Senator McCain, the presumptive Republican candidate for President, has, over the years, made a virtue out of inconsistency when the logic of consistency has not always been a virtue. This has been part of his appeal to independents and to others who gaze at the political world not from partisan eyes but through analytical lenses. What some observers may interpret as an inconsistency or paradox, others view as logical and well-formulated understanding. In this context, it is difficult to separate campaign rhetoric from serious policy, to differentiate politics from policy.

One apparent inconsistency in the campaign that involves U.S.-Russian relations is worth exploring. Earlier this year, the Senator surprised some observers by proposing that Russia be excluded from the G-8 group of industrial democracies. Then, on May 27^th, in a speech outlining a comprehensive U.S. approach to foreign policy and proliferation that revealed clearly his internationalist mind-set, he urged continuation of cooperation with Russia on programs of mutual interest such as cooperative threat reduction (aka Nunn-Lugar or “loose nukes” program) and a host of related nonproliferation and anti-terrorist programs. How punitive action depriving Russia of the status among the G-8 would advance cooperation on nonproliferation has puzzled more than one observer. Senator McCain has since distanced himself from his G-8 statement on Russia, but the motive underlying his initial thinking merits some analysis and can shed light on his national security thinking.

Russia was invited to join the G-8 by President Clinton in 1997 at a time when the Russian economy was declining sharply, its political stability shaky, a barrel of oil a fraction of its current price, and its regional and international influence all but sapped of capability. Russia had participated on the margins of the then G-7 prior to 1997, and the thinking in the 1990s was that inviting Russia into the international cluster of important nations would bring them further into cooperation on matters over which the rest of the world had concerns – nuclear weapons, energy resources, regional stability, and the shift away from Communism and authoritarianism to an open society and democratic governance. Apart from that, Russia’s bare economy hardly qualified it for membership with the other seven and it had not transitioned into a democratic society, the two important eligibility criteria for membership in the influential group of industrial democracies.

Since l997, the price of a barrel of oil has skyrocketed, Russia has re-gained influence on its periphery and beyond. Its economy is now buoyant, its self-confidence restored, and its politics mostly settled, with one exception – the drift back to authoritarian governance – Russia would seem today to be more eligible for G-8 membership than it was a decade ago. When measured by Gross Domestic Production (GDP), the 2007 IMF ranking had Russia the eleventh largest economy in the world. When the country scores come out for 2008, its ranking will, no doubt, move up several notches. This has encouraged a bolder, more assertive foreign policy, use of its energy muscle to pressure neighbors, and greater determination to advance its interests on issues ranging from missile defense to shoring up is southern border with tough talk and behavior, actions that were unthinkable in the 1990s.

Russia’s contribution to national security and nonproliferation decisions in recent G-8 meetings has not been noteworthy for its exceptionality. Its voice has been heard more often and listened to more closely by the other G-8 members than in the past and this evolution has been in direct correlation to its growing economic clout. In the G-8 nonproliferation working groups, Russia has often stood with the United States on nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and anti-terrorism issues by resisting strident language on disarmament, while jointly promoting initiatives to combat nuclear terrorism, promote responsible nuclear energy, and advance mechanisms for assuring an international supply of nuclear fuel so that countries will abstain from developing indigenous fuel cycle capabilities. Russia has been a cooperative, though often-times prickly participant, in the bilateral Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program aimed at reducing the proliferation threat from the states of the former Soviet Union and the larger ten year, twenty billion dollar Global Partnership which is the G-8 follow-on to the U.S. Nunn-Lugar program.

Russia’s helpful rhetoric in the G-8 on Iran has not been matched by its action towards Iran in the United Nations Security Council where it has acted to soften sanctions resolutions and in the IAEA Board of Governors where it has sought to tone down harsh criticism of Iran. This has understandably riled Senator McCain and others who believe that Russian cooperation is essential if Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons capability is to be stopped and reversed. Essential, but not fully forthcoming. This also explains why the proposed U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia, sometimes known as a 123 Agreement, has been buffeted by political turbulence in the Congress.

Russia’s drift back to its tradition of authoritarian governance and the recurring attacks on civil society and concentration of political power in Moscow wear badly on those, like Senator McCain, who have been enthusiastic promoters of programs that further democratic governance and open societies. Indeed, he has proposed that the world’s democracies form a voluntary consortium – a League of Democracies – as a problem solving alternative to international organizations prone to inaction or sluggish reaction to international crises. Presumably, McCain might consider excluding Russia from this consortium.

It is entirely appropriate to criticize the drift towards authoritarian governance in Russia because the backward political drift there is true, not fabricated for purely political reasons here. To remain silent is to ignore the core values underlying our political culture. Questioning the membership of Russia in the prestigious G-8 is one way of getting attention to the political regression. Similarly, ignoring the role that Russia can and must play in strengthening the global nonproliferation regime would be contrary to our national interest. We should encourage more Russia cooperation on nonproliferation and arms control matters even as we express our concern about political backsliding at home. When competing interests collide, as they often do, they can co-exist and survive and succeed if carefully managed. We need to cooperate with Russia on issues of mutual interest where we can, and to disagree with them on those issues where we must. Senator McCain’s maverick reputation and his propensity to speak his mind may allow him considerable running room to follow both foreign policy tracks toward Russia.

Related posts:

1. START is Just the Beginning
2. What to make out of Russia’s new doctrine
3. New IAEA Director Takes on Nuclear Proliferation

Many observers, inside and outside the U.S. Government, believe we are at a critical juncture, some say a tipping point, in global efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles materials, technology and expertise associated with them.  While much progress has taken place over the past few years, the trend lines are not very promising and we may be falling behind where we need to be.  The next administration will be tested the first day it takes office.  It will need to prepare itself for the long haul with a policy agenda, an organizational structure, skilled leadership and adequate staffing to rally our country and our friends and allies to the cause, if it hopes to reverse this trend.

Controlling the spread of WMD is a bipartisan national priority. Improving the way we organize our arms control and nonproliferation structure to prevent WMD proliferation should be a bipartisan challenge as well. Dispassionate discourse on the strengths and weaknesses of past and current organizational practices can help shape the next administration’s strategy on stemming and reversing the proliferation of WMD.

First, let’s look at the tricky issue of institutional culture. The State Department must change its cultural biases against multilateral diplomacy and transnational activities.  State has a strong preference for service in the geographic bureaus and foreign country posts, but service in functional or transnational bureaus and international organizations is seen with disfavor.  The Department doesn’t staff the regional bureaus or foreign country missions with skills involved in nonproliferation and arms control negotiations,  and prefers conducting our diplomacy through bilateral, rather than through multilateral channels or in international institutions.  This attitude has been especially pronounced in recent years, but it has been a cultural attribute of the Department for years.

State’s institutional culture makes it difficult to recruit Foreign Service Officers to serve in functional bureaus.  Foreign Service Officers who serve repeated assignments in functional bureaus are generally not promoted as rapidly and frequently opt to terminate their careers early, thus depriving the Foreign Service and the United States government of the expertise and experience they have accumulated over the years.
To tackle these cultural biases directly would be very difficult and would take a long time to implement because they are part of the core make-up of the Department.

A potentially more rewarding option would involve a fundamental change in organizational structure, by creating a separate independent or semi-independent entity—inside or outside the Department –that would be guaranteed a seat at the table in important decisions.  A separate agency(modeled perhaps after the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)) would work in tandem with the State Department but possibly report directly to the Secretary of State and the President, with inter-agency coordination managed by a senior member of the National Security Council.  This type of re-structuring would elevate the role of the agency and its head above the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary, could give the agency more clout in inter-agency and international negotiations, give more weight to multilateral diplomacy than it now has, and yield greater influence over its funding needs.

Of course, changing basic organizational structure—especially doing so frequently—is not without cost or challenges. There have been two major reorganizations in the structure and management of arms control and nonproliferation policy in the State Department in the past ten years.  The next administration will want to weigh carefully the possible costs of undertaking a third major realignment, whatever its intrinsic merits, as it begins to organize itself.

A less risky option for improving the conduct of our nonproliferation and arms control diplomacy would involve organizational reforms.   Several organizational and personnel changes could improve the conduct of our nonproliferation and arms control policy:

(1) More programmatic funding.  Current spending for nonproliferation and arms control in the 150 NADR account is less than one percent of the Department’s overall budget.

(2) The ISN (International Security and Nonproliferation) bureau needs authorization for additional permanent personnel so that it doesn’t have to rely less on temporary or part time staff to manage key issue-areas.

(3) The FSI (Foreign Service Institute) should add more courses on multilateral diplomacy and on nonproliferation and arms control to its training curriculum.

(4) The Foreign Service should include assignment(s) in functional bureaus as a required part of the Foreign Service career path.

(5) The Department should consider resurrecting the Foreign Service Reserve Officer program, or something similar, to recruit specialists for skills difficult to fill, such as physical and natural scientists needed to tackle the complexities of nuclear, chemical and biological proliferation and arms control.

(6) Re-writing the mission statement of the Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International Security to place it on a par with the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to strengthen the internal trade-offs involving the nonproliferation/arms control agenda.

These types of incremental changes should be considered, but caution is in order. Perfecting an organization structure will by itself not translate into good policy.   Getting the attention of the Secretary or the President, having a seat at the decision table, or implementing a fair and balanced personnel system can improve the policy process and the policy itself, but it cannot be a substitute for good, sound policy. The next administration will have to first determine its nonproliferation and arms control agenda, then shape the structure and chose the personnel to implement it.

As a statistician might put it:  most of the variability in success or failure of policy lies with the quality of the policy itself.  But, it doesn’t account for all variability.  Congress can play a constructive role by focusing its oversight attention on our nonproliferation and arms control policy, as well as giving careful consideration to the organizational structure and personnel policies that underlie it.

If the next administration wishes to re-direct and strengthen the U.S. nonproliferation and arms control policy agenda, it would do well to elevate the status and role of the organization(s) responsible for conducting our policy by ensuring that they are amply resourced, appropriately organized and led, and staffed with quality and experienced personnel with the right skills.

This will require greater support from the Secretary of State and the President – and from the Congress — and may entail the creation of a more independent or separate entity devoted to nonproliferation and arms control.  More modest institutional changes can help improve policy development and implementation and should be seriously considered.

It would be wise to create a bipartisan blue ribbon task force to think through and make recommendations on what our nonproliferation and arms control policy agenda should be, and how that agenda should be structured and managed to optimize chances of successful implementation.  This should be done as soon as possible so that its findings and recommendations are available for consideration by the incoming administration.

Related posts:

1. New IAEA Director Takes on Nuclear Proliferation
2. Obama Takes a Long View of Missile Defense
3. START is Just the Beginning