According to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in an article in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs, China’s reluctant and belated concession to allow a skeleton UN-AU peacekeeping force in Sudan represents a newly “cooperative approach on a range of problems.” But the reality is that some newfound sense of Chinese responsibility on the world stage had nothing to do with Beijing’s decision to “cooperate.” The concession on Darfur (if you want to call it that) was entirely about the Beijing Olympics. Given that it took a threatened boycott by Western leaders for China to stop arms sales to Sudan and drop its veto of the peacekeeping resolution, I am dubious that we’ll see any further “responsible” behavior after the Olympic Games have come and gone. At this point, the Games are going ahead—with or without protesting Western leaders—and the leverage a coordinated boycott might have provided will be a mere memory.

But I’m not writing this to bemoan a missed opportunity or cast aspersions on Rice’s diplomatic optimism. I’m writing this to call some attention to the next opportunity down the road: Sochi 2014.

China and Russia are both rising powers, economically, militarily and diplomatically. Secretary Rice referred to both as carrying “special responsibility and weight as fellow permanent members of the UN Security Council.” Translation: they both have lots of nuclear weapons, so our military power doesn’t really scare them. China is also not the only rising power we’d love to see adopt a more cooperative stance as it claims (or reclaims) “full membership in the international community.”

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By any measure, George W. Bush’s foreign policy has been a disaster. However, one of the few bright spots during his seven years in office has been his policy towards Africa, particularly in the fight against HIV/AIDS. The President raised development aid by 30% from 2001 to 2003 and raised total HIV/AIDS funding by 36% in his first years in office. In Africa, his foreign policy is not seen solely through the prism of failed militarism. People recognize the strides that Sub-Saharan Africa has made in combating disease and poverty during his term. To be sure, there is still tremendous work to be done and the Bush administration should not strain themselves patting their own backs. However, for a President searching in vain for a foreign policy legacy, Africa offers an opportunity to enhance the presidency in the eyes of the historians, and to help millions of people who still ache for a better life. With this in mind, I believe now is the right time for President Bush to make the bold moves and take on the politically risky challenges that the continent presents.

He could start in Darfur, where the (much like other parts of his foreign policy) the rhetoric has been strong, but the action has been timid. President Bush could do much to help the UN peacekeepers that are just now being deployed there. He could lease helicopters to the UN so that the peacekeepers can track movements of the militias and travel quickly from camp to camp. While he has been forceful in his use of the word genocide, there needs to be more state level engagement in order to isolate the Bashir regime in Khartoum. These efforts could begin with our allies Egypt and Saudi Arabia and perhaps even extend to China, which holds financial influence over the country. Finally, he could float the idea of a NATO enforced no-fly zone (as seen in the PSA statement on Darfur) in the region, at least for some more diplomatic leverage. Not only would progress in Darfur be a monumental foreign policy achievement, but it would also be a boon to the moral credibility of the United States (something Bush has done plenty to hurt over the last six years).

Additionally, President Bush could use his profile to highlight on-going conflicts in Africa that have received little, if no attention. He could make a high profile statement in support of the democratic process in Congo. He could put pressure on the government of South Africa to harshly condemn the policies and police state of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. He could use his status as the world’s terrorist warrior to show Americans what is going on in Somalia; not just the fight against extremists, but the failed state conditions that breed them. Finally, he can use his position as Leader of the Free World and chief aid distributor to push for a transition from aid handouts to direct investment, which is a more effective (and more sustainable) development strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa.

While this list is a bit hopeful, it is no more hopeful than President Bush’s attempts to solve the Mideast crisis in a year. By refocusing on Africa, President Bush could score some significant gains for his reputation and that of the United States. But most importantly, he could concentrate the world’s attention on vital issues that seem only to pop in and out of the world’s radar screen.

The “Pottery Barn Principle” has tremedous informal influence in the on-going debate about what to do in Iraq. The quick summary is incredibly evocative: “you broke it, you bought it” applies in international affairs, just as it does at Pottery Barn and other stores. So the U.S. “owns” the Iraq problem and can’t leave until stability and happiness return to the land.

Of course, the principle is rarely enforced at stores like Pottery Barn. Nice stores understand in advance that they have fragile displays, with glasses stacked in precarious poses to make them look nice for potential customers. So the owners and managers expect some glasses to break from time to time. And the stores focus on making the unfortunate customer who accidentally bumps into the wine glass display while backing away to get a different perspective on the beautiful $800 console table feel comfortable enough to come back to the store — or perhaps even to buy the console table that very day. Other customers don’t turn and stare and clap and otherwise humiliate the unfortunate, clumsy person, as they would do in a high school cafeteria. Nice stores are much more grown up and understanding.

Yet the analogy still holds strange power in the foreign policy debate. Many Americans really have a deep streak of responsibility. The U.S. “owes” something to Cambodia, to Guatemala, to the Philippines. As a country, we don’t always act on our guilt, but sometimes we do, and there’s a deep reservoir of support that prioritizes efforts to improve the lives of people that the U.S. had something to do with harming over efforts simply to help people. Many Americans want to do good in the world, and that matters; the impulse to do good tinged with the guilt of having done ill in the past matters even more.

But how much sense does that make? Even in the moral framework, I think it’s tough to make the case for the pottery barn principle. (more…)

I am not an Africa expert, and perhaps that is why I am confused about U.S. policy in Somalia. So I am using this blog to ask some honest questions, and I hope that our readers (or my fellow bloggers) will help me with some answers in the comments section.

Here’s what I understand to be the core events of 2006 in Somalia, from a U.S. perspective. First, the Islamic Courts movement, a group of fundamentalist Islamists, took over much of the country and started to establish a government, leaving the “transitional government” coalition of warlords in control only of only one major city, Baidoa. The areas controlled by the Islamic Courts enjoyed relative stability, but the Courts also imposed a relatively stringent version of Sharia and restricted Western influences (cigarettes, music) and some traditional Somali customs (chewing Khat) [for this background, see, for example, this New York Times article].

Americans don’t tend to like foreign governments that make such decisions, but the real U.S. policy beef with the Islamic Courts came down to their ties to al Qaeda. In the early years of the War on Terror, the U.S. feared that terrorists driven out of Afghanistan and Iraq would regroup in the chaos of Somalia (before the Islamic Courts took over); that did not seem to happen — perhaps because the terrorists preferred to keep fighting Americans on more central battlefields like Iraq. Nevertheless, some people (like Vance Serchuck at the American Enterprise Institute) seem to think that the Islamic Courts cooperated to a significant extent with al Qaeda, at a minimum “harboring” operatives; the maximal view of al Qaeda involvement (described, though not endorsed, by Niall Ferguson and attributed to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Fraser, here) seems to suggest that al Qaeda’s “East Africa Cell” “infiltrated” Islamist fighters into Somalia to begin with, perhaps leading to the Islamic Courts’ initial military success at taking over much of the country.

These ties apparently led to the second major event of 2006 in Somalia, from the U.S. perspective: some level of support (ranging from “tacit” to “logistical” in various accounts) for the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia that drove out the Islamic Courts and replaced their rule in Mogadishu (and other major cities) with the intermin government’s president. And to the most interesting choice, from my perspective: as Kenya sealed its border with Somalia to prevent the escape of the Islamic Courts fighters (at the request of the interim government and the Ethiopians), the U.S. used naval forces off the Somali coast to try to block Islamic Courts fighters’ escape by sea (see coverage in the Washington Post).

Of course, this strikes me as an extremely challenging mission, given the long Somali coastline and the number of small boats that must normally ply the waters there (for fishing and such). And I’m not sure how hard the U.S. is trying to really “seal” the coast.

But the choice to declare that policy at all seems remarkable to me. Of course U.S. forces generally do their best to chase al Qaeda operatives around the world — specific people who have done the U.S. harm or have tried to do the U.S. harm. But the Islamic Courts must have had many more supporters than the small number of people there who specifically have attacked the United States (or even our allies). Most people fighting in Somalia presumably cared most about stability in Somalia or, perhaps, Islam in Somalia. Somalia is apparently relatively homogeneous ethnically and religiously, but clan (and subclan) differences lead to a constant struggle for power there; some people seem to think that Islam might serve as a uniting and stabilizing force there. If the U.S. is now in the business of rounding people up solely because they supported an Islamic government, are we not substantially expanding the list of adversaries in the War on Terror? I’m certainly not inclined to think someone is an anti-American terrorist just because s/he prefers a form of government in her/his own country that I would not choose for the United States!

Somalia is an interesting country for the War on Terror. Al Qaeda has certainly had deep connections there in the past (apparently dating to the famous “Black Hawk Down” incident). And its chaos has offered something of a test for two widely believe theoried: 1) that “failed states are breeding grounds for anti-American terrorists; and 2) that “failed states offer hideouts and training grounds for anti-American terrorists.” It seems to me that Somalia provides some evidence against theory #1: as far as I know, very few al Qaeda fighters in Iraq or other terrorists around the world hail from Somalia; Somalis are busy fighting for their own future in their own country. And I am dubious of the second theory, but I don’t really know enough at this point to judge. What do we really know about the ties between al Qaeda and the Islamic Courts? And even if there were ties between the two, were those anti-American ties or ties aimed primarily at promoting Islamic rule over Islamic citizens — a frequent goal announced in al Qaeda rhetoric?

Now that the Islamic Courts have been bounced from power, al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has called for jihad against the Ethiopian “crusaders” in Somalia. But what was his view two months ago? I certainly don’t remember resounding calls from the jihadis to “regroup in Somalia to prepare a big fight against the Americans.” Did anyone else notice that directive?

While Iraq is rightly dominating the headlines and the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan is also occupying the minds of U.S. policy makers and politicians, events in the horn of Africa demand that Somalia is placed on the U.S. foreign policy priority agenda for the New Year.   Frankly it is only due to a lack of focus on both sides of the aisle that the downward spiral in a country only a day long boat ride away from Yemen has not been the subject of greater attention. With the Ethiopians and an interim Somali government + warlords (supported by the U.S.) ranged against the Islamic Courts militia (supported by the business community) the situation in Somalia seems as volatile as ever. Despite the fact that interim Prime Minister Ali Mohamad Ghedi entered the capital, Mogadishu, today, it is far from clear whether the Islamic Courts militias have been defeated or whether they have gone to ground. It is also unclear as to the level of support/cooperation the Courts have received from Al Qaeda or other non-government actors from the Arabian Peninsula.  

Nevertheless, the reasonable fear among many analysts is that Al Qaeda will be able to take advantage of the turbulence and open a third front. The very real fear is that they will seek to bolster and ally with the defeated Courts militias – radicalizing and enlisting them and turning Somalia into another Afghanistan or Iraq.  

Much remains murky re: Somalia at present so I am not going to use this post to prescribe a remedy. Instead I want to strongly encourage the SFRC Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee and Senate Intel Committee to do three things: 

1. Establish what the current U.S. role in the horn of Africa is and has been. Carefully ascertain the role of Al Qaeda and other non-Somali actors. 

2. Listen to a broad range of regional experts and consider remedies that do not simply rely on a military solution to a crisis. Meet with AU and UN representatives. Determine whether the crisis can be solved via a well structured political strategy.   

3. Engage the Administration in a sustained dialogue on Somalia. Urge that Somalia receive high level and coordinated attention.  

It is far better for our own interests and the interests of the civilian populace of Somalia if we can stop that country and the sub region from becoming a third front in the fight against Al Qaeda. We may be too late and at best I fear that we do not have much time. 

The Pentagon has confirmed a policy decision to create a new combatant command for Africa, breaking off those responsibilities primarily from the US military’s European Command (EUCOM), and consolidating authorities now held by Central Command and Pacific Command.     

As reported by the Army Times (and raised last Friday at our Stimson Center workshop with African embassy officials), this long-debated idea is to become a reality, possibly “in one to two months.” Reportedly:

at a Dec. 13 awards ceremony for Theresa Whelan, deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said a new command would be created within “one to two months.” In accepting her award, Whelan quietly noted to Rumsfeld that the proposal is on President Bush’s desk awaiting his signature.

Washington Post analyst and blogger Bill Arkin is highly skeptical – seeing this move as an expansion of the Department of Defense’s reach without a real strategy.  The comments on his post take the issues further, suggesting US hegemony and poor intentions.  

But I’d like to suggest that this new Command might be the right way to go.  First, the US needs a more strategic approach to Africa – and a clearer idea of how we spend our time and resources.   (more…)

I had the great honor earlier today to participate in the White House Summit on Malaria, an inspired gathering of business, non-profit, and government leaders committed to ending malaria — a disease that kills a child every third seconds. I was excited to see the President, Mrs. Bush, Condi Rice, Paul Wolfowitz, and so many other leaders participating in the summit. It is clear that this administration is committed to ending malaria and the President talked today about a $1.2 billion initiative over five years to provide bed nets, and indoor spraying, and anti-malaria medicine in 15 African countries.

This is a step in the right direction for the Bush administration and our country. In the end, our country will not be judged on our wealth or power alone, but on how we used that wealth and power to better our world and to honor the sanctity of life. Given the myriad of foreign policy challenges that this country is facing, this is something of a slam dunk — it’s good for the world, good for the economy (since malaria is a $12 billion burden on Africa), and good for our security. Of course, as the discussion on this blog has shown, Bush is going to need some three-pointers to restore our image in the world and find an adequate exit strategy for Iraq. Regardless, I’m glad to see the President moving forward on other fronts to save lives.

All of that said, I still came away from today’s gathering wondering if the U.S. government really is doing enough? Wolfowitz reminded the audience today that 3,000 die every day from malaria — that’s a death tool the size of 9-11 every day. But if you look at our total expenditures as a country, $1.2 billion over five years is tiny. If this is a 9-11 every day, shouldn’t we be willing to commit more?

Fortunately, there is a wonderful network of private leaders complementing the U.S. government’s efforts and showing our conscience to the world through individual philanthropy. It’s called Malaria No More and it is an organization that I believe really will live up to its name. Check it out at  http://www.malarianomore.org/ .

George Packer has a pitch-perfect indictment of the latest round of inaction in Darfur, as a predictable spike in violence is/will be accompanied by a predictable round of condemnations, meetings, and failure to take effective action. His basic point: Africa is where everybody - meaning the U.S., Europe, the U.N., the Islamic world - has their gap between rhetoric and action exposed. We’re summoning greater and more timely outrage than we did with Rwanda, and still it makes little difference.

Africa and its tragedies - Darfur, Uganda, Congo, and on and on - simply cannot get the attention of western governments or the broad majorities of their public who would compel action. It does benefit from the attention of well-meaning celebrities, crusading jouranlists, and student activists, but there is a touch of condescension in this - that there is a status quo emerging where Africa is the domain of an international celebrity culture, and not institutions that could take more effective action (just look at the Clinton Global Initiative, where Bill Clinton is leading laudable efforts to solve problems in Africa after he has left the presidency).

Perhaps Packer’s most chilling statement is this: “But since when does the world listen to Africans? Unless Ivorians and Congolese start blowing themselves up in front of Western embassies and shops, it seems, their grievances won’t be taken seriously.” The implications of that statement are chilling in ways that the mind does not want to tackle.