Last Friday, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a direct rebuke to Iran’s nuclear program, demanding that Iran cease construction of a new enrichment plant.  The final tally on the censure was 25-3, with Russia and China casting critical votes in favor of the motion.  Iran responded to the vote by suggesting that it might withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Maybe that would be a good thing.  No one in the Obama Administration would ever say that Iran withdrawing from the NPT is one of the U.S.’s policy goals, but it might just be the best achievable outcome.  I don’t see a problem if our engagement policy pushes Iran out of the NPT.

Of course, our main objective is a reversal in Iranian policy.  We want Iran to admit that it has been pursuing a nuclear weapons program and then verifiably dismantle it.  The Obama Administration is willing to engage directly with the Iranians to make this happen.  The problem is that, given Iran’s history of stalling public negotiations to buy time for covert nuclear programs, there is no reason to believe that the Iranians are going to change.

However, Obama’s engagement policy can be successful with either a positive or a negative response from Iran to our offers.  This is because by offering to engage Iran we are actually engaging Russia, China and the rest of the international community.  The more Iran spurns U.S. and global engagement, the most extreme instance of which would be withdrawal from the NPT, the closer our position aligns to necessary allies.  Russia and China’s votes on the IAEA censure are a clear sign that this is already happening.

Withdrawal from the NPT would make it very difficult for Russia to continue its civil nuclear collaboration with Iran.   China and other countries would also have to rethink trade relationships because though they would prefer to ignore Iran’s nuclear ambitions, none of them actually wants to be the exporter that directly enables Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.  To be deeply cynical for a moment, it could be said that Iran’s NPT membership has served to provide cover for other countries that wish to believe that Iran only seeks a civilian nuclear capability without affecting Iran’s ability to move toward a nuclear weapons capability.

I’m not sure that Iran’s withdrawal would hurt the treaty itself either.  The fact that Iran is a signatory is often cited as a reason the NPT is flawed.  And having Iran at the table for all NPT negotiations and decisions has made it nearly impossible in recent years to achieve anything from within the parameters of the Treaty.  When North Korea withdrew, there was much hand wringing, but ultimately the NPT did not change, nor did the obligations felt by most of the signatories.  I do not believe that Iran’s withdrawal would cause a cascade effect of other countries withdrawing.  Instead, it would make the Treaty seem more honest.  Iran would be clearly identified as outside international norms and could be dealt with accordingly.

In the end, Iran is unlikely to pull out of the Treaty.  They must realize that all of their arguments for the inherent right to a civilian nuclear program are built around being a signatory.  The worst outcome for the Obama engagement policy would be for the Iranians to successfully continue to stonewall, as they have done to the Europeans for years.  Therefore, engagement cannot be about pulling the Iranians into prolonged negotiations.  Instead, engagement must be viewed as an opportunity to present a series of reasonable options, such as the recent proposal to enrich Iran’s uranium abroad, that the Iranians will either choose to accept or reject.  As they are discovering, it is more costly to say no to an outstretched American hand than it is to rail against perceived U.S. belligerence.

So, I say let’s be aggressive in our engagement policy, both by offering new solutions that other countries that get behind and maintaining real deadlines for the Iranians to respond.  If we push hard enough, maybe we can force the Iranians to make a rash decision that will finally bring their true nuclear intentions into the sunlight and create an effective international coalition to oppose them.

No related posts.

Two recent blog posts by John Pomfret over at the Washington Post got me thinking about how much more complicated China’s position on North Korea has become since the beginning of the Obama Administration.

As Pomfret points out in his May 27 post, for many years the U.S. has been waiting for China to solve the North Korea problem without realizing that our goals are not aligned.

First, there’s a silly assumption in Washington that our interests (no nukes in North Korea) are the same as China’s. But they’re not. China’s first interest in North Korea is making sure the Kim regime doesn’t collapse. China’s second interest? Making sure the Kim regime doesn’t collapse. From Beijing’s perspective, nukes in North Korea rank somewhere around 10th.

Pomfret goes on to give a great explanation about why regime change is the real threat to China.  At the end of the day, as long as the DPRK could be coaxed to the negotiating table, China was satisfied that it was not falling apart.

Then, a few days later, in a June 6 post, we get the following from Pomfret:

There are surprising noises coming from China these days about North Korea. One influential Chinese academic thinks China’s policy — long supportive of the hermit kingdom — might be changing.

So, what happened in less than a week?  Has China finally realized that no nukes is their number one priority?  Not exactly.  Turns out China, as evidenced by the Zhu Feng article that Pomfret is referring to,  may be realizing that the regime in Pyongyang is not interested in negotiations and doesn’t care what Beijing thinks.

If in fact this is true, the Obama Administration should get the credit for forcing this incipient shift within China.  Not because of its own North Korea policy, of course.  I don’t think that Obama has any more of a clue about how to change North Korea than Bush or Clinton did before him.  The difference between this Administration and the previous two is a distinct disdain for drama.

Bottom line is that by not overreacting to the latest string of DPRK provocations, the Obama Administration is keeping the spotlight on North Korea where it belongs.  Let’s be honest — the Bush Administration was prone to answering the North Koreans’ insanity with a little crazy talk of its  own.  This gave China the cover it needed to consider the problem to be a case of two unreasonable sides that needed it to play peacemaker in the middle.  But when one side starts stops inciting the other, and the other reacts by increasing its irrational behavior, China starts to lose face in the process.  No longer is Beijing the reasonable party standing between two unreasonable countries — suddenly it is the patron of the only country unwilling to sit down at the table.

Like I said, none of this suggests that Obama knows how to solve the DPRK problem (or for that matter the Iran problem or the Cuba problem, etc.).  What it does suggest is that maybe the Administration has learned an important lesson from the last two Administrations:  the first step to solving these intractable problems may be to avoid any reasonable suggestion that the source of the problem is the U.S. itself.

No related posts.

From day one, there has been rampant speculation about what will test Obama on foreign policy.  Iran and North Korea come up frequently as countries that could force Obama into a crisis situation.  However, I think that another country may be the real test of the fledgling Obama doctrine:  Burma.

Aung San Suu Kyi went on trial last week.  Her crime is allowing an American trespasser, John Yettaw, who swam to her isolated house uninvited, to spend a night in her guest room.  This violated the rules of her house arrest, which she has been under for years.  The house arrest was about to end and conventional wisdom holds that the Burmese generals who rule the country would have trumped up some reason to keep her under lock and key.  Yettaw just saved them the trouble of having to make something up.

The U.S. has condemned the trial, just as we have condemned every action by the ruling junta since they took control of the country decades ago.  The Administration also announced that sanctions would continue on Burma for at least another year, by which time I assume the announced U.S. review of Burma policy will be complete.  The question is what could possibly change.

There are no push factors with Burma.  It is not a national security threat to us.  There is no direct threat to an ally in the region.  If anything, Burma’s neighbors have agreed to either live with the status quo or actively support it.  ASEAN countries have bent over backwards to maintain their position of non-interference in domestic affairs of member states.  China is as close to a patron as Burma has, but even that relationship is more about geographic convenience that real strategic importance.  That said, a stepped up U.S. campaign to change Burma would certainly only raise the profile of the country in China’s eyes.

There may not be a push factor, but there is definitely a pull to do something.  There is strong bipartisan agreement on Burma.  It is an easy one, after all.  A democratically elected government was never seated due to military intervention.  There is no grey area on this one.  A tenable plan to change Burma would have broad support across the political spectrum.  The problem is that the strategy that most agree on is to continue the sanctions and tough talk.

And that is why Burma is a true test of Obama’s foreign policy.  The Administration has clearly stated its interest in talking to enemies and friends alike.  Engagement is a key element of the Obama Doctrine (and as far as I can tell the only one elaborated so far).  So is the Obama Administration going to open up an official dialogue with the Burmese junta?  Is there anything to talk about?  How does a policy of engagement handle a test case where the only positive outcome is to replace the sitting government that you are engaging?

A former Bush Administration official recently wrote a piece for the Far Eastern Economic Review defending the Bush policies.  Usually I don’t pay a lot of attention to former officials doing legacy control, but this article struck me.  You can sense the frustration of dealing with Burma.  The article claims some success, but it is hard to see where as Aung San Suu Kyi is on the verge of being permanently moved from house arrest to prison and there is no sign of the junta losing control of the country.  The bottom line is that, while Burma should have been a candidate for action under Bush’s freedom agenda, it never rose to the top of the agenda. The question is whether Obama’s engagement doctrine will place Burma any higher on the to-do list.  Somehow I doubt it.  I hope I’m wrong. whatever it is zac brown band mp3

No related posts.

As we near the end of Obama’s first 100 days, it would be hard to argue that this Administration has been reticent about stating its policies on national security and foreign policy issues.  We’ve heard major policy announcements on Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Russia, climate change and nuclear proliferation, just to name a few of the big fish that have been thrown onto the crowded frying pan.  And given the number of high-profile officials that have been named to coordinate key challenges, it seems that President Obama is looking to put his name in the Guinness Book of World Records under “most special envoys named.”

Yet, despite what has been a relatively forthright presentation of policy shifts on many other issues, the Administration continues to be relatively restrained on changing policy toward Cuba.  True, the Administration is lifting some restrictions, but that is small potatoes when you’re starting from a trade embargo, which apparently is not open for debate.

On April 17, Obama will meet with his counterparts from the Western Hemisphere at the Summit of the Americas.  Cuba will not be in attendance, and the Administration has gone so far as to point out that Cuba is not on the agenda.  It is clear that the President will hear a lot about Cuba and say very little.  The question is why.

There is some political cover for Obama to move boldly to dramatically increase engagement with Cuba.  Senator Richard Lugar has publicly supported such a move.  Senator Mike Enzi co-sponsored the bill to lift travel restrictions.  The House bill on lifting travel restrictions also has sponsors from both parties, which seems to be a rare accomplishment these days.  The Cuban American National Foundation now pretty much declares current U.S. policy a failure.  And a recent CNN poll shows nearly three-quarters of Americans supporting diplomatic relations with Cuba.

So, again, the question — why isn’t there a more robust Cuba policy?  Quite simply, because there doesn’t need to be.

It might seem quite obvious to observers that the embargo does not achieve its stated goals.  It may be clear that we have never managed to isolate Cuba or destabilize the Castro government.  It is possible that everyone in the Obama Administration, most of the Congress and a majority of the general public believe that Cuba policy should be changed.  And you know what — it just doesn’t matter.

Cuba is not a national security threat.  Cuba is not a foreign policy problem.  Though many leaders at the Summit of Americas may try to convince Obama otherwise, our Cuba policy does not have much effect on our relationships with other countries.  Despite some convoluted assertions by U.S. Government officials over the years, Cuba is not a source of terrorists or WMD.  Cuba can be ignored.

What is Cuba then?  Using Administration calculus, a likely political liability that is better left alone.  Cuba is the grand gesture that could tie up the Obama Administration in a media frenzy for weeks.  Any bold action on Cuba could threaten to delay or even derail countless other more pressing foreign policy objectives.

After all, you don’t get those poll numbers (or support in Congress) if the debate becomes about supporting the Castro brothers.  I would strongly urge those in Congress who want a change in Cuba policy to stay home rather than heading out on codels to Havana.  Supporters of the embargo — which also happen to be a bipartisan group — will scorch the earth to keep the policy, and every photo op taken with someone named Castro helps them rile up their base.  Though Obama has done a good job surrounding himself with foreign policy stalwarts, he is still relatively new at the game himself.  I’m sure his staff is not interested in giving political opponents a chance to use “President Obama” and “soft on dictators” together in a sentence.

So the lack of a wide-reaching new Cuba policy may be nothing more than the Obama Administration deciding it has too many other things to do to waste political capital defending a policy shift that is sound but will not actually make that much of a difference in terms of making the U.S. safer or stronger.  There are no consequences to taking no action on Cuba, regardless of how ineffective and outdated the current policy may be.

So is Cuba worth it?  I guess not.

Maybe next year?

No related posts.

The latest trend in media coverage of the Obama Administration seems to be to ask variations on the question, “Is he doing too much?” Most of these stories focus on the ambitious domestic agenda, but the scope of the suggested foreign policy overhaul, particularly when it comes to rethinking bilateral relationships, is no less dizzying.

Less than two months into the Administration, President Obama and Secretary Clinton have telegraphed their intention to change the landscape surrounding some of our most troubled relationships.  Clinton went to China on her first trip and emphasized cooperation over conflict.  Just a couple of weeks later, she sat down with her Russian counterpart and pledged to “reset” the relationship, despite handing FM Lavrov a red button that read “overload” in Russian.  While in Israel, Clinton dispatched two envoys to talk to Syria.  Same trip — invitation extended to Iran to sit down in the same room with Clinton and discuss Afghanistan.  Now, throw in the Congressional changes to the Cuba travel policy that Obama has supported.

For those scoring at home, that’s one member of the Axis of Evil, two A of E wannabes and our two biggest headaches on the Security Council.  I’ve personally blogged about the need to reach out to Iran, Syria and Cuba, and PSA recently put out a statement about renewing the U.S.-Russia relationship.  So I would humbly suggest to the media that the question is not whether Obama is doing too much, it is whether any of the other countries will respond as he hopes they will.

There is a question of moral hazard here.  When presented with an open hand, will these countries see any consequences in responding with a clenched fist?  After Bush’s belligerence, will they view Obama’s openness as a free pass to do as they wish?  They may view the transition to Obama in the U.S. as insulation from any real risk regardless of their actions.

You may notice that I haven’t mentioned North Korea yet.  The DPRK is also on Obama’s to-do list and provides an early example of the pushback the Administration should expect.  Just the wiff of an olive branch in the air seems to have riled them up, leading to an announcement of a missile launch and accusations that the U.S. is planning to invade.  True, the DPRK is the crazy uncle of the Axis of Evil, so it’s hard to extrapolate anything from its behavior.  Still, while the other countries mentioned do a somewhat better job of presenting a diplomatic face to the world, all of them have also made political hay over the years out of being in opposition to the U.S.  Those habits will be hard to break.  Already, Cuba is reportedly considering letting Russia use its bases for strategic bombers.  Iran has said the U.S. must change to have successful negotiations.  All of these countries are testing the waters, trying to determine exactly what the Obama Administration will be willing to do if rebuffed.

For eight years, the world has dealt with a Bush Administration whose negotiating tactics managed to make carrots look like orange-colored sticks.  In contrast, the Obama Administration runs the risk of seeming a little too eager to please.  Their efforts are not going to be any more effective than Bush’s if the folks sitting on the other side of the table believe that there aren’t any sticks at all.

Threats and bullying did not change these countries over the past eight years, but four years of polite conversation won’t be any better.   When the Obama Administration gets these countries behind closed doors, the negotiators need to be a little more forthcoming about the consequences of refusing to play ball.  After all, we still want these countries to change.  And these countries still don’t want to change.  With the Bush Administration, there was always the implicit threat of military action against rogue states, a threat that became impotent after the mismanagement of Iraq.  Obama is going to need a different set of sticks.

Maybe the answer is that he can use his current popularity worldwide to push our allies (and almost-allies such as Russia and China) to join us in truly turning the screws on the rogue states through a unified front of sanctions and economic isolation.  Otherwise you may see most of these countries deciding that there is more benefit to saying no to the U.S. than yes.

No related posts.

After the House passed the stimulus bill without a single Republican vote last month, many declared the age of bipartisanship under the Obama Administration over.  How quickly the pundits and the talking heads who hailed the bipartisanship of the new President trumpeted its demise.

So, is President Obama bipartisan or isn’t he?  Everyone wants the answer and they want it now.  The media is tracking bipartisanship as if it can be quantified issue by issue and moment to moment.  This betrays a fundamental misunderstanding about what bipartisanship is and why it is important.

Bipartisanship is not a sound bite.

Bipartisanship does not occur during a press conference.  It doesn’t happen in front of the cameras.  True bipartisanship happens out of sight.  It doesn’t mean going to a meeting with the other party, only to step outside the room to accuse them of not acceding to your demands.  The results of bipartisan cooperation show up in legislation and policy and, yes, on the news, only after the heavy lifting has been done behind the scenes over a long period of time.

Bipartisanship is not a campaign promise.

Every Administration starts off with statements about bipartisanship because it is a great part of a stump speech, particularly in a national election.  After all, the President represents all the American people, so of course he needs to work with all of their elected representatives.  But we should never confuse rhetoric with action.  We need policymakers, not PR flacks.

Bipartisanship is not a negotiating strategy.

Bipartisanship must start with an idea, not a text.  It is not one side making edits to the other side’s words.  It is two parties collaborating to achieve the best outcome.  But instead, in Washington, one party writes a bill and then claims to be leading a bipartisan effort when they ask the other party to comment on it.  Accusing each other of not being bipartisan is not the way to create a successful environment for discussing key policy disagreements.

So what is bipartisanship?

Bipartisanship is trust.

Politicians used to build relationships with members of the other party.  They used to get to know each other even if they disagreed with each other.  True bipartisanship requires the ability to be frank and honest in discussions without worrying that your words will be used against you an hour later on cable news or talk radio.

Bipartisanship is respect.

Bipartisanship does not mean that one side yields to the other on core principles.  It means that both sides listen and truly try to understand why the other side believes what they do.  It does not mean that one side automatically agrees with the other.  It means that both sides enter the room honoring the fact that the other side has an opinion worth considering.

Bipartisanship is a process.

It doesn’t happen because a new President comes into the White House.  It doesn’t happen because that President makes a trip to Capitol Hill.  It happens because good policy takes into consideration all points of view.  It happens over time when the leadership and rank-and-file of both parties meet on a regular basis, not because they need to solve the crisis of the moment, but because they know they’ll need to work together on the challenges of tomorrow and the day after that.

All of these points may seem obvious.  Yet, in practice there are few politicians making the effort to craft truly bipartisan legislation these days.  Why?   Because, unfortunately, bipartisanship is the antithesis of politics, which is what makes it so hard to accomplish in Washington.  In a world where the next campaign begins as soon as the last one ends, there is no time to stop being a politician and start being a policymaker.  It is much easier to score points on partisan differences than it is to work together to craft truly bipartisan legislation and policy.

But some challenges — foreign policy, national security, the economy — are too important to allow partisan bickering to interfere with concrete solutions.  Our problems right now are too great to be solved by either party working alone.

It doesn’t take an Idiot or a Dummy to figure that out.

No related posts.

In our WMD Report Card, PSA strongly supported this new position and made the following recommendations:

Put someone in charge. There is a critical need for a top-level official with authority to make government-wide decisions on funding and programs.  Someone needs to be responsible for turning our resolve into results.

Build the blueprint. We need a strategic plan that links all existing programs together, prioritizes funding across the Federal Government, and coordinates implementation.  We can no longer afford to hope that our patchwork of programs and initiatives will naturally cohere into an effective whole.

Samore does not have an easy task ahead of him.  The programs in question are spread out across multiple Departments, including State, Defense, Energy and Homeland Security.  Secretaries Clinton, Gates, Chu and Napolitano will each have their own strong ideas about how to move forward on preventing WMD terrorism and proliferation.  This isn’t just herding cats — this is herding lions.

Obama needs to make it clear that all issues related to WMD terrorism and proliferation need to pass through the new office.  The key players need to believe that their concerns won’t hit Obama’s desk unless they hit Samore’s first.  The easiest way to do this, beyond allowing Samore visible access to the Oval Office, is to give the WMD Coordinator’s office a real role in the budget process.

By putting the WMD Coordinator within the NSC, the Administration will avoid Senate confirmation, but it also risks sending the message that Samore is actually not the top official on the issue.  If signals are sent that Samore is merely another of James Jones’ lieutenants, will the aforementioned Secretaries listen to him?  After all, both the Clinton and Bush Adminstrations had NSC officials in charge of these issues, but none of them were considered government-wide coordinators.

To succeed, Samore will also need to define his role as the Coordinator clearly.  There is great potential here for a combination of mission creep and mission uncertainty.  This office should not be involved in administering the the day-to-day minutiae of the wide variety of programs that touch on WMD proliferation and terrorism.   The office should be aware of all those programs and be deeply involved in setting the overall priorities and funding levels that will allow them to accomplish their goals, but not necessarily clearing every minor program change and set of talking points.  Samore also cannot let his staff get bogged down in trying to have a voice on the “hot” nonpro issues of the day.  Iran, North Korea, Pakistan — all of these crucial issues already have their own heavy hitter coordinators appointed.  Again, Samore should be involved in the big picture on these, but he can’t get drawn into a bureaucratic food fight over control of these issues.

So what does that leave as Samore’s responsibilities?  Simple.  As PSA recommended, someone needs to create a strategic plan, a blueprint for achieving the overall goal of preventing terrorists from gaining access to WMD capabilities.  To this end, it is important that the new office resist the label of “czar” and all the baggage that accompanies it.  The WMD Coordinator needs to be a partner, not a dictator.  Samore will be the one official in the U.S. Government who has no competing interests other than to ensure that we employ, to quote the 9/11 Commission, “maximum effort” against WMD proliferation and terrorism.  Samore will need to be an honest broker in setting the direction of the policy and a tireless advocate in prioritizing it for the Departments, the Agencies, NSC, OMB, our international partners and the President himself.

My final piece of advice for the new WMD Coordinator and President Obama is to study the history and the current operations of the Office of National Drug Control Policy.  This independent agency is both part of the White House and separate from it.  It was set up to coordinate efforts on a key national security priority.  And ONDCP has some budget authority, including reprogramming of funds.  Unfortunately, the National Drug Control Budget as it has become known is little more than a PR exercise.  The drug budget is useful resource about U.S. Government efforts, certainly, but not the strategic plan that I hope Samore can create for WMD programs.  The ONDCP budget is a record of policy rather than a proactive hand in it.  And the ONDCP Director is an often-ignored czar rather than a critical coordinator.

All in all, the creation of this office and the appointment of Samore are promising signs.  Now, we can only hope that the actuality of the position meets the potential as described by the 9/11 Commission, Congress, PSA, and countless others who have supported this concept.  After all, the White House says “the gravest danger to the American people is the threat of a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon and the spread of nuclear weapons to dangerous regimes.”  That’s the big stick that Samore can wield as he walks softly into the new Administration.  Let’s hope Obama gives him the real authority to use it.

No related posts.

The situation in Gaza is going to force the Obama Administration to focus on the Middle East earlier that might have been planned.  Israeli ground troops in Gaza ensures that the conflict will continue past the inauguration.  Calls for Obama to step in immediately to broker peace will be loud and persistent.  My advice to the President-elect is to ignore them.

Getting Israelis and Palestinians to sit down together is a nearly impossible task in the best of times.  In the heat of a conflict or even in the immediate aftermath, I would argue that any meaningful negotiations are unachievable.  Patience is going to be key for Obama.  At this point, there is no choice but to help end the current conflict and then let some time pass until the real work can begin again.

In the meantime, however, there is a great deal of work to be done to achieve peace in the Middle East that does not involve the Palestinian situation directly.  For three decades, there has been slow but steady progress toward building a stable Middle East.  The threat of a full-scale regional war has been diminishing as peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, less belligerent relations with Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries and the regime change in Iraq have all significantly changed the geopolitical landscape for Israel.  Putting aside the Palestinians (which, as you might be beginning to suspect, is the last piece of the puzzle in my mind), that leaves Israeli relations with Iran and Syria as the remaining major obstacles.  Taking the next step through Damascus, rather than Tehran, seems obvious to me.

Trying to move the ball on Middle East peace through Iran isn’t going to work.  The U.S.  needs to talk directly to Iran for a variety of reasons, but improving regional stability isn’t one of them.  Iran has no interest in improving the security situation for Israel.  I have pushed for the U.S. to talk directly to Iran, but for different reasons.  Quite simply, we need to talk to Iran to contain Iran, both by understanding our adversary better and by showing necessary allies such as the EU and Russia that we are making real diplomatic efforts.

Syria, however, is not Iran.  The Assad regime does not have hegemonic aspirations to dominate the region.  It is mainly interested in domestic stability and maintaining power.  Also, Syria has a largely secular government that lacks the religious fervor that underpins so many of Iran’s actions.  Perhaps most important, though, is that Assad seems ready to talk.  Syria has already agreed to an informal process through Turkey to talk to Israel.  Back in April 2008, Assad was even quoted as saying that peace talks could occur under a new U.S. President, long before anyone knew who that President would be.  Although the events in Gaza have led Syria to pull back from the Turkey talks, the door still appears to be open to a committed Obama Administration effort.

Danielle Pletka argues in the New York Times that peace with Syria won’t work because the Assad regime needs to be a pariah state to survive.  I disagree.  Assad must have come to the conclusion that there might be a better way in order to accept the Turkey initiative.  After all, there aren’t many benefits to being a farm club for the Axis of Evil.  And having Iran as your only true ally cannot be comforting.

If Assad has been looking around for a model among his peer group on how to survive, I suspect he has focused a great deal on Qadaffi.  Libya took the grand bargain with the U.S. and so far it seems to be working out pretty well for Qadaffi’s rule.  He has maintained power and put an end to U.S. sanctions.  Given that Libya was caught red-handed with a WMD program, Assad has to think that he can get an even better deal than Qadaffi.  This doesn’t even take into account the fact that a peace agreement with Israel comes standard with huge economic benefits both in trade and foreign aid (see Egypt and Jordan).

Changing the U.S. relationship with Syria and brokering an Israel-Syria peace agreement will require a great deal of effort, but as Aaron David Miller points out in the Washington Post, it is easier than wading into the Palestinian conflict.

Miller also points out that engaging Syria further isolates Iran.  Even more important than driving a wedge between the countries, starting a serious effort with Syria sends a strong message to Iran that it is not our only priority in the region.  There has been so much focus on the U.S.-Iran relationship that I think it is important to remind Iran that we will not allow them to become the pivotal player in Middle East dynamics.

Engagement with Syria would also be an opportunity to show the Arab world that the U.S. has a new policy in the region.  Taking steps to improve relations and address Syria’s regional concerns should resonate far more on the Arab street than any engagement with Iran.  If Arab governments begin to view the U.S. as a more honest broker, an Israeli-Palestinian agreement seems a little more likely.

One thing that hasn’t been discussed much is that the Obama Administration is also going to have to establish its bilateral relationship with Israel.  Any agenda that involves peace in the Middle East — and you have to assume that Obama’s does, just as it was on the wish list for each of the last five Administrations — will require Israeli arm-twisting.  Working with Israel on an agreement with Syria would be a better place to start than a Palestinian deal since the issues are far less emotional and raw.

Finally, Syria offers the Obama Administration the opportunity to make a significant symbolic break from the Bush Administration.  Before the Iraq War, conventional wisdom held that the neocons wanted to start in Baghdad, then hit Damascus en route to Tehran.  Obama can follow the same road through the Middle East, heading to Syria next with diplomacy rather than military action.

No related posts.

Iran is going to get the bomb.  More and more that seems to be the consensus view in Washington.  Despite speeches by both Bush and Obama that state without equivocation that this is “unacceptable,” the pessimistic view based on Iranian actions and the ineffective global reaction is that the outcome is inevitable.  Iran’s own statements only add fuel to the fire.

I was still skeptical, however, until I attended an AEI event last week where John Bolton was a panelist.  Let’s just say I have always considered Bolton to be the canary in this particular coalmine.  When he stops beating the military action drum, I would know it was time to start worrying.  Here’s what he had to say:

Iran is going to get nuclear weapons.  We have lost this race.

I would say that this canary has stopped singing.  When Bolton has given up on stopping Iran from getting the bomb, it’s time to consider what to do the day after they get the bomb.

In an LA Times interview, Mohammed El Baradei, who will soon leave his post as director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, calls the U.S. and European strategy on Iran a “failure.” There is no love lost between El Baradei and the Bush Administration, and it does not surprise me to hear him laying out the groundwork for an argument that a nuclear Iran will be the result of U.S. actions.

The case against the U.S. is not helpful, I do think El Baradei is right that our Iran policy has failed.  European negotiations have been unsuccessful.  Worse than that, they have given Iran time and a platform to mount a defense of its behavior.  Sanctions have also not accomplished much.  And they never will unless China, Russia and the EU agree to isolate Iran completely.  Don’t hold your breath on that one.  Finally, there is no good option for a military strike.  Pretty much everyone agrees that there is no way to know if the nuclear program can be wiped out.  Not a lot of folks in the White House, current or future, or on Capitol Hill are going to spend political capital on an attack that may achieve nothing.

Where does that leave us?  According to Iran Watch, Iran will have enough enriched uranium to start the process of making a single bomb by next December and a couple more by the end of 2010.  That doesn’t give us a lot of time.

The Obama Administration needs to work the Iran issue on two parallel tracks.  The first is aggressive engagement to try and prevent the acquisition of nuclear capabilities.  Obama may be able to craft a negotiating stance that leads Iran to back off.  The optimistic view is that there is precedent in the nuclear age for countries walking up to the brink of building a nuclear weapon and being convinced to give up the program.

The second track is to formulate a strategy for dealing with a nuclear Iran.  We need to know exactly how we will react to an Iranian nuclear test before it happens.  We cannot afford to figure it out after the fact.  In coming up with a post-Iranian-nuclear-test position, I think the Obama Administration should avoid the following words: containment and deterrence.  These are fraught with Cold War definitions and decades of entrenched arguments that will not be helpful.

In all of these comments, I am assuming that acquiring nuclear weapons is not due to messianic reasons for Iran.  I know that this requires that the rhetoric of Iran’s leaders be discounted to some extent. But I believe that Iran has a strong interest in self-preservation and that the leaders are not actually willing to destroy themselves in order to destroy Israel or the U.S.  In a way, you have to believe that Iran is not developing the bomb to use it, but instead to have a political lever for obtaining greater geopolitical power.  The moment that we believe that Iran intends to use or transfer the bomb, the military option becomes the only option.

So what do we do?

First of all, I think that the Obama Administration needs to add a new talking point to its standard list of discussion topics with the usual suspects.  Quite simply, we need to ask Russia and China and the EU member countries what it is that they will do the day after Iran tests a nuclear weapon.  We need them to know that we will have an answer to that question and that we will expect them to have an answer.  For Russia in particular, this needs to be phrased in a way that makes it clear that, after years of official Russian denials and equivocation, we will hold them accountable for a nuclear Iran and expect them to take a leadership role in reacting swiftly and harshly when the time comes.  The EU needs to understand that we will expect a united front on sanctions and other punitive actions.  We also need to make it clear that if the Russians step up to the plate, it will be untenable for China to use its veto in the Security Council on any Iran resolutions.

Second, the U.S. must start to develop a presence in Iran.  We must open up diplomatic ties of some sort.  I know that many feel this is rewarding Iran for bad behavior.  I tend to take the opposite view.  Our actions have not delegitimized Iran in the eyes of any other country.  We have merely robbed ourselves of opportunities to understand how the Iranians operate and think.  We cannot deal with a nuclear Iran based on a series of poorly informed assumptions.  To many Iranian leaders, a U.S. presence would be a lot more dangerous than the lack of one.  But more importantly, after a nuclear test, the U.S. must communicate clearly to Iran what our actions would be in the case of use or transfer of a nuclear weapon.  This cannot be done through the media or European allies or oblique statements.  This must be done firmly and directly.

Which brings me to the final aspect of our necessary planning.  We need to have some honest discussions with Israel about what happens after Iran tests.  I hope we are doing this already.  The U.S. must be prepared to provide security guarantees in the Middle East.  We are going to be the only country that can credibly stand between Iran and Israel when tensions run high and face them both down from a nuclear conflict.   We will need to explore confidence building measures with both sides – and eventually Iran and Israel will need to have direct talks to institutionalize them.  We have to realize that the biggest danger might be misunderstandings, miscommunication and/or accidents that lead to a nuclear conflict.  The idea of a direct hotline between Tel Aviv and Tehran is not as crazy as it sounds.

This is just a starter list for issues that must be considered now.  The world will become a more dangerous place the day after Iran declares its nuclear capability.  We must be prepared to deal with it.

No related posts.

The statement makes an important case for action on key issues of strategic importance to the UN and the U.S.  You can read about the nine specific recommendations for the Obama Administration here.  However, I want to draw attention to two things that the statement does not do.

First, it does not deliver faint praise for the United Nations as an institution.  There are flaws that will always be inherent in a multilateral mechanism that brings all the countries in the world together under one roof.  Any U.S. engagement with the UN must include strong leadership on reform efforts.  To paper over these flaws with blind admiration prevents us from understanding the limitations and possibilities of the UN.

However, this statement also does not condemn the institution for those flaws.  Too often, the unwieldy structure and contradictory actions of the UN make easy targets for those who would like to turn their backs on multilateral processes.  But to focus only on the negative aspects of the UN backs the U.S. into a corner where nothing can be accomplished without first smoothing ruffled feathers.

If there is one thing that this bipartisan statement pinpoints, it is that the U.S. cannot let our rhetoric get in the way of our ability to effectively utilize the opportunities and tools provided by the UN for achieving our foreign policy and international security goals.

There is a clear symbiotic relationship between the U.S. and the UN.  Neither party is particularly comfortable with it, but it cannot be denied that we need each other.  Even the Bush Administration realized that on countless issues, not the least of which was the invasion of Iraq, it had little choice but to attempt to work within the UN to gain support for its positions.

Over the next few years, this is going to become even clearer.

Our best hope for achieving real progress on climate change is to become a leader at the UN conference in Copenhagen.

It is generally recognized that the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has helped stem the spread of nuclear weapons in the world.  The NPT RevCon in 2010 will be a critical opportunity to maintain the multilateral norms that have served us so well.

On these and many other key U.S. priorities, ranging from counterterrorism to development to food aid, the UN will play a key role in our efforts.

As we enter the age of Obama, we should all approach the U.S.-UN relationship with eyes wide open, not expecting that the change in Administration is going to make the difficulties of working together disappear.  The U.S.-UN relationship will always be difficult.  But it does not have to be marked by anger and mistrust.  Both sides need to make a fresh start.  It is not merely the U.S. needing to acknowledge the importance of the UN, but the UN also must respect the unique interests of the U.S.  It is popular to blame the U.S. for the strained relationship.  It is also counterproductive to do so.

Today, we have released a statement elaborating on steps the U.S. can take to heal the relationship.  It is our hope that the UN is considering its own actions as well.  Our challenges are too great to take on alone.

No related posts.