Just a few years ago, conventional wisdom held that Google would be the vanguard of Internet freedom in China, transforming the way information flows throughout the historically closed society. But while the rapid expansion of the Internet in China has indeed served as a vital medium for political activism, Beijing has essentially kept pace with its extensive surveillance network to silence “cyber dissidents” and with its use of the Web as a pro-government propaganda machine to steer public opinion. At first glance, it appears that China’s censorship practices warrant a strong U.S. policy and a thorough condemnation from the Obama administration. But as Emily Parker, the Arthur Ross Fellow at the Asia Society, explains, U.S. technological innovation – not U.S. policy – is likely the most capable, effective, and politically sensible tool for chipping away at China’s Great Firewall.

Since Google’s departure, the Chinese government has taken action to tighten its grip on the Internet. Earlier this month, China quietly acknowledged the creation of a new “Internet news coordination bureau,” officially responsible for “guidance, coordination and other work related to the construction and management of Web culture.” And just this week, China’s legislature proposed an amendment to the Law on Guarding State Secrets that would require telecommunications companies to “detect, report and delete” leaks of “state secrets,” broadly defined by the government as “information concerning national security and interests that, if released, would harm the country’s security and interests.” These measures are just the latest pieces fastened to a massive regulatory system, much to the chagrin of the international human rights community and many of China’s 400 million Internet users. (more…)

By almost any standard, the outcome of the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen last week fell well short of its increasingly humble expectations. Copenhagen was considered pivotal because the “Bali Roadmap” laid out in 2007 circled this meeting on the calendar as the conclusion of the negotiating period which was to create a legally-binding post-Kyoto agreement. But by the beginning of the conference, the goal had been reduced to just establishing a politically-binding framework that would set the world on a course toward reaching a comprehensive international agreement in 2010.

Modest yet politically significant emissions reduction pledges by the US, China, and others prior to the conference contributed to a mood of cautious optimism at the outset of the two-week summit. But on just the second day, the massive rift between developed and developing countries was exposed with the leak of the so-called “Danish text” – drawn up by delegates from Denmark, Australia, the UK, and the US – which would allegedly place most of the power in the hands of developed countries at the expense of developing countries. The text was dismissed by the executive secretary of the UNFCCC, Yvo de Boer, as just an “informal” draft. But China quickly fired back with its own draft text, flipping the blame and the burden onto wealthy countries. A day later, delegates from the US and China traded barbs as the US State Department Envoy Todd Stern told reporters that “there’s no way to solve this problem by giving the major developing countries a pass,” to which Chinese Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei responded that Stern either “lacks common sense” or is “extremely irresponsible”.

The controversy stirred up in the first few days served as a precursor for the deep division between rich and poor countries that would plague the remainder of the negotiations. The next week was remarkably unproductive. Countless controversial draft texts fluttered around the Bella Center amid a walkout by African countries and thousands of angry rioters – impatient with the lack of progress – taking to the streets. With the looming arrival of over a hundred heads of state, the symbolic dichotomy of rich vs. poor countries had grown ever clearer and was threatening to derail the negotiations. (more…)

Two recent blog posts by John Pomfret over at the Washington Post got me thinking about how much more complicated China’s position on North Korea has become since the beginning of the Obama Administration.

As Pomfret points out in his May 27 post, for many years the U.S. has been waiting for China to solve the North Korea problem without realizing that our goals are not aligned.

First, there’s a silly assumption in Washington that our interests (no nukes in North Korea) are the same as China’s. But they’re not. China’s first interest in North Korea is making sure the Kim regime doesn’t collapse. China’s second interest? Making sure the Kim regime doesn’t collapse. From Beijing’s perspective, nukes in North Korea rank somewhere around 10th.

Pomfret goes on to give a great explanation about why regime change is the real threat to China.  At the end of the day, as long as the DPRK could be coaxed to the negotiating table, China was satisfied that it was not falling apart.

Then, a few days later, in a June 6 post, we get the following from Pomfret:

There are surprising noises coming from China these days about North Korea. One influential Chinese academic thinks China’s policy — long supportive of the hermit kingdom — might be changing.

So, what happened in less than a week?  Has China finally realized that no nukes is their number one priority?  Not exactly.  Turns out China, as evidenced by the Zhu Feng article that Pomfret is referring to,  may be realizing that the regime in Pyongyang is not interested in negotiations and doesn’t care what Beijing thinks.

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The big news at the end of last week for those who follow China or have an interest in bipartisanship was the appointment of Governor Jon Huntsman (R-UT) to be ambassador to China.  I’ll explore here both the political angle on Huntsman’s appointment and also propose one idea on the approach that Huntsman might consider as Ambassador to China.

Many people are still trying to figure this appointment out.  Just a bit over a week ago, Chris Cillizza of the Washingtonpost.com was pointing to Huntsman as one one to watch for 2012.  Barack Obama’s campaign manager said that Huntsman made him a “wee bit queasy”.  What’s more, Huntsman recently returned from a trip to Michigan, an important Republican primary state.  So, amidst all of this speculation about Huntsman’s 2012 plans, Obama named Huntsman, John McCain’s campaign co-chair, to be his next Ambassador to China.  How’s that for an unexpected pick?

However, upon further consideration, it makes a lot of sense when looking at Huntsman’s background.  Huntsman has been a moderate Republican who has regularly pushed the party to expand its tent.  He has been a champion of bipartisanship in Utah, which also meshes well with Obama’s approach to governance.  He is fluent in Mandarin Chinese, served as Ambassador to Singapore, and did missionary work in Taiwan.  Anyone looking for a strong candidate (Democrat or Republican) would want to consider someone like Huntsman for such an important relationship.  China isn’t a job for a wealthy or well connected donor.  It’s going to be one of the most important relationships for the US in the decades to come. (more…)

The latest trend in media coverage of the Obama Administration seems to be to ask variations on the question, “Is he doing too much?” Most of these stories focus on the ambitious domestic agenda, but the scope of the suggested foreign policy overhaul, particularly when it comes to rethinking bilateral relationships, is no less dizzying.

Less than two months into the Administration, President Obama and Secretary Clinton have telegraphed their intention to change the landscape surrounding some of our most troubled relationships.  Clinton went to China on her first trip and emphasized cooperation over conflict.  Just a couple of weeks later, she sat down with her Russian counterpart and pledged to “reset” the relationship, despite handing FM Lavrov a red button that read “overload” in Russian.  While in Israel, Clinton dispatched two envoys to talk to Syria.  Same trip — invitation extended to Iran to sit down in the same room with Clinton and discuss Afghanistan.  Now, throw in the Congressional changes to the Cuba travel policy that Obama has supported.

For those scoring at home, that’s one member of the Axis of Evil, two A of E wannabes and our two biggest headaches on the Security Council.  I’ve personally blogged about the need to reach out to Iran, Syria and Cuba, and PSA recently put out a statement about renewing the U.S.-Russia relationship.  So I would humbly suggest to the media that the question is not whether Obama is doing too much, it is whether any of the other countries will respond as he hopes they will.

There is a question of moral hazard here.  When presented with an open hand, will these countries see any consequences in responding with a clenched fist?  After Bush’s belligerence, will they view Obama’s openness as a free pass to do as they wish?  They may view the transition to Obama in the U.S. as insulation from any real risk regardless of their actions.

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The Bush administration’s unilateralism and incompetence, typified by its reckless invasion of Iraq, have damaged perceptions of the United States in much of the world. By many accounts, China has taken advantage of this lapse in U.S. leadership by bolstering its own influence across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. But a new study of perceptions in Asia suggests that favorable opinions of the U.S. will outlast the Bush years and that China still has a long way to go before it can match America’s soft power. This offers grounds for optimism that forecasts of America’s global decline are premature and that a new U.S. president with a more multilateral foreign policy will find many overseas partners who seek and support his leadership.

The new study is a survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the East Asia Institute of more than 6,000 people in China, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and the United States. The survey, conducted before this year’s unrest in Tibet and the devastating Sichuan earthquake, asked ordinary citizens questions about how they view each country’s culture, economy, politics, and influence. The findings are striking: majorities in every country except Indonesia see U.S. influence in Asia as positive, and Asians have more positive perceptions of America’s diplomatic, political, and human capital power than they do of China’s. Even Chinese views of America’s soft power are quite favorable: 44% of Chinese would pick the U.S. as their first choice for their children’s higher education. What’s more, pluralities or majorities in most countries state that U.S. influence in Asia has increased over the last 10 years. All of this suggests that, despite the many failings of the Bush administration’s foreign policy, the underpinnings of America’s standing in Asia remain strong.

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According to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in an article in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs, China’s reluctant and belated concession to allow a skeleton UN-AU peacekeeping force in Sudan represents a newly “cooperative approach on a range of problems.” But the reality is that some newfound sense of Chinese responsibility on the world stage had nothing to do with Beijing’s decision to “cooperate.” The concession on Darfur (if you want to call it that) was entirely about the Beijing Olympics. Given that it took a threatened boycott by Western leaders for China to stop arms sales to Sudan and drop its veto of the peacekeeping resolution, I am dubious that we’ll see any further “responsible” behavior after the Olympic Games have come and gone. At this point, the Games are going ahead—with or without protesting Western leaders—and the leverage a coordinated boycott might have provided will be a mere memory.

But I’m not writing this to bemoan a missed opportunity or cast aspersions on Rice’s diplomatic optimism. I’m writing this to call some attention to the next opportunity down the road: Sochi 2014.

China and Russia are both rising powers, economically, militarily and diplomatically. Secretary Rice referred to both as carrying “special responsibility and weight as fellow permanent members of the UN Security Council.” Translation: they both have lots of nuclear weapons, so our military power doesn’t really scare them. China is also not the only rising power we’d love to see adopt a more cooperative stance as it claims (or reclaims) “full membership in the international community.”

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There’s been a lot of talk about whether the U.S. President should boycott the Olympics because of Chinese human rights concerns. The irony is that in the eyes of much of the world, it may not mean very much if we took such a bold action. Studies indicate that the U.S. under George W. Bush has a less favorable image than China. And it’s hard to imagine that many people could take Bush seriously when he talks about human rights in China, after he has condoned waterboarding practices that clearly violate international human rights protocols.

Even in an ideal world, I’m not sure that a boycott is the most effective way to influence China’s deeply concerning human rights record. After all, Nixon’s trip to China was arguably the most impactful U.S. act in shaping China’s future and Nixon went there more in friendship than in protest. At the same time, he delivered a clear message. Similarly, I tend to think America should fully participate in the Olympics while wearing a clear symbol of our support of human rights and making clear our hope that China will change its ways.

What’s sad, though, is that our country, which for so long has been an image of freedom despite all our shortcomings and our continued inequities, is now seen so negatively worldwide that it is not clear even if we tried to make a statement anyone would take us seriously. It is yet another sign of one of the great casualties of the Bush years: America’s image in the world.

 The world has been watching closely the recent demonstrations in Burma and the crackdown by the junta there.  What I’ve found encouraging is the fact that both those on the left and the right seem to be in broad agreement that more must be done to rein in the generals who have maintained their grip on power there for many years.  President Bush used his speech last week at the UN to announce new sanctions against those Burmese leaders responsible for the crackdown.  The UN has sent a special envoy, Ibrahim Gambari to Burma to seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis.  So far, however, the military junta seems to be holding out. 

The conservative National Review published a commentary condemning the Burmese government and urging stronger action.  At the same time, the Democratic presidential candidates are united in calling for stronger action to be taken against the ruling junta.  Here is Biden’s statement.  Here is Obama.  Here is Senator Clinton.  It’s not hard to see why everyone is condemning the actions of the military junta and calling for strong action against them.  It’s hard to be against a group of monks that are peacefully protesting a violent and oppressive regime.  So, if Democrats and Republicans are united in calling for more pressure on the ruling junta, why aren’t we doing more?  Well, the truth of the matter is that the U.S. actually has very little direct leverage with Burma.  The economic ties are minimal.  The pressure points with Burma are its Asean neighbors and major powers such as China, India, Japan, and Russia, as outlined by Michael Schiffer in a recent op-ed in the Des Moines Register. 

China it turns out is the major arms supplier to Burma. Once again, we find ourselves in a situation similar to that of Darfur.  Although the U.S. claims to be putting diplomatic pressure on the Chinese, China is using the justification of noninterference in another country’s internal affairs.  As I wrote in my last post, the U.S. and its allies must step up the pressure on China to play a constructive, positive role in world affairs.  We must make it clear to the Chinese that inaction against a tyrannical regime will be considered the same as support of that regime’s actions.  Nonintereference in domestic affairs will no longer be an acceptable excuse in situations such as Burma.  I’m not proposing military action  against Burma, but I am talking about making the Burmese pay an economic price for their oppressive policies.  There’s no guarantee that it will work and it could very well fail.  But, economic pressure from China would certainly be more likely to succeed that the limited measures the U.S. now has at its disposal.  (more…)

PSA Advisory Board member Sandy Berger and Eric Schwartz had a compelling op-ed recently in the Boston Globe on September 5th that I believe deserves more attention.  Berger and Schwartz argue that due to America’s foreign policy attention being focused primarily on Iraq, other competing powers are gaining the upper hand in important regions around the world.  In some developing countries America is losing influence as Russia and China pick up the slack with new infrastructure development projects and other types of support.  In national security terms the short term loss of influence in countries such as East Timor may not be the most pressing item on the US foreign policy agenda.  However, we must not forget that once upon a time Afghanistan also ceased to be a priority as Soviet troops departed, only to resurge as an Al Qaeda stronghold.  Seemingly insignificant backwater countries can have tremendous impact on the US at the hands of a few determined extremists. 

What is concerning is that in the Bush administration’s proposed 2008 budget the USAID foreign assistance component has been slashed by 31%.  Granted, some of this money has been funneled into the State Department’s economic assistance fund.  Nevertheless, this is no time to be pulling back on our engagement in the developing world. 

Berger and Schwartz raise the issue of China gaining ground in the developing world as it exercises its newfound wealth and global influence.  Although framing this relationship in adversarial terms can make sense, we may also want to consider how China might be brought into the global community as a responsible citizen.  I see this as one of our major foreign policy challenges. 

The jury is still out in terms of what type of foreign policy China intends.  My belief is that China’s foreign policy will be governed primarily by its interest in expanding both the markets for its products and for raw materials and energy.  Instability and conflict are bad for business, which leads me to conclude that although its foreign policy is focused primarily on its economic interests, it is not in the business of empire building.  Certainly this is the story that the Chinese are spinning for Western audiences so as to reduce their anxiety about China’s emergence.  Although a healthy dose of skepticism is always warranted, I tend to believe that narrative. 

See this explanation of China’s foreign policy on its US embassy web site: 

Maintaining world peace. China does not participate in the arms race, nor does it seek military expansion. China resolutely opposes hegemonism, power politics, aggression and expansion in whatever form, as well as encroachments perpetrated by one country on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another, or interference in the internal affairs of another nation under the pretext of ethnic, religious or human rights issues.

Clearly for China sovereignty and economic self interest supersede “pretext” concerns such as human rights. (more…)