There’s a Better Way to Gauge Congress

I suspect that most members of Congress will want to forget the year that just ended.

The institution that symbolizes our democracy finished 2011 plumbing depths of unpopularity it has never experienced before. Its low approval ratings set records — suggesting, as Gallup put it, “that 2011 will be remembered as the year in which the American public lost much of any remaining faith in the men and women they elect and send off to Washington to represent them.”

The poor jobs picture, the lurching from one brink-of-disaster deadline to the next, the polarization that keeps the parties from working together, the widespread sense that Congress is so dysfunctional it cannot meet the nation’s challenges — all play a role.
These are all valid ways of judging Congress, but they are not the only way. Every year, the Center on Congress at Indiana University polls a group of congressional scholars on how they think the institution is doing, and one of the challenges we face is devising a set of questions that meaningfully probe Congress’s performance. It’s not as easy as you’d think.

The historic mission of the Congress has been to maintain freedom, a goal whose achievement is impossible to measure in a year’s — or even a few years’ — time. Moreover, a well-functioning Congress has to operate on many fronts: as the legislative body representing a diverse nation, as a counter-balance to the president, as an overseer of the federal bureaucracy, as a forger of policy, as two separate institutions (Senate and House) that have to find common ground and uphold processes that allow each one to perform effectively.

The first of Congress’ responsibilities is to protect its constitutional role as a strong, coequal branch of government. It must stand apart from and serve as a check upon the excesses of presidential power. So how well is it safeguarding its powers from presidential encroachment? Does it live up to its proper role in determining the federal budget? How’s it doing at oversight of the executive branch? Is it generating meaningful, politically sustainable policy alternatives or just sitting back and letting the White House take all the political risks? Does it set the national agenda, or act timidly? And does it safeguard the war powers assigned it by the Constitution?

Its second great role is to represent the American people. This means making sure that all voices get a fair hearing and that diverse viewpoints play a part in crafting initiatives — all while safeguarding institutional practices that allow legislation to move forward in a timely manner. Just as important, does Congress spend its time on key issues facing the country, or instead let itself get diverted by partisan concerns or by issues of importance only to well-heeled special interests?

Third, in a country as politically and demographically varied as ours, negotiation and compromise are key to crafting legislation that can enjoy broad political support. To gauge whether Congress is following sound process, you would want to know several things. Are its leaders capable of working hard to forge a consensus? If they can’t, do conflicts over legislation represent substantive differences or mere political game-playing? Does it balance careful deliberation with making decisions? Does it protect the rights of the minority and allow all points to be heard? Is it transparent — so that its members can be held accountable for their actions?

Fourth, does Congress set sufficiently high standards for its individual members? That means keeping excessive partisanship in check and making sure its members are behaving ethically.

And finally, how strong is the connection of members of Congress to their constituents back home? Do they understand their constituents and try to represent them in Washington? Do they make themselves accessible in a variety of settings and speak out for their communities at times of need? Do they listen well and are they closely attuned to the core needs and interests of the people they represent?

All of these questions add up to how well Congress represents the interests of the American people and, as always, it does better on some than on others. Despite its obvious troubles, the picture is not entirely bleak. And I can’t help but believe that the more well-rounded our understanding of where Congress falls short and where it performs well, the better we can hold it to account.

Related posts:

1. Reducing the Deficit Requires Skill and Risk
2. James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton Op-Ed: Breaking the War Powers Stalemate
3. Graeme Bannerman: Libya, A Costly Victory

Two decades ago, our opinion survey of the Soviet Union during perestroika showed a huge divide between hardline communists and the young, urban Russians who backed Boris Yeltsin and favoured a free market economy. Last weekend’s election results show how the divide endures 20 years on.

Just 50 per cent of Russians approve of multi-party politics according to the Pew Global Attitudes Survey and half consider it a misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists. By a margin of 57 to 32 per cent, Russians believe that having a “strong leader” is more important than a democratic government. This is the conviction that, for more than a decade, fuelled the popularity of Vladimir Putin, but is now beginning to pall. His “look-at-me” style appeared when the economy was on the rise but a combination of inflation and stagnant living standards is prompting many Russian voters once again to signal their unhappiness with the status quo. This search for leaders who will deliver economically holds an important lesson for the Middle East where the democratic tide still swells despite panicked opposition from some and the efforts of others to regulate its tempo.

When people take to the streets, they want to believe that a new government will lead to greater prosperity, but this is often a triumph of hope over experience. Russians remember Boris Yeltsin not as the hero who freed them from communism, but as the bumbler who presided over the free fall of their economy and failed to pay their pensions. Even today, 61 per cent of Russians believe the 20-year-old political transformation has had a negative impact on prosperity. There is a widespread perception that elites have enjoyed the spoils of “democracy”, while ordinary citizens have been left behind.

Our survey in Egypt – conducted after Hosni Mubarak’s departure -– found hopes similar to those once existing in Russia. A 56 per cent majority expected the economy to improve. Instead, it has sagged amid continuing political uncertainty. What is clear is that revolutions tend to create unsettled conditions, which, at least in the short-term, retard economic growth.

Decades of communist propaganda, emphasising social conformity over private initiative, left the newly-independent Russian Federation ill-prepared for capitalism. The Yeltsin government’s version of economic reform was rushed, plundered by profiteers, and implemented at a time when record low oil prices drained revenue from the national treasury. Many Russians saw their social safety nets disappear while the well-connected few became obscenely rich – all under the mantle of democracy. So there is little wonder that the majority rushed to embrace Mr Putin when he arrived on the scene in 1999, promising a strong hand and the restoration of lost benefits. People like to vote, but they need to eat, and Mr Putin, more than Mr Yeltsin, seemed able to deliver what mattered most. But just as Mr Putin received credit for the Russian Federation’s resurgence, so now he is blamed by many for its recent sluggishness and for the government’s failure to share the benefits of oil wealth.

Arabs will have an easier time than ex-Soviets did in supporting privatisation and decentralisation. Calls for reform are stronger in the Arab world than they were in Russia 20 years ago. But the overriding question remains whether newly-democratic governments can meet expectations. Economic restructuring can take years to yield dividends. As Russia’s experience shows, haste is not a solution. But revolutionaries are not known for patience.

Russia’s trajectory and our Middle Eastern surveys suggest three principles for nurturing democracy. First, economic progress is vital. Vibrant political parties matter, and so do competent administrators, transparent laws for business, a stable climate for investment and policies aimed at developing a middle class. Second, fairness counts. New leaders will have more time to succeed if they are given credit for insisting on equitable treatment. That means collecting taxes from rich and poor, creating courts free from political influence, protecting minority rights and providing basic services to slums and suburbs alike.

Finally, it is essential to do everything possible to prevent the idea of democracy from being hijacked by those promising an easier way. The “iron hand” is an illusion, not a solution. One can readily imagine an Arab version of Mr Putin arising, offering a platform that exploits economic yearnings and cultural pride, and that uses democratic means to seize power but then refuses to relinquish it.

Arab protestors have not raised the banner of democratic reform so that their countries may one day revert to autocracy. That danger exists, but so does the chance to build something far greater. Even at its best, democracy can be frustrating, and slow, but it remains the superior means for uniting disparate populations, resolving disputes, and generating prosperity. We can but hope Arab populations will learn – not repeat – the Russian experience.

Related posts:

1. Rethink our Russian Relationship
2. Graeme Bannerman: Libya, A Costly Victory
3. A Time to Lead

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta asserted recently that critics of the Libyan mission “have been proven wrong.” Now, with the death of dictator Muammar Qadhafi, the secretary’s view is supported by the overwhelming majority of Washington’s foreign policy establishment.

But this won’t be the first time that Washington may be proven wrong. Even conceding the unlikely outcome that the Libyans overcome their tribal, regional, and political differences to establish a democratic state, the long-term costs of U.S. involvement are likely to far outweigh the benefits.

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3. A New Approach to Interventionism

Washington (CNN) — Longtime observers of the Middle East are baffled by allegations that high-ranking officials in the Iranian government approved a plan to assassinate Saudi Arabia Ambassador, Adel al-Jubeir, and blow up the Saudi and Israeli embassies in Washington. Commentators have described the plan as “brazen,” but “bizarre” and ‘bone-headed” might be more appropriate adjectives.

It’s difficult to comprehend either the motives or the means selected to carry out the plan outlined by the Justice Department in its criminal indictment of Manssor Arbabsiar and Gholam Shakuri. Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are not new, but Iran has been both cautious and clever enough to restrain its ambitions for regional dominance.

If the allegations of the assassination and bombing plot are true, and the covert operation had proved successful, Iran’s leaders would have invited retaliation on a scale far more vigorous than any they might have contemplated. Indeed, I think it’s fair to say that the Iranian landscape would likely have been substantially altered.

Assuming, however, that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad never authorized the action or were ever aware of it, both have great cause for concern. Elements in their covert, black bag, assassination/ terrorist unit were planning an attack that could have brought about the decapitation of their leadership, the obliteration of their ambitions to enter the nuclear weapons club and quite possibly have precipitated a global depression by engulfing the region in war. Rather than dismissing the plot as a Zionist fabrication, these leaders should be looking inward and holding accountable those who were responsible for undertaking such a dangerous and destructive mission.

While awaiting greater clarification from those responsible for moving forward with the prosecution against Arbabsiar and Shakuri, the United States should explore several options:

1. Bring the assassination and bombing plan to the United Nations Security Council and seek much tougher sanctions against Iran;

2. Encourage Saudi Arabia to review and revise its contractual arrangements with any country that refuses to support the imposition of tougher sanctions against Iran;

3. Intensify the effort to expose the activities of those nations who are circumventing the existing sanctions against Iran;

4. Make it clear to all members of the U.N. that Iran’s nuclear weapons program poses a serious threat to global stability. If a non-nuclear Iran initiated an assassination plan through a Mexican drug cartel, what would it be tempted to do once it possess a nuclear weapon?

5. Strengthen our ability to keep the Persian Gulf open should hostilities ever break out;

6. Force the administration and Congress to move forward on improving the defense posture of our friends and allies who are threatened by Iran;

7. Urge Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States to move more aggressively in constructing coordinated, regional defense and security policies; and

8. Release intelligence information, to the maximum extent possible, which exposes those in the Iranian regime responsible for this act — as a means of galvanizing support for the actions, such as additional sanctions, mentioned above.

The above options are illustrative only. Others may have more punitive measures in mind. But right now, the United States and Saudi Arabia should proceed with vigor and not permit Iran to hide its dagger behind its back in its left hand, while professing its innocence with the right.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of William S. Cohen.

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2. Crossing the Rubicon
3. No-Fly Zone Over Libya: A Case for Multilateralism

SYRIA – What do we do now?

The situation in Syria is unfolding as many experienced observers expected when the protests began last March. The Assad regime is attempting to crush the protesters with force, not only to destroy them but to intimidate the rest of the population. Assad has promised reforms, while continuing to warn Syrians and the international community that if he goes down, sectarian violence will follow and Islamists may assume power. The reality, as many Syrians realize, is that any political reforms by Assad would be illusory. He will only introduce them after he has found a way to keep the controls in his hands.

It is surprising that the protesters have continued to demonstrate, despite suffering deaths, injuries and detentions. Average Syrians have not dared to speak out for decades, despite the frustration and despair many have felt due to their deteriorating economic circumstances and lack of freedoms.  Now, however, they have been encouraged by the success of similar insurrections during the “Arab Spring” and by Assad’s mishandling of the protests.

With this situation, the obvious question arises: What can outsiders do to assist the protesters in achieving their goals?  The view presented here is that we can do a number of things, but one path we should not take is direct intervention.

Despite their perseverance, opposition groups have undermined themselves. They have been disorganized, without clear leadership and continue to bicker.  To solve this, representatives from various minorities and ethnic groups recently met in Turkey to form a transitional coalition called the Syrian National Council.  The group was immediately attacked by others who allege that Islamists are over-represented and that the Council lacks a credible leader.

Nevertheless, presenting a pluralistic and united front, the Council has called for non-violent protests to continue until the Assad regime collapses. Their hopes appear to include several scenarios or combinations thereof:  the military will implode, bringing down the regime; a military coup will lead to Assad’s ouster; more and more Syrians will rise up and force Assad out. The Council is trying to establish itself as a viable alternative that can lead Syria through its transition.  Importantly, as with most Syrians, the Council is against any direct foreign intervention at this time, whether military or other.

I believe it will be a long time before the Syrian army collapses or launches a coup. Unlike the homogenous, professional armies of Egypt and Tunis, the Syrian military and intelligence and security services were structured by Hafez Assad precisely to avoid coups. Key positions are filled by loyal Alewites. The worker bees and even many senior positions are occupied by Sunnis but with a healthy blend from various minorities. To advance in the ranks, loyalty to the regime comes above all else and there is always someone prepared to rat out suspect colleagues. Sadly, this pattern occurs in other institutions around Syria, which is why there are few organizations in the country with integrity. The Syrian people deserve better but, for the majority of Syrians, it is the only environment they have ever known.

As for desertions from the military, most lower-ranked soldiers are neither well educated nor worldly. Often isolated from the general population, their knowledge of events around them is limited and managed. They are required to follow orders, ask no questions, and act without understanding why or whom they may be fighting. Consequently, while some will desert because they are influenced by outside sources, most will not, unless there is a breakdown in command at senior levels.

In the short to medium term, I also consider it unlikely, without additional catalysts, that popular protests will reach the point, as in Egypt and Tunis, where the regime collapses. Many Syrians still believe in Assad and want to give him more time to effect change. Others are fearful of what might happen if he falls, especially some minorities and privileged groups. It will take more than pockets of protests to cut that umbilical cord. This is where the West can play a role.

The UN, the USA, EU, Canada and other countries have called on Assad to leave and have implemented a range of sanctions to undermine the regime. It is noteworthy that many Arab countries, as well as Syrian allies like Turkey and Iran have also exhorted Assad to cease the violence and to find a peaceful solution. Noteworthy, because not many years ago, few of those countries would have publicly berated a fellow leader. It is deeply ironic that several of them still operate under an autocratic leadership and one must conclude that they are doing this less out of concern for the Syrian people or because of a sudden conversion to democratic principles than out of fear that if they are not on the right side of history, they may soon be joining the Mubaraks, Ben Alis and Gaddafis.

As difficult as it is to sit on the sidelines and watch the situation without a more forceful intervention, this is precisely what the international community should be doing. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which have killed so many and drained billions of dollars from the West’s coffers, are useful examples of what not to do. Those countries are still mired in centuries-old internal conflicts that will long outlast the West’s presence on the ground. The same would happen in Syria. Some will point to Libya as an example of a successful military intervention but how the Libyan situation will unfold remains uncertain. Moreover, Western intervention received the blessing of the Arab League, thus legitimating NATO’s actions. In the case of Syria, a similar invitation is unlikely, unless the situation degenerates into all out civil war.

Egypt and Tunis are better examples of how to handle Syria, allowing public pressure to force change without foreign interference. In the case of Egypt, supporting the demands from the street without heavy-handed intervention regained for the West, particularly for the USA, some of the credibility it had lost from decades of interference and manipulation of Arab governments. Of course, this also means accepting whatever political system replaces the old. The West has preached democracy in the Middle East for decades; now, it must be prepared to live with the results.

This does not leave Western governments, nor for that matter, other states in the region, powerless in influencing developments in Syria. They can and should use indirect pressures. They should apply sanctions to the maximum. Ordinary Syrians will be affected but there is a price to be paid for freedoms and the Syrian opposition needs to feel international support. More importantly, sanctions will begin to squeeze the business elite, who have stood by Assad until now but who may begin to question the costs of their allegiance. Syrian merchants have circumvented sanctions, wars and other impediments for decades, even centuries. However, this time, they are faced with a different situation. A popular uprising is underway. At some point, they may decide that Assad can no longer protect them nor assure the benefits that have tied them to him. When that happens, their loyalty may falter, thereby weakening the regime further.

A severely weakened economy will also feed public discontentment. As Government revenues continue to dwindle, can the regime sustain the expensive subsidies it currently offers to Syrians for a wide range of goods? Syrians are already faced with an astronomical youth unemployment rate, extremely low incomes and shortages of daily materials. At some point, if that situation continues, more and more will be drawn to join the protests against Assad.

When the opposition groups achieve greater stability and cohesion, the international community should get to know them and offer not only moral support but to assist them in rebuilding Syrian institutions after the regime is gone. If the regime continues to survive, more opposition members will come to believe that they must take up arms. Some seem to have done so already. There should be no question of the West arming those groups. Such adventures in the Middle East have usually come back to haunt us and to further destabilize the area. The region does not need more armed and trained fighters acquiring expertise in guerrilla warfare. Nor should any steps be taken that might be interpreted as manipulation of the opposition. Syrians have a healthy distrust of the West and any suggestion that opposition groups are western puppets will be used by Assad to undermine them.

When the Assad regime eventually falls, and sooner or later it will, we should be ready for the aftermath.  It is difficult to predict what will happen. Much is made of the potential for sectarian violence but some of this is due to deliberate efforts by the regime to foster that idea. Nevertheless, the potential is real. Syria has divisions along ethnic, religious, tribal, secular/Islamic, and even economic lines. Adding to this volatile mix, a half million Palestinian refugees have lived there for decades. It is a society that has not known openness and the freedom to resolve differences through discussion and debate. Rather, suspicions and misinformation have taken root, among communities, villages, groups. In such an environment, it is easy to exploit ignorance and fears.

Despite this, there are grounds for optimism. Syria has a justly deserved, centuries-long history of tolerance and of generosity towards each other and towards others. These qualities can prevail, provided wise leaders emerge during the transition and that meddlers, both domestic and international, can be kept at bay.

The Syrian people want change. They are finding their voices after decades of silence. They now realize that they can only create opportunity and find freedoms if the Assad regime disappears. Even one year ago, no Syrian would have believed it possible to be at this juncture. The path to victory will not be easy and will take time. Syrians want the West’s support in whatever way we can offer it short of military action or compromising their integrity. Respecting that position should be our guide to developing appropriate policies towards Syria at this time.

Related posts:

1. The Value of Being There in Syria
2. Graeme Bannerman: Libya, A Costly Victory
3. To Sanction or Not To Sanction: A report from Myanmar

While Libya is currently at the center of the debate, Yemen conjures up far more ominous headlines like “Yemen: Trouble in the Most Dangerous Domino.” There, President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has been in power longer than most Yemenis have been alive, is facing an opposition that fails to abate despite his concessions and is tenuously holding on to power.  Meanwhile, the fears surrounding a rapid destabilization require the United States to think creatively about how to change the lens through which it views Yemen as it prepares for a Yemen sans Saleh.

For most Americans, Yemen is only in the news when it is connected to terrorism – and with good reason.  The Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, was behind the failed 2009 Christmas Day airline bombing.  Recently, Defense Secretary Robert Gates referred to the group as the “most active and, at this point, perhaps the most aggressive branch of al Qaeda.” Moreover, there are serious concerns that AQAP could gain a stronger foothold should Yemen fall into further chaos.

To some extent, though, the unrest in the country and across the Arab world has done its part to present Yemen in a wider prism.  For one, it has served to highlight for the American public the role that lingering political and economic grievances in the country have played in creating the deteriorating security situation – making the need for reform more paramount.  It has also shown that the Arab public cares about human rights, as the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies pointed out in its third annual survey on the state of human rights in the Arab World in 2010.

Now the United States must capitalize on that momentum and rally Yemeni reformers to ensure that a post-Saleh Yemen does not become equivalent to AQAP Central.  Some have already advanced reform plans, such as 10-step reform plan proposed by a group of Yemeni technocrats; the plan addresses challenges like government employment, oil, and land issues, and has received favorable Western response.  But since a viable alternative to Saleh has yet to emerge, buy-in from a wide range of actors will be necessary in order to implement any long-term reforms.  Therefore it will be crucial to get the fragmented opposition to continue to engage with each other about how to best achieve these ends.  So too, such steps will be critical in terms of making reform seem possible, especially among an opposition that is used to President Saleh failing to fulfill his promises.

At the same time, garnering the constructive involvement from the international community, particularly regional groups like the Gulf Cooperation Council, will also be important.  Although the GCC is reluctant to let Yemen accede to full membership, the upheaval in the region has now made Yemen’s predicament impossible to ignore, given the impact that its destabilization could have on its neighbors and major shipping lanes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.  The GCC could play an important part by serving as a useful mechanism through which to mediate a peaceful political transition and provide support for Yemen going forward.

As the protests continue in the midst of the Arab Spring, many are warning that there is only a limited amount of time to take advantage of the “unprecedented opportunity” reformers have in order to prepare for life after Saleh.  Mitigating the risk that comes with that fall – and painting a new picture of Yemen devoid of the apocalyptic images associated with it now – starts with a workable strategy for promoting reform that draws on Yemenis and the international community alike.  The clock is ticking.  Fast.

Related posts:

1. No-Fly Zone Over Libya: A Case for Multilateralism
2. An “Iron Hand” is No Substitute for Democracy
3. A Time to Lead

At the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 28, just as the world’s attention was becoming riveted to the pro-democracy protests taking place in Egypt, a pro-democracy leader from another repressive regime, Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi, sent an audio message to the Forum’s influential and powerful participants. In the course of her message, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate called upon the global community to begin investing in her country with developments in technology, infrastructure and microlending services. While Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi cautioned that, “we also need to pay close attention to the costs and collateral damage of our development, whether environmental or social,” she asserted that responsible investment was necessary to bring 55 million Burmese people into the 21^st century.

Unfortunately, Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi’s message comes at a time when global attention has been fixated on the turmoil in the Middle East, leaving little airtime for vital discussions of reform in other oppressive regimes. Indeed, the only government who seems to have paid serious attention to her Davos remarks has been the Burmese military junta itself. After Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi’s message on increased development in Burma ignited a debate as to whether this was a call for the West to lift economic sanctions which inhibit Western investment, her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), issued a statement two weeks ago re-iterating its support of “targeted sanctions.” In response, the mouthpiece of the military, the government newspaper The New Light of Myanmar, warned that Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD could meet “tragic ends” for publicly supporting sanctions. Instead of discussing new alternatives for Western companies to invest in the Burmese people, the conversation has been diverted right back to where the junta wants it – old arguments over sanctions.

Meanwhile, as the West dithers and the NLD clings to old ideas, Myanmar’s closest neighbors, such as Thailand and China, have stepped into the gap – and have often blatantly disregarded Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi’s plea for respecting the environment and workers’ rights.

For instance, the new Dawei Development Project, spearheaded by Italian-Thai, one of Bangkok’s largest conglomerates and run by one of its most respected families, aims to create an industrial zone in southern Myanmar that would employ millions of Burmese. Yet, the Dawei project has the potential not only to decimate an otherwise pristine environment along Myanmar’s lengthy Andaman Sea coastline but also to endanger the lives of millions of Burmese workers and area residents. Thailand’s Oxford-educated prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva, was actually quoted in the International Herald Tribune as saying, “Some industries are not suitable to be located in Thailand … That is why [Ital-Thai] set up there [in Dawei]” – effectively implying that Burmese workers’ lives and living conditions are worth far less than their Thai counterparts. The IHT article goes on to detail how Myanmar, unlike Thailand, lacks the kinds of laws that require environmental impact reports and hearings with local residents before moving forward – making it easy for unscrupulous foreign companies to do business with the unscrupulous government.

Thai companies are not the only ones to invest in Myanmar without fear of pesky regulations. In recent years, Chinese companies have swarmed their southern neighbor, looking to harvest its abundant natural resources for use in resource-hungry China. Last October – just before the November elections and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest – I spent two weeks traveling around Burma. Almost every local I talked to, from lowly souvenir seller to middle-class innkeeper and wealthy, Western-educated business people, told me about the encroaching presence of Chinese business. Many believed that their country was being stripped of its resources by Chinese businesses, while the generals profited. For instance, despite having numerous hydroelectric plants, gas reserves and other means of producing electricity, the government sells most of it to neighbors like the Chinese and Thais, while Burmese citizens endure near-constant blackouts. A local businessman in Mandalay I spoke to outlined Chinese business involvement in the country: Chinese corporations buy Burmese raw resources like timber at bargain prices, while still lining generals’ pockets; those raw resources are made into goods in Chinese factories; those goods are then sold back to the Burmese at much higher prices, with the generals and the government profiting a second time around.

What can be done? Despite the iron grip the military junta has on its people, there are reasons to hope. Even though the NLD reiterated its support for sanctions, younger Burmese activists, as well as increasing numbers of Western observers, are beginning to agitate more for the lifting of sanctions. As Mark Mackinnon points out in a recent article in Canada’s Globe and Mail, the West does business with China, despite its authoritarian regime and corrupt practices that are similar to Myanmar’s, much to the benefit of millions of Chinese people, who have been pulled out of poverty due to economic engagement with the West. Myanmar is also an increasingly more open society than, say, North Korea. While most Burmese do not have mobile phones because the SIM card alone costs $1000, almost all of the people I met had Facebook profiles and email accounts.  Through these Internet portals, many people engage with foreign tourists they have met and keep up with international news. Though the generals have been very good at oppressing the people in most other ways, they seem to have underestimated the power of the global web revolution. As generals like 78-year old Than Shwe begin to pass away and the Burmese people engage more with the outside world, there is a chance for a transition to the stable and open democracy that its people have been hoping to see for decades.

Amelia Salyers graduated cum laude from Princeton University with a degree in English literature. Having lived and traveled extensively in Europe and Asia, she has recently returned to the United States after two years spent working at a communications agency based in Bangkok, Thailand.

Related posts:

1. The Dragon Comes to Africa
2. The Democracy Protests in Shades of Saffron
3. Brian J. Davis: SYRIA – What do we do now?

Recently, Obama Administration officials, including Secretary Hillary Clinton, Ambassador Susan Rice, and even President Barack Obama himself, have spoken in support of ratifying the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).  The treaty also enjoys support from former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.  Naturally renewed talk of CEDAW, combined with a Senate hearing held on the treaty in November 2010, has activist groups gearing up for an epic inside-the-beltway battle should President Obama transmit the treaty to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) for its advice and consent.

While I understand arguments against CEDAW, especially those concerning the unenforceable nature of human rights treaties, I find them unconvincing considering the promise CEDAW holds as a tool of diplomacy on a very sensitive and complicated issue.  Treaties do not always need an enforcement mechanism to be useful.  Human rights treaties can function as a means of establishing agreed upon norms and values that serve as a framework for dialogue to address worldwide problems.  In this capacity, CEDAW has the potential to provide the United States with another tool to engage internationally and serve as a model on the rights of women.  Even better, it can do so at little or no cost to U.S. sovereignty.

Once the U.S. ratifies CEDAW, U.S. citizens will be eligible to sit on the 23 person CEDAW Committee, which is charged with monitoring efforts to implement CEDAW worldwide. Leadership on this committee would provide an opportunity for the U.S. to share its expertise and best practices.  While not enforceable, the recommendations of the Committee can be used as guidance by countries as they implement laws that protect women’s rights.  Also, as certain countries undergoing post-conflict transitions review their laws, they can use CEDAW’s standards as a model to establish regulations preventing discrimination against women.

CEDAW also provides NGOs and civil society with a platform for lobbying their own governments worldwide, something the United States should further support and enable.  Women living in countries where their basic rights are systematically ignored often do not even know that their rights are being violated.  Some accept the abuse as a part of daily life.  In countries where subjugation of women is the norm, NGOs can use the CEDAW definition of discrimination to hold trainings to educate women about their rights.  In addition, since States parties must report to the CEDAW Committee at least every 4 years on the progress of implementation, NGOs are able to write shadow CEDAW reports to provide an alternative view to the  Committee.  This practice creates an important conversation between the Committee, the States party, and the NGO community in certain countries.  It also helps nurture a more robust civil society that is devoted to and concerned with women’s issues.

One central argument against CEDAW is that America would cede sovereignty by ratifying the treaty.  Such an argument fails to take into account that the CEDAW Committee lacks an enforcement mechanism for non-compliance by States parties.  Furthermore, reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) proposed by President Bill Clinton in 1994, as well as the SFRC in 2002, include a non-self executing declaration, an understanding  proposed by former Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) that excludes abortion from the definition of family planning, and a reservation rejecting the obligation to regulate private conduct, except as required by the U.S. Constitution.  These RUDs provide additional assurances that CEDAW will not infringe on United States sovereignty or override laws made by Congress.  With these RUDs, the SFRC reported CEDAW favorably with bipartisan support in 1994 and 2002, but the full Senate has not considered the treaty.

Other opponents of CEDAW argue that it is an ineffective way of preventing discrimination against women, as evidenced by some of the States parties that continue to have poor women’s rights records.  They point to Saudi Arabia and North Korea, both of which have women’s rights records incompatible with CEDAW’s aims, as examples.  However, as noted previously, the role of CEDAW is to create a framework for dialogue and to draw attention to women’s rights issues.  The treaty cannot change entrenched discrimination against women overnight.

Seven countries in total have not ratified CEDAW, including Iran, Somalia, and Sudan—nations that are hardly good company to keep when it comes to women’s rights.  Even if CEDAW did have an enforcement mechanism, the United States would have little to fear by ratifying CEDAW, as its domestic laws already fulfill most of the requirements under the treaty.  Many would argue, myself included, that total equality for women in the U.S. is still a work in progress, but our standards are high and our legal framework strives to protect the rights of both men and women.  The same cannot be said for the laws of certain other countries in the world.

The Obama Administration deserves credit for making the participation of women in politics, the economy, and education a priority worldwide, but if the U.S. ratified CEDAW it would gain still more credibility with the 186 other countries in the world that have already supported the treaty.   The United States can serve as a more formal example by ratifying CEDAW, because it can then point to officially agreed upon standards – standards that even the most powerful country in the world agrees to follow – when addressing the woefully inadequate treatment of women and girls around the world.  Missing another opportunity to ratify this important treaty would be a mistake.

Related posts:

1. There’s a Better Way to Gauge Congress
2. An “Iron Hand” is No Substitute for Democracy
3. A Time to Lead

Traveling in the Middle East over the past week has been extraordinary, to say the least. In a region where change is measured in incremental adjustments over decades, the days of rage and anger should not be interpreted as anything but transformational.

Observers have been tracking the angst of this new generation for about a decade.  The question was always where and when the teapot would sing.  Without any other release mechanism, overflowing anxiety simply funneled to the streets.

Although the activism in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen reflect the distinctiveness of those particular countries, some significant common denominators thread through the region.  First, the demonstrations reflect a chronic angst stemming from the challenges of living in authoritarian states beset by stagnation and corruption; political, economic, and even social, cultural and religious repression, to a noticeable degree.  The call to action came not from political leaders but from frustration cutting through the younger set.

Second, by and large, the new legions of activists hitting the streets come from a generation that has some degree of education and an understanding of the opportunities denied to them. Even in the abysmally poor Yemen, the youth regularly watch international satellite TV and access independent information through the Internet to an extent. Every demonstrator that I spoke to pointed to the prospects and better quality of life available in the neighbouring oil-rich Gulf countries and the West.

Except for Iraq, Arab dynasties have either co-opted or crushed opposition efforts.  Traditional opposition parties proffer idealistic, religious or other dynastic alternatives, until now.  The street activists talk not of replacing one authoritarian ruler with another. They speak clearly about the need for institutional reform – ability to participate and benefit from a popular decision making process.  This desire will not ultimately be satisfied by elections and posturing.
Egyptian, Yemeni, Syrian, and Tunisian activists that I spoke to yesterday all spoke in an eerily common language.  They do not want to be “sheep.”

Taking notice, except for a few Gulf countries, governments throughout the Middle East-North Africa region have announced significant reforms. Even the notoriously inflexible Syrian and Libyan regimes quickly reversed course, recognizing the powerful populist forces at work despite their countries not experiencing the same degree of protests.

The short-term consequences will not yet be fully apparent for weeks if not months to come.  Yes, street demonstrations across the region may not immediately bring down another entrenched regime, other than that of Tunisia – the tipping point is not yet breached.  However, there is no doubt that the people have found their voice.  Western diplomats fear upheavel and instability.  Reportedly, the chatter at the World Economic Forum in Davos fears market swings and threat of extremists assuming power.  This short-sited analysis ignores the long-term benefits of prosperity and stability that comes with more open systems of rule that govern for the people.

Related posts:

1. Yemen: Widening the Scope
2. Reason for hope in Egypt
3. Brian J. Davis: SYRIA – What do we do now?

Walking in to a meeting of Middle East civil society activists in London last week, I expected the usual somber, intellectual examination of how the increase in recent political upheavals was negatively affecting respect for human rights and civil liberties. Renewed violence in Iraq; another delay in installing winners of the faulty elections in Afghanistan; Egyptians lighting themselves on fire; Hezbollah bringing down the Lebanese government; a reconstituted Israeli government reflecting the disintegration of the peace movement; more violence in Gaza; and the overthrow of the chronic Ben Ali regime in Tunisia.

Instead of the usual angst and anguish, these usually serious scholars exhibited a child-like, back-slapping giddiness. The primary instigator was no less than the Brother Leader and “Guide of the First of September Great Revolution of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.”

In a televised address this week, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi railed against the online world of Facebook, YouTube, and the blogosphere – citing the internet as helping to bring down Ben Ali’s two decade rule in Tunisia, saying that he thought the dictator would continue to run Tunisia “for life.”

The Libyan ruler termed cyber-activism as “lies” fabricated by drunks and drug-addicts – the Internet was a tool created by “them” – to ridicule “us.” We spent the evening drinking coffee and making jokes about the outrageous comments. A rough translation of one rather amusing section of the speech:

Even you, my Tunisian brothers. You may be reading this Kleenex and empty talk on the Internet. This Internet, which any demented person, any drunk can get drunk and write in, do you believe it? The Internet is like a vacuum cleaner, it can suck anything. Any useless person; any liar; any drunkard; anyone under the influence; anyone high on drugs; can talk on the Internet, and you read what he writes and you believe it. This is talk which is for free. Shall we become the victims of “Facebook” and “Kleenex”* and “YouTube”! Shall we become victims to tools they created so that they can laugh at our moods?

It took a Syrian activist to explain that the mention of “Kleenex” refers to “Wikileaks.” A Pakistani added a more holy perspective telling the group how he gave thanks to God for bringing Mark Zuckerman, Chad Hurley, Steve Chen, and Jawed Karim. Adding to the conversation, I cited the Social Network movie mentioning that if we prayed for Zuckerman we should also give thanks to Facebook’s co-conspirators Eduardo Saverin, Dustin Moskovitz and Chris Hughes.

The night ended on a less but still upbeat note. The consensus was that events in Tunisia may not be the start of other populist movements bringing down less than democratic rulers but it does put dictators on notice. In this day of cyberactivism, the people’s rights are ignored at the peril of dictators. Ironically, the Brother Leader in Tripoli’s direct response to cyberactivism will probably make him a more attractive target for bloggers and their online ilk.

Related posts:

1. Graeme Bannerman: Libya, A Costly Victory
2. No-Fly Zone Over Libya: A Case for Multilateralism
3. Brian J. Davis: SYRIA – What do we do now?