There was a moment in 2005 when American democracy promotion efforts and national security interests seemed perfectly aligned. Syria announced its withdrawal from Lebanon; Egypt allowed contested elections for the first time in its history; elections were held in Palestine; and Iraq held parliamentary elections. A more secure, more democratic Middle East appeared to be only a matter of time. Then Hizbullah filled the void in Lebanon, leading to war with Israel. Egypt’s elections turned out to be a sham, and the government subsequently cracked down on the opposition. Hamas swept the elections in Palestine the following year, and Iraq was quickly mired in the deadliest year of its occupation. This swift reversal revealed that our democracy promotion efforts and our national security are linked in very complex, and sometimes contradictory, ways. Promoting democracy while protecting national security is always desirable, and in the long term those interests do indeed align. In the short term, however, we often have to make the difficult decision to prioritize one before the other. If we strike the right balance, we will be able to keep our country safe from immediate threats while laying the foundation for stable democracies in the future.

Today, the Middle East is, if anything, less stable than it was in 2005. The government in Iraq clings to the best news it can get—that the violence isn’t as bad as it used to be. In Afghanistan, NATO troops struggle to regain territory they controlled a few years ago and a corrupt government rules the country. The dream of a stable, democratic Middle East seems to be gone, replaced only with a desperate hope that we might be able to withdraw without triggering civil war. Democracy, if it is achievable in either country, will be a long, hard slog.

Last week, I attended a lunch with Larry Diamond, a fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and an adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq. Dr. Diamond discussed the challenges inherent in promoting democracy, and he also touched on reconciling democracy promotion efforts with security interests. The instability and corruption in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown us that encouraging democracy in those countries will be a complex process, expensive both in terms of blood and treasure. Dr. Diamond emphasized that democracy promotion is desirable for its own sake, and he also stressed that it can be an effective security tool in the long-term.

But what happens when national security and democracy are at odds? What happens when an autocratic nation is a crucial American ally and democratic elections in that country risk bringing power to more radical leaders? It’s exactly the question we face when dealing with nations like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, or Uzbekistan. We grant aid or coordinate military operations with these governments, lending them legitimacy and material support. By reinforcing such governments, we deal democracy a blow. In 2003, Undersecretary of State Paula J. Dobriansky and Carnegie Fellow Thomas Carothers debated a similar issue in the pages of Foreign Affairs. Dobriansky essentially claimed that there was no tension between security and promotion of democracy. That is not the case, and it is crucial that we recognize it. Rather than accept Dobriansky’s insistence that democracy and security are never at odds, we need to develop a framework for deciding how to prioritize our goals when they push us in different directions. We should consider at least four factors when making these sorts of foreign policy decisions:

1. The immediacy of the threat. If we face an immediate threat to American national security, short-term security concerns may well outweigh long-term goals for democracy.
2. The nature of our cooperation. Some types of support—such as economic and military aid—provide instant tangible support for the regime. If we can achieve our security goals by other means, that might be preferable. If not, we should consider exacting concessions on democratic reform or human rights in exchange for our aid.
3. How the aid we provide will affect the regime. It’s possible—as we’ll see in a moment—that aid to some regimes might actually help promote democracy and security simultaneously. In other cases, aid might legitimate and support autocratic governments.
4. The importance and loyalty of the ally in question. It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that the more strategically important a country is, the more leniency we will grant in terms of democratic reform and human rights (think Saudi Arabia). However, I list this question last because we must consider alternatives to supporting an autocratic regime for security reasons.

In the wake of the Christmas Day bomber, the United States is considering a package of military and economic aid to help the Yemeni government root out al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Of the governments on the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen is certainly not the worst potential ally. The problem is not so much that the government is undemocratic (in fact the International Crisis Group says Yemen has the most open political system on the Peninsula), but that it is weak. A well-designed aid package could help to reduce political instability and poverty. At the same time it might help to prop up one of the freer regimes in the region.

Yemen is an example one of the easier cases. Assessing the immediacy of a threat is always a complicated process, but a country that hosts a terrorist organization capable of planning an attack on American soil certainly qualifies. In the case of Yemen, a well-constructed aid package might promote both democracy and our national security. But we also face situations in which those two goals are much more difficult to reconcile. In fact, on Sunday General Stanley McChrystal indicated that ending the fighting in Afghanistan might require a power-sharing arrangement with the Taliban.

McChrystal’s position suggests that maintaining a modicum of stability in Afghanistan is a higher priority than establishing a truly democratic government—in the short term at least. Cooperating with the Taliban would be a major setback for democracy in Afghanistan given the Taliban’s abysmal human rights record, not to mention its collaboration with al-Qaeda. No doubt McChrystal would respond that the difficulties we have had over the past eight years render cooperation with the Taliban the most realistic exit strategy. Considering items 2 and 3 will be critical here, as it may be possible to establish some sort of compromise that eventually helps to transform moderate elements of the Taliban into a legitimate political organization. But it’s still a big risk to take. As tough as it is to make these sorts of decisions, considering the right priorities will help us craft more effective foreign policy, one that can protect our security in the short term and build democracy over time.

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During Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to India last week, Indian environmental minister Jairam Ramesh expressed India’s views on climate change policy: “There is simply no case for the pressure that we, who have been among the lowest emitters per capita, face to actually reduce emissions.” Other less-developed countries (LDCs) have similar, though perhaps less aggressive, attitudes. The problem is, developing countries now make up a significant portion of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions (China emits the most carbon dioxide of any country, and India is fourth). While it’s true that LDCs still emit greenhouse gases at much lower per capita rates than developed nations, a successful policy to combat climate change will require their cooperation.

The arguments about whose responsibility it is to curb climate change are well-worn by this point, but they still threaten to thwart meaningful international collaboration. Developed nations point out that the LDCs will soon account for a large majority of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. LDCs shoot back that industrialized nations created the climate change problem and that it’s only fair that LDCs also get a chance to modernize their economies without environmental restrictions. Both sides have valid points. But the developing world’s unwillingness to address the problem will have devastating consequences that will harm LDCs far worse than the developed world.

As an example, take Ramesh’s claim that fears about receding Himalayan glaciers are a “preconceived notion … based on western media.” Not only is Ramesh’s allegation entirely untrue—an Indian research institute predicted last year that, at the current rate of melting, the glaciers may disappear entirely by 2035—but it is grossly irresponsible for India’s government to take that position. Unless the world does something soon, climate change and environmental damage caused by reckless development policies will cripple developing economies and create a massive humanitarian crisis.

Himalayan glaciers feed major rivers including the Ganges, Barahmaputra, Mekong, and Yangtze, which provide fresh water to billions of people in South and East Asia. When the glaciers are gone, those mighty rivers will shrink dramatically, and some may even become seasonal water sources. Already, droughts in India are causing wars over water, reduced precipitation has caused grain shortfalls in Pakistan, and 500 million Chinese lack access to clean water. If the glaciers melt, water shortages could affect over one billion people. LDCs claim that environmental regulation is prohibitively expensive, but a humanitarian disaster wrought by climate change will cost them far more.

Frustratingly, the parameters of an agreement have existed for years. Any successful international climate change policy will be based on a system of cash transfers from rich countries to fund LDC’s environmental programs. Indeed, developed nations admitted their historical responsibility for most greenhouse gas emissions in the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Developed countries must also acknowledge that, as the world’s richest nations by far, they have the capacity and responsibility to bear the brunt of solving a global problem. At the same time, LDCs need to recognize their own crucial role in reducing future emissions. More importantly, though, they must realize that climate change threatens their very existence. Developed nations should make it clear that they are willing to fund meaningful and effective environmental measures in LDCs. But unless the LDCs get on board, they will face an environmental catastrophe that will more than erase the economic gains they’ve made over the past few decades.

In December, representatives from over 170 countries will meet in Copenhagen to discuss the future of international climate agreements. These efforts have the potential to significantly advance environmental policy, but only if the world stops playing the blame game and recognizes climate change as a global problem that everyone must help to solve. Progress in preparation for Copenhagen has reached an impasse in the form of bickering over financing for the LDC’s efforts to cut emissions. But something has to give. Either the world will reach a compromise to share the burdens of climate change policy, or we risk a future of environmental disasters and state failure triggered by severe natural resource shortages.

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Many experts agree that progress on START is crucial to maintaining the nonproliferation regime. Indeed, Ambassador Graham cited the recent PSA statement on nuclear proliferation as evidence of a broad bipartisan consensus on the importance of strategic arms reduction. Additionally, Dr. Payne called for an agreement that encompasses Russia’s large supply of tactical nuclear weapons, something Russia has resisted. Another major proliferation concern (though unrelated to arms reduction) is Russia’s continued support for Iran; it has supplied nuclear fuel to Iran’s Bushehr reactor and blocked or weakened efforts to stop Iran’s uranium enrichment.

The Russians have their own list of objectives. Russia has insisted that arms reductions talks should encompass more than offensive strategic forces. Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev has stated that he will only agree to a START successor if the United States addresses Russia’s concerns about ballistic missile defense. Russia is also disturbed by the expansion of NATO. While Medvedev has voiced his support of modest stockpile reductions, he has called for reducing the number of delivery vehicles by “several times.” According to Dr. Payne, Russia wants to limit delivery vehicles because Russia’s long-range missiles are quickly becoming obsolete. Due to a lingering Cold War mentality and self-consciousness over its limited conventional power, Russia is eager to maintain strategic parity with the United States. As Russia’s delivery systems go off-line, Russia will need American cooperation to maintain a comparable array of delivery systems.

Both the United States and Russia have compelling security reasons to negotiate a successor to START, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that things will go flawlessly. There is, however, room to maneuver—for example, Russia might agree to reduce its tactical nuclear weapons if we limit our delivery systems. At the very least, we should be able to extend START’s crucial verification mechanisms and reduce our arsenals below the ceiling set in 2002. That limited agreement needs to come before START expires in December, and therefore it should be relatively modest and focused on offensive weapons. But it should be negotiated with the understanding that it will be followed by a more comprehensive nonproliferation agreement that will address American and Russian concerns beyond offensive weapons. Given both sides’ interests, it’s not hard to imagine how that second agreement might take shape.

Generally, the United States should work to relieve Russia’s concerns about missile defense and the expansion of NATO in return for more support on Iran. Though missile defense has been a sticking point, the witnesses agreed that there is some room for flexibility. For example, the United States might agree not to deploy missile defense systems in former Soviet satellites. Another option would be to negotiate a new ABM treaty. American officials insist that our missile defense efforts are arrayed not against Russia, but against emerging threats from rogue states. If that’s the case, then the two countries should be able to find some middle ground in which the U.S. can pursue missile defense without threatening Russia’s strategic forces. With regard to NATO, we should agree not to recruit aggressively in Eastern Europe and to slow expansion of the alliance.

In exchange for our cooperation, we should request Russia’s support on a Security Council resolution to enforce sanctions on Iran. We should encourage Russia to help us lead a multilateral effort to end Iran’s uranium enrichment programs. Only if Russia agrees to support us in negotiations with Iran will we be flexible on NATO and missile defense.

An agreement along these lines will have crucial implications for international security. A new arms reduction treaty will reduce the world’s nuclear weapons and demonstrate our commitment to our Article VI obligations under the NPT. A more amenable approach to missile defense will ensure that we can continue to develop that technology without threatening Russia. An agreement on tactical nuclear weapons will reduce a serious proliferation threat. Gaining Russia’s backing against Iran will help us make progress on one of the most intractable security problems that we face. Repairing our relations with Russia is critical to American security, and extending START will be a strong first step.

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Yesterday, I attended a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee meeting on the foreign policy implications of our response to the international financial crisis. The controversial security issue discussed was America’s funding for international financial institutions (IFIs) that lend money to nations like Iran, Sudan, and Syria. It would be great if we could convince the IFIs to stop loaning to regimes we don’t like. However, these institutions will play a critical role in the world’s economic recovery, and funding multilateral institutions necessarily requires that we sacrifice some control over where our money goes.

At the hearing, Representatives Brad Sherman (D-CA) and Ed Royce (R-CA) castigated President Obama for his recent promise of billions of dollars in new funding to the IMF and the World Bank. Dr. Nancy Birdsall of the Center for Global development testified that IFIs can stimulate growth in developing countries. That growth in turn boosts the American economy by providing markets and trading partners. It also keeps America safe by combating the poverty and economic instability that foster extremism and failed states.

During the hearing, Iran was of particular concern. Though the World Bank has not approved new loans to Iran since 2005, it continues disbursements on loans negotiated between 2000 and 2003. Sherman and Royce excoriated the World Bank for continuing disbursements to Iran, even though the money was designated for earthquake recovery, sanitation, and development projects. Loaning to IFIs does mean that American tax dollars will end up in countries whose policies we oppose. But it does not compromise our security interests.

Again, take the example of Iran. The truth is, cutting off loans won’t force Iran to give up its nuclear program, make democratic reforms, or concede anything else important to American strategic interests. Tough sanctions on Iran in the second half of the 1990s prompted the Iranian government to cut back on civilian programs while maintaining military spending and making progress towards a nuclear weapon. If we stop loans from IFIs, the effect will be similar. Preventing the World Bank and IMF from loaning to Iran won’t hurt the repressive regime or cripple the nuclear program. Instead, Iran will stop spending on disaster relief and clean water. If anything, denying the funds will only hurt the nascent democratic movement in Iran.

The United States should follow through on President Obama’s promises and increase funding for IFIs. At the same time, we can pressure those institutions not to loan to our adversaries, but we must be prepared to accept that IFIs will not always follow our lead—they’re multilateral organizations, after all. As Dr. Birdsall pointed out, the IMF is at least partly responsible for the rise of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa since 1989. More recently, IFIs have contributed crucially to social spending in developing nations that will help to blunt the pain of global recession. Reducing funds for IFIs risks the reversal of that progress, and that would be a real threat to our long-term security and stability.

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