Across the Aisle » Democracy

KORUS Free Trade Agreement: An Agent of Stability

PSA Staff — Mon, 06 Feb 2012 19:34:11 +0000

This article was written by two Fall 2011 Fellows in PSA’s Congressional Fellowship Program. All CFP articles are produced by bipartisan groups of Democrat and Republican Fellows who were challenged to develop opinion pieces that reach consensus on critical national security and foreign affairs issues.

KORUS Free Trade Agreement: An Agent of Stability

Almost sixty years ago at the end of the Korean War, the relationship between the United States and South Korea took on a new meaning. The relationship was built on a cooperative framework between allied forces in order to promote stability on the peninsula through a strengthened commitment to the mutual goals of protecting democratic values, peace and economic security.

Within the past few months the United States Congress and the Korean Parliament took large steps in solidifying their commitment to these basic tenants of the U.S.-Korea relationship when they passed the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). Their support of this agreement is evidence that shared economic prosperity is a strong part of the U.S.-Korean relationship. As the political dynamics on the Asian continent continue to change, it is critical that the U.S. maintain and build its relationship with Korea as a means to enhance America’s position to promote political and economic stability in the region.

Most of those who have been following the debate and progress of the long-stalled KORUS FTA have heard most about how the reduction or removal of several tariff and non-tariff barriers will lead to greater economic opportunity through increased market access for American goods and services. Korean duties on major agricultural products like meat and dairy products and cotton and soybeans will be eliminated and many U.S. businesses will experience simplified and expedited customs procedures that will allow them to reach customers in South Korea with less red tape. Overall, the U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that tariff cuts alone to a variety of U.S. goods could amount to an increase of $10 billion to $11 billion of U.S. goods exports alone. KORUS is mutually beneficial to the South Korean economy and its competitiveness. Reducing tariffs and increasing exports will increase the country’s gross domestic product by an estimated five percent.

The KORUS FTA was negotiated and signed by the United States and South Korea on June 30, 2007; however, the George W. Bush Administration did not submit legislation to the then Democratically-controlled Congress due primarily to partisan differences over autos and beef. The often referenced case is the American automobile industry, which originally opposed the agreement, but after the Obama Administration achieved key concessions that soothed the concerns of the industry, not only did the auto industry itself welcome the opportunity to compete on a level playing field, the United Autoworkers also joined to support. Their support came as a result of Korean commitments to immediately reduce their eight percent tariff on U.S.-built passenger cars, including electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids, to four percent and to immediately reduce their ten percent tariff on trucks to zero. After five years, tariffs on U.S.-made motor vehicles, including electric cars and plug-in hybrids, will be reduced to zero.

Though these tariff reductions and concessions are important and positive elements, they should not overshadow the FTA’s equally positive effects on strengthening the U.S.-Korea relationship and how U.S. trade policy can function as a key diplomatic tool. As North Korea pursues a misguided nuclear weapons strategy, it threatens the tenants of the U.S-Korean relationship. The tensions on the Korean Peninsula are heightened by the growth of China’s influence in the region while other nations have grown increasingly wary of the foreign and military policy goals of the communist-led countries of Asia. The KORUS FTA provides opportunities for greater economic security and emboldens the democratic institutions of a key partner in the region since the end of the Korean War. Our growing economic relationship will empower both the United States and Korea to be active agents for stability.

Growing trade relations with our allies is rarely easy to achieve; however, with the mutual goal of fairness to our businesses, workers and consumers, the KORUS FTA will not only benefit our economic well-being but also support our longstanding relationship with Korea that has sought to maintain peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.

Why EU Sanctions May Hurt the West More than Iran

Lori Shah — Mon, 23 Jan 2012 20:35:46 +0000

Today the European Union announced an escalation of their sanctions against Iran. According to the new guidelines, the 27 member nations will end any oil contracts with Iran by July 1^st and any assets held by the Iranian central bank within the EU will be frozen, with a limited exemption to continue legitimate trade. While this new oil embargo will go a long way in satisfying European public opinion, it is unlikely that it will have the desired effect on the Iranian regime and, most importantly, has huge potential to backfire.

The range of possible outcomes include the following:

The EU oil embargo holds and the Iranian economy takes a huge hit hurting the Iranian middle class and the Green Movement more than the regime;
Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz prompting a US military response and potentially a military exchange between the US, NATO, and Iran;
Iran refuses to give in causing a spike in oil prices that cause the price of gas and food to soar in the US and EU;
The oil embargo is successful and Iran abandons its nuclear program.

Obviously the fourth option is the one that the EU is hoping for; however, it is the least likely and the other three possible outcomes should be of great concern to the US, Europe, and NATO. The driving force behind Iran’s nuclear ambitions lies in its desire to assert regional hegemony in the Middle East and build the strategic power necessary to counter US influence in Iraq and Northern Africa. Giving into the pressure of sanctions would destroy the image of military strength and political influence that the Iranian regime has attempted to cultivate over the past ten years. At the same time, Tehran has been very clear that they are willing to, and capable of, closing the Strait of Hormuz; recent military exercises in the Strait should be considered a clear indication that interference with their oil exports will result in the closing of the most strategically important trade route for the West

If Tehran decides that it does not want to risk a war over the Strait of Hormuz, we could be left with a combination of outcomes one and three, both of which hurt middle class, working citizens of Iran and the EU more than anyone else. In some EU countries 12-30% of the imported oil comes from Iran. An abrupt cessation of that trade would cause a huge shortage and therefore, an increase in the price of oil for EU citizens. This leads to price increases in heating oil, gasoline, transportation, food, and the general cost of living. In the already troubled and depressed economies of the EU, this could lead to even more public discontent and economic volatility. While EU officials have said that they would be able to replace Iranian imports, they have not described their alternatives with specificity. New agreements involving oil often require lengthy negotiations and the increased output necessary from potential suppliers like Saudi Arabia and Russia may incur new costs of their own. Also, Russia has been an ally to Iran and it is not inconceivable that they would refuse to supply the extra oil to the EU in an effort to pressure them to reverse the sanctions.

In Iran, where the government subsidizes energy prices along with bread, sugar, medicine, cooking oil, rice, and other necessities, a drop in government revenue could mean that these essential items are no longer available to those who need them. Furthermore, a worsening of the Iranian economy due to actions by the European Union only bolsters the regime who will spin the issue to convince the public that the development of a nuclear weapon and the bargaining power and deterrence ability that follows is essential to Iran’s national security and sovereignty.

Iran has consistently claimed that its nuclear program is for civilian purposes only. While IAEA inspectors have reported that Iran does have the capability to create a nuclear weapon within a short period of time, they have found no evidence of Iran actually weaponizing uranium. Also, despite bellicose statements about Israel, Iran has been careful to avoid suggesting it would actually detonate a nuclear weapon if it did possess one. Discounting the power of diplomacy could severely hinder the possibility of a peaceful solution with Iran. The first step in this process should not be an increase in sanctions, but a diplomatic effort to convince Iran to stop producing highly enriched uranium and stick with low-enriched uranium which is sufficient for energy production but not easily weaponized.

Rethink our Russian Relationship

PSA Staff — Thu, 19 Jan 2012 15:58:52 +0000

Gary Hart is a member of the PSA Advisory Board, president of Hart International, Ltd. and chairman of the American Security Project. He served in the U.S. Senate from 1975 until 1987. This article originally appeared in The Hill on January 18th, 2012 and can be found here.

As an American with more than average interest and experience in Russia, it is a mystery to me why, unlike virtually every other country on earth, U.S. policy has tended to be so dependent on the personal relationship between the respective leaders.

This was especially true of Presidents Clinton, with the late Boris Yeltsin, and George W. Bush, with then-President Vladimir Putin (“I looked the man in the eye.”). This mystery of Russian relations is not totally confined to U.S. leaders: Remember Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s famous report to President George H.W. Bush on Mikhail Gorbachev as “a man we can do business with.” A humorist might call it the vodka syndrome, except Clinton was never known as a drinker and, of course, the second President Bush had sworn off alcohol.

This is a cause for reflection, when the question is raised as to how the United States might go about organizing its Russian relationship if Vladimir Putin were to be driven to the sidelines by an emerging, though putative, Russian Spring. Recent weeks have witnessed virtually unprecedented (for Russia) mass rallies in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other cities of what journalists have described as emerging middle-class Russians.

Those of us who have a history of frequenting Russia and keeping in touch with developments there are increasingly asked about what this means, whether it will continue or go away, and who is behind it. None of these questions is authoritatively answerable, at least for the time being. Like much of the uprisings of 2011 in the Middle East and North Africa, the Russian movement includes a number of factions and profiles. Together with middle-class protesters who seem, at least for now, not to have a cohesive ideology, there are Russian nationalist and aging communists, disgruntled pensioners and groups flying the banners of disparate causes.

At a distance they seem united, for now, by an attitude toward Putin that ranges from mild distrust to outright antipathy, even hatred. And again, like the Arab Spring, no single leader or small coterie of leaders has emerged to champion the uprising and give it direction. You can’t beat something with nothing, as the old saying goes. And the Arab Spring has given way to faction fighting, sectarian struggles, and citizen- versus-security-forces clashes. To be charitable, the hard work of democracy has begun … and without a Jefferson, Madison or Hamilton among them.

Those Russophiles among us, driven much less by dreamy nostalgia for Tolstoy and Tchaikovsky than by the certain realization that the United States and Russia have many more interests in common than we have differences, choose to believe that the incipient movement toward democracy embraces demands for multiple party elections; media freedom including protection from violence of reporters who uncover corruption; transparency in government operations; an end to cronyism; an independent and honest judicial system; and many of the other basic qualities and institutions normally characterizing democratic societies.

Even during the worst Cold War days, and certainly during the Gorbachev era of glasnost and perestroika, everyday Russians would tell Westerners: “We simply want an ordinary life; we want to live like everyone else.” That could be this movement’s anthem.

But if the Russophobes among us could let up for a time (and there are more of those in foreign policy circles than we would like to imagine), we might have a chance to institute a far-reaching bilateral policy emphasizing our mutual interests, minimizing our differences and seeking Russian support where it would be welcome and meaningful. That includes dealing with Iran and its nuclear potential; quarantining North Korea; managing the five Muslim republics on Russia’s southern border; isolating and crushing terrorism; countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; stabilizing world energy distribution systems; and a host of similarly important problems.

This agenda, including lending moral support for the nominally democratic movement in the Russian streets, should operate regardless of whether Vladimir Putin is reelected Russia’s president. Great powers, it has been said even before the arch-realist Henry Kissinger came along, do not have permanent friendships — they have permanent interests. In the great scheme of things, it matters less how Barack Obama (or for that matter, even Newt Gingrich) gets along with Putin or his successor and much more on whether we can identify and pursue, over several successive American administrations, those real and important permanent and mutual interests.

It is manifestly in the interest of the United States to do so. Years from now it will finally come to our understanding that our relationship with Russia is one of our most important.

There’s a Better Way to Gauge Congress

PSA Staff — Fri, 13 Jan 2012 17:49:59 +0000

Lee Hamilton, Co-Chair of the PSA Advisory Board, is director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University. He was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from the Indianna for 34 years. The original article appeared in the South Bend Tribune and can be found here.

There’s a Better Way to Gauge Congress

I suspect that most members of Congress will want to forget the year that just ended.

The institution that symbolizes our democracy finished 2011 plumbing depths of unpopularity it has never experienced before. Its low approval ratings set records — suggesting, as Gallup put it, “that 2011 will be remembered as the year in which the American public lost much of any remaining faith in the men and women they elect and send off to Washington to represent them.”

The poor jobs picture, the lurching from one brink-of-disaster deadline to the next, the polarization that keeps the parties from working together, the widespread sense that Congress is so dysfunctional it cannot meet the nation’s challenges — all play a role.
These are all valid ways of judging Congress, but they are not the only way. Every year, the Center on Congress at Indiana University polls a group of congressional scholars on how they think the institution is doing, and one of the challenges we face is devising a set of questions that meaningfully probe Congress’s performance. It’s not as easy as you’d think.

The historic mission of the Congress has been to maintain freedom, a goal whose achievement is impossible to measure in a year’s — or even a few years’ — time. Moreover, a well-functioning Congress has to operate on many fronts: as the legislative body representing a diverse nation, as a counter-balance to the president, as an overseer of the federal bureaucracy, as a forger of policy, as two separate institutions (Senate and House) that have to find common ground and uphold processes that allow each one to perform effectively.

The first of Congress’ responsibilities is to protect its constitutional role as a strong, coequal branch of government. It must stand apart from and serve as a check upon the excesses of presidential power. So how well is it safeguarding its powers from presidential encroachment? Does it live up to its proper role in determining the federal budget? How’s it doing at oversight of the executive branch? Is it generating meaningful, politically sustainable policy alternatives or just sitting back and letting the White House take all the political risks? Does it set the national agenda, or act timidly? And does it safeguard the war powers assigned it by the Constitution?

Its second great role is to represent the American people. This means making sure that all voices get a fair hearing and that diverse viewpoints play a part in crafting initiatives — all while safeguarding institutional practices that allow legislation to move forward in a timely manner. Just as important, does Congress spend its time on key issues facing the country, or instead let itself get diverted by partisan concerns or by issues of importance only to well-heeled special interests?

Third, in a country as politically and demographically varied as ours, negotiation and compromise are key to crafting legislation that can enjoy broad political support. To gauge whether Congress is following sound process, you would want to know several things. Are its leaders capable of working hard to forge a consensus? If they can’t, do conflicts over legislation represent substantive differences or mere political game-playing? Does it balance careful deliberation with making decisions? Does it protect the rights of the minority and allow all points to be heard? Is it transparent — so that its members can be held accountable for their actions?

Fourth, does Congress set sufficiently high standards for its individual members? That means keeping excessive partisanship in check and making sure its members are behaving ethically.

And finally, how strong is the connection of members of Congress to their constituents back home? Do they understand their constituents and try to represent them in Washington? Do they make themselves accessible in a variety of settings and speak out for their communities at times of need? Do they listen well and are they closely attuned to the core needs and interests of the people they represent?

All of these questions add up to how well Congress represents the interests of the American people and, as always, it does better on some than on others. Despite its obvious troubles, the picture is not entirely bleak. And I can’t help but believe that the more well-rounded our understanding of where Congress falls short and where it performs well, the better we can hold it to account.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: After America

PSA Staff — Wed, 04 Jan 2012 16:15:01 +0000

PSA Advisory Board Member and former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinksi, write about what a decline in American power could mean for the rest of the world – particularly China. The fall of the American hegemon could mean a slide into global chaos as quickly developing countries compete for global economic and strategic power. This article originally appeared in Foreign Policy and can be found here.

After America

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America’s decline and China’s rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: “But, please, let America not decline too quickly.” Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader’s expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America’s demise.

For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor — not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes.

While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system — for instance, another financial crisis — would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue.

The leaders of the world’s second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America’s uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America’s leading role.

China, invariably mentioned as America’s prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system’s dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America’s role in the world. Beijing’s leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership.

At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China’s international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China’s key neighbors — India, Japan, and Russia — is ready to acknowledge China’s entitlement to America’s place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China’s neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century — violent and bloodthirsty.

At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America’s global preeminence — and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America’s decline. The states in that exposed position — including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East — are today’s geopolitical equivalents of nature’s most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist.

A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America’s economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others’ development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents.

Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons — shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America’s decline would generate global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America’s collapse would probably come to regret it. And as the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy — or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.

A Different Goodbye

Bryan Bearden — Fri, 16 Dec 2011 19:18:20 +0000

Col Bryan Bearden, USAF, is an instructor of National Security, Joint Warfare and Leadership and Ethics at the Marine Corps War College.

A subdued but respectful ceremony marked the end of combat operations in Iraq. A flag was rolled and encased, and speeches respectful of the fallen and hopeful for the future were made. Signs of friendship between the two countries were left in the hearts of both peoples and policies are in place to continue non-military support to a continually developing democracy in Iraq. A joyous America will see her military members return celebrating a job well done and remembering those who paid the ultimate price.

This is in stark contrast to the images scared into the American psyche of a helicopter rising from the roof of the embassy in Saigon in April of 1975, an event that most recognize as the end of a terrible chapter in America’s history.

The Vietnam experience still reflects one of the worse times in our history. The failed political policies that resulted in only marginal military successes during this time period are only rivaled in grandeur by the incense of the American public for the war. The nightly reports on a budding television news medium of the American dead, eventually summing over 58,000, brought the graphic images of war to the American public for the first time.

This American public, already gushing with disdain for an unpopular war was further galvanized by events such as the My Lai Massacre and the shooting of students at Kent State University. The resulting wave of anti-war protest reflecting the overall feeling of the country produced not only a backlash against the politicians involved and their failed policies, but also contempt for the very soldiers that were fighting and dying in the war.

As the military returned home, their limited tactical successes were dwarfed in the public eye by the view of the military as a failure, albeit due to numerous factors beyond its control. Thousands of military members with lifelong mental or physical scars were practically discarded by a disinterested public. There were no ceremonies, no parades, only a country ready to bury this memory and forget all things associated with Vietnam. A single helicopter flying away from an overrun embassy seemed to be a fitting end.

As the Iraq war comes to a close, so much is different about this ending than the ending of the Vietnam experience. Some may question the policies and politicians that brought us into the war, but by in large no one questions the way the military has performed its duties.

This is not to say that the military has escaped this lengthy conflict unscathed by controversy. The events such as the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, the killings in Haditha, friendly fire incidents and the recent controversy of the handling of the remains of the war dead all call into questions tactics used by military members, but never the overall conduct of the military during the conflict.

American public’s support has endured these controversies as well as other tough times throughout the war. It has endured a persistent conflict despite President Bush’s declaration of “mission accomplished,” an Iraqi insurgency that expanded our involvement, a 2007 call for a troop surge, continued reports of Improvised Explosive Devices killing U.S service members and the reports of the bloody conflicts in places like Fallujah and Anbar. All of these were challenging times for the military, yet support for the troops remained.

There were, however, events along the way that highlighted the courage of our service members and produced recognition by Americans of the contributions the military was making to a free Iraq. The capture of Saddam Hussein and the elimination of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, are just two examples of the courage and valor of our military displayed every day during this conflict. One of the most poignant moments celebrated by our country was when an Iraqi woman stood from her seat in the U.S. Capitol during a State of the Union speech proudly displaying an ink stained finger having just voted in an Iraqi election for the first time. A proud moment made possible by the sacrifices of our military.

As military members have returned home from Southwest Asia over the years (sometimes after 2, 3 or more deployments) they arrive to a different reception from the members that served in Vietnam. Rousing applause by Americans on airplanes and in airports, a reception that moves most military members to tears, replaced being spat upon, harassed and jeered in airports when military members returned from service in Vietnam. Overwhelming support for our wounded warriors, as exemplified by enormous contributions to programs like the Wounded Warrior Project, is common place versus the neglect experienced by the wounded returning from Vietnam.

There will be no national victory parade recognizing the end of the Iraq War, like the one seen after Operation Desert Storm. However, there will be celebrations across America, much as we’ve seen over the past 10 years, to recognizing military men and women for their sacrifices as they return home. A free and independent Iraq exists today because of the valor displayed by the U.S. military and our allies, another reason to celebrate as we welcome our troops home.

A simple ceremony and a grateful nation mark the end of the Iraq War. The goodbye to the Iraq War is different in so many ways from the goodbye we said to the Vietnam War so many years ago. For the veterans who endured the sacrifices during any war, thank you. For an American public who persevered the Iraq War – job well done.

Reducing the Deficit Requires Skill and Risk

PSA Staff — Wed, 14 Dec 2011 15:19:34 +0000

Lee Hamilton is a Co-Chair of Partnership for a Secure America’s Advisory Board, Director for the Center of Congress at Indiana University, and also served in Congress for 34 years. This article originally appeared in the Taunton Daily Gazette and can be found here.

The failure of the congressional Supercommittee to reach an agreement on reducing the deficit was not just bad fiscal news. It was a significant failure of political leadership.

Not only did the committee move us one step closer to a genuine fiscal crisis, but also it put the dysfunction of Congress on full display. At a time of great economic stress, its members lost sight of what failure would cost the country in lost economic growth and foregone job creation. They did not fully appreciate that inaction ensures grave economic risks. Even worse, they sent a signal to the American people — who overwhelmingly wanted to believe that common ground is still possible in a divided age — that partisan politics is stronger than the national interest. Failure robbed Americans of hope at a time when they desperately needed some.

Where do we go from here? We did learn some important lessons from the Supercommittee’s many weeks of work.

An obvious one is how difficult it will be getting our fiscal house in order. The Supercommittee proved that deficit reduction is hard on the substance and even harder on the politics. The fact that its members could not salvage a formal agreement from their discussions, unlike special committees in the past, makes clear that it will take a supreme effort of political will to move the nation past this point. Though even in failure, the committee could have done much more to educate the American public on the hard choices necessary to get our fiscal house in order.
A second, related lesson is that fixing the deficit will require politicians who can set aside the politics of the moment. The members of the special committee were unable and unwilling to do that. Some gave me the feeling that they wanted to defeat an agreement, not achieve one, and none seemed willing to go against their party priorities.

Though they laudably tried early on to keep partisan messaging from derailing their efforts, by the end, each side was trying to make the other look bad. They worked hard to present their own party as flexible and open to solutions on tax increases or spending cuts, and the other as entrenched and unyielding.

Why were the politicians unable to reach a solution when the American people clearly wanted one? The White House and President Obama were mostly silent. Congressional leaders of both parties supported their negotiators’ positions, neither demanding an agreement nor pressuring negotiators to reach one. To their credit, rank and file members of both parties did go on record urging the Supercommittee to set aside partisanship and arrive at a resolution. But their voices could not drown out the ideological activists dead-set against raising taxes on the wealthy or finding meaningful cuts in entitlements.

The members of the Supercommittee had neither the influence on Capitol Hill nor the willingness to forge a solution that would lead the country forward. They did not strive for an agreement large enough to allow room for the necessary trade-offs to solve the problem, and in the end, they and congressional leaders seem to calculate that they would pay a greater political price for reaching an agreement than for failing.

Those who favored a compromise bear some responsibility here: Ideological activists were able to exert more pressure than the majority who wanted to see an agreement. In the future, the voices of moderation will have to be louder.

Meaningful progress on our fiscal problems will require skilled politicians at the highest level to roll up their sleeves and take a risk with their own political bases. It has been done before, when politicians like former Republican Senator Bob Dole and former Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan stepped up and made hard decisions. They were able, when the occasion demanded, to use their public stature and their political gifts to command attention and sway public opinion.

For the final lesson from the Supercommittee’s failure is that it’s not about the numbers, it’s about political leadership. Our fiscal crisis is still with us. The issues that broke the committee’s back have not gone away. Congress has no choice but to press on. Surely the president and members of Congress must now grasp the magnitude of our fiscal problem and the necessity of shared sacrifice to resolve it.

Sometimes in politics, you have to fail before you can succeed. Even in failure, the Supercommittee provided some valuable lessons. Our hope must be that our political leaders can discern them, and that this failure will pave the way for progress.

An “Iron Hand” is No Substitute for Democracy

PSA Staff — Wed, 07 Dec 2011 16:36:13 +0000

Ms Albright is former US secretary of state and a member of PSA’s Advisory Board. Mr. Kohut is president of the Pew Research Center. The original editorial appeared in the Financial Times, you can find the article here.

Two decades ago, our opinion survey of the Soviet Union during perestroika showed a huge divide between hardline communists and the young, urban Russians who backed Boris Yeltsin and favoured a free market economy. Last weekend’s election results show how the divide endures 20 years on.

Just 50 per cent of Russians approve of multi-party politics according to the Pew Global Attitudes Survey and half consider it a misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists. By a margin of 57 to 32 per cent, Russians believe that having a “strong leader” is more important than a democratic government. This is the conviction that, for more than a decade, fuelled the popularity of Vladimir Putin, but is now beginning to pall. His “look-at-me” style appeared when the economy was on the rise but a combination of inflation and stagnant living standards is prompting many Russian voters once again to signal their unhappiness with the status quo. This search for leaders who will deliver economically holds an important lesson for the Middle East where the democratic tide still swells despite panicked opposition from some and the efforts of others to regulate its tempo.

When people take to the streets, they want to believe that a new government will lead to greater prosperity, but this is often a triumph of hope over experience. Russians remember Boris Yeltsin not as the hero who freed them from communism, but as the bumbler who presided over the free fall of their economy and failed to pay their pensions. Even today, 61 per cent of Russians believe the 20-year-old political transformation has had a negative impact on prosperity. There is a widespread perception that elites have enjoyed the spoils of “democracy”, while ordinary citizens have been left behind.

Our survey in Egypt – conducted after Hosni Mubarak’s departure -– found hopes similar to those once existing in Russia. A 56 per cent majority expected the economy to improve. Instead, it has sagged amid continuing political uncertainty. What is clear is that revolutions tend to create unsettled conditions, which, at least in the short-term, retard economic growth.

Decades of communist propaganda, emphasising social conformity over private initiative, left the newly-independent Russian Federation ill-prepared for capitalism. The Yeltsin government’s version of economic reform was rushed, plundered by profiteers, and implemented at a time when record low oil prices drained revenue from the national treasury. Many Russians saw their social safety nets disappear while the well-connected few became obscenely rich – all under the mantle of democracy. So there is little wonder that the majority rushed to embrace Mr Putin when he arrived on the scene in 1999, promising a strong hand and the restoration of lost benefits. People like to vote, but they need to eat, and Mr Putin, more than Mr Yeltsin, seemed able to deliver what mattered most. But just as Mr Putin received credit for the Russian Federation’s resurgence, so now he is blamed by many for its recent sluggishness and for the government’s failure to share the benefits of oil wealth.

Arabs will have an easier time than ex-Soviets did in supporting privatisation and decentralisation. Calls for reform are stronger in the Arab world than they were in Russia 20 years ago. But the overriding question remains whether newly-democratic governments can meet expectations. Economic restructuring can take years to yield dividends. As Russia’s experience shows, haste is not a solution. But revolutionaries are not known for patience.

Russia’s trajectory and our Middle Eastern surveys suggest three principles for nurturing democracy. First, economic progress is vital. Vibrant political parties matter, and so do competent administrators, transparent laws for business, a stable climate for investment and policies aimed at developing a middle class. Second, fairness counts. New leaders will have more time to succeed if they are given credit for insisting on equitable treatment. That means collecting taxes from rich and poor, creating courts free from political influence, protecting minority rights and providing basic services to slums and suburbs alike.

Finally, it is essential to do everything possible to prevent the idea of democracy from being hijacked by those promising an easier way. The “iron hand” is an illusion, not a solution. One can readily imagine an Arab version of Mr Putin arising, offering a platform that exploits economic yearnings and cultural pride, and that uses democratic means to seize power but then refuses to relinquish it.

Arab protestors have not raised the banner of democratic reform so that their countries may one day revert to autocracy. That danger exists, but so does the chance to build something far greater. Even at its best, democracy can be frustrating, and slow, but it remains the superior means for uniting disparate populations, resolving disputes, and generating prosperity. We can but hope Arab populations will learn – not repeat – the Russian experience.

Graeme Bannerman: Libya, A Costly Victory

PSA Staff — Mon, 24 Oct 2011 15:56:44 +0000

Graeme Bannerman is a PSA Board Member and scholar at the Middle East Institute, where his work focuses on US-Arab relations, regional security, the peace process, and the history of the Middle East.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta asserted recently that critics of the Libyan mission “have been proven wrong.” Now, with the death of dictator Muammar Qadhafi, the secretary’s view is supported by the overwhelming majority of Washington’s foreign policy establishment.

But this won’t be the first time that Washington may be proven wrong. Even conceding the unlikely outcome that the Libyans overcome their tribal, regional, and political differences to establish a democratic state, the long-term costs of U.S. involvement are likely to far outweigh the benefits.

The first negative fallout was seen in the Russian and Chinese veto of the U.N. Security Council resolution on Syria. The Russians and Chinese made it clear that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s abuse of the U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force in Libya to ”protect civilians” to justify a policy of regime change will make them reluctant to support future Security Council resolutions — which the United States and NATO could exploit to pursue an expanded agenda.

The Libyan adventure appears to have transformed the Security Council from a potential instrument of U.S. foreign policy to an impediment.

Equally important are those who abstained on the Syrian resolution—India, Brazil, South Africa and Lebanon, as the representative of the Arab League. They also share the concerns about the overreach of U.S. policy. The BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China — lining up against the United States is worrisome. Considering these nations’ economic clout and the need for their support in the important challenges facing the United States, creating unnecessary rifts seems imprudent.

The Arab League resolution expressing concern about Libya and calling for a “no-fly” zone to protect civilians was essential to win international approval for NATO’s intervention. But within days after NATO starting its bombing of Qadhafi forces, the Arab League Secretary General complained that they did not call for bombing, only the establishment of a “no-fly” zone.

Securing Arab League support for action against a member state was unprecedented — and is now unlikely to happen again. Most Arab governments will likely be highly resistant to giving even a hint of approval to foreign intervention in the internal affairs of one of their members.

Trust in the word of the United States has been significantly harmed. The international distrust is likely to far outlast the joys of military victory and Qadhafi’s demise.

Non-proliferation policy has also been made more difficult. Many are suggesting that NATO would not have attacked Libya if Qadhafi had not negotiated away his weapons of mass destruction. Obtaining weapons of mass destruction appears to many as the only way to protect against Western intimidation. So getting people to abandon attempts to obtain WMD has become more difficult.

Even more important is the damage done to American democracy.

The administration’s failure to obtain congressional approval for the military operation sets an unfortunate precedent. Making matters worse, the White House asserted that it was authorized to take military action by the U.N. Security Council. The idea that the administration has time to get Security Council approval for sending U.S. citizens to war, but does not have time or need to get congressional approval is a serious setback for U.S. democracy.

Congress, with all of its faults, remains the people’s elected representative and it must not be excluded from the decision of going to war. The idea that the president believes that some unelected international institution gives him, as the elected leader of the American people, the authority to go to war is a significant diminution of U.S. democracy

The entire operation was funded by executive branch fiat. No request for congressional funding was made. Such a request would have required Congress to debate the policy.

According to the administration, $1.1 billion of Defense Department funds were spent in Libya. No one has stated the cost in intelligence and clandestine funds. If the executive branch of government can expend such sums outside the constitutional process, where approval of all expenditures must begin in the House, what chance do the American people have to establish control over government spending?

President Barack Obama asserted that we were going to war because American values were being threatened. The United States had an obligation to prevent a massacre of Libyan citizens.

Historically, the United States went to war when American lives were in danger or our national interest was threatened. In this case, the president alone decided what American values were and when they were being threatened. In democracies, the people determine national values.

One cannot promote democratic values abroad while weakening those same values at home.

William Cohen: What the U.S. Should Do About Iran

PSA Staff — Fri, 14 Oct 2011 15:34:46 +0000

Advisory Board Member and former Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, discusses his recommendations for U.S. Policy in Iran. His recommendations include greater cooperation with the United Nations, collaboration with regional partners, and intelligence sharing in addition to many other points of leverage and influence the United States could use. The article originally appeared here on CNN.

Washington (CNN) — Longtime observers of the Middle East are baffled by allegations that high-ranking officials in the Iranian government approved a plan to assassinate Saudi Arabia Ambassador, Adel al-Jubeir, and blow up the Saudi and Israeli embassies in Washington. Commentators have described the plan as “brazen,” but “bizarre” and ‘bone-headed” might be more appropriate adjectives.

It’s difficult to comprehend either the motives or the means selected to carry out the plan outlined by the Justice Department in its criminal indictment of Manssor Arbabsiar and Gholam Shakuri. Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are not new, but Iran has been both cautious and clever enough to restrain its ambitions for regional dominance.

If the allegations of the assassination and bombing plot are true, and the covert operation had proved successful, Iran’s leaders would have invited retaliation on a scale far more vigorous than any they might have contemplated. Indeed, I think it’s fair to say that the Iranian landscape would likely have been substantially altered.

Assuming, however, that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad never authorized the action or were ever aware of it, both have great cause for concern. Elements in their covert, black bag, assassination/ terrorist unit were planning an attack that could have brought about the decapitation of their leadership, the obliteration of their ambitions to enter the nuclear weapons club and quite possibly have precipitated a global depression by engulfing the region in war. Rather than dismissing the plot as a Zionist fabrication, these leaders should be looking inward and holding accountable those who were responsible for undertaking such a dangerous and destructive mission.

While awaiting greater clarification from those responsible for moving forward with the prosecution against Arbabsiar and Shakuri, the United States should explore several options:

1. Bring the assassination and bombing plan to the United Nations Security Council and seek much tougher sanctions against Iran;

2. Encourage Saudi Arabia to review and revise its contractual arrangements with any country that refuses to support the imposition of tougher sanctions against Iran;

3. Intensify the effort to expose the activities of those nations who are circumventing the existing sanctions against Iran;

4. Make it clear to all members of the U.N. that Iran’s nuclear weapons program poses a serious threat to global stability. If a non-nuclear Iran initiated an assassination plan through a Mexican drug cartel, what would it be tempted to do once it possess a nuclear weapon?

5. Strengthen our ability to keep the Persian Gulf open should hostilities ever break out;

6. Force the administration and Congress to move forward on improving the defense posture of our friends and allies who are threatened by Iran;

7. Urge Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States to move more aggressively in constructing coordinated, regional defense and security policies; and

8. Release intelligence information, to the maximum extent possible, which exposes those in the Iranian regime responsible for this act — as a means of galvanizing support for the actions, such as additional sanctions, mentioned above.

The above options are illustrative only. Others may have more punitive measures in mind. But right now, the United States and Saudi Arabia should proceed with vigor and not permit Iran to hide its dagger behind its back in its left hand, while professing its innocence with the right.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of William S. Cohen.