Actually, it’s tahadiya, as opposed to hudna, which means calm or cease fire (sometimes spoken of as a truce). It’s interesting that in the Middle East, even a temporary, grudging condition-laden cessation in the fighting has to be negotiated. For the amount of time Israelis and Arabs (not to mention a host of other intermediaries, including US presidents) have spent at the negotiating table, they could have gotten through a lull, a calm, a cease fire, a truce, an armistice, a treaty, and moved on to solving world hunger, the energy crisis, and working out deals for Brad Pitt’s next dozen movies. They could have, that is, if it were anywhere other than the Middle East. But at least the latest round of Israeli-Palestinian negotiation (this time under Egyptian auspices) has given rise to what experts are calling a “lull” in the fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Inshala.

I’m not just writing this to highlight the absurdity of drawn out negotiations over something as pessimistically titled as a “lull”—it almost invites speculation about who’ll manufacture a violation first, and take advantage of it to catch the other side off guard—but rather to offer you, dear reader, a bit of detail about the nature of this agreement that I find infinitely more revealing than the reams of colorful descriptions coming from the mainstream press. So, here goes. (These details, by the way, are courtesy of the loosely IDF affiliated Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center in Tel Aviv—hardly an impartial source, but their information is generally solid.)

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As you all know, the crisis in Burma is transforming from a natural disaster to a humanitarian catastrophe due to the xenophobia, incompetence, and malevolence of the Burmese government. With every day that passes, the situation of the up to tow million Burmese people affected by this crisis, almost three quarters of whom have reportedly not received any assistance, is becoming ever more precarious. It is clear that the time has come for bold international action.  My colleague, Brian Vogt, wrote an excellent piece detailing one strategy for getting aid through to those who need it earlier this week.  Brian is quite right to warn that we must not to allow our disgust for the Burmese junta lead us to political posturing rather than decisive action.

Although the Chinese government stated last week that they did not think it appropriate for the Burma crisis to be brought to the UN Security Council, it is becoming increasingly clear that stronger action by the UN and the international community will be required to break this deadly impasse. French Prime Minister Bernard Kouchner was among the first to call for aid drops in Burma, even against the wishes of the Burmese regime. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is now calling for a UN summit on aid to Burma. The United States must continue to take a lead in these efforts, and to build international consensus around a more aggressive assistance agenda with the greatest amount of international legitimacy possible. Clearly, food and aid drops will not be enough as water-borne diseases begin to take their toll over the coming days, particularly on the young and the elderly.  Specifically, the United States can actively support the provision of assistance under chapter 7 of the UN Charter, as was done for Somalia and other recent humanitarian crises.

There’s been a lot of talk about whether the U.S. President should boycott the Olympics because of Chinese human rights concerns. The irony is that in the eyes of much of the world, it may not mean very much if we took such a bold action. Studies indicate that the U.S. under George W. Bush has a less favorable image than China. And it’s hard to imagine that many people could take Bush seriously when he talks about human rights in China, after he has condoned waterboarding practices that clearly violate international human rights protocols.

Even in an ideal world, I’m not sure that a boycott is the most effective way to influence China’s deeply concerning human rights record. After all, Nixon’s trip to China was arguably the most impactful U.S. act in shaping China’s future and Nixon went there more in friendship than in protest. At the same time, he delivered a clear message. Similarly, I tend to think America should fully participate in the Olympics while wearing a clear symbol of our support of human rights and making clear our hope that China will change its ways.

What’s sad, though, is that our country, which for so long has been an image of freedom despite all our shortcomings and our continued inequities, is now seen so negatively worldwide that it is not clear even if we tried to make a statement anyone would take us seriously. It is yet another sign of one of the great casualties of the Bush years: America’s image in the world.

Last week Raj Purohit wrote that now that the Pakistani electorate has clearly rejected the status quo that it is time for Musharraf to step aside.  While I agree that the long term outlook for Pakistan would be much improved if Musharraf were listen to the will of the electorate, I think that we all must admit that the likelihood of him stepping down is fairly remote.  Although Musharraf’s party lost the parliamentary elections, thanks to his stacking of the court, he claims that he still legally can remain in power.  Until Musharraf loses the confidence of the military, we’re likely to see him in power for the foreseeable future.  No, I’m not happy with that reality, but I also recognize that US policy towards Pakistan is unlikely to force Musharraf from power.  If we focus our attention primarily on the removal of Musharraf, I fear that we are setting ourselves up for failure. 

No, the most encouraging result I heard from the Pakistani elections came not from Nawaz Sharif nor from President Musharraf, but rather from Senator Joe Biden when he called on the US to get serious about its long term Pakistan policy.  He called on the US to:

1. The U.S. must triple non-security aid, to $1.5 billion annually for at least a decade.  This aid would be unconditioned.  It would be the U.S.’s pledge to the Pakistani people.  Instead of funding military hardware, it would build schools, clinics, and roads.
2. The U.S. must condition security aid on performance. We should base our security aid on clear results.  The U.S. is now spending well over $1 billion annually, and it’s not clear we’re getting our money’s worth.
3. The U.S. must help Pakistan enjoy a “democracy dividend.”  The first year of democratic rule should bring an additional $1 billion – above the $1.5 billion non-security aid baseline.  Sen. Biden supports tying future non-security aid – again, above the guaranteed baseline – to Pakistan’s progress in developing democratic institutions and meeting good-governance norms. 
4. The U.S. must engage the Pakistani people, not just their rulers.  This will involve everything from improved public diplomacy and educational exchanges to high impact projects that actually change people’s lives.  (more…)

According to the New York Times, a donors’ conference in Paris today pledged a record $7.4 billion of aid for the embattled Palestinian Authority over the next three years. That’s a big number, and it is intended to support critical government functions in the Palestinian territories, while jump-starting economic growth to help provide Palestinians with a tangible “peace dividend.”

As observers of the conflict have learned by now, there is a direct and critical correlation between political stability and economic growth, so that neither can last long without the other. I hope, in particular, that the latest infusion of charity to the Palestinian territories will be quickly followed by for-profit investment, especially from wealthy Arab states, demonstrating the concrete benefits of stability to Palestinians, and helping to deflate the bloated state bureaucracy by offering attractive private sector employment. (more…)

The outlook is looking increasingly gloomy for democracy in Pakistan.  Our erstwhile ally in the war on terror, General Musharraf is looking worse by the day.   After he took power in a bloodless coup in 1999, many Pakistanis were hopeful about the future.   They were happy to be rid of a corrupt leader and willing to take a chance on Musharraf.  Polls indicate, however, that they have soured on his leadership.  And it’s not surprising why.  After having regularly promised free and fair elections, Pakistan’s electoral efforts have fallen short.   Musharraf’s seems to have a messiah complex and his justifications for his actions seem increasingly weak.  Moreover, Musharraf’s alliance with the US has also hurt him with the Pakistani public that is increasingly skeptical of the war on terror.  For the Pakistani public the “war on terror” is just considered a convenient excuse for further autocratic rule. 

The New York Times reported that Musharraf caught word that the Supreme Court was about to issue a unanimous decision invalidating his recent election.  Of course, Musharraf wasn’t about to let that meddling court have its way.  He had learned his lesson in his tussle earlier this year with the Chief Justice.  He therefore dismissed the court and we’re left today with an increasingly isolated and unpopular leader who justifies his continued abrogation of the constitution on the spurious grounds that it is necessary to combat terrorist elements.  Sound familiar?   I wonder if in a one on one meetings with President Bush, they exchanged notes on using the “terrorist”  threat to bypass constitutional controls on power.    

Of course, the U.S. is in a bind here.  President Bush has publicly declared that democratic governance is the long term answer to overcoming violent extremism.  It can give hope and dignity to oppressed people around the world who might otherwise choose terrorism.  I agree that certainly it is a component of the solution - a very long term solution.  However, this long term solution comes into conflict with our short term dilemma that Pakistan is ground zero on the war on terror.  After 9/11 Musharraf signed onto the coalition of the willing and has been rewarded handsomely in terms of massive infusions of aid.  The results of Musharraf’s alliance have been mixed.  Certainly Pakistan’s assistance has led to the arrest and detention of high value targets and Pakistan’s support of our Afghanistan mission has been important.  However, at the same time, Pakistan’s inability to control its own territory and reign in the Al Qaeda elements in the country have made many wonder whether we are getting our money’s worth. 

It’s really a question here of short term vs long term interests.  Unfortunately, in the past we too often have tended to focus on short term results and ignore the potential blowback from those actions.  Just think back to the struggle in Afghanistan against the Soviets in the 1980s.  Back then the US backed the mujahideen which, after the end of the Afghanistan conflict, led to the formation of Al Qaeda.  The U.S. followed the old maxim, my enemy’s enemy is my friend.  That sort of short term thinking contributed to the development of Al Qaeda and the foreign policy quagmire we find ourselves in now.  (more…)

Chris Preble highlighted yesterday an op-ed by Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan that appeared in Monday’s Washington Post.  I actually had somewhat of a different reaction to the piece.  Chris wrote that Kagan and Daalder, “celebrate the broad bipartisan consensus among the Washington policy elites and the major party candidates in favor of military intervention.”  When I read the piece I felt that the focus of the article was more on the importance of “international legitimacy” whenever the U.S. considers military action.  For many years polls have shown that Americans are much more comfortable with the use of force if it has broad international support, often in the form of UN Security Council resolutions.  The Bush administration recognized this and, even after UN rejection, hailed its “Coalition of the Willing” that had been, in many cases (with the exceptions Australia and Britain), basically strong armed and bribed into token participation.  

I agree with Daalder and Kagan that the US will undoubtedly find itself in situations in the future of deciding whether to use force.   I feel that if we can create a bipartisan consensus around the need for international legitimacy for military action, then indeed that is a good thing and a far cry from where we have been for the past 7 years.  Remember, even John Kerry defended himself against Republican attacks in the 2004 presidential elections, saying that he wouldn’t need a “UN permission slip” to act against threats.  If our leaders, both Democrats and Republicans, can actually admit publicly that international support matters and not portray this as a weakness, then we are headed in the right direction, I believe. 

Now for the issue of the “Concert of Democracies”.  I wrote on this back in September when the Princeton Project on National Security released its report, Forging a World of Liberty Under Law, US National Security in the 21st Century.  Like Daalder and Kagan the report proposed the formation of a “Concert of Democracies” that would play a legitimizing (or delegitimizing) role when the US or other democracies proposed using force.  Although I feel that the Concert of Democracies idea has merit, I felt that in this most recent op-ed, that Daalder and Kagan too quickly dismissed the UN.  They write, “The traditional answer, the U.N. Security Council, no longer suffices, if it ever did.”  Although it certainly has been difficult to get the P-5 to agee to take action, it has happened.  In the first Gulf War, for example, the Security Council did conclude the force should be used to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.  Although, many would argue that it was the very fragility of the international consensus that prevented us from finishing the job, it seems that, considering our current debacle, limitations on the intervention certainly were warranted.  (more…)

Since March the Stanley Foundation has been involved in a noble campaign that pairs together ideological adversaries to craft bipartisan positions of different foreign policy issues.  This effort, “Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide” is very much needed.  I read with interest the most recent paper on democratic development authored by Francis Fukuyama and Michael McFaul. 

The paper begins by outlining the different arguments for and against democracy promotion as a key tenet of US foreign policy.  In the end, the authors conclude that indeed it does make sense, despite the inherent problems, to include democracy promotion as an important component of US foreign policy for both strategic and moral interests.  I agree. 

Historically, both Democrats and Republicans have heralded the importance of democracy promotion.  Woodrow Wilson proclaimed that, “The world must be made safe for democracy.”  Reagan said, “Democracy is worth dying for, because it’s the most deeply honorable form of government ever devised by man.”  Many Democratic and Republican administrations have included democracy promotion as components of their foreign policy.  Of course, anyone involved in democracy promotion work knows that Iraq has completely skewed the public’s view of democracy promotion.  Many who once believed in democracy promotion now question whether this is the correct goal.  Those who are involved in democracy promotion activities around the world are hampered both by the failures of democratic checks on power (ie Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo) and the fact that the supposed goal of democracy promotion in Iraq has led to mass chaos and death.  If that is what democracy is about, few will be convinced that this is the best path.  (more…)

This week, the Pakistani government has laid siege upon a radical mosque in Islamabad, exchanging gunfire with the extremists that are holed up there. Today, President Pervez Musharraf’s plane was fired upon in an apparent assassination attempt as he left for storm-ravaged Baluchistan. This follows riots in March that were prompted by a judicial crisis when the president suspended Pakistan’s chief justice for alleged abuses of office. Since then, protesters have frequently taken to the streets to rally against what they see as an attempt by Musharraf to snuff out fledgling democratic institutions and ease his way to another term. These incidents, combined with the greater radicalization of the urban population, beg the question, what would the United States do if its man in Pakistan were to fall? What are America’s long-term options in a country that is so volatile, yet so vital in the fight against transnational terrorism and global jihadism?

Current US policy towards Pakistan has been to provide whatever military support they needed to help in the Global War on Terror. Over the last five years, the United States has given Pakistan 10 billion dollars in assistance, with most of it going directly to the military. Additionally, there are classified funds that have gone straight into Musharraf’s coffers as reward for capturing or killing Al-Qaeda terrorists in Pakistan. With so much money weighted toward the Pakistani military, it suggests that the United States is emphasizing short-term tactical goals rather than a long-term strategic alliance, reminiscent of our disastrous allegiances during the Cold War.

While Pakistan had early success against Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters, recently terrorists have been using the Pakistani-Afghani border as their safe haven. President Musharraf has refused to put his troops in harm’s way by sending them out to fight in these borderlands. The Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan in part because they have remained unmolested in the tribal lands of Waziristan after Musharraf’s deal with the tribal leaders. Under a 2006 peace agreement, the Pakistani military would leave Waziristan and tribal chiefs would be responsible for security in the area. Clearly, the United States is seeing diminishing returns on their investment in Pakistan’s military capability. Meanwhile, less than ten percent of the assistance money given to Pakistan is earmarked for institutional reform or infrastructure building. With little emphasis on the long-term development of the country, it is assured that Pakistan will continue to churn out madrassas that preach violence against the United States and encourage more terrorism and that standoffs with the US-backed government are to continue.

So what can be done to change the status quo? What can the United States do to enhance its long-term security vis-à-vis Pakistan? Well, the options are not ideal. For being such a large donor to Pakistan, the United States has very little leverage when it comes to dealing with Musharraf. We need Pakistan to help combat the insurgency in Afghanistan, and to get them to comply, we need to bribe them with money. Additionally, there is a dearth of alternatives to Musharraf’s rule. The last two prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, enjoy little support in the country (though there have been talks of bringing Bhutto back in a power sharing arrangement) and, to make matters worse, parts of the country are going through a “Talibanization”. Finally, no matter what happens in an election, the Pakistani military and shadowy intelligence services will still be in control of much of the politics.

All these factors are frightening for a nuclear-armed state. Since September 11^th, Plan A for Pakistan has been to give Musharraf the money and equipment he needs to fight the terrorists in Waziristan and maintain control in Islamabad. For years, the United States has seen him as the only possible force for stability in the country. However, with Musharraf’s support eroding and the Taliban surging, it is time for the United States to formulate a Plan B. Tying more of the assistance money to domestic reform, especially in the education sector, would help average Pakistanis and create the basis for real social development outside of radical Islam. One possible solution would be the International Youth Opportunity Fund, established by the 9/11 commission. This bipartisan initiative could be used to help fund moderate education in Pakistan that accurately reflects the world outside the Middle East. With money from the IYOF, the educational system could be turned away from extremist madrassas that teach a misguided view of the world and the United States. Finally, American policy makers should also formulate a plan for life without Musharraf, as he has been the target of numerous assassination attempts and his popularity has continued to plummet with general population. At the very least, Pakistan should move to a more prominent place on Washington’s priorities list. If not, it may force itself upon America’s attention in the worst way possible.

Tomorrow, with food, fireworks and fellowship, Americans everywhere will commemorate the 231^st anniversary of our Declaration of Independence in 1776. Nearly a decade after that brazen announcement, when the founders of this republic at last won their freedom from Britain, they set out to construct not merely a new nation, but a wholly new kind of nation. Although they cleaved to ideals that included the natural rights of liberty and self-determination, the revolutionaries pursued American sovereignty as a tool, not as an end in itself. Most were deeply distrustful of states and governments, seeing no advantage in trading a tyrannical sovereign for the sovereignty of statism.

In 2007, after more than two centuries of proud American independence, there are those who claim the mantle of the founders’ values and vision at every corner of the political map. In recent years, a growing chorus of political voices has sought to link American sovereignty and security with the need to reduce our openness to the world in immigration, commerce, and diplomacy. This could hardly be a greater misunderstanding of America’s history or a worse prescription for our critical national interests in the twenty-first century.

Although US citizenship was denied to non-whites and immigration was regulated by racial and ethnic quotas well into the modern era, bigoted, isolationist and economic protectionist rationales have always been at odds with America’s founding ideals. In fact, Thomas Jefferson famously complained in the Declaration of Independence that King George had wronged Americans by restricting free immigration, “for that purpose obstructing the Laws of Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.” As President, Jefferson raised America’s first navy at the turn of the nineteenth century to secure America’s lifeblood—commerce with Europe—against the predations of North African pirates.

Today, of course, opponents of open immigration cite a litany of important concerns that have little to do with discrimination or protectionism, including the unfortunate reality that a small percentage of those who enter this country legally or illegally each year might wish to do us harm. Likewise, they contend that a flood of immigrants—encouraged, perhaps, by amnesty for illegals already here—would overwhelm our social and political system and bankrupt our economy. But the dangers of unregulated immigration can be reconciled with America’s founding political ideals, and our real economic interests in growth. The moribund Senate immigration bill, while far from an ideal compromise, was an important first step. More can be done to bring Democrats and Republicans together to strengthen regulatory and physical barriers to illegal infiltration, while broadening and simplifying the mechanisms for legal residence in this country.

Solving the immigration impasse is not important just for economic, moral or historical considerations. Our inability to fix immigration is emblematic of our failures in other, closely related policy arenas including national security and public diplomacy. For instance, outdated and xenophobic security clearance guidelines prevent US intelligence and defense agencies from recruiting the most skilled linguists in the most needed languages, such as Arabic, Pashtu and Farsi. It is absurd that while we still hold prisoners at Guantanamo Bay to exploit their years-old “personal knowledge” of terror networks halfway around the world, we disqualify loyal Americans from government service precisely because their knowledge of states and individuals that might be linked to wanted terrorists is too fresh and personal.

Just as we are skeptical of the loyalty and commitment to “American values” of recent immigrants from unfamiliar parts of the world, we undermine our own interests with excessive skepticism toward international law and international institutions. As a recent Times op-ed noted, at least a dozen treaties on important topics like the laws of war and environmental pollution, which both Democratic and Republican Presidents have signed, now languish in the Senate for lack of sufficient votes. Similarly, the US has refused to cooperate with the International Criminal Court, even though that body’s governing document reflects quintessentially American procedural protections and this country’s longstanding commitment to the primacy of international law.

America’s porous borders and broken immigration system, our grossly mismanaged intelligence operations, and our growing rift with even close allies over international law are all symptoms of a political system that has elevated the formal sovereignty component of American independence above the substantive values that sovereignty was meant to secure. Let us celebrate 231 years of self-determination by rededicating ourselves to unity, pragmatism and openness as we engage even the greatest challenges to our security, our standing in the world, and our identity as Americans.