The Dragon Comes to Africa

Africa’s development has been a focus of goodwill for the American people for decades, and a central topic of geostrategic importance for policy makers. China is working to develop Africa too—but how they aid and invest in the continent is different. This is leaving Africans with a choice about how to develop and where they end up. The countries of sub-Saharan Africa are learning quickly that even free money can come with negative effects.

China, the source of a massive influx of cash into the sub-Saharan continent, is offering sub-Saharan Africa money and technical support, ostensibly with no conditions.  This is the opposite of most Western trade and aid which comes with a number of conditions for transparency, good governance, and encourages sound economic planning.

China is taking a modern version of the mercantilist approach towards its trade, aid, and investment in Africa.  While the easy money may seem attractive to African leaders now, they may yet rue the day they fell under the sway of the Chinese.  Most Chinese loans to African governments and private firms for infrastructure projects are offered under agreements that require Chinese firms to do much of the work involved and in which African natural resources are often used as a source of collateral or payment.  So the Africans not only lose out by forgoing opportunities to  build technical expertise (because the Chinese are importing labor from mainland China), but also by depleting their natural resource stocks and failing to use them locally to modernize their own economies.

Most development economists agree that when a country relies solely on natural resource exploitation, the manufacturing and other industrial sectors of the economy often remain seriously underdeveloped. Digging and shipping natural resources is a low-value added and commodity process. Africa is starting to develop some advanced processing facilities for minerals, but not with much help from the Chinese. And this is the key to understanding the approaches and the risks to Africa right now.

Chinese trade with Africa has increased by 1,124% from 2000 to 2010, when it reached $100.5 billion and China became the largest investor in Africa, beating out even the World Bank.  In 2010, about 63% of African exports to China consisted of crude oil and another 32% was made up of raw materials – mostly metals and wood; 95% of China’s imports from Africa were basic natural resources that China then uses to fuel its own economy, leaving the Africans far below them on the value-chain ladder.

While China’s use of imported labor, natural resource exploitation, and general lack of investment in the domestic African economy are all concerns, perhaps the largest concern is that China provides its financial largesse to governments with unsavory leaders (Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Omar al-Bashir of Sudan come to mind) with no restrictions on how the funds may be used or limitations that prevent those funds from being used to purchase firearms (often from China) or other destructive goods that can be used to subdue their own domestic populations.  China insists it is only upholding the principle of sovereignty, but the international community has consistently worked to forbid such capital transfers to autocratic governments that commit human rights violations.

Even if you look past the financial support of the most despotic regimes, China’s increasing economic dominance of Africa gives quarter to those in pseudo-democracies who need aid or funds for infrastructure projects and prefer the soft terms of the Chinese aid or loans against the more forceful and accountability-producing restrictions that are placed on them by American or other Western aid.  Why deal with the foreign assistance bureaucracy of Uncle Sam when you can get an easy deal with the Chinese?

U.S. restrictions on aid and trade are put there to encourage governments to observe human rights norms, strengthen democracy and governance systems, and provide for the equitable well-being of their people.  When there’s an easy alternative to U.S. funding, U.S. influence in the region is significantly diminished as Americans begin to look like colonial-era missionaries trying to “save” the African people.  Unfortunately, it is the Chinese who, through their mercantilist practices and investments, may be enabling many of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa to go through another generation of endemic poverty by undermining local labor markets, failing to observe labor rights, and exploiting natural resources without building domestic capacity that enables countries to truly prosper from their innate natural wealth.

All is not lost.  The United States, working with its global partners, can continue and expand upon its funding to good governance, transparency, and human rights civil society groups that can use the technical skills they learn to better pressure their own governments.  Secondarily, African states should be encouraged to create better financial due diligence procedures to ensure that the money that’s promised them is going into sustainable endeavors that will benefit the people first and the elites second.  If the United States and other responsible actors do not use their leverage to intervene, we fear the second “scramble for Africa” will leave the continent as destitute as did the first.

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For the vast majority of Americans, watching the last American boot leave Iraqi soil is nothing short of good riddance. The numbers have become seared in Americans minds: Nearly nine years. Nearly a trillion dollars spent. Nearly 35,000 US soldiers wounded. Nearly 4,500 US soldiers dead.

The long-term effect of the Iraq War is pretty obvious—a national sentiment for retrenchment—a streak of isolationism that is being espoused by both sides of the political spectrum. It’s hard not to watch Texas Republican Governor Rick Perry warn against “military adventurism” without comparing him to his predecessor.

But despite the desire to go inward, the simple fact is that if there was any hope for the US to go on the sidelines, that’s changed forever with the onset of the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring has reminded the world of the danger of failed states. With long-time dictators losing power, militant Salafists (not solely Al Qaeda) are looking to fill the vacuum.

But the Arab Spring also comes with a new challenge—a new type of interventionism.

That new interventionism will not look like Afghanistan of 2009-2011—where we put boots on the ground in order to take out a ruling, rogue power. It will also not look like Pakistan—where our intervention will largely rely on airpower (unmanned predator drones in particular) with a small, light on-the-ground footprint to conduct reconnaissance and special operations, but with no motive to change the leadership.

The new interventionism will be a mix of two factors. Like Pakistan, it will be heavy on airpower, light on boots. Like Afghanistan in 2001, the effort will involve removing a rogue power, but with a slight difference. The intervention will not lead the effort to remove a rogue power, but will enable an indigent rebel to do the job.

In other words, it’s the fullback strategy of foreign intervention. The new intervention does not mean playing the halfback, taking the ball to the endzone for the touchdown. It means playing the full-back, creating the hole for the indigenous rebel groups to score the winning touchdown.

In this case, the main objective is very different. The hope is helping enable a victory on the ground that forestalls a long, drawn out war that creates the type of environment where a terrorist group can take hold.

The merits of the new (or fullback) approach to interventionism contrasts, for example, how the Iraq War was executed.  Because the new interventionism does not do the heavy lifting, it doesn’t overrule the will of the people in a given country.

Also, because the interventionism largely relies on airpower, with limited if any boots on the ground, it makes it easier and more likely to develop the type of multilateral coalition that is associated with legitimate and successful interventionist endeavors. And because of the airpower focus and multi-lateralist character of the intervention, the result is greater political legitimacy, a substantially decreased likelihood of casualties, and, therefore, staying power to finish the job.

In short, the new paradigm of successful intervention is not Afghanistan or Pakistan, but Libya. Heavy on firepower, multi-lateralism, and a limited mandate that paves the way for a rebel victory, not a Western one. While the removal of Qaddafi is an enormous immediate benefit, the long-term goal is preventing the drawn-out civil war that would make Libya a terrorist launchpad.

But ignoring the inclination towards isolationism is not only good for the Middle East. Successful, limited intervention also benefits the United States. When the US is involved in liberation that increases US influence in the world. This is not only an upside in the Arab World, but it means improving our soft power in other parts of the world, including areas where we are competing for influence with China.

And it also revives the notion of American humanitarian sway. The greatest casualty of the Iraq War is that it dampened our ability in the eyes of the world. We were distracted from ongoing operations in Afghanistan. We had a slow response to atrocities in Darfur. Now, the fullback humanitarian approach is attached to the heightened likelihood of intervention. That could have a deterrent effect on would be genocidaires and reinvigorates the idea of American power.

It’s not easy to ignore a nine-year war where America lost valuable blood and treasure. But isolationism is the easy approach. Isolationism was the approach after 1919 and the world was in the midst of another world war twenty years later. The goal is not taking the ball and going home. The goal is finding a pragmatic approach that means greater political stability, the return of American influence, and the preservation of innocent life. Just don’t call it leading from behind.

Related posts:

1. A Time to Lead
2. No-Fly Zone Over Libya: A Case for Multilateralism
3. Graeme Bannerman: Libya, A Costly Victory

Last week, as the unrest in the Middle East raged on, Iran and Senegal broke up.  At the heart of the matter was the seizure of a shipment of weapons from Iran allegedly headed to the separatist Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces (MFDC) movement, which has engaged in a low-level insurgency against the Senegalese government for three decades.  Outraged, Senegal ended diplomatic ties with Iran, a move that Iran labeled “illogical.”

Regardless of the logic involved, the split could significantly set back Iranian efforts to push into Africa – efforts which Senegal, a 95 percent Muslim majority country with friendly ties to the United States, had been central to.  In the last several years, Iran, keen to spread its influence into Africa as it faced increased diplomatic pressure from the West, proposed major economic projects in the West African nation, ranging from infrastructure modernization to plans for a car plant that would sell the Iranian Khodro car.  In return, Senegal expressed support for the Iranian nuclear program.

But last fall the Iranian soft power story turned on its head when it morphed into a weapons caper.  In October, Nigerian officials seized 13 containers of weapons – including mortars, ammunition, and rockets – from Iran en route to Gambia, sparking suspicion that MFDC was the intended recipient of the cache.  Initially, Senegal recalled its Ambassador from Tehran despite Iran’s explanation that the arms shipment was bound for Gambia as part of a bilateral agreement (Gambia, which has a strained relationship with neighboring Senegal, broke diplomatic relations with Iran over the incident as well).  Then, on February 23^rd, after evidence showed that Iranian weapons were used by the MFDC to kill Senegalese soldiers, the diplomatic break became official.

For Iran, several political, economic, and security implications may result from this.  Although Senegal is roughly the size of South Dakota, it commands diplomatic influence in Africa.  And, as an August 2010 Congressional Research Service report pointed out, Iranian interest in Senegal also appeared to focus on “Iran’s attempt to foster cohesion with Muslim leaders while countering Arab cultural and political influence in Africa, and the perceived potential for Senegal to serve as a base for Iranian exports to the region.”  The incident has now jeopardized those strategic priorities.  Furthermore, if, as suggested by a new U.S. intelligence report quoted by the Associated Press, Iran is looking to gain a foothold in Africa in order to tap into its large uranium reserves, the fallout from this incident could hinder that aim as well.

On a larger scale, the Iran-Senegal split also raises important questions about the extent of Iran’s overall economic influence.  Even prior to the split, major Iranian-sponsored projects in Senegal had yet to come to fruition.  For example, few of the highly publicized Iranian Khodro cars have been sold.  Moreover, as Afrik-News described, the most important projects have not taken shape:

“In 2006, faced with an unprecedented energy crisis, [President Abdoulaye] Wade called his Iranian friends to the rescue. It was time for the Iranians to prove their worth in times of need. Numerous projects were to be embarked upon: The purchase of crude oil at unprecedented rock-bottom prices; A partnership between the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC) and the Société Africaine de Raffinage (SAR); The construction of a mega oil tank farm. Projects that looked good on paper, but were never to see the light of day.”

As Iran tries to spread its influence in Middle East power vacuums, the challenges it currently faces with in Senegal are instructive with regard to the constraints of the Islamic Republic’s reach.  Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad once proclaimed that there are “no limits to the expansion of [Iran’s] ties with African countries.”  Now it has become clear that limits do exist.  And when they are pushed, serious ramifications may be around the corner.

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3. The Dragon Comes to Africa

The announcement of the final result of the Referendum has marked the end of an era and today is the beginning of a new era in our history.  Today is a glorious day for all the sons and daughters of Southern Sudan.  It is a glorious day for the people of the Republic of the Sudan.  It is a glorious day for Africa and the world.  You have exercised your inalienable right to self-determination freely, fairly and peacefully.  You have expressed your freewill over your future.  By this official result of 98.83%, the whole world has heard your voice loud and clear!

-President Salva Kiir

Very few experience the kind of jubilation the Southern Sudanese felt when the results of the independence referendum were certified by the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC) and President Omar al-Bashir this week. Despite the seemingly insurmountable odds, they went to the ballot box and at 98.83% of the vote walked away from a ruthless dictator with a knack for not only surviving, but thriving off his country’s misfortunes. The impromptu dance party in the capital of Juba said it all. On July 9^th, 2011 Southern Sudan will become the 193^rd country in the world and the 57^th independent country in Africa.

Yet two major events since February 7th demonstrate the precarious high wire the people of Southern Sudan walk. First, there are concerns ethnic and political divisions in Southern Sudan will flair as they get into the nitty gritty of governing – fears that heightened when reports came out today that clashes between south Sudan’s army and a renegade commander killed 105 soldiers and civilians.

Second, with expectations running high in one of the poorest and underdeveloped parts of the world, President Salva Kiir and members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement attended a ceremony yesterday breaking ground for Southern Sudan’s first highway, a 120 mile road that will run from the regional capital of Juba to Nimule – doubling the length of paved roads in the country. The project is bankrolled by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) at $225 million and will link Southern Sudan to Mombasa, the largest port in east Africa. Described by Kiir as a “lifeline of the people,” the prioritization of development by the newly independent government is a promising sign. However, the road is one of many intended steps to decrease dependence on the north and creating stronger economic and political ties with East Africa. With Southern Sudan holding over ¾ of Sudan’s oil wealth, this could be detrimental to constructive relations with the North. So far, the UN Envoy Haile Menkerios is reporting both parties are “engaging seriously and making progress” on key unresolved issues, including citizenship, property ownership, and a framework for non-aggression and military cooperation. Both sides have agreed to resolve by the end of March the status of Abyei, although progress is slow.

As these events begin to shape Southern Sudan’s future, dynamics are changing and the international community has shifted attention. President Obama reassigned former Special Envoy Scott Gration as the Ambassador to Kenya and President Bashir is attempting to improve international standing while balancing increased hardliner pressure in his government. As Southern Sudan becomes less intertwined economically, it is unclear how Northern Sudan will react as a major source of prosperity decreasingly trickles into the country. President Salva Kiir will have to be the best kind of statesman to keep Southern Sudan on the track of stability to promote sustainable development, while allaying any fears that he’ll resort to undemocratic means to do so.

Right now, all eyes are on the events in Egypt – Sudan has not been immune to the changes in the Arab world, as student protests sporadically broke out in Khartoum against President Omar al-Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP). While it is risky to draw too many comparisons, the threshold of tolerance for unwieldy dictators in the region is being lowered. From the U.S. perspective, it has to maintain influence over President Bashir to keep the transition to statehood on track and keep pressure on Darfur while not being seen as an enabler for another dictator. In light of Egypt, concessions made to remove Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list and allegations of efforts to drop the International Criminal Court (ICC) charges against President Bashir are extremely damaging.

No one wants Southern Sudan to fail. Many of the mechanisms put in place to get Southern Sudan from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 to independent statehood could become useful in finding the productive combination of international assistance and homegrown democracy and development in the most difficult of situations. There are still five months to go until independence and many years of institution and infrastructure building to do after that before total vindication. The promise lies in the fact the  Southern Sudanese now have ownership of their country and future for the first time in decades.

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3. A Time to Lead

Kenya captured headlines in December 2007 when the former beacon of stability and growth in East Africa descended into political and social chaos after elections heightened ethnic and tribal divisions. Yet despite over 1,300 deaths, 300,000 displaced, and fears of a second Rwanda, Kenya has pulled back from the brink with the creation of a fragile power-sharing government between the two major rival parties, facilitated by the collaborative efforts of multiple stakeholders locally, nationally, and internationally.

Today, Kenyans return to the polls for the first time since the post-election violence to usher in a new constitution and drastic political and judicial reforms. As Kenya takes a step in a positive direction, its trajectory from violence and complete institutional breakdown to slow but constructive change should be an opportunity for the international community and United States to evaluate the potential and limitations of preventive diplomacy as a concrete foreign policy tool.

International involvement in Kenya did not involve boots on the ground, but focused on rigorous negotiations and external economic and political pressure from international institutions and countries. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania, the African Union, and others were all key in the process, threatening punitive measures and pushing both sides towards compromise.

The effective and calibrated response of the international community following the diplomatic intervention was touted as a successful example of preventive diplomacy, where outside actors addressed both the security and humanitarian concerns. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe at a recent Brookings Institution briefing  stated,

We quickly deployed political officers, electoral, constitutional and security experts that became the main support staff for the mediator [former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan] as he helped the parties forge the agreements to end the crisis. I think few would contest that prompt international mediation in Kenya helped prevent an even larger catastrophe.

Further, international support for Kenya’s already robust civil society was key in the process, and continues to be so today. The international Commission on Inquiry on Post Election Violence, also known as the Waki Commission; the involvement of the International Criminal Court; and President Obama purposefully skipping Kenya on his trip to Africa; are a few examples of how the international community remained engaged in nudging Kenya forward. For the referendum, the United States has taken an active financial role by “supporting the process, not the outcome,” and the threat of ICC investigations has tempered the hate speech that fueled violence in 2008.

Getting involved in the internal politics of other countries can be messy, counterproductive, and costly, as Americans today know well.  Yet developments in Kenya demonstrate that by engaging strategically, early, and with local ownership, there is a way to walk the fine line of effective outside involvement. As we continue to address the threat of failing and failed states, we need to identify and strengthen tactics that work. Replicating Kenya is by no means an exact science: Kenya benefits from a robust civil society, free press, business sector interested in stability, and strategic importance internationally, all of which heavily contributed to the resolution of the conflict, and all of which are more rare in other conflict-prone countries.  Nevertheless, by engaging directly and purposefully early rather than too late, lives are saved, long-term costs are cut, and there is one less failed state threatening international security. The United States and the international community have a strong strategic interest in engaging quickly and early in rigorous preventive diplomacy to keep instability from taking root.

Today, Kenyans will take their own future into their hands to bring about long needed reforms to address their many economic, social, and political ills. They are a long way from the finish line, and there is still much to be done to ensure violence does not reoccur on the level it did in 2008. Two years ago, they got another chance and the safe space needed to move forward. It is in the interest of all to be prepared and ready to offer the right tools for others to have that chance.

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1. 98.83% in Sudan: What’s Next?
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For the past 8 months, Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Mines has been amassing a huge stockpile of diamonds plucked from the Marange diamond field in the eastern part of the country. The stockpile, which now tips the scale at around 4.6 million carats, is the unwanted byproduct of the Kimberley Process, the UN-backed regulatory body that certifies diamonds as conflict-free. Under the auspices of the Kimberley Process, 75 countries have agreed to adhere to strict standards governing the mining and sale of diamonds to ensure that the stones do not fund regional conflicts or contribute to human rights violations. If member countries are unable to meet the standards of the Kimberley Process, they are suspended or barred from selling diamonds under the Process. Zimbabwe fell into that category this past November when the Process suspended the country after investigations confirmed that the Marange mine was the site of grave human rights violations, including the alleged massacre of several hundred illegal miners by the Zimbabwean military.

Zimbabwe’s temporary suspension, however, is now under reconsideration and may soon be lifted. Several weeks ago, over 70 representatives from Kimberley Process member countries met in Israel to consider Zimbabwe’s case. Although the meeting ended without a decision, the Zimbabwean government’s position has enough support to make it conceivable that exports may be approved the next time the representatives meet. The South African businessman sent by the Kimberley Process to inspect Zimbabwean mines recommended that the country be approved, and African countries have largely backed Zimbabwe’s position. The main opposition to approval comes from three Western countries- the US, Canada and Australia- and numerous NGO and advocacy groups.

If the Kimberley Process member countries decide to lift the suspension, they will do so to the detriment of Zimbabwe’s future. On the surface, the Kimberley Process decision rests on whether Zimbabwe can prove that the Marange mining operation does not contribute to conflict or violate human rights in any way.  However, as the US well knows, any decision to allow Zimbabwe to sell vetted stones on the international market will carry repercussions not only for miners in Marange but for the country as a whole. For the past thirty years Zimbabwe has been ruled by President Robert Mugabe, whose unwillingness to relinquish power has seen his country deteriorate to the point where the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy have officially designated it the 4^th worst state in the world. Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party is using the Marange field as a much-needed source of funds in poverty-stricken Zimbabwe, funds that it believes can strengthen ZANU-PF and ensure supporters’ loyalty. By diminishing the massive revenue stream from the Marange mines, the Kimberley Process can help weaken ZANU-PF’s finances, thus both preventing it from exponentially increasing its domination of the unity government and weakening its ability to compete with the political opposition, MDC, when Mugabe dies.

That day is looking closer than ever. At 86, Robert Mugabe is slowly coming to the inevitable end of his long reign over the disintegration of Zimbabwe. Mugabe’s death will almost certainly spark a power struggle for control of the country between his ZANU-PF party and opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC. While both parties nominally share power under the auspices of a 2009 agreement, in reality the unity government is heavily dominated by ZANU-PF. Decades of entrenched power and corruption have proven impossible for MDC to supplant, and Mugabe has repeatedly reneged on promises and plans to meaningfully share power with Tsvarangirai.

Nevertheless, MDC is in a stronger position than ever before. ZANU-PF remains the prevailing force in Zimbabwe’s government, but the creation of the unity government was a significant victory for the MDC, allowing it to squeeze its foot through Mugabe’s door and step into the halls of government. In light of Tsvangirai’s past- tried for treason in 2003; beaten almost to death by state security forces several years later- his ascension to the post of Prime Minister is impressive. Bolstering MDC’s recent advances is the party’s popularity with the Zimbabwean populace: since 2000, MDC has won every national election in Zimbabwe. Yes, Tsvangirai is still harassed, and MDC supporters are still beaten and imprisoned, but there is now a faint glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel. If the MDC can hold on until Mugabe’s death, meaningful political change in Zimbabwe may yet be possible.

The biggest obstacle to this future is the strength and unity of ZANU-PF, which is where the Marange field comes into play. At 60,000 hectares, the Marange field has been described as “the biggest find of alluvial diamonds in the history of mankind” and, more succinctly, “a freak of nature.” Potential revenues from the mine apparently fall between $1 billion and $1.7 billion a year, or “half the crisis-ridden country’s total forecast GDP this year and enough to end its economic woes almost at a stroke.” It is certainly more than enough to pay off key ZANU-PF supporters, notably the armed forces and police, and to ensure a loyal coterie of “haves” willing to throw their weight behind the party in any potential future struggle for control of the country. For ZANU-PF, Marange is a fiscal catalyst for bringing about the return of one-party rule in Zimbabwe and ousting the MDC for good.

ZANU-PF’s behavior over the past several years has proven this to be an accurate assessment. The human rights violations at Marange- the reason Zimbabwe was suspended from the Kimberely process in the first place- came about when ZANU-PF dispatched the military to consolidate its control over the Marange field.  And although the diamond field is technically under the ownership of the UK-based African Consolidated Resources, the ZANU-PF-controlled ministry of mines has chosen to simply ignore the company’s claim. As a result, profits from the Marange field have been finding their way into the pockets of ZANU-PF’s top brass, including those of the Minister of Mines, who was found to have pillaged $18 million worth of diamonds earlier this year. The national treasury, headed by a minister loyal to MDC, hasn’t seen any of the revenues, nor have the people of Zimbabwe.

A decision by the Kimberley Process member countries to lift Zimbabwe’s suspension will thus condone and enable ZANU-PF’s legal pilfering of Marange, simultaneously strengthening Mugabe’s regime whilst undermining MDC’s prospects. As a member of the Kimberley Process, the US must not allow this to happen.

Critics may point out that even if the Kimberley Process does continue to suspend Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF will find ways to sell the diamonds anyways, as it has repeatedly threatened to do. Smuggling of diamonds into neighboring countries is already a quotidian occurrence, and likely to continue. Unfortunately, the Kimberley Process is flawed and thus unable to effectively stop such smuggling. Nevertheless, the price and buyers that Zimbabwe will be able to get for uncertified diamonds will be far below that of the legitimate market, and the resources of the Marange mine are so vast that it is difficult to conceive of a smuggling operation that truly exhausts the field’s resources.

Blocking the legal sale of Marange diamonds is not a one-stop solution to Zimbabwe’s political problems. But it is one way that the US can help undermine the supremacy of ZANU-PF and support gradual political change in one of Africa’s worst states.

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This is my last post for 2009 I thought I would write about Afghanistan but on second thought I will, no doubt, be doing that quite a lot during 2010. Thanks to the Obama Administration’s surge strategy Afghanistan will, from a blogging viewpoint, be the gift that keeps on giving.

So, as we contemplate whether 2010 will be better or worse let’s take a moment to consider 2009. In the spirit of Dave Barry’s classic annual year in review column let’s acknowledge, albeit with some poetic license commentary by moi, a few of the significant events that made, however briefly, the headlines.

Although it started on Dec. 28 2008 the month of January saw massive Israeli air strikes and a ground force invasion of the Gaza Strip. Heavy fighting took place in Gaza City between the Israeli forces and Hamas. At least 1300 Palestinians were killed. On Jan. 17 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced a unilateral ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, declaring that Israel has achieved the goals it set when launching the military operation. On Jan. 21 Israel completes its troop withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

Also that month President Barack Obama signed executive orders closing the US detention camp at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, within a year; closing the CIA’s secret prisons; requiring a review of military trials for terror suspects; and requiring all interrogations to follow the non-coercive methods specified in the Army Field Manual.

Of course, nobody knew back then that the camp would end up in Illinois. One can only hope that the inmates are not too acclimated to the Caribbean climate to adjust to a midwest winter.

On Jan 27 Hama declared that it previously was just kidding and broke the ceasefire by attacking an Israeli frontier patrol. Israel immediately responded that it lacks a sense of humor and renewed its air strikes on the Gaza Strip border with Egypt.

On Feb. 3 Iran launched its first domestically built satellite into orbit. Iran stated that the satellite is meant for research and telecommunications purposes, but Western states express concern that the technology could be used in the development of ballistic missiles. The U.S. intelligence community, estimating that Iran will show the same swift progress with its missiles that it did with its nuclear program, predicted the next flight will be in 2040.

On Feb. 6, renewing their classic rivalry, a British and a French nuclear submarine collided in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Political leaders from both countries sighed in relief that it was merely submarines and not their respective football fans that collided.

On Feb. 17 President Barack Obama authorized the deployment of an additional 17,000 military personnel to Afghanistan. The troops will be deployed to ‘meet urgent security needs’ in southern Afghanistan.  Later in the year President Obama deploys 30,000 more troops to meet “super duper double urgent” security needs in Afghanistan.

On March 15 two US female journalists, together with their Chinese guide, are detained by North Korean soldiers at the China–North Korea border when reporting on North Korean refugees in northeastern China. In June the two women are sentenced to 12 years of hard labor. On 4 August the two are pardoned and released following mediation by former US President Bill Clinton, who stood in for the Rev. Jesse Jackson. Rev. Jackson subsequently mediated between Bill and Hillary Clinton.

On March 19 China and Viet Nam agree to set up a hotline between their foreign ministries, and to focus on negotiations to solve the outstanding maritime issues in order to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea. Britain and France send representatives from their submarine branches to offer their expertise.

On March 24 French Defence Minister Hervé Morin announces that France will compensate those suffering health problems linked to radiation and resulting from the more than 200 nuclear weapon tests that France carried out from 1960 to 1996 in Algeria and Polynesia. Whether any radiation was the result of a French-British submarine collision remains unknown.

On March 27 US President Barack Obama presents the new US strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke is appointed the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Citizens of both countries, remembering Amb. Holbrooke’s splendid efforts in the Balkan wars of the 1990s, riot in the streets.

On April 1 the new Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, states that the Israeli Government is not bound by the commitments made by its predecessors, such as the 2007 Annapolis Agreement for a two-state solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Lieberman subsequently says April Fools.

On May 25 North Korea carries out an underground nuclear weapon test in Kilju, Hamgyong province. The U.S. National Rifle Association condemns the test as an attempt by godless communists to violate American’s god given second amendment rights.

Following the presidential election in Iran on 12 June, in which President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is reelected, hundreds of thousands of people take to the streets to protest against what they perceive as a fraudulent election. At least eight people are killed and several wounded by security forces in the largest demonstrations since the 1979 Iranian revolution. Senator Lieberman, saying you can’t make democracy without breaking a few eggs, says this shows why the U.S. needs to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities.

On June 14 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announces that Israel is ready to endorse the creation of a Palestinian state as long as it is demilitarized and the Palestinians accept Israel as a Jewish state with Jerusalem as the capital. Foreign Minister Lieberman reminds people that this is not an April Fools joke.

On June 30 the withdrawal of US combat troops from cities and villages in Iraq is completed and the security duties are handed over to the new Iraqi forces. Approximately 131,000 US troops remain in Iraq. The remaining quarter million private military and security contractors working for the U.S., partying in the Green Zone, start crying in their beer.

On July 2 the US Army launches a major offensive against Taliban militants in southwestern Afghanistan, involving 4000 US soldiers and 650 Afghan troops. It is the first such operation under US President Barack Obama and differs from previous operations as the US forces will remain in the secured areas and build bases to provide security for the local population. Halliburton offers to help build the bases. Blackwater offer to help provide security. The residents of Helmand province start fleeing the country.

On July 16 British Prime Minister Gordon Brown issues a statement on nuclear non-proliferation together with the new British strategy, Road to 2010, outlining how the UK will play a leading role in tackling nuclear issues. Manchester United offers to tackle a British nuclear submarine to help promote nuclear disarmament.

On Sep. 25 US President Barack Obama, French President Nicholas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown accuse Iran of building a secret underground uranium enrichment facility. President Ahmadinejad denounces the accusation as a lie, saying he was spending all his free time cracking down on democracy protesters.

On September 28 the 2006 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms, Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials enters into force following Benin’s deposit of the ninth instrument of ratification. The NRA denounces convention as an attempt to take god-fearing American’s guns away.

On Oct. 16 the UN Human Rights Council endorses the recommendations made in Richard Goldstone’s report on the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip. The report accuses both Israel and Palestinian militants of war crimes and demands that the parties investigate the allegations, or the cases will be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Sen. Lieberman calls for the bombing of the United Nations.

On Oct. 17 the Pakistani Army launches a massive air and ground offensive against al-Qaeda and Taliban rebels in South Waziristan. At least 20,000 people flee the region. Amb. Holbrooke announces that this is proof President Obama’s strategy for the region is working.

On October 30 the UN First Committee agrees to set a timetable for the negotiation of an arms trade treaty. A UN conference on an arms trade treaty will be held in 2012 to elaborate a legally binding instrument for the transfer of conventional arms. Lockheed Martin, Smith & Wesson, Colt Industries, and Glock file a complaint with the Human Right Commission, claiming that liberal pinkos are imperiling their economic livelihood. Bob Geldorf announces the will organize a concert for laid off weapons brokers and promises a special guest appearance by Viktor Bout, currently enjoying the hospitality of the Thai government.

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For the last decade, deep in the heart of the African continent the Democratic Republic of the Congo has laid claim to one of the most devastating humanitarian crises in history. Since the beginning of the Second Congo War (also known as Africa’s World War) in 1998, an estimated 5.4 million people have died, making the war and its ongoing six-year aftermath the deadliest conflict since World War II. Equally appalling is the fact that only 10% of deaths are attributed to violence, with most resulting from starvation and easily preventable disease. An estimated 45,000 people are still dying each month – more than triple the mortality rate at the peak of the Darfur crisis in 2003 – and, according to both the World Bank and the IMF, the Congolese people are, quite simply, the poorest in the world.

The extraordinary level of Congo’s suffering is perhaps only rivaled by the conflict’s own complexity. Congo’s eastern provinces contain massive mineral deposits that are the source of the metals used in the cell phones, laptops, mp3 players, and digital cameras we use every day. But the minerals are mined in horrendous conditions under the watchful eye of many ambiguously interrelated militant factions, earning the lucrative natural resources the name “conflict minerals”.

Recently, strides have been taken toward achieving transparency of the origins of the minerals with the introduction of the Congo Conflict Minerals Act, co-sponsored by Senators Brownback, Durbin, and Feingold. The legislation would require all U.S.-registered electronics companies selling products containing columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, or wolframite to annually disclose the country of origin – and, if derived from Congo or an adjacent country, the mine of origin – to the SEC. Through oversight by the State Department, the intended outcome of the bill will be to sever the funding of the armed groups at the source. By modeling the effort on the Kimberley Process – the regulatory policy that has brought relative stability to the diamond trade in Liberia and Sierra Leone – the plan hopes to achieve the same results.

But Congo’s crisis is fundamentally different from the one that rocked much of West Africa for the better part of the last twenty years. The scenario of mining-at-gunpoint, as depicted in the film “Blood Diamond”, does occur – particularly by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the same Hutu rebel group that earned international infamy for the 1994 Rwandan genocide. However, the system more often takes the form of a subtle taxation scheme imposed by the militants, which then steer the revenue into a “shadow economy” and smuggle the minerals across the borders into neighboring Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi to be exported. The taxation system traps the Congolese workers in appalling conditions and extreme poverty, but they have no alternative. So, in order to ensure the livelihood of millions, any attempt to disrupt the mineral trade must be an extremely delicate process. The investigation into the militant groups must be, as Senator Feingold said, “sensitive to the complex reality” of the crisis to avoid inaccurately casting all of the factions in the same light and prompting an implicit blanket sanction on all metals derived from the region by a wary consumer electronics industry.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the “conflict minerals” are as much a symptom of the crisis as they are a cause. Congo’s suffering is cyclical – weak governance gives rise to the inadequate security that allows for the exploitation of the minerals which, in turn, fuels the persistence of weak governance. Therefore, sanctions on the mineral trade must be complemented by proportionate measures to address the lack of a functioning central government. Currently, the militants essentially operate autonomous fiefdoms in the east that lie well beyond the realm of the Congolese government’s minimal authority. To make matters worse, the Congolese National Army often facilitates the illicit trade with support drawn from the very same UN funding intended to suppress the conflict. The only way for the government to achieve some semblance of legitimacy is to initiate a comprehensive development strategy that accounts for the Congolese state’s ineffectiveness. In the words of Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, “the only way to help Congo is to stop pretending it exists.”

Although the conflict has dragged on virtually unchecked, it is not as if Congo has gone unnoticed. Despite the remarkable lack of media attention, Congo is actually home to the world’s largest UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC). The UN Security Council also adopted Resolution 1857 in December 2008, enhancing sanctions on the “conflict minerals” trade. The U.S. Congress has acted as well. The self-explanatory Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 – introduced by then-Senator Barack Obama with support from a group of 12 high-profile bipartisan co-sponsors – passed by unanimous consent in the Senate. But, thus far, the act and all other attempts to establish stability have failed largely because of a fundamental lack of cohesion in Congo’s development strategy. In its recent Congo strategy paper, the Enough project lamented, “there has been no coherent approach to alter the incentive structures that keep Congo’s institutions weak and dysfunctional.” Nicholas Garrett echoed the need for a strategy that will “lay the foundation for a large reform process.”

The U.S. global development capacity is currently spread haphazardly across 12 departments, 25 agencies, and nearly 60 government offices, and are still predominantly governed by an outdated law passed in 1961. But the timely Initiating Foreign Assistance Reform Act – introduced April 29th by Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Rep. Howard Berman – calls for the first National Strategy for Global Development (NSGD). The proposed legislation would provide a long-term “centralized decision making” framework for U.S. development efforts. Such a comprehensive framework is the key to ensuring that an effective approach to relief and development in Congo is finally realized.

Congo is the victim of an intricately intertwined array of problems, from “conflict minerals” to deep insecurity to incompetent governance. We must form a cohesive development strategy to tackle all facets of the country’s complex instability. Most importantly, we must not lose sight of the critical role played by “conflict minerals” in the crisis. Just as the militants’ “shadow economy” hinges on the continued flow of the minerals, the trade’s vast wealth must also be harnessed and redirected into a legitimate Congolese economy. There is no quick fix for Congo. Debates about the root of the crisis are irrelevant because Congo’s suffering is not a chain that can be broken when one link is detached. Rather, Congo is a balloon that can not be popped – squeezing one side only swells the rest even more as the air flows throughout it. But by applying careful and coordinated pressure on all sides, Congo’s air of suffering can, slowly but surely, be released.

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In the wake of the recent surge in piracy, it would be hard to argue that there is not a silver lining fastened to this unique international crisis – the tragedy of Somalia has finally been pushed onto the world stage. Somalia has long been a political catastrophe, having hit rock bottom after claiming the #1 ranking in The Fund for Peace’s most recent Failed States Index. In the last 18 years, Mogadishu has watched 14 failed attempts at establishing a functioning central government, and the current transitional government’s sphere of control has been reduced to just a few city blocks of the war-torn capital. The rest of the country is governed by unbridled anarchy in a violent free-for-all between rival clans, powerful warlords, and radical Islamists. To call Somalia a classic embodiment of Hobbesian state of nature would be a monumental understatement because Thomas Hobbes never fashioned his model of anarchy to include a seemingly infinite supply of automatic weapons. The timeline of the past two decades is dotted with covert military forays and half-hearted state-building efforts, but only as the crisis begins to spill over into the Gulf of Aden and aboard the decks of merchant vessels has the world finally truly taken notice. At a recent conference in Brussels attended by leadership from the UN, the EU, the African Union (AU), the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the international community pledged $213 million (far exceeding the requested aid) toward strengthening Somali security forces. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the UN special envoy for Somalia, said recently that “the problem of piracy has opened the eyes of those who have forgotten Somalia.”

However, many have been quick to note that international intrigue and foreign aid do not necessarily equate to results especially since, at first glance, stability in Somalia appears all but hopeless. After all, 2 million displaced refugees and a $600 per capita GDP in a country defined by drought, famine, and incessant war does not paint a promising picture. But Somalia is an anomaly among the rest of the world’s failed states, which are almost invariably defined by deep-seated religious or ethnic sectarian conflict. Somalia, on the other hand, is strikingly homogeneous. Nearly the entire population of almost 10 million shares the same ethnicity, religion, language, and culture. But the prolonged absence of the rule of law has given rise to violent clan loyalties that have shattered the Somali nation into countless unidentifiable pieces. Nevertheless, the pieces of unity exist. They just need a foundation on which to take shape.

In the past, failed attempts to stabilize Somalia by means of foreign intervention have only encouraged stronger Islamist extremism and deeper anti-American sentiment. But in a recent letter to President Obama, Senator Russ Feingold, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, articulated a strategy of engagement to unite Somalia from within. Senator Feingold pointed to the dramatic decline in violence and piracy that occurred under the brief rule of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006. Despite the repressive shari’a law imposed by its hard-line al-Shabaab branch of Sunni Islam, the ICU brought Somalia the central authority that it desperately needed to establish order and security. Journalist Jeffrey Gettleman wrote that when he visited Mogadishu in September 2006, he “saw work crews picking up trash and kids swimming at the beach. For the first time in years, no gunshots rang out at night. Under the banner of Islam, the Islamists had united rival clans and disarmed much of the populace … They even cracked down on piracy by using their clan connections to dissuade coastal towns from supporting the pirates.” The brief reign of the ICU prior to its ousting by a U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion is widely considered the most peaceful six months in Somalia since 1991. The ICU’s radical Islamic law presented its own set of intolerable human rights violations, but the lesson to be learned from the six-month interlude from chaos is the ability of Islam to unite Somalia’s rival clans and thwart the cycle of violence that they perpetuate. Moderate Islam can, and must, serve as the foundation on which the new Somali nation-state will be pieced together.

Recognizing the common underlying identity of the Somali people and the ability to unite the country as a moderate Islamic Republic is the first step, but implementing such a daunting strategy presents a long and uncertain challenge. However, the Somali anomaly is two-fold. Not only does Somalia’s ethnic and religious solidarity make it unique among failed states, but it also stands alone in enjoying the benefit of a precise model to guide its construction. The northernmost region of the country, Somaliland, declared independence from Mogadishu after the fall of Siad Barre’s violent 20-year dictatorship in 1991. Since then, while Somalia has torn itself apart, Somaliland’s 3.5 million inhabitants – despite failing to gain international recognition – have established a fully-functioning central government predicated on moderate Islam, complete with a President, a bicameral legislature, an independent judiciary, a police force, a coast guard, and multi-party elections. In the words of its Foreign Minister Abdillahi Duale, Somaliland is “Africa’s best kept secret”. The existence of Somaliland presents a bizarre scenario, as if serving as a window into a parallel universe in which the course of Somalia’s history veered off on a starkly different trajectory in 1991, resulting in a stable, moderate Islamic Somali nation-state. By mimicking the structure of Somaliland, the international development effort can blend the principles of moderate Islam, Somali nationalism, and representative democracy into a cohesive and stable Somalia.

The Western world understandably balks at the notion of an Islamic republic, but Islam’s unifying capacity in Somalia is undeniable. By reaching for the calm core beneath the disorder that plagues Somalia’s surface, a country that barely understands the concepts of law and order can finally find peace. Piracy’s knack for grabbing headlines has led the African Union special envoy for Somalia, Nicholas Bwakira, to call the current level of global interest in ending the ongoing crisis on land “unprecedented”. Stability will not come quickly or easily, but for the first time the international community is creating genuine hope that there will someday be a peaceful nation nestled on the tip of the Horn of Africa.

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We do not need to reorient our grand strategy to deal with pirates. We don’t need to reshape the U.S. Navy to fight a motley band of young men in leaky boats. As my colleague Ben Friedman has written, piracy is a problem, but decidely minor relative to many other global security challenges.

But some are criticizing the approach taken to resolve last week’s standoff. They say that the only way to truly eliminate the piracy problem is to attack and ultimately clean out the pirates’s sanctuaries in lawless Somalia. This “solution” fits well with the broader push within the Washington foreign policy community that would deal with our security problems by fixing failed states.

I have gone on at length, usually with my colleagues Justin Logan and Ben Friedman, on the many reasons why a strategy for fixing failed states is unwise and unnecessary. I won’t expand on that thesis here, other than to point out that of all failed states in the world, Somalia is arguably the most failed of the lot. “Fixing” it would require a massive investment of personnel, money, and time — resources that would be better spent elsewhere.

Mackubin Owens offers one of the more intriguing defenses of this approach in a just published e-note for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Owens likens a strategy of fixing Somalia to Gen. Andrew Jackson’s military operations in Florida, a story that features prominently in John Lewis Gaddis’s Surprise, Security and the American Experience. As Owens notes, when some members of President James Monroe’s cabinet wanted to punish Jackson for exceeding his mandate — in the course of his military campaign he captured and executed two British citizens accused of cavorting with the marauders who had attacked American citizens – Secretary of State John Quincy Adams jumped to Jackson’s defense, and proposed a different tack. He demanded that Spain either take responsibility for cleaning up Florida, or else give it up. And we all know what happened. Under the terms of Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819, Florida became a territory of the United States. 26 years later, it became our 27th state.

I’ve vacationed in Florida many times. Walt Disney World is wonderful for the kids; I’ve been there six times. I spent three memorable days watching March Madness in Miami a few years back. Spring training baseball is great fun.  Adams couldn’t have imagined any of these things when he acquired a vast swampland; he cared only that Florida under Spanish control, or lack thereof, posed a threat.

Here is where the parallels to the present day get complicated. I’ll admit that I’ve never been to Somalia. Perhaps they have their own version of South Beach, or could have some day. But I’m frankly baffled by the mere intimation that our national security is so threatened by chaos there that we need to take ownership of the country’s — or the entire Horn of Africa region’s — problems.

And yet, that is what many people believe. And this is not a new phenomenon. In many respects, we have chosen to treat all of the world’s ungoverned spaces as the modern-day equivalent of Spanish Florida.

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