

Most development economists agree that when a country relies solely on natural resource exploitation, the manufacturing and other industrial sectors of the economy often remain seriously underdeveloped. Digging and shipping natural resources is a low-value added and commodity process. Africa is starting to develop some advanced processing facilities for minerals, but not with much help from the Chinese. And this is the key to understanding the approaches and the risks to Africa right now.

Chinese trade with Africa has increased by 1,124% from 2000 to 2010, when it reached $100.5 billion and China became the largest investor in Africa, beating out even the World Bank.  In 2010, about 63% of African exports to China consisted of crude oil and another 32% was made up of raw materials – mostly metals and wood; 95% of China’s imports from Africa were basic natural resources that China then uses to fuel its own economy, leaving the Africans far below them on the value-chain ladder.

While China’s use of imported labor, natural resource exploitation, and general lack of investment in the domestic African economy are all concerns, perhaps the largest concern is that China provides its financial largesse to governments with unsavory leaders (Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Omar al-Bashir of Sudan come to mind) with no restrictions on how the funds may be used or limitations that prevent those funds from being used to purchase firearms (often from China) or other destructive goods that can be used to subdue their own domestic populations.  China insists it is only upholding the principle of sovereignty, but the international community has consistently worked to forbid such capital transfers to autocratic governments that commit human rights violations.

Even if you look past the financial support of the most despotic regimes, China’s increasing economic dominance of Africa gives quarter to those in pseudo-democracies who need aid or funds for infrastructure projects and prefer the soft terms of the Chinese aid or loans against the more forceful and accountability-producing restrictions that are placed on them by American or other Western aid.  Why deal with the foreign assistance bureaucracy of Uncle Sam when you can get an easy deal with the Chinese?

U.S. restrictions on aid and trade are put there to encourage governments to observe human rights norms, strengthen democracy and governance systems, and provide for the equitable well-being of their people.  When there’s an easy alternative to U.S. funding, U.S. influence in the region is significantly diminished as Americans begin to look like colonial-era missionaries trying to “save” the African people.  Unfortunately, it is the Chinese who, through their mercantilist practices and investments, may be enabling many of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa to go through another generation of endemic poverty by undermining local labor markets, failing to observe labor rights, and exploiting natural resources without building domestic capacity that enables countries to truly prosper from their innate natural wealth.

All is not lost.  The United States, working with its global partners, can continue and expand upon its funding to good governance, transparency, and human rights civil society groups that can use the technical skills they learn to better pressure their own governments.  Secondarily, African states should be encouraged to create better financial due diligence procedures to ensure that the money that’s promised them is going into sustainable endeavors that will benefit the people first and the elites second.  If the United States and other responsible actors do not use their leverage to intervene, we fear the second “scramble for Africa” will leave the continent as destitute as did the first.

Related posts:

1. To Sanction or Not To Sanction: A report from Myanmar
2. Zbigniew Brzezinski: After America
3. Guns, Butter, And Band-Aids: A Three-Tiered Approach to Foreign Policy

The range of possible outcomes include the following:

1. The EU oil embargo holds and the Iranian economy takes a huge hit hurting the Iranian middle class and the Green Movement more than the regime;
2. Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz prompting a US military response and potentially a military exchange between the US, NATO, and Iran;
3. Iran refuses to give in causing a spike in oil prices that cause the price of gas and food to soar in the US and EU;
4. The oil embargo is successful and Iran abandons its nuclear program.

Obviously the fourth option is the one that the EU is hoping for; however, it is the least likely and the other three possible outcomes should be of great concern to the US, Europe, and NATO. The driving force behind Iran’s nuclear ambitions lies in its desire to assert regional hegemony in the Middle East and build the strategic power necessary to counter US influence in Iraq and Northern Africa. Giving into the pressure of sanctions would destroy the image of military strength and political influence that the Iranian regime has attempted to cultivate over the past ten years. At the same time, Tehran has been very clear that they are willing to, and capable of, closing the Strait of Hormuz; recent military exercises in the Strait should be considered a clear indication that interference with their oil exports will result in the closing of the most strategically important trade route for the West

If Tehran decides that it does not want to risk a war over the Strait of Hormuz, we could be left with a combination of outcomes one and three, both of which hurt middle class, working citizens of Iran and the EU more than anyone else. In some EU countries 12-30% of the imported oil comes from Iran. An abrupt cessation of that trade would cause a huge shortage and therefore, an increase in the  price of oil for EU citizens. This leads to price increases in heating oil, gasoline, transportation, food, and the general cost of living. In the already troubled and depressed economies of the EU, this could lead to even more public discontent and economic volatility. While EU officials have said that they would be able to replace Iranian imports, they have not described their alternatives with specificity.   New agreements involving oil often require lengthy negotiations and the increased output necessary from potential suppliers like Saudi Arabia and Russia may incur new costs of their own. Also, Russia has been an ally to Iran and it is not inconceivable that they would refuse to supply the extra oil to the EU in an effort to pressure them to reverse the sanctions.

In Iran, where the government subsidizes energy prices along with bread, sugar, medicine, cooking oil, rice, and other necessities, a drop in government revenue could mean that these essential items are no longer available to those who need them. Furthermore, a worsening of the Iranian economy due to actions by the European Union only bolsters the regime who will spin the issue to convince the public that the development of a nuclear weapon and the bargaining power and deterrence ability that follows is essential to Iran’s national security and sovereignty.

Iran has consistently claimed that its nuclear program is for civilian purposes only. While IAEA inspectors have reported that Iran does have the capability to create a nuclear weapon within a short period of time, they have found no evidence of Iran actually weaponizing uranium. Also, despite bellicose statements about Israel, Iran has been careful to avoid suggesting it would actually detonate a nuclear weapon if it did possess one. Discounting the power of diplomacy could severely hinder the possibility of a peaceful solution with Iran. The first step in this process should not be an increase in sanctions, but a diplomatic effort to convince Iran to stop producing highly enriched uranium and stick with low-enriched uranium which is sufficient for energy production but not easily weaponized.

Related posts:

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2. Crossing the Rubicon
3. The Limits of Iran’s Reach

As an American with more than average interest and experience in Russia, it is a mystery to me why, unlike virtually every other country on earth, U.S. policy has tended to be so dependent on the personal relationship between the respective leaders.

This was especially true of Presidents Clinton, with the late Boris Yeltsin, and George W. Bush, with then-President Vladimir Putin (“I looked the man in the eye.”). This mystery of Russian relations is not totally confined to U.S. leaders: Remember Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s famous report to President George H.W. Bush on Mikhail Gorbachev as “a man we can do business with.” A humorist might call it the vodka syndrome, except Clinton was never known as a drinker and, of course, the second President Bush had sworn off alcohol.

This is a cause for reflection, when the question is raised as to how the United States might go about organizing its Russian relationship if Vladimir Putin were to be driven to the sidelines by an emerging, though putative, Russian Spring. Recent weeks have witnessed virtually unprecedented (for Russia) mass rallies in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other cities of what journalists have described as emerging middle-class Russians.

Those of us who have a history of frequenting Russia and keeping in touch with developments there are increasingly asked about what this means, whether it will continue or go away, and who is behind it. None of these questions is authoritatively answerable, at least for the time being. Like much of the uprisings of 2011 in the Middle East and North Africa, the Russian movement includes a number of factions and profiles. Together with middle-class protesters who seem, at least for now, not to have a cohesive ideology, there are Russian nationalist and aging communists, disgruntled pensioners and groups flying the banners of disparate causes.

At a distance they seem united, for now, by an attitude toward Putin that ranges from mild distrust to outright antipathy, even hatred. And again, like the Arab Spring, no single leader or small coterie of leaders has emerged to champion the uprising and give it direction. You can’t beat something with nothing, as the old saying goes. And the Arab Spring has given way to faction fighting, sectarian struggles, and citizen- versus-security-forces clashes. To be charitable, the hard work of democracy has begun … and without a Jefferson, Madison or Hamilton among them.

Those Russophiles among us, driven much less by dreamy nostalgia for Tolstoy and Tchaikovsky than by the certain realization that the United States and Russia have many more interests in common than we have differences, choose to believe that the incipient movement toward democracy embraces demands for multiple party elections; media freedom including protection from violence of reporters who uncover corruption; transparency in government operations; an end to cronyism; an independent and honest judicial system; and many of the other basic qualities and institutions normally characterizing democratic societies.

Even during the worst Cold War days, and certainly during the Gorbachev era of glasnost and perestroika, everyday Russians would tell Westerners: “We simply want an ordinary life; we want to live like everyone else.” That could be this movement’s anthem.

But if the Russophobes among us could let up for a time (and there are more of those in foreign policy circles than we would like to imagine), we might have a chance to institute a far-reaching bilateral policy emphasizing our mutual interests, minimizing our differences and seeking Russian support where it would be welcome and meaningful. That includes dealing with Iran and its nuclear potential; quarantining North Korea; managing the five Muslim republics on Russia’s southern border; isolating and crushing terrorism; countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; stabilizing world energy distribution systems; and a host of similarly important problems.

This agenda, including lending moral support for the nominally democratic movement in the Russian streets, should operate regardless of whether Vladimir Putin is reelected Russia’s president. Great powers, it has been said even before the arch-realist Henry Kissinger came along, do not have permanent friendships — they have permanent interests. In the great scheme of things, it matters less how Barack Obama (or for that matter, even Newt Gingrich) gets along with Putin or his successor and much more on whether we can identify and pursue, over several successive American administrations, those real and important permanent and mutual interests.

It is manifestly in the interest of the United States to do so. Years from now it will finally come to our understanding that our relationship with Russia is one of our most important.

Related posts:

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2. Why EU Sanctions May Hurt the West More than Iran
3. A Time to Lead

Guns, Butter, And Band-Aids: A Three-Tiered Approach to Foreign Policy

In the early hours of a tropical morning in January 2010, the Baltimore-based U.S. Navy hospital ship Comfort docked two kilometers off the coast of Port-au-Prince, Haiti equipped with military, U.S. Public Health Service, nongovernmental organization, and international organization personnel ready to respond to the raw wounds of the island nation still trembling from a 7.0 magnitude earthquake that had struck only days earlier. Despite initial doubts from the Pentagon that the ship was needed as another member of a swiftly-deployed fleet of similarly-equipped Navy and Marine vessels to the island[1], the U.S.N.S. Comfort quickly became a household name for U.S. military relief efforts due to the ship’s remarkable capability to quickly provide wounded Haitians a stable, secure place to receive desperately needed medical care. Not to be understated were the colossal efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development.  This agency was designated to spearhead the U.S. intergovernmental agency response to the tragedy, which deployed disaster assistance personnel within a day of the crisis’ occurrence and continues to rebuild Haiti nearly two years later. Monitoring on-the-ground developments in Haiti, the U.S. Department of State preserved its strong tradition of diplomacy with the Haitian government and the international community; thereby assuring the distressed country that it had an ally in its long fight to recover, rebuild, and thrive.

The confluence of missions on the ground in Haiti reflects the latitude of the U.S. military, diplomatic, and humanitarian aid communities that ultimately advance overall U.S. goals in a positive light. Prior to the disaster, the U.S. gave over $200 million through USAID to Haiti in FY 2009. In FY 2010, the U.S. gave Haiti over $350 million through USAID and $450 million through DOD. Additionally, the U.S.N.S. Comfort’s response to the earthquake was not its first trip to the island, having stopped there in April 2009 en route through Latin America on another humanitarian mission. During an emergency, our military has the ability to respond instantaneously and provide a secure working environment for humanitarian assistance to occur. Without trusted diplomatic relations, the Haitian government wouldn’t have known who to help lead them toward normalcy. Even in non-emergency situations, U.S. foreign aid ensures continuity of leadership so that when crises do occur, the world looks to the U.S. as the Haitian government did in its time of catastrophe.

Crises like the earthquake in Haiti emphasize the critical role foreign aid has in a robust national security agenda that is earnest and proactive through a well-rounded approach, and not a reactionary, single-approached strategy. Unfortunately, cutting foreign aid has become a catchphrase proposal in conversations about solving our country’s debt and deficit crisis. In a tight budget environment, this notion can be appealing. Why continue to send funds overseas that could be used to better the lives of Americans at home? This, however, is a short-sighted solution to a multi-pronged problem. Foreign aid is an investment in the present and the future. The solution is not to cut foreign aid simply because it holds a line on the national checkbook; rather, the key rests in finding common operational themes with the military, diplomatic, and development communities to ensure our foreign aid dollars are maximized, our values are promoted abroad, and our leadership maintains its trustworthiness.

By having our military, diplomacy, and humanitarianism complement each other, the U.S. can achieve not only the goals of both the military and foreign policy, it can come together to provide a platform for the U.S. to do more globally. This is far easier said than done. Operationally, the military, diplomatic, and foreign aid communities have experienced turf wars over competing foreign policy objectives. The military’s inherent role is to defend the country while the foreign aid community’s objective is to enhance quality of life. Diplomacy remains the chief non-coercive method to advance U.S. interests overseas; however, the field has experienced deepened ties to both defense and foreign aid since September 11, 2001 that don’t particularly please members of the defense or aid communities.

Still, foreign aid as national security is here to stay, and this point has been acknowledged and supported by our military leadership. On June 9, 2011, then CIA Director and our current Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, in his confirmation hearing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, testified that foreign aid through education, agriculture, health, and justice programs are assets in the national security agenda. Specifically addressing the acquisition of weapons from terrorist groups in Pakistan, Secretary Panetta stated, “I know the U.S. Department of Defense is our primary military weapon in terms of securing weapons, but if we don’t follow it up with these other important assets, we will never be able to fully secure these countries.”[2] U.S. national security is not simply our military capacity; it is our value-projection through diplomacy and humanitarianism, without which, the globe will come to fear and distrust the U.S.

Any time an event of such magnitude to destabilize an already weak society occurs, like the humanitarian emergency in Haiti or even the sociopolitical uprisings in Libya, the U.S. must consider the interests it has at stake on the ground because intervention into every emergency is not feasible. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell outlined a rubric against which defense, diplomatic, and development officials can determine whether a situation is worth intervention in what is termed the “Powell Doctrine.” The core aspects of the Powell Doctrine include an accurate determination that vital national security interests are in jeopardy, an analysis of risk, consequence, and cost, a clearly-defined and attainable objective and a strategy to achieve that objective to ultimately avoid an endless engagement, and the strength of support at home and abroad. These decisions cannot—and should not—be made by one branch of national security and foreign policy communities.

Despite the stark differences between the three extensions of foreign policy, there is common ground to be found. Military personnel can provide security in an unstable situation for diplomats, aid workers, and American citizens caught in a crisis. At times, military personnel can even engage in distributing relief aid and supplies if the situation warrants, and they can do so indefinitely should the stability of a situation call for this commitment. The military ensures speed of access because it has the equipment needed to enter a situation quickly. Diplomacy, however, is contextual in nature. Diplomats specialize in understanding the culture, society, and general environment of a country and work tirelessly to ensure the preservation of congenial relations with foreign governments. Diplomats can facilitate on-the-ground activity not only with their U.S. counterparts but also with other governments and their counterparts in those bodies.

Development workers possess the strength of longevity, ensuring action on the U.S. core values with the citizens of a foreign country. Development workers are flexible and motivated by the results they see on the ground, ensuring that U.S. values are understood and promulgated. Ultimately, the military has the resources to create stability, diplomats have the knowledge to provide stability, and development workers possess the stamina to preserve stability.

The cases of Libya and Haiti show how the U.S. is developing a humanitarianism policy as a means to promote its values and assert its leadership abroad. While this may not entirely be the planned course of action, it is the direction in which the U.S. is heading. There are three main ways for the U.S. to ensure the success of this route and recognize the strength of each foreign policy community. First, the U.S. must maintain its foreign aid program. Foreign aid allows the U.S. to proactively seek a stable world instead of being reactive with force. Problems are increasingly becoming global in nature and do not always require the military to solve. Further, it is expensive in both terms of human lives and money. Second, the U.S. must maintain its force projection. Force projection allows the U.S. to maintain its values while keeping the ability to act on them swiftly if needed. Finally, the U.S. needs to encourage a more engaged civil society through strengthened funding for the Peace Corps, Foreign Service, and nongovernmental organizations. Without an engaged civil society, the support for U.S. foreign policy dries up and discourages the public and international support needed to intervene in a crisis.

Among our most pressing national security priorities, leadership is one of the most critical. If the U.S. is going to intervene when our values of democracy, human rights, equality, and opportunity are at stake, we need to show an example of leadership at home. Furthermore, a foreign policy that doesn’t give equal respective weight to the contributions of its three tiers is destined to chip away at the world’s perception of the U.S.’s capabilities to lead. The long-term cost of a destabilized world in which disengagement is the currency between nations is higher than the cost of current U.S. investments in foreign aid, which account for less than 1% of our federal budget.

Related posts:

1. Will Senators Have the Midas Touch?
2. Crossing the Rubicon
3. Too Important to Fail: The Least Bad Call on Afghanistan

After America

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America’s decline and China’s rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: “But, please, let America not decline too quickly.” Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader’s expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America’s demise.

For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor — not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes.

While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system — for instance, another financial crisis — would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue.

The leaders of the world’s second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America’s uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America’s leading role.

China, invariably mentioned as America’s prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system’s dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America’s role in the world. Beijing’s leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership.

At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China’s international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China’s key neighbors — India, Japan, and Russia — is ready to acknowledge China’s entitlement to America’s place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China’s neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century — violent and bloodthirsty.

At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America’s global preeminence — and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America’s decline. The states in that exposed position — including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East — are today’s geopolitical equivalents of nature’s most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist.

A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America’s economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others’ development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents.

Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons — shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America’s decline would generate global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America’s collapse would probably come to regret it. And as the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy — or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.

Related posts:

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3. OP-ED: How to Weaken the Power of Foreign Oil

A subdued but respectful ceremony marked the end of combat operations in Iraq.  A flag was rolled and encased, and speeches respectful of the fallen and hopeful for the future were made.  Signs of friendship between the two countries were left in the hearts of both peoples and policies are in place to continue non-military support to a continually developing democracy in Iraq.  A joyous America will see her military members return celebrating a job well done and remembering those who paid the ultimate price.

This is in stark contrast to the images scared into the American psyche of a helicopter rising from the roof of the embassy in Saigon in April of 1975, an event that most recognize as the end of a terrible chapter in America’s history.

The Vietnam experience still reflects one of the worse times in our history.  The failed political policies that resulted in only marginal military successes during this time period are only rivaled in grandeur by the incense of the American public for the war.  The nightly reports on a budding television news medium of the American dead, eventually summing over 58,000, brought the graphic images of war to the American public for the first time.

This American public, already gushing with disdain for an unpopular war was further galvanized by events such as the My Lai Massacre and the shooting of students at Kent State University.  The resulting wave of anti-war protest reflecting the overall feeling of the country produced not only a backlash against the politicians involved and their failed policies, but also contempt for the very soldiers that were fighting and dying in the war.

As the military returned home, their limited tactical successes were dwarfed in the public eye by the view of the military as a failure, albeit due to numerous factors beyond its control.  Thousands of military members with lifelong mental or physical scars were practically discarded by a disinterested public.  There were no ceremonies, no parades, only a country ready to bury this memory and forget all things associated with Vietnam.  A single helicopter flying away from an overrun embassy seemed to be a fitting end.

As the Iraq war comes to a close, so much is different about this ending than the ending of the Vietnam experience.  Some may question the policies and politicians that brought us into the war, but by in large no one questions the way the military has performed its duties.

This is not to say that the military has escaped this lengthy conflict unscathed by controversy.  The events such as the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, the killings in Haditha, friendly fire incidents and the recent controversy of the handling of the remains of the war dead all call into questions tactics used by military members, but never the overall conduct of the military during the conflict.

American public’s support has endured these controversies as well as other tough times throughout the war.    It has endured a persistent conflict despite President Bush’s declaration of “mission accomplished,” an Iraqi insurgency that expanded our involvement, a 2007 call for a troop surge, continued reports of Improvised Explosive Devices killing U.S service members and the reports of the bloody conflicts in places like Fallujah and Anbar.  All of these were challenging times for the military, yet support for the troops remained.

There were, however, events along the way that highlighted the courage of our service members and produced recognition by Americans of the contributions the military was making to a free Iraq.  The capture of Saddam Hussein and the elimination of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, are just two examples of the courage and valor of our military displayed every day during this conflict.  One of the most poignant moments celebrated by our country was when an Iraqi woman stood from her seat in the U.S. Capitol during a State of the Union speech proudly displaying an ink stained finger having just voted in an Iraqi election for the first time.  A proud moment made possible by the sacrifices of our military.

As military members have returned home from Southwest Asia over the years (sometimes after 2, 3 or more deployments) they arrive to a different reception from the members that served in Vietnam.  Rousing applause by Americans on airplanes and in airports, a reception that moves most military members to tears, replaced being spat upon, harassed and jeered in airports when military members returned from service in Vietnam.  Overwhelming support for our wounded warriors, as exemplified by enormous contributions to programs like the Wounded Warrior Project, is common place versus the neglect experienced by the wounded returning from Vietnam.

There will be no national victory parade recognizing the end of the Iraq War, like the one seen after Operation Desert Storm.  However, there will be celebrations across America, much as we’ve seen over the past 10 years, to recognizing military men and women for their sacrifices as they return home.   A free and independent Iraq exists today because of the valor displayed by the U.S. military and our allies, another reason to celebrate as we welcome our troops home.

A simple ceremony and a grateful nation mark the end of the Iraq War.  The goodbye to the Iraq War is different in so many ways from the goodbye we said to the Vietnam War so many years ago.  For the veterans who endured the sacrifices during any war, thank you.  For an American public who persevered the Iraq War – job well done.

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2. A New Approach to Interventionism
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Two decades ago, our opinion survey of the Soviet Union during perestroika showed a huge divide between hardline communists and the young, urban Russians who backed Boris Yeltsin and favoured a free market economy. Last weekend’s election results show how the divide endures 20 years on.

Just 50 per cent of Russians approve of multi-party politics according to the Pew Global Attitudes Survey and half consider it a misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists. By a margin of 57 to 32 per cent, Russians believe that having a “strong leader” is more important than a democratic government. This is the conviction that, for more than a decade, fuelled the popularity of Vladimir Putin, but is now beginning to pall. His “look-at-me” style appeared when the economy was on the rise but a combination of inflation and stagnant living standards is prompting many Russian voters once again to signal their unhappiness with the status quo. This search for leaders who will deliver economically holds an important lesson for the Middle East where the democratic tide still swells despite panicked opposition from some and the efforts of others to regulate its tempo.

When people take to the streets, they want to believe that a new government will lead to greater prosperity, but this is often a triumph of hope over experience. Russians remember Boris Yeltsin not as the hero who freed them from communism, but as the bumbler who presided over the free fall of their economy and failed to pay their pensions. Even today, 61 per cent of Russians believe the 20-year-old political transformation has had a negative impact on prosperity. There is a widespread perception that elites have enjoyed the spoils of “democracy”, while ordinary citizens have been left behind.

Our survey in Egypt – conducted after Hosni Mubarak’s departure -– found hopes similar to those once existing in Russia. A 56 per cent majority expected the economy to improve. Instead, it has sagged amid continuing political uncertainty. What is clear is that revolutions tend to create unsettled conditions, which, at least in the short-term, retard economic growth.

Decades of communist propaganda, emphasising social conformity over private initiative, left the newly-independent Russian Federation ill-prepared for capitalism. The Yeltsin government’s version of economic reform was rushed, plundered by profiteers, and implemented at a time when record low oil prices drained revenue from the national treasury. Many Russians saw their social safety nets disappear while the well-connected few became obscenely rich – all under the mantle of democracy. So there is little wonder that the majority rushed to embrace Mr Putin when he arrived on the scene in 1999, promising a strong hand and the restoration of lost benefits. People like to vote, but they need to eat, and Mr Putin, more than Mr Yeltsin, seemed able to deliver what mattered most. But just as Mr Putin received credit for the Russian Federation’s resurgence, so now he is blamed by many for its recent sluggishness and for the government’s failure to share the benefits of oil wealth.

Arabs will have an easier time than ex-Soviets did in supporting privatisation and decentralisation. Calls for reform are stronger in the Arab world than they were in Russia 20 years ago. But the overriding question remains whether newly-democratic governments can meet expectations. Economic restructuring can take years to yield dividends. As Russia’s experience shows, haste is not a solution. But revolutionaries are not known for patience.

Russia’s trajectory and our Middle Eastern surveys suggest three principles for nurturing democracy. First, economic progress is vital. Vibrant political parties matter, and so do competent administrators, transparent laws for business, a stable climate for investment and policies aimed at developing a middle class. Second, fairness counts. New leaders will have more time to succeed if they are given credit for insisting on equitable treatment. That means collecting taxes from rich and poor, creating courts free from political influence, protecting minority rights and providing basic services to slums and suburbs alike.

Finally, it is essential to do everything possible to prevent the idea of democracy from being hijacked by those promising an easier way. The “iron hand” is an illusion, not a solution. One can readily imagine an Arab version of Mr Putin arising, offering a platform that exploits economic yearnings and cultural pride, and that uses democratic means to seize power but then refuses to relinquish it.

Arab protestors have not raised the banner of democratic reform so that their countries may one day revert to autocracy. That danger exists, but so does the chance to build something far greater. Even at its best, democracy can be frustrating, and slow, but it remains the superior means for uniting disparate populations, resolving disputes, and generating prosperity. We can but hope Arab populations will learn – not repeat – the Russian experience.

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SYRIA – What do we do now?

The situation in Syria is unfolding as many experienced observers expected when the protests began last March. The Assad regime is attempting to crush the protesters with force, not only to destroy them but to intimidate the rest of the population. Assad has promised reforms, while continuing to warn Syrians and the international community that if he goes down, sectarian violence will follow and Islamists may assume power. The reality, as many Syrians realize, is that any political reforms by Assad would be illusory. He will only introduce them after he has found a way to keep the controls in his hands.

It is surprising that the protesters have continued to demonstrate, despite suffering deaths, injuries and detentions. Average Syrians have not dared to speak out for decades, despite the frustration and despair many have felt due to their deteriorating economic circumstances and lack of freedoms.  Now, however, they have been encouraged by the success of similar insurrections during the “Arab Spring” and by Assad’s mishandling of the protests.

With this situation, the obvious question arises: What can outsiders do to assist the protesters in achieving their goals?  The view presented here is that we can do a number of things, but one path we should not take is direct intervention.

Despite their perseverance, opposition groups have undermined themselves. They have been disorganized, without clear leadership and continue to bicker.  To solve this, representatives from various minorities and ethnic groups recently met in Turkey to form a transitional coalition called the Syrian National Council.  The group was immediately attacked by others who allege that Islamists are over-represented and that the Council lacks a credible leader.

Nevertheless, presenting a pluralistic and united front, the Council has called for non-violent protests to continue until the Assad regime collapses. Their hopes appear to include several scenarios or combinations thereof:  the military will implode, bringing down the regime; a military coup will lead to Assad’s ouster; more and more Syrians will rise up and force Assad out. The Council is trying to establish itself as a viable alternative that can lead Syria through its transition.  Importantly, as with most Syrians, the Council is against any direct foreign intervention at this time, whether military or other.

I believe it will be a long time before the Syrian army collapses or launches a coup. Unlike the homogenous, professional armies of Egypt and Tunis, the Syrian military and intelligence and security services were structured by Hafez Assad precisely to avoid coups. Key positions are filled by loyal Alewites. The worker bees and even many senior positions are occupied by Sunnis but with a healthy blend from various minorities. To advance in the ranks, loyalty to the regime comes above all else and there is always someone prepared to rat out suspect colleagues. Sadly, this pattern occurs in other institutions around Syria, which is why there are few organizations in the country with integrity. The Syrian people deserve better but, for the majority of Syrians, it is the only environment they have ever known.

As for desertions from the military, most lower-ranked soldiers are neither well educated nor worldly. Often isolated from the general population, their knowledge of events around them is limited and managed. They are required to follow orders, ask no questions, and act without understanding why or whom they may be fighting. Consequently, while some will desert because they are influenced by outside sources, most will not, unless there is a breakdown in command at senior levels.

In the short to medium term, I also consider it unlikely, without additional catalysts, that popular protests will reach the point, as in Egypt and Tunis, where the regime collapses. Many Syrians still believe in Assad and want to give him more time to effect change. Others are fearful of what might happen if he falls, especially some minorities and privileged groups. It will take more than pockets of protests to cut that umbilical cord. This is where the West can play a role.

The UN, the USA, EU, Canada and other countries have called on Assad to leave and have implemented a range of sanctions to undermine the regime. It is noteworthy that many Arab countries, as well as Syrian allies like Turkey and Iran have also exhorted Assad to cease the violence and to find a peaceful solution. Noteworthy, because not many years ago, few of those countries would have publicly berated a fellow leader. It is deeply ironic that several of them still operate under an autocratic leadership and one must conclude that they are doing this less out of concern for the Syrian people or because of a sudden conversion to democratic principles than out of fear that if they are not on the right side of history, they may soon be joining the Mubaraks, Ben Alis and Gaddafis.

As difficult as it is to sit on the sidelines and watch the situation without a more forceful intervention, this is precisely what the international community should be doing. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which have killed so many and drained billions of dollars from the West’s coffers, are useful examples of what not to do. Those countries are still mired in centuries-old internal conflicts that will long outlast the West’s presence on the ground. The same would happen in Syria. Some will point to Libya as an example of a successful military intervention but how the Libyan situation will unfold remains uncertain. Moreover, Western intervention received the blessing of the Arab League, thus legitimating NATO’s actions. In the case of Syria, a similar invitation is unlikely, unless the situation degenerates into all out civil war.

Egypt and Tunis are better examples of how to handle Syria, allowing public pressure to force change without foreign interference. In the case of Egypt, supporting the demands from the street without heavy-handed intervention regained for the West, particularly for the USA, some of the credibility it had lost from decades of interference and manipulation of Arab governments. Of course, this also means accepting whatever political system replaces the old. The West has preached democracy in the Middle East for decades; now, it must be prepared to live with the results.

This does not leave Western governments, nor for that matter, other states in the region, powerless in influencing developments in Syria. They can and should use indirect pressures. They should apply sanctions to the maximum. Ordinary Syrians will be affected but there is a price to be paid for freedoms and the Syrian opposition needs to feel international support. More importantly, sanctions will begin to squeeze the business elite, who have stood by Assad until now but who may begin to question the costs of their allegiance. Syrian merchants have circumvented sanctions, wars and other impediments for decades, even centuries. However, this time, they are faced with a different situation. A popular uprising is underway. At some point, they may decide that Assad can no longer protect them nor assure the benefits that have tied them to him. When that happens, their loyalty may falter, thereby weakening the regime further.

A severely weakened economy will also feed public discontentment. As Government revenues continue to dwindle, can the regime sustain the expensive subsidies it currently offers to Syrians for a wide range of goods? Syrians are already faced with an astronomical youth unemployment rate, extremely low incomes and shortages of daily materials. At some point, if that situation continues, more and more will be drawn to join the protests against Assad.

When the opposition groups achieve greater stability and cohesion, the international community should get to know them and offer not only moral support but to assist them in rebuilding Syrian institutions after the regime is gone. If the regime continues to survive, more opposition members will come to believe that they must take up arms. Some seem to have done so already. There should be no question of the West arming those groups. Such adventures in the Middle East have usually come back to haunt us and to further destabilize the area. The region does not need more armed and trained fighters acquiring expertise in guerrilla warfare. Nor should any steps be taken that might be interpreted as manipulation of the opposition. Syrians have a healthy distrust of the West and any suggestion that opposition groups are western puppets will be used by Assad to undermine them.

When the Assad regime eventually falls, and sooner or later it will, we should be ready for the aftermath.  It is difficult to predict what will happen. Much is made of the potential for sectarian violence but some of this is due to deliberate efforts by the regime to foster that idea. Nevertheless, the potential is real. Syria has divisions along ethnic, religious, tribal, secular/Islamic, and even economic lines. Adding to this volatile mix, a half million Palestinian refugees have lived there for decades. It is a society that has not known openness and the freedom to resolve differences through discussion and debate. Rather, suspicions and misinformation have taken root, among communities, villages, groups. In such an environment, it is easy to exploit ignorance and fears.

Despite this, there are grounds for optimism. Syria has a justly deserved, centuries-long history of tolerance and of generosity towards each other and towards others. These qualities can prevail, provided wise leaders emerge during the transition and that meddlers, both domestic and international, can be kept at bay.

The Syrian people want change. They are finding their voices after decades of silence. They now realize that they can only create opportunity and find freedoms if the Assad regime disappears. Even one year ago, no Syrian would have believed it possible to be at this juncture. The path to victory will not be easy and will take time. Syrians want the West’s support in whatever way we can offer it short of military action or compromising their integrity. Respecting that position should be our guide to developing appropriate policies towards Syria at this time.

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OUR country has just gone through a sober national retrospective on the 9/11 attacks. Apart from the heartfelt honoring of those lost — on that day and since — what seemed most striking is our seeming passivity and indifference toward the well from which our enemies draw their political strength and financial power: the strategic importance of oil, which provides the wherewithal for a generational war against us, as we mutter diplomatic niceties.

Oil’s strategic importance stems from its virtual monopoly as a transportation fuel. Today, 97 percent of all air, sea and land transportation systems in the United States have only one option: petroleum-based products. For more than 35 years we have engaged in self-delusion, saying either that we have reserves here at home large enough to meet our needs, or that the OPEC cartel will keep prices affordable out of self-interest. Neither assumption has proved valid. While the Western Hemisphere’s reserves are substantial and growing, they pale in the face of OPEC’s, which are substantial enough to effectively determine global supply and thus the global price.

According to senior executives in the oil industry, in the years ahead that price is going to rise beyond anything we’ve seen — well above the $147 per barrel we experienced three years ago. Such a run-up in the price of oil has been predicted as a consequence of an event like an attack on a major Saudi processing facility that takes production off line. But such a spike would be more likely to be caused by the predictable increase of demand in China, India and developing countries, alongside the cartel’s strategy of driving up prices by constraining supply. While OPEC sits on 79 percent of the world’s conventional oil reserves, it accounts for only one-third of global oil supply.

There is, however, a way out of this crisis. Ultimately, electric cars may become the norm, but for the near and middle term, the solution lies in opening the transportation fuel market to competition from sources other than petroleum. American oil companies have come around to understanding the wisdom of introducing competition, as a matter of their own self-interest. But doing so means rapidly ramping up production of the alternative fuels, and that is the challenge. As an example, before investors will expand production capacity for cellulosic ethanol from plant life, or for methanol from natural gas — which on a per-mile basis is significantly cheaper than gasoline — they want to see that a sufficient proportion of the cars and trucks on America’s roads can burn these fuels.

Here too, however, a solution is at hand; it lies in Detroit’s making more flex-fuel cars — cars able to use gasoline, ethanol, methanol or any mixture of these. And because this flex-fuel option costs less than $100 per car, making such a change is not exorbitant. Indeed, some 90 percent of all cars sold in Brazil last year are flex-fuel cars, and many of them were made by Ford, Chrysler and General Motors. That gives Brazilian drivers the option to purchase the most cost-effective fuel, and they can easily switch from one type to another.

But here’s the rub. Although the American manufacturers have stated publicly their willingness to make flex-fuel vehicles up to 50 percent of their production, they’re just not doing it. Hence the need for Congress to require that new vehicles allow the use of alternative fuels. In some corners of Washington, that raises a cry against “mandates.” Of course the response to that is: Doing nothing is equivalent to mandating a monopoly by a single fuel (whose price is set by a foreign cartel).

Competition is a bedrock of our American way of life. It’s time to introduce it into our fuel market.

That is the purpose of the United States Energy Security Council, a bipartisan group being introduced to the public today in Washington, which includes former Secretary of State George P. Shultz and two former secretaries of defense, William J. Perry and Harold Brown, as well as three former national security advisers, a former C.I.A. director, two former senators, a Nobel laureate, a former Federal Reserve chairman, and several Fortune-50 chief executives (including a former president of Shell Oil North America, John D. Hofmeister).

The time has come to strip oil of its strategic status. We owe it to those who lost their lives on 9/11 and in its aftermath, and to those whose fate still hangs in the balance.

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