This article was written by two Fall 2011 Fellows in PSA’s Congressional Fellowship Program.  All CFP articles are produced by bipartisan groups of Democrat and Republican Fellows that were challenged to develop opinion pieces that reach consensus on critical national security and foreign affairs issues.

For the vast majority of Americans, watching the last American boot leave Iraqi soil is nothing short of good riddance. The numbers have become seared in Americans minds: Nearly nine years. Nearly a trillion dollars spent. Nearly 35,000 US soldiers wounded. Nearly 4,500 US soldiers dead.

The long-term effect of the Iraq War is pretty obvious—a national sentiment for retrenchment—a streak of isolationism that is being espoused by both sides of the political spectrum. It’s hard not to watch Texas Republican Governor Rick Perry warn against “military adventurism” without comparing him to his predecessor.

But despite the desire to go inward, the simple fact is that if there was any hope for the US to go on the sidelines, that’s changed forever with the onset of the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring has reminded the world of the danger of failed states. With long-time dictators losing power, militant Salafists (not solely Al Qaeda) are looking to fill the vacuum.

But the Arab Spring also comes with a new challenge—a new type of interventionism.

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William S. Cohen, former Secretary of Defense under Clinton and PSA Advisory Board member, recently wrote an opinion article in Politico discussing the use of drones in modern warfare. Cohen has always supported bipartisan action on issues of national security and as a member of Congress (R-Maine) took a nonpartisan stance on security policy. Since leaving the pentagon, Cohen has penned numerous articles and books and even appeared on the Daily Show. In his most recent article, Cohen focuses on the critical role drones have played in Afghanistan and their place at the center of counter-insurgency vs. counter-terrorism debate.

Among the many issues that Defense Secretary Leon Panetta must ponder in the coming months will likely be whether to recommend shifting U.S. strategy in Afghanistan from counterinsurgency to counterterrorism.

Some critics argue that our current policy of deploying large numbers of ground troops puts more of our men and women at risk for questionable gain and even encourages more Afghans to join the Taliban, fighting against what they claim is an invasion force. Yet the recent gains in clearing out Taliban strongholds and helping to build schools, medical facilities and other civic institutions argue, instead, for staying the course for several more years.

President Obama’s address Wednesday night regarding U.S. troop withdrawals in Afghanistan will make few people happy. Many in the military wanted a smaller withdrawal than the 10,000 he announced will come out this year, with another 23,000 out by the end 2012, and all troops gone by 2014. For the far left and increasingly some on the right, who want nothing short of a full scale withdrawal now, the President’s announcement disappointed at best and represented a betrayal at worst. For many Americans, 56% according to a recent Pew poll, the war’s cost no longer seems worth the effort, where every service member deployed in Afghanistan costs U.S. taxpayers $1 million per year. Many have said it is time to stop rebuilding Afghanistan and start rebuilding America.

One can understand the frustration on all sides of this, the longest war in America’s history. However, the United States cannot afford to turn its back on what is right – either in terms of national security or our values. And on both counts, President Obama’s modest withdrawal is the right call.

In terms of national security, Osama bin Laden’s assassination scored a huge foreign policy victory for the Obama administration as well for all peoples who oppose the hatred and violence that bin Laden espoused. Yet the sole justification for the Afghan campaign was not bin Laden’s death or capture. It is true that only about 50 to 100 al Qaeda operatives remain in Afghanistan. Recall, however, that only 19 hijackers were needed for the September 11th attacks. Furthermore, so few al Qaeda remain in Afghanistan, in part, because many have fled to the ungoverned tribal areas in Pakistan. If the United States leaves Afghanistan an ungoverned mess, al Qaeda will have more places from which to train to kill Americans and our allies. (more…)

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced Friday that PSA Advisory Board member Marc Grossman has been appointed the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ambassador Grossman assumes the post recently left vacant by the passing of former PSA Advisory Board member, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. Secretary Clinton made the announcement during a speech delivered in Ambassador Holbrooke’s honor at the Asia Society in New York, during which she noted Grossman “knows our allies and understands how to mobilize common action to meet shared challenges.” From 2001-2005, Ambassador Grossman served as the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the State Department’s third-ranking official. Throughout a distinguished career in public service spanning 29 years, Ambassador Grossman also served as the Director General of the US Foreign Service, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and U.S. Ambassador to Turkey.

“Virtually all serious observers of national security affairs now recognize the current structure of the national security system militates against unified problem-solving when the problem is a multiagency issue. The question is what to do about it.”

Counter-proliferation, counterinsurgency, food security, energy policy – all examples of complex and multifaceted issues that increasingly dominate America’s security priorities and starkly highlight the chronic limitations of the U.S. national security structure. The Project on National Security Reform and others stress the critical need for a Goldwater-Nichols Act of national security to take on the colossal and outdated bureaucracy built around the security challenges of the post WWII period. (more…)

Since the Afghan war began, NATO and Afghanistan have become inextricably intertwined.  The linkage culminated at last year’s NATO summit where the 60^th anniversary of the alliance sparked the assertion that Afghanistan could be the alliance’s make-or-break test of the 21^st century, despite other looming challenges.

This year’s summit in Lisbon, Portugal, meanwhile, was billed as a turning point in the war and the beginning of the transition process.  This past weekend, members formally agreed to the end of combat operations in Afghanistan by 2014.  But setting a timetable is only one key component of this process; having a competent security force to hand responsibility off to is the other.  Thus, NATO’s mission to train the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) is just as integral to the endgame.

Earlier this month, the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), which provides and better coordinates existing training of the ANA and ANP, celebrated its first anniversary.  Over the first year of the mission, there have been some notable positive outcomes, namely substantial growth in number of both the ANA and the ANP.  But there have also been some notable challenges, like corruption and illiteracy, which are hindering the effort.  All in all, a robust effort is still needed to create a viable Afghan security force.  Yet the program still needs nearly 1,000 more trainers to be able to fully complete the development of the forces. (more…)

Past midnight, our wait for a flight at  Camp Bastion, Helmand, had an eerie surreal feel.  In the passenger lounge, scores of Marines, Brits, contractors and Afghans waited in relative quiet.  Screams and dark music blared from the big flatscreen showing a grisly horror movie — a disturbing choice given the setting and the audience.   The flight was delayed because of a repatriation ceremony — a Marine’s remains were going home via C-17.  Finally, a young blond girl dressed in British fatigues cheerfully ordered us to put on helmets and flak vests for the walk to an old Afghan bus that would take us to the plane.

The wait and the flight gave me time to consider all I’d heard from the many fine professionals working to stabilize southern Afghanistan.  People mostly believed in their work and that they were making a difference at the local level.  But nobody has a good answer when we ask about the corrupt power brokers like Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK), Abdul Rahman Jan (ARJ), Gul Agha Sherzai, and Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, not to mention President Karzai himself.

These men wield immense power in Afghanistan, controlling large economic enterprises, political patronage organizations, private militia, local security forces, narcotics trade, and official government posts.  They are often protected by Karzai himself, due to their relationships or their danger to the Afghan President (or both).  They live in huge garish mansions and own dozens of firms that scoop up American aid contracts while also (allegedly) fueling corruption, intimidation, and narcotics trafficking.  They are feared and despised by much of the population, sapping the legitimacy of both GiROA (for whom they work) and ISAF (who showers them with money).  Some of them may have ties to the Taliban and collaborate when it suits their interests. (more…)

My visit to Camp Leatherneck and the PRT at Lashkar Gah reinforced that  Helmand is the land of extremes.  Afghanistan’s largest and longest province, Helmand also produces most of the poppy in Afghanistan — making Helmand province a bigger producer of poppy than any nation in the world save its own.

Helmand is dominated by the Helmand river, which runs north-south from the Kajaki dam near Kandahar to Dishu in the south.   The population of Helmand lives off and along the river and its canals and irrigation channels.  Helmand’s border with Balochistan, Pashtun tribes, and poppy dominated economy made it largely Taliban controlled  — until recently at least.

The mission of Marines in Helmand is to wrest control of the population centers from the Taliban.  This is tough counterinsurgency fighting and the Marines have done amazing work turning the tide in key districts of Helmand, though the fight is far from over.  The offensive which began with Marjah in 2009 continued district by district into the key towns of the Helmand including Nad Ali, Musa Q’ala, Garmsir,  and now Sangin. Taliban resistance hasn’t disappeared by any means (even in Marjah) but don’t underestimate the ability of the Marines to clear and hold.  With a density of forces now in place and a dismounted force, the results from the population are visible.  People are getting out, engaging in commerce, and talking to Marines about needs and concerns. (more…)

I’m in Kabul!  I inspect the city on my drive from the airport.  It seems  pretty similar to my last visit with one big annoying exception: traffic.  There are just more cars on the road now (both Afghan and expat) and the result is close to gridlock.  The 30 minute drive from the airport turns into total nightmare as protests at Kabul University completely paralyze Mayor road.  We end up bailing out of the car, flagging down a taxi, and heading to the Gandamack for dinner.    I suppose traffic is actually a good thing. It either shows that more Afghans are buying cars, more are out and showing confidence in the regime, or the civilian surge has had a secondary effect of gridlock.  Overall the impression is a more busy and vibrant Kabul.

Our initial meetings feature a variety of senior civilian and military officials representing State, USAID, ISAF, RC-South, and Task Force Raider.   Our discussions go quickly to the issues at hand: are we winning?  If so, why?  How is the civ-mil collaboration working?

The general consensus from those on the ground is that we are making progress in security and the population is responding at a local level, especially in the south.   (more…)

Over the past week, Taliban militants in western Pakistan have bombed and set fire to dozens of tankers carrying oil to U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The seemingly daily trend of attacks on NATO fuel supply convoys has been ongoing since Pakistan closed a key border crossing in retaliation to a U.S. helicopter strike within its airspace. This recent surge in violence highlights the increasingly precarious reliance on fossil fuels as the single most critical strategic linchpin of U.S. military success. With the soaring costs – in both dollars and lives – of the military’s dependence on oil becoming ever more apparent, there has never been a more urgent time to accelerate the transition to renewable energy use on the battlefield.

Even before the recent wave of attacks, a study by the Army Environmental Policy Institute found that for every 24 fuel convoys to Iraq or Afghanistan, one soldier or civilian involved in the transport was killed. On top of the risk, the economic costs of the military’s dependence on oil are staggering. Although the military purchases gasoline at a relatively cheap price, transporting a gallon of fuel to a forward operating base can cost up to $400. Moreover, the sheer scale of the military’s energy expenses ($20 billion in 2008) leaves it particularly vulnerable to oil price volatility, as just a $10 uptick in the price of a barrel of oil costs the Department of Defense about $1.3 billion. These factors, in addition to the strategic challenges and indirect costs associated with importing foreign-produced oil rather than using American-made renewables, make the military’s current energy practices dangerous, inefficient, and ultimately unsustainable. (more…)