The Cost of Dropping the Ball in Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan, a former Soviet state in Central Asia, has made many headlines after its corrupt President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was toppled in April. On June 10th, riots erupted between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbek minority in Bakiyev’s stronghold Osh, leaving hundreds dead and sending a flood of refuges to neighboring Uzbekistan. The June 27th constitutional referendum ratifying a new constitution was deemed successful, but true peace is elusive in southern Kyrgyzstan. The violence continues as the Kyrgyz police abuse ethnic Uzbeks, and the unrest threatens to spread to neighboring countries. Riots may flare up anew when the local clans start vying for power in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Kyrgyzstan’s weak central authorities are unable to rein in the violence.
During this time, only the lazy refrained from opining about the Kyrgyz misfortune, but nevertheless world governments have not followed words with actions. Russia and the United States have limited their response to Kyrgyz pleas for help to providing humanitarian relief. Their continued inaction may have dire consequences. Even in the unlikely scenario that the conflict resolves itself, the indecisiveness of the two world powers will leave a bitter aftertaste in the former Soviet republics.
Just recently, Moscow and Washington were so anxious about securing their military bases that they were cutting deals with Bakiyev’s authoritarian regime: in 2008, Bakiyev threatened to close the U.S. military base to secure a Russian loan, changed his mind when the U.S. more than tripled its rent for the base, and appeased Russia by allowing it a second base in the country. Now that their bases are secured, both countries are indifferent to Kyrgyz problems. To be sure, Russia fears chaos in its backyard, and the United States hopes for a stable Kyrgyzstan as it wages war in Afghanistan. However, Moscow and Washington have so far shunned responsibility for stabilizing the region.
When asked to send peacekeeping troops by both sides in the conflict in June, the Kremlin refused, citing the “internal” nature of the unrest. Russia has never hesitated to use force in the past; twenty years ago the Soviet troops were sent to Kyrgyzstan’s Osh to quell a very similar conflict. Russia’s recent foray into Georgia proves the Kremlin is willing to go far to achieve its objectives in the region. Moscow’s objectives may also explain – though not excuse – its current inertia. The international opprobrium after the August 2008 war has made Russia wary of sending its troops to intervene in the affairs of other states, whatever the reason. Today, any presence of Russian peacekeepers in Kyrgyzstan could be criticized by neighboring Uzbekistan, if not by the international community. Russia sees no need to interject itself between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek, potentially angering both sides. If anything, the unrest between the two pro-Russian ethnic groups could, conveniently for Moscow, put the U.S.’s feet to the fire by endangering the Manas transit hub for Afghanistan supplies, even more crucial after Uzbekistan closed a US base in 2005, making it more dependent on Russia’s cooperation.
Hiding its inaction with an image of a law-abiding state that shuns unilateral action, Russia called a summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and had CSTO uncover an excuse for inaction in its own charter, which allows for collective military actions only in response to a threat from another state. As a leader of CSTO, which also includes Belarus (which sheltered the deposed Bakiyev), Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Russia could easily find an appropriate chapter in the U.N. Charter allowing it to deploy CSTO troops, had it wanted to do so. However, inaction is what Russia has consciously chosen.
The United States has no less responsibility in maintaining stability in the region. After all, it was among the supporters of the Tulip revolution that had brought the now deposed Bakiyev to power. Where the previous U.S. administration may have not thought twice before intervening, the Obama administration called for multilateral action and is demurely exchanging “opinions on potential solutions to the crisis” with Uzbekistan, which it had once criticized for human rights violations and authoritarianism.
Not unwisely, the United States seeks to coordinate its security response with Moscow. Washington hopes Russia takes the lead. There is only one difference between the U.S.’s and Russia’s equally passive approaches to the problem: Russia shields its inaction behind CSTO, while the United States covers up with the Organization for Security and Cooperation for Europe (OSCE). Washington favors sending in an OSCE police force – a measure that is being decided by the OSCE Security Council this week. Clearly, an unarmed mission will not be able to stop another outbreak of violence, and only a strong dose of peacekeeping and mediation can fix the problem. While the United States cannot act too boldly in a post-Soviet state like Kyrgyzstan, it can surely be more active in advocating multilateral action beyond humanitarian aid.
The United States and Russia have a shared responsibility in stabilizing Kyrgyzstan, and the costs of their inaction are growing. The two countries cannot ignore ethnic conflicts in the region and should work on developing a common approach to security problems in Central Asia. If neither Moscow nor Washington take the lead in Kyrgyzstan (which may become the first parliamentary republic in Central Asia, if the fall elections succeed), China (which is far less tolerant of democratic developments) may have to step up to fill their roles. If they continue to stand idle, Russia and the United States may miss an opportunity to strengthen their positions in the region and instead allow the suffering of many innocent people.
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