This article was written by two Fall 2011 Fellows in PSA’s Congressional Fellowship Program.  All CFP articles are produced by bipartisan groups of Democrat and Republican Fellows who were challenged to develop opinion pieces that reach consensus on critical national security and foreign affairs issues.

The Dragon Comes to Africa

Africa’s development has been a focus of goodwill for the American people for decades, and a central topic of geostrategic importance for policy makers. China is working to develop Africa too—but how they aid and invest in the continent is different. This is leaving Africans with a choice about how to develop and where they end up. The countries of sub-Saharan Africa are learning quickly that even free money can come with negative effects.

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PSA Advisory Board Member and former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinksi, write about what a decline in American power could mean for the rest of the world – particularly China. The fall of the American hegemon could mean a slide into global chaos as quickly developing countries compete for global economic and strategic power. This article originally appeared in Foreign Policy and can be found here.

After America

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America’s decline and China’s rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: “But, please, let America not decline too quickly.” Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader’s expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America’s demise.

For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor — not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes.

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Since the conclusion of last year’s UN climate change conference in Copenhagen, doubt surrounding the efficacy of the multilateral negotiating process had been steadily gaining momentum, and the criticism was set to explode in the event of failure in Cancun. Last December, after two years of unrealistically ambitious expectations, the Copenhagen Accord was cobbled together in the eleventh hour by President Obama and a handful of other heads of state, putting an end to a disappointing two weeks of controversy, chaos, and finger-pointing. The New York Times’ Andrew Revkin described watching events play out in Copenhagen to be “like witnessing the derailment of a slow freight train on a curve that could be seen to be too sharp well ahead of time.” By all accounts, the mood at this year’s conference at Cancun’s Moon Palace resort was much more cooperative, and the resulting set of decisions, the Cancun Agreements, is being lauded as a sensible and balanced compromise, albeit an imperfect one. Nevertheless, support for a move away from the UN process in favor of a bottom-up approach based on national policies and bilateral engagement will surely continue, and deservedly so. The Cancun Agreements can serve as the blueprint for an eventual legally-binding successor to the Kyoto Protocol. But there is still much progress to be made – and a wide gap to be bridged between stated commitments and scientifically-recommended action – that will require simultaneous action on several diplomatic tracks.

Even if the Cancun conference had not produced such an unexpectedly favorable result, the UN process deserves to be preserved. The all-inclusive forum is likely the best means of addressing certain issues affecting many of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable countries, particularly adaptation, clean energy technology transfer, and deforestation. Furthermore, the perception that success hinges on the adoption of a legally-binding treaty is false. It is important not to downplay the ability of “soft law” political agreements to produce tangible results. Besides, without the political will in the U.S. Senate, any internationally-binding treaty would be irrelevant, and the woes of New START should shed any lingering hope that a climate change treaty stands a chance of Senate ratification in the foreseeable future. And even in the absence of legislation, the U.S. has the capacity, through federal regulation and aggressive state and local initiatives, to come very close to meeting its short-term emissions reduction commitments (17% reduction below 2005 levels by 2020). At that point, it is not unreasonable to envision the emergence of the political will for strong legislative action, especially if successful state or regional efforts present a sound model for a national initiative. (more…)

Praseodymium, Gadolinium, Erbium: you may not have heard of them before, but chances are you’ve used them recently. All three are examples of rare earths, the 17 elements occupying the middle of the Periodic Table.  Rare earth elements- which, in actuality, are as globally ubiquitous as many other metals- are a critical component of both current and future technologies, helping to create products from cell phones to fiber-optic cables to electric cars.

These elemental tongue-twisters, once only the provenance of scientists and technology manufacturers, have become the object of much attention and speculation from policymakers in the past few weeks, courtesy of China. Although the PRC only has 35% of the world’s rare earth reserves, it has cleverly maneuvered its way into controlling 95% of global supply for the elements, thanks to heavy investment in the industry and a willingness to incur massive levels of environmental pollution while mining them. In the past few months, China has strategically wielded its monopoly as a diplomatic weapon, halting shipments to Japan during the two countries’ nasty territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Now reports say that China is using the same strategy against the U.S. in retaliation for the United States Trade Representative (USTR) accepting a petition alleging that China is subsidizing green energy investment in violation of WTO practices.  All in all, it appears that China is beginning to engage in tit-for-tat diplomacy that raises serious questions about its intentions and its ability to behave like the superpower it strives to be. (more…)

There are encouraging signs that mil to mil relations between the Pentagon and the PLA are thawing.  This week, after a freeze in relations that lasted nearly a year, Defense Secretary Robert Gates met with his Chinese counterpart, General Liang Guanglie, at the ASEAN “Plus” Defense Ministerial in Hanoi.  At the meeting, Gates received an invitation to visit Beijing, probably sometime in the first half of next year, although the dates still have to be worked out. Separately, there have been reports of a meeting between Chinese and American officials on maritime security in Honolulu. Though limited, these are welcome developments as the Administration lays the groundwork for President Hu’s visit to Washington next year.

But these steps are unlikely to lead to the kind of comprehensive security relationship that the U.S. wants with China.  Rather, a form of limited engagement and competition is more likely to be the new norm.  The Chinese are still angry over the $6.4 billion arms deal with Taiwan, and they are irritated by U.S. offers to mediate the dispute over the Spratley islands in the South China Sea, which they consider a “core” national interest.  This summer’s joint U.S.-South Korean exercises in the East China Sea, did nothing to ease tensions either.  Many people in the Chinese leadership feel encircled by the U.S.  These moves only reinforce their fears. (more…)

In a 2004 speech, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao summarized the basic tenets of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ doctrine: the growing power and clout of China, he said, “will not come at the cost of any other country, will not stand in the way of any other country, nor pose a threat to any other country.”

If only China’s neighbors still believed him. Earlier this year, China declared the South China Sea, which is partially claimed by Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei, to be part of China’s “core interest” of sovereignty, similar to regions such as Taiwan and Tibet on which China sees no room for negotiation.  China’s statement followed closely on the heels of past aggressive Chinese actions in the disputed waters, which have included seizing Vietnamese fishing boats, ordering foreign oil companies not to work with Vietnam on maritime oil exploration projects, planting a Chinese flag on the ocean floor, and training guns on an Indonesian naval ship. Needless to say, from the perspective of the other five nations that share territorial claims on parts of the Sea, these actions look anything but peaceful.

China’s southern neighbors are right to be worried. The past year  has produced a number of indicators that Chinese regional policy is shifting away from its previous strategy of soft-power projection to a more assertive, hard-line position.   (more…)

Just a few years ago, conventional wisdom held that Google would be the vanguard of Internet freedom in China, transforming the way information flows throughout the historically closed society. But while the rapid expansion of the Internet in China has indeed served as a vital medium for political activism, Beijing has essentially kept pace with its extensive surveillance network to silence “cyber dissidents” and with its use of the Web as a pro-government propaganda machine to steer public opinion. At first glance, it appears that China’s censorship practices warrant a strong U.S. policy and a thorough condemnation from the Obama administration. But as Emily Parker, the Arthur Ross Fellow at the Asia Society, explains, U.S. technological innovation – not U.S. policy – is likely the most capable, effective, and politically sensible tool for chipping away at China’s Great Firewall.

Since Google’s departure, the Chinese government has taken action to tighten its grip on the Internet. Earlier this month, China quietly acknowledged the creation of a new “Internet news coordination bureau,” officially responsible for “guidance, coordination and other work related to the construction and management of Web culture.” And just this week, China’s legislature proposed an amendment to the Law on Guarding State Secrets that would require telecommunications companies to “detect, report and delete” leaks of “state secrets,” broadly defined by the government as “information concerning national security and interests that, if released, would harm the country’s security and interests.” These measures are just the latest pieces fastened to a massive regulatory system, much to the chagrin of the international human rights community and many of China’s 400 million Internet users. (more…)

By almost any standard, the outcome of the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen last week fell well short of its increasingly humble expectations. Copenhagen was considered pivotal because the “Bali Roadmap” laid out in 2007 circled this meeting on the calendar as the conclusion of the negotiating period which was to create a legally-binding post-Kyoto agreement. But by the beginning of the conference, the goal had been reduced to just establishing a politically-binding framework that would set the world on a course toward reaching a comprehensive international agreement in 2010.

Modest yet politically significant emissions reduction pledges by the US, China, and others prior to the conference contributed to a mood of cautious optimism at the outset of the two-week summit. But on just the second day, the massive rift between developed and developing countries was exposed with the leak of the so-called “Danish text” – drawn up by delegates from Denmark, Australia, the UK, and the US – which would allegedly place most of the power in the hands of developed countries at the expense of developing countries. The text was dismissed by the executive secretary of the UNFCCC, Yvo de Boer, as just an “informal” draft. But China quickly fired back with its own draft text, flipping the blame and the burden onto wealthy countries. A day later, delegates from the US and China traded barbs as the US State Department Envoy Todd Stern told reporters that “there’s no way to solve this problem by giving the major developing countries a pass,” to which Chinese Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei responded that Stern either “lacks common sense” or is “extremely irresponsible”.

The controversy stirred up in the first few days served as a precursor for the deep division between rich and poor countries that would plague the remainder of the negotiations. The next week was remarkably unproductive. Countless controversial draft texts fluttered around the Bella Center amid a walkout by African countries and thousands of angry rioters – impatient with the lack of progress – taking to the streets. With the looming arrival of over a hundred heads of state, the symbolic dichotomy of rich vs. poor countries had grown ever clearer and was threatening to derail the negotiations. (more…)

Two recent blog posts by John Pomfret over at the Washington Post got me thinking about how much more complicated China’s position on North Korea has become since the beginning of the Obama Administration.

As Pomfret points out in his May 27 post, for many years the U.S. has been waiting for China to solve the North Korea problem without realizing that our goals are not aligned.

First, there’s a silly assumption in Washington that our interests (no nukes in North Korea) are the same as China’s. But they’re not. China’s first interest in North Korea is making sure the Kim regime doesn’t collapse. China’s second interest? Making sure the Kim regime doesn’t collapse. From Beijing’s perspective, nukes in North Korea rank somewhere around 10th.

Pomfret goes on to give a great explanation about why regime change is the real threat to China.  At the end of the day, as long as the DPRK could be coaxed to the negotiating table, China was satisfied that it was not falling apart.

Then, a few days later, in a June 6 post, we get the following from Pomfret:

There are surprising noises coming from China these days about North Korea. One influential Chinese academic thinks China’s policy — long supportive of the hermit kingdom — might be changing.

So, what happened in less than a week?  Has China finally realized that no nukes is their number one priority?  Not exactly.  Turns out China, as evidenced by the Zhu Feng article that Pomfret is referring to,  may be realizing that the regime in Pyongyang is not interested in negotiations and doesn’t care what Beijing thinks.

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The big news at the end of last week for those who follow China or have an interest in bipartisanship was the appointment of Governor Jon Huntsman (R-UT) to be ambassador to China.  I’ll explore here both the political angle on Huntsman’s appointment and also propose one idea on the approach that Huntsman might consider as Ambassador to China.

Many people are still trying to figure this appointment out.  Just a bit over a week ago, Chris Cillizza of the Washingtonpost.com was pointing to Huntsman as one one to watch for 2012.  Barack Obama’s campaign manager said that Huntsman made him a “wee bit queasy”.  What’s more, Huntsman recently returned from a trip to Michigan, an important Republican primary state.  So, amidst all of this speculation about Huntsman’s 2012 plans, Obama named Huntsman, John McCain’s campaign co-chair, to be his next Ambassador to China.  How’s that for an unexpected pick?

However, upon further consideration, it makes a lot of sense when looking at Huntsman’s background.  Huntsman has been a moderate Republican who has regularly pushed the party to expand its tent.  He has been a champion of bipartisanship in Utah, which also meshes well with Obama’s approach to governance.  He is fluent in Mandarin Chinese, served as Ambassador to Singapore, and did missionary work in Taiwan.  Anyone looking for a strong candidate (Democrat or Republican) would want to consider someone like Huntsman for such an important relationship.  China isn’t a job for a wealthy or well connected donor.  It’s going to be one of the most important relationships for the US in the decades to come. (more…)