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The Committee has followed the trail of information in exhaustive detail (check out its website) since March 2003. He and other members have engaged in repeated efforts to gain information from Rice and other officials. And Waxman has asked Rice to answer specific questions, as in his most recent April 17 letter. This morning he stated the need for the subpoena:

In the last seven weeks, I have sent four letters to Secretary Rice and received three responses from her staff. My request is simple: I would like Secretary Rice to suggest a date that would be convenient for her to testify before our Committee.

Secretary Rice has already testified before House and Senate committees seven times this year. There is nothing extraordinary about our Committee’s request. But we have hit a brick wall with the Secretary of State. She will not propose a date to testify, she will not agree to testify, and she insists that our Committee be satisfied with partial information that was previously submitted to other committees…. I regret — I deeply regret — that the Secretary of State is giving us no choice but to proceed with a subpoena.

Waxman’s questions go to the heart of government accountability and Congressional oversight. Its a mystery as to why Rice would not appear before the Committee. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the US decision to go into Iraq, it is hard to understand how the Administration can deny answering such questions about the lead-up to the war in Iraq. That’s a story that both Congress and the public deserve.

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In contrast, I was struck this week by a gripping radio interview with an Iraqi man, Saleem Amer, who serves as an interpreter for National Public Radio (NPR) in Baghdad and has become, himself, a journalist.

He tells the simple story of going to the market with his wife the week before. On the way, they see a group of kids playing soccer in their mixed Sunni/Shiite neighborhood. Suddenly, a group of men jump out of cars and gun down the young children, firing repeatedly. Saleem and his wife, hidden behind a tree, watch in horror:

“I start looking and they are shooting on the kids,” he said. “Eight of the kids fell already on the ground. The guys kept shooting — they just wanted to make sure that everybody is dead.” NPR News goes on to report that “The houses around the empty lot are owned by families of both sects. They have known each other for years. Until then, sectarian tensions had been kept in check, but the savagery of this attack sent them over the edge.”

It is worth listening to the radio interview by Lourdes Garcia-Navarro to hear his voice as he tells what happens next. Upon discovering the death of the children, their parents use arms to go after one another.

“And that is when I saw something that I will never forget in my whole life — they just went crazy,” Saleem said. “Fathers, brothers, they get quickly inside their houses, they take their weapons and they start shooting on their neighbors.” He then explains it turned into a sectarian free-for-all.

Worse, he reports that more men with guns have since arrived, strengthening the divisions between the Shiite and Sunni families. Without a government “its like living in a zoo,” says Saleem.

NPR’s efforts to get a government explanation of the original event has led to very little – only a report that the children had been victims of random shootings.

How do people seek remedies in such environments?

The story drives home the huge consequences for the people of Iraq when the government can not function and when there is little public information about the violence faced by many communities. Senator McCain is not yet walking in these people’s shoes.

With more American and Iraqi deaths reported over the weekend, it is clear that a desire to reduce the violence unites most people. The Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard is trying to identify the specific ways that US military actions can succeed at both their missions and reduce casualties and fatalities for civilians, whether strategic or tactical. The Center’s director, Sarah Sewall, runs pioneering workshops and research in this area, partnering with both US military leaders and human rights experts. Yet the US military has not reportedly collected data even in the area it can – on the civilian casualties of the war. As she wrote in 2005 in The Washington Post, however, the US military should collect data to gauge their impact on civilians, and thus, know which strategies work or not as the US strives to win hearts, minds, and battles. And to be better humanitarians.

That data would not substitute for the non-answer given NPR about their reporter’s horrific experience or his suggestion that Iraq “is about to explode.” One shudders to think about all the communities facing such zoo-like situations and knowing that no one may investigate such crimes or provide basic safety and security.
I hope that we hear more from Saleem Amer.

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Naturally, the budget pushes us to ask what missions US forces should be asked to carry out.  Colleagues here have debated this question, offering useful ideas about whether military force is the best vehicle for addressing terrorism (no, says Chris Preble & others) or be expanded in Iraq.  How about peacekeeping?  That is unlikely under a UN flag, though the US is increasingly embracing stability operations. 

But there’s another debate I think we should go back to discussing – how prepared are US forces – are any deployed forces – if asked by their leaders to stop genocide? Or to take action and intervene if civilians come under threat of large-scale violence?  Debates over Darfur have theoretically raised this issue, but not answered it.  Those questions are often misunderstood as a question just for peacekeepers.  While peacekeepers need to know how to respond, the mission to interrupt, halt, disable or defend against violent actors at times shares more with traditional war-fighting.  Yet few military leaders offer public plans of action for Darfur (oddly, I hear more proposals from frustrated humanitarians).   

The US does not have endless funds or patience for overseas adventures.  Neither does the rest of the world.  We are seeing huge overstretch in US deployments, in those of our allies, and in the Security Council’s expansive directions for peace operations.  Yet acting to stop the most wrenching levels of violence against civilians is not always an act of invasion – it may be a task of some peace operations, for example.

Today at a Brookings lunch, I offered an analysis of how prepared military forces are today – whether deployed through NATO, the EU, the UN, the African Union, or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – to protect civilians under imminent threat.  My perspective is based on a book I recently published through the Stimson Center on this subject.   Chris made some excellent points at the off-the-record lunch – perhaps we should continue that conversation here?  Between the QDR pointing the US in the direction of acting to stop genocide, the increase in NGO activities to take action, and the new budget, it is time for sorting this out. 

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The Pentagon has confirmed a policy decision to create a new combatant command for Africa, breaking off those responsibilities primarily from the US military’s European Command (EUCOM), and consolidating authorities now held by Central Command and Pacific Command.     

As reported by the Army Times (and raised last Friday at our Stimson Center workshop with African embassy officials), this long-debated idea is to become a reality, possibly “in one to two months.” Reportedly:

at a Dec. 13 awards ceremony for Theresa Whelan, deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said a new command would be created within “one to two months.” In accepting her award, Whelan quietly noted to Rumsfeld that the proposal is on President Bush’s desk awaiting his signature.

Washington Post analyst and blogger Bill Arkin is highly skeptical – seeing this move as an expansion of the Department of Defense’s reach without a real strategy.  The comments on his post take the issues further, suggesting US hegemony and poor intentions.  

But I’d like to suggest that this new Command might be the right way to go.  First, the US needs a more strategic approach to Africa – and a clearer idea of how we spend our time and resources.  

US funding through the State and Defense Departments goes to a wide range of competing security concerns, from offering counter-terrorism programs to supporting African Union forces deploying in Darfur; from security sector reform in Liberia to longer-term peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; from preventing HIV-AIDS to sponsoring demobilization of former fighting forces. The State Department’s budget often is stressed, as it tries to fund efforts that range from regionally-based and UN-led peace operations and bilateral training for such missions in Africa, as well as work on peace negotiations and democratic reforms, development and another dozen missions. There is coordination between the two, but that’s not easily transparent to outside viewers.  And there are plenty of gaps in US policy as well.

So why not try to make the US approach to Africa more coherent?  US security and humanitarian concerns are directly connected: instability begets instability, and humanitarian crises are exacerbated by conflict.  Addressing conflict – whether terrorism or marauding rebels – requires a clearer and more thoughtful approach at a time of US resources and focus in other regions taking priority. Is countering terrorism the main driver? We need to have a discussion about where our resources do – and don’t – go.  

A still-timely 2005 report by an independent task force chaired by Anthony Lake and Christine Todd Whitman for the Council on Foreign Relations made this point clear last year, calling for a US approach that was “more than humanitarianism” and ably recognized the many areas of US concern.  

Second, the US military is already working in Africa and a new command could bring better focus to its efforts across the board. Rather than create excuses for new missions and funding, a new Command could bring a better way for US policymakers to track the varied programs and approaches.  This could also centralize planning for specific operations in Africa, such as support to a strengthened peacekeeping force in Darfur.  And it could give those of us on the outside one place to go to get answers.

Arkin suggests that “Our adversaries and the skeptics of American power will just see it all as another example of empire and military domination in the making.”  This may be true – and that is a criticism worth airing anyway. The US is already in Africa, but it is dispersed. 

A new command might not be a bad way to drive coherence, and the hearings Congress should hold on the idea would be an excellent vehicle to bring clarity to US goals for the continent, the resources available, and the strategy to meet those goals.  

Perhaps, too, it could bring some clarity to US policy toward troubled regions – whether Sudan or Somalia.  Let’s ask the Armed Services Committee to invite the Foreign Relations Committee members to join them in joint hearings, and see if a whole-of-government approach to the continent is articulated. 

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The current SG Kofi Annan has served for ten years at the helm of the UN – and what a ride it has been for him and the world.  What do we know of Annan’s decade, and what does that suggest for what lies ahead?

A new book gives us an intimate view of those years.  James Traub, a contributor to The New York Times Magazine, has written a highly-readable history of the Secretary-General’s era, The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American Power. My colleagues Rick Barton and Karin von Hippel at CSIS, with Peter Gantz of Refugees International, hosted Traub this week, which included a lively discussion with many of us.

The book combines skepticism about the UN as an organization with vigorous reporting about the individuals who bring the institution and its ideals to life.  Some US names are familiar – Richard Holbrooke figures prominently, as do Senator Jesse Helms and Ambassador John Bolton. But he also profiles key personalities within the UN and those, both famous and not, who have worked to halt genocide, to argue for change, and to push for modernization of its creaky ways.  Traub had access, and his book is told as a fly-on-the-wall for many pivotal crises of the last ten years: What happened in Somalia, Rwanda, the Balkans and Sierra Leone? What is the story of Afghanistan and Iraq? Politics are covered too, including the SG’s effort to bring reform, to recast sovereignty to have responsibilities, and to deal with the Oil-for-Food scandal.  

As for the Washington world, Traub covers our intense fight with ourselves over the US role in the world, and at the UN.   I know this story well, and he got much of it right, including meetings I was in on Capitol Hill and at the UN during the arguments over peacekeeping operations and US arrears.   Who else knows about Senator Helms’ trip and speech to the Security Council, and then his resultant hosting of the Ambassadors on the Council in Washington in 2000? 

What will happen next in Iraq or Afghanistan is not known, but without Annan, the unknowns are greater.  Traub is also right to offer a cautionary tale of the importance of engaging at the UN, warts and all, to support US interests.  The next US Ambassador to the UN should read this book.

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So with this in mind I flipped open this month’s Foreign Policy magazine, drawn to a memo by Joshua Muravchik of the American Enterprise Institute on “Operation Comeback” addressed to “my fellow neoconservatives,” presented as a critical analysis for the way forward.

Given the upcoming Vanity Fair interviews with Richard Perle and Ken Adelman, who is quoted as saying that neoconservatism “is dead, at least for a generation. After Iraq…’it’s not going to sell,’” this could be part of an interesting dialogue.

But that’s not exactly what is offered – its more chilling. Written before the elections, Muravchik argues that neocons must learn from their mistakes – perhaps they underestimated how large a force was needed in Iraq – but then suggests that much of the problem is the neocon reliance on politicians to carry out their ideas. President Bush “took the path we wanted, but the policies are achieving uncertain success. His popularity has plummeted.” The ideas are sound, its just the messenger that’s flopped.

Next “neocon hero” Rumsfeld is criticized gently for an over-fixation on high tech, not human capacities. Instead, add more military forces, put Karl Rove and James Carville in charge of US support for Middle East moderates, and train US Foreign Service officers in the war of ideas, like those in the 1940s & 1950s who “learned their political skills…fighting commies in the labor unions.”

Now, having cleared up the critiques of neocon ideas (i.e., it’s the messenger!) Muravchik aims squarely at the future: Bomb Iran before the end of Bush’s term. “Even if things in Iraq get better, a nuclear-armed Iran will negate any progress there. Nothing will embolden terrorists and jihadists more than a nuclear-armed Iran.”

Wait — he doesn’t explain any more about how to do this. The biggest worry? Expect an outcry from MoveOn.org, he counsels. 

Hold on, there is a way forward for bipartisan foreign policy. Draft Joe Lieberman as the Republican VP since the “Democrats have already shown that they are incurably addicted to appeasement, while the ‘realists’ among the GOP are hoping to undo the legacy of George W. Bush.”

Yikes. I’m not sure who this memo is really aimed at, since neo-cons should be in step already and the rest of us will be excused for being confused. Commies and appeasement? Bomb Iran? The lack of offering more on this topic in the context of Iraq is surprising. While the piece is short, no options for addressing North Korea, China or Sudan is odd. When smart writers at AEI offers ideas like these, they can garner attention from policymakers and Congress. The debate over intervention, and the new Congress, both deserve better.  

PS Worth reading: Doug Farah and Stephen Braun on the systems of smuggling and arms trade that keeps so many conflicts humming along, thanks to international arms merchants like Viktor Bout, a subject worthy of future discussion.

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Given this blog’s effort to bring together voices and experts with different points of view, I thought that the Washington Post article by Shankar Vedantam, “Why Everyone You Know Thinks the Same as You,” (Monday, October 15) offers a challenge to us by saying how we are drawn to groups that think more like us than we may want to admit – even in non-political environments.

Do people reading this blog have friends who are politically different?

As a new election day looms, this question is important.  The power structure in Congress could well shift.  It may already be changing from red to blue in Kansas.

The idea of this blog is that we don’t all think alike.  And big issues require working together – North Korea and Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan – for example.  But we’re fighting the odds. The article points out:

“Studies show that most people interested in politics associate nearly exclusively with others who have similar political beliefs. In fact, research by sociologist David Knoke at the University of Minnesota shows that if you know whether a person’s friends are Republicans, Democrats or independents, you can predict with near certainty that person’s political views.”

Seems the researchers think this gap is dangerous, and not just because it dims bipartisanship: “In politics, for example, the fact that people rarely have friends with different views makes it difficult to seek common ground or to examine one’s positions closely.”

When I worked in the House, I learned early that nothing moved legislatively without coalitions, and the odder and more bipartisan the better.  I sat in on New York delegation meetings, where the members – some of the greatest personalities in the Congress – argued loudly but came out with a common agenda. One Senate staffer and I became good friends after mutual questions about NY defense  contractors’ (sometimes crazy) ideas led to earnest, long-winded debates about deterrence theory, the Soviet threat, and good government, even though our bosses were political opposites.  We got a lot of work done.

One of my Congressional bosses did wonderful coalition building in the House gym, a break from more political spaces.  After one workout, he came back with a cosponsor for one of his more audacious anti-pork efforts – that of a young Republican maverick who went on to chair a major committee.  (I think we won the floor amendment as well.)

I think the key is trust.  If we don’t know and trust those with whom we disagree, it makes it much harder to take their arguments seriously or work together.  Sure, we are all drawn to those who think like us, and, care about similar goals.  We should fight for what we believe in.  But the issues we face today require collaboration and more trust across many aisles, in Congress and at the Y, if bipartisanship is to survive.     

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She continued:

If the notion of the “responsibility to protect” that we all agreed to last year – if the notion of the responsibility to protect the weakest and most powerless among us is ever to be more than an empty promise, then we must take action in Darfur. This is a profound test for the international community, and we must show that we are equal to it.

Strong words. But she didn’t answer her own challenge, namely, how should the international community both respect the sovereignty of Sudan and yet not stand for the on-going violence in Darfur? What is the plan? Sending UN peacekeepers to Darfur is not just hard for the obvious reasons – a difficult environment, huge area, lack of funds and troops – but because it is ill-equipped to act when a sovereign power opposes its entry. That’s just as challenging when the United States has declared the situation genocide.

If this is a “profound test,” then the Administration has an obligation to offer options and backing.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee should ask UN Ambassador John Bolton these questions on Thursday (September 28), when he appears before them as their hearing witness on “Darfur: Prospects for Peace.” [UPDATE 9/26: Hearing abruptly cancelled! Hmm.] Senator Biden has called for a no-fly zone, along with Committee colleagues Senators Voinovich, Dodd, Chafee, Feingold, Coleman, Nelson and Kerry. Does the Administration support a no-fly zone? How about forceful intervention despite resistance from Khartoum? Doubling humanitarian aid? Giving the African Union forces there increased air assets and support?

These are hard questions that need answers. The Senate just unanimously passed sanctions on Sudan. But that doesn’t answer the Rice questions: what does she recommend the US do to “take action in Darfur”?

Chris Preble’s recent post here about realist thinking is quite related, actually. I appreciate his argument to apply more rationale thought to American foreign policy, such as what will – and will not – work with Iran. He argues against false dichotomies – such as bomb Iran or do nothing. What would he and his colleagues argue we should do in Sudan, and specifically in Darfur? What do realists think about other, sticky not-war, not-peace uses of diplomacy, blue paint and military forces, namely UN peace operations? Is a genocide worthy of an intervention or should the US only support operations where the goal may be easier to achieve, such as in Liberia or Timor (might)?

Peace operations deserve some hard thinking, real attention and genuine support to succeed. I fear that US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan will lead some Americans to decide that the US (and thus, other nations) don’t know how to do post-conflict operations, can’t do peacekeeping, and shouldn’t try.

But for now, for Sudan, Rice should address these questions and offer a real plan for Darfur. In doing so, she should point out that post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping missions worldwide are not likely to end any time soon – and that foreign policy experts of all persuasions should engage in useful thinking about how to make the chances for their success in Sudan and elsewhere much more likely.

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Great topics. Important questions. Bipartisan views. Much brainpower from experts with broad experience and knowledge, many DC-based. Just one thing about these polls: They are based nearly completely on interviews with men. Over the course of five polls, it is striking that only five women are named, total, as participants, according to the magazine’s website. 

I noticed this disparity after reading the absorbing September issue on a flight home, especially the worth-reading “Declaring Victory” by James Fallows, about the US war on terror. Pieces on Presidential doodles and the development of the Wikipedia universe were both engaging. Then I found the Poll on a “Nuclear Iran” where it asked: Do you believe there is any set of incentives and economic sanctions that could persuade Iran to give up its quest for nuclear weapons? I noticed the list of those polled; two of the 38 were women. That’s about 5% participation. I was surprised. I checked the past polls by the magazine. The ratio of women got only a bit higher. [Their May poll wasn’t on foreign policy.]

So what’s up with the lack of woman experts included in The Atlantic’s re-occurring Poll group?  (They post the list in the magazine and for subscribers.)

There is a real gender visibility gap – many public forums on foreign affairs and defense have few women in prominent positions. This is more than a hunch. A report last year calculated that women guests on the five major Sunday morning news talks, for example, were never more than 20% of those appearing per show, and often much less; male guests appeared roughly over 82% to 89% of the time.

Certainly there are greater numbers of men in the circles of former government officials and with international and foreign policy expertise from which to draw. But still – women make up half the population. Plenty have substantive experience and knowledge from serving in high positions of government and Congress, as well as scholars and experts at think tanks, and in the military and business.

Professional organizations like Women in International Security (WIIS) and the Women’s Foreign Policy Group demonstrate that there are ample numbers of women leaders with expertise and experience on a vast array of subjects. The WIIS database, for example, offers over 200 people (mostly women) with expertise on the Middle East alone. The Women’s Foreign Policy Group offers a long list of the top female leaders serving in the United States, internationally and at the United Nations. 

Their insights should be tapped and offered publicly for commentary, analysis and political counsel. Editors, why not benefit from their knowledge next time? 

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