This article was written by Sen. Gary Hart and Rep. Lee Hamilton, members of PSA’s Advisory Board, and Matthew Hodes, PSA Executive Director. The article originally appeared in The Huffington Post.

Enlarging the Frame

With the next round of talks between the P5+1 and Iran coming up on May 23rd in Baghdad, we know that the parties have concluded further talks could be useful. But it still appears that the central thrust of the P5+1 (the U.S., U.K., China, Russia, France and Germany) will be limited to immediate concerns over Iran’s nuclear program and not the underlying issues that define Iran’s relationship with the international community. While we must hope that approach bears fruit, we must not lose sight of the wider frame that represents the more strategic approach, and just possibly, offers a higher likelihood of long term success.

We already know what one version of negotiations limited to the nuclear agenda can produce. In 2010, Brazil and Turkey brokered a potential deal with Iran, consistent with Iran’s existing obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that would have dealt with the enrichment issue currently under discussion but the U.S. government rejected that approach, choosing to pursue a stricter sanctions regime in the U.N. Security Council. At the same time, we also have evidence of what broader, more comprehensive negotiations might look like. In 2003, a memo, provided by the then-Swiss Ambassador to Iran, described the outline of a comprehensive U.S.-Iran negotiation process. The U.S. government questioned its legitimacy and took no action. Regardless of its provenance, the memo provided an illustration of the critical interests, the underlying issues, both for the U.S. and for Iran. Any negotiation with the Iranians over their nuclear program will stand a better chance of success if the broader issues that have created tensions since 1979, especially Iran’s role in the Middle East region, can be resolved.

What interests would the U.S. and the West want to promote and protect? Paraphrasing the memo, we would want an Iran that had no nuclear weapons or weapons program, with verification from IAEA without obstruction; we would want Iran to end its support to terror groups, including but not limited to Hamas and Hezbollah; we would want Iran to end its efforts to thwart Arab-Israeli peace and accept the two-state solution concept and; we would want an end to any effort to de-stabilize governments in the region and cooperation in efforts of the international community in Iraq and Afghanistan. Put simply, the U.S. will insist that Iran behave like a responsible neighbor in the region and submit itself to appropriate scrutiny to prove it is behaving in that manner.

What interests would the Iranians want to promote and protect? Iran would want an end to efforts to de-stabilize the current regime and acceptance into the international community of nations; Iran would want a lifting of all sanctions; Iran would want access to peaceful nuclear technology and; Iran would want Western recognition of Iranian security interests in the region. Put simply, Iran will want to normalize its status in the world and feel secure from any threats of regime change.

Thomas Pickering and William Luers, respected former U.S. diplomats, used a similar line of thought. In a recent article they used as a point of reference Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and described the anecdote in which Nixon wrote down what the Chinese would want, what we would want and what we both would want, describing this list as Nixon’s “analytical pillars.” Applying that framework to U.S.-Iran relations, they suggested a set of shared interests that one could easily take from the aims described above. They suggested that both Iran and the United States would want stability in the region, the end of terrorism, the reincorporation of Iran into the international community, and no war. Barry Blechman of the Stimson Center has also weighed in, suggesting a broader agenda that would include the issue of nuclear weapons. Far from being a sign of weakness, our willingness to offer both carrots and sticks would show our confidence. The Iranians would know that there is an alternative to war or capitulation; at the same time we would not remove military options from our list of contingencies should comprehensive negotiations fail.

As we approach the next round of negotiations, we must beware of extreme voices that will want to limit the conversation to an expansion of threats — a structure of confrontation or capitulation. Bellicose words can box us in just as they can box in the Iranians, making a military confrontation more likely. We would be better served by quiet, frank discussions about our respective interests and our potentially shared interests. We should never forget that during the Cold War, we faced an adversary that was equipped and prepared to destroy us and our allies. But while we never let our guard down, we nevertheless looked for opportunities to cooperate. Eventually, we found areas of mutual interest that helped build confidence in our ability to manage that complicated relationship. That policy worked for us during the Cold War; it should work for us with a regional actor today.

This article was written by two Fall 2011 Fellows in PSA’s Congressional Fellowship Program.  All CFP articles are produced by bipartisan groups of Democrat and Republican Fellows who were challenged to develop opinion pieces that reach consensus on critical national security and foreign affairs issues.

KORUS Free Trade Agreement: An Agent of Stability

Almost sixty years ago at the end of the Korean War, the relationship between the United States and South Korea took on a new meaning.  The relationship was built on a cooperative framework between allied forces in order to promote stability on the peninsula through a strengthened commitment to the mutual goals of protecting democratic values, peace and economic security.

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This article was written by two Fall 2011 Fellows in PSA’s Congressional Fellowship Program.  All CFP articles are produced by bipartisan groups of Democrat and Republican Fellows who were challenged to develop opinion pieces that reach consensus on critical national security and foreign affairs issues.

The Dragon Comes to Africa

Africa’s development has been a focus of goodwill for the American people for decades, and a central topic of geostrategic importance for policy makers. China is working to develop Africa too—but how they aid and invest in the continent is different. This is leaving Africans with a choice about how to develop and where they end up. The countries of sub-Saharan Africa are learning quickly that even free money can come with negative effects.

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Stuart Thorson is Donald P. and Margaret Curry Gregg Professor at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. Hyunjin Seo is assistant professor in the William Allen White School of Journalism and Mass Communications at the University of Kansas.

It has now been over a week since the announcement of Kim Jong Il’s death. We learned the news in Seoul and observed shocked but calm South Koreans diligently following events.

The sense of calmness in Seoul reflects that there appears to be an orderly transition of power within North Korea. Of course, no one knows for sure what exactly is going on and what is going to happen in North Korea. That said, we hope, once an appropriate period of mourning is concluded, that steps toward positive engagement in such areas as humanitarian food assistance and nuclear talks that were underway at the time of Kim’s death will continue to move forward.

However, hope is not enough. We must recognize that even in places such as North Korea the future doesn’t simply happen. Rather, the future there as elsewhere is, to a significant degree, the result of a complex interplay of ideas and action. U.S. history provides a clear demonstration that among the most powerful of those ideas are notions of widely available education and open scientific inquiry. One need look only to the actions associated with U.S. support for these ideas in the countries of Western Europe following the Second World War. Or perhaps even more relevantly, consider programs such as the U.S. State Department funded Minnesota Project which developed sustained medical, engineering, and agricultural support to a South Korea suffering from the consequences of the Korean Conflict. Or the Fulbright Program which has served to help in the transformation of higher education throughout much of the world.

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This month, on February 2, 2011, India lost one of its greatest strategic thinkers, K Subrahmanyam.

Known affectionately to many people as “Subbu,” K Subrahmanyam was considered the father of strategic studies in India. Over four decades, he helped to shape Indian foreign and defense policy in critical ways, both inside and outside of government.  He was Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Defense from 1962-65; Secretary of Defense Production from 1979-80; and Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee from 1977-79.  He built India’s first and foremost defense policy think tank, the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA) and served as its director from 1966 to 1975 and again from 1980 to 1989.  He was the principle author of India’s nuclear doctrine and strongly backed the India-U.S. civil nuclear agreement.  After the Kargil war, he headed the Kargil Review Committee, which recommended an overhaul of India’s national security apparatus and led to the creation of several new agencies, including the National Security Advisory Board, which he chaired. After leaving government, Subrahmanyam became a contributing editor to The Economic Times and The Times of India and taught as a visiting professor at Cambridge University.  Whether you agreed with him or not, he was a giant of the Indian national security establishment.  Stephen Cohen of The Brookings Institution and a long time friend of Subrahmanyam said, “Subbu was a guru to me and many others, but he did not insist that I share his views, and his most endearing quality was his love of argument and debate, which irritated some, but which on balance made him a great teacher.”

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Praseodymium, Gadolinium, Erbium: you may not have heard of them before, but chances are you’ve used them recently. All three are examples of rare earths, the 17 elements occupying the middle of the Periodic Table.  Rare earth elements- which, in actuality, are as globally ubiquitous as many other metals- are a critical component of both current and future technologies, helping to create products from cell phones to fiber-optic cables to electric cars.

These elemental tongue-twisters, once only the provenance of scientists and technology manufacturers, have become the object of much attention and speculation from policymakers in the past few weeks, courtesy of China. Although the PRC only has 35% of the world’s rare earth reserves, it has cleverly maneuvered its way into controlling 95% of global supply for the elements, thanks to heavy investment in the industry and a willingness to incur massive levels of environmental pollution while mining them. In the past few months, China has strategically wielded its monopoly as a diplomatic weapon, halting shipments to Japan during the two countries’ nasty territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Now reports say that China is using the same strategy against the U.S. in retaliation for the United States Trade Representative (USTR) accepting a petition alleging that China is subsidizing green energy investment in violation of WTO practices.  All in all, it appears that China is beginning to engage in tit-for-tat diplomacy that raises serious questions about its intentions and its ability to behave like the superpower it strives to be. (more…)

There are encouraging signs that mil to mil relations between the Pentagon and the PLA are thawing.  This week, after a freeze in relations that lasted nearly a year, Defense Secretary Robert Gates met with his Chinese counterpart, General Liang Guanglie, at the ASEAN “Plus” Defense Ministerial in Hanoi.  At the meeting, Gates received an invitation to visit Beijing, probably sometime in the first half of next year, although the dates still have to be worked out. Separately, there have been reports of a meeting between Chinese and American officials on maritime security in Honolulu. Though limited, these are welcome developments as the Administration lays the groundwork for President Hu’s visit to Washington next year.

But these steps are unlikely to lead to the kind of comprehensive security relationship that the U.S. wants with China.  Rather, a form of limited engagement and competition is more likely to be the new norm.  The Chinese are still angry over the $6.4 billion arms deal with Taiwan, and they are irritated by U.S. offers to mediate the dispute over the Spratley islands in the South China Sea, which they consider a “core” national interest.  This summer’s joint U.S.-South Korean exercises in the East China Sea, did nothing to ease tensions either.  Many people in the Chinese leadership feel encircled by the U.S.  These moves only reinforce their fears. (more…)

Providing security for major international summits and sporting events is always a bit of a nightmare for host countries. Perhaps even more difficult is managing to actually convince everyone attending that they’ll be safe from the assorted threats of frenzied protesters, terrorists and other various local menaces.  As India has recently learned the hard way,  it’s much easier to lose the international community’s confidence than to gain it. Collapsing bridges and poisonous snakes hiding in athlete dormitories have turned the Commonwealth games into a national disaster, and not even police efforts of the most unusual sort can redeem the country’s reputation.  Not that it’s stopped anyone from trying. The latest police gambit involves determined (and well-publicized) efforts to protect the unsuspecting public from simian hooligans: the New Delhi Municipal Council has reportedly deployed 38 trained Langur monkeys to keep their recalcitrant relatives in line.

It seems that India’s calamity has inspired future host countries to step up their game.  Next month’s G20 will be held in South Korea, and the country seems to have taken India’s experience to heart. As the Wall Street Journal‘s slideshow clearly demonstrates, the South Koreans are prepared for any and every security situation that might arise, ranging from your run-of-the-mill violent G20 protesters to sword-wielding Ninja assassins. In short, no task is too much for these men. Need to smash through some boards with your head? Check. Need to slice open a watermelon while blindfolded? No problem. If these photos are anything to go by, the G20 promises to be both a stunning security success and an excellent opportunity for low-budget filmmakers to shoot some free martial arts background footage.

Earlier this morning, the National Bureau of Asian Research held a launch event for the newest volume of their Strategic Asia series, “Asia’s Rising Power and America’s Continued Purpose.” One of the most interesting presentations at the event was that of Nicholas Eberstadt, who discussed the changing demographics in the Asia-Pacific region.

Eberstadt’s talk highlighted an important point: when debating the long-term future of the Asian strategic system, American academics and policymakers tend to ignore demographics in favor of factors such as economic growth, political stability, bilateral relationships, territorial disputes and military expenditures. The exceptions to this, of course, are studies on China, India and Japan, countries whose population statistics have received some attention, primarily from economists trying to predict their economic growth. But these studies tend to focus only on the country in question, instead of taking into account how the demographic changes of that country might impact the balance of power of the Asian system.  Looking at the demographics of individual power players does not give a comprehensive picture of the region’s shifting dynamics as a whole. More worthwhile is an expansive look at which countries are growing in population and which are shrinking. (more…)

The Thai name for Bangkok, Krung Thep, roughly translates as “city of angels.” Rarely has this moniker seemed more of a misnomer than the past week, with its climatic battle between the Red Shirt protesters encamped in downtown Bangkok and the Thai government.

Early Wednesday morning, the Thai army made a final push on the protesters’ camp in downtown Bangkok, rolling through barricades in armored vehicles and prompting two prominent protest leaders, Jatuporn Prompan and Nattawut Saikua, to surrender to the Bangkok police on charges of terrorism. At least five people died in the operation, adding to the previous six days’ toll of 38 dead. While Prompan and Saikua asked protesters to surrender, saying “we cannot resist against these savages anymore,” some die-hard elements chose not to, turning instead to rioting, looting and continued street battles in defiance of the government’s 8pm curfew.  One of the more extremist protest leaders, Arisman Pongruengrong, managed to escape government forces. Protesters set fire to around thirty buildings, including the Thai Stock exchange; CentralWorld, one of Bangkok’s biggest and ritziest malls; two banks, a television station, and a movie theater.

While the height of the organized protest is now over, replaced by rioting, the situation is far from resolved. Bangkok is still nowhere close to calm, and guerrilla-style attacks and looting by more militant members of the Red Shirt movement who have so far escaped arrest will likely continue for another few days.

More important, however, are the long-term effects the violence and events of the past month will have on Thailand’s fragile political situation. The activities of both sides of the conflict have entrenched the positions and grievances of each party, and a peaceful and speedy resolution of the country’s difficulties is looking farther away than ever.

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