I am reminded of the old saying, “Be careful what you ask for as you might just get it” regarding the recent news about the breakthrough in the long running deadlock over Iran’s nuclear program, Thanks to an agreement brokered by Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan Iran has agreed to send the bulk of its nuclear material to Turkey as part of an exchange meant to ease international concerns about Iran’s aims and provide fuel for an ailing medical reactor.

The essential details are that after a final agreement is signed between Iran and the Vienna group, Iran’s nuclear fuel will be shipped to Turkey under the supervision of Iran and the IAEA. Iran we will send 1,200 kilograms [2,640 pounds] of 3.5% enriched uranium to Turkey to be exchanged for 120 kilograms [264 pounds] of 20% enriched uranium from the Vienna group to replace the nearly exhausted fuel of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) that makes medical isotopes. This represents more than half of the 2065 kg of LEU that Iran had produced as of February according to the IAEA, and it greatly reduces Iran’s capability to produce enough fissile material for a bomb. The Vienna group refers to Russia, France, the U.S. and the IAEA.

But Iran would not suspend sensitive atomic activities which the West suspects are aimed at making bombs, including work to enrich uranium to a level of 20 percent it launched in February.

“Iran expressed its readiness to deposit its LEU within one month. On the basis of the same agreement the Vienna Group should deliver 120 kg fuel required for Tehran research reactor in no later than one year,” a joint declaration said.

Turkey does not enrich uranium itself although it has agreed to serve as the venue for the fuel exchange. It remains unclear whether it would serve as a guarantor for the low-enriched uranium or whether the material would be shipped to a nation with refinement capacity such as Russia, Brazil or France.

The deal appears to build upon an IAEA proposal last year that was endorsed by the Obama administration and Western powers. Back then Iran was to send around 2,640 pounds of its low-enriched uranium to Russia to be further refined and afterward to France to be converted into 20%-enriched fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor. The compromise was to serve as a way of drawing Iran’s supply of nuclear material below the threshold for building a bomb and to create an atmosphere for a broader deal between the West and Iran.

That deal broke down when Iran appeared to back away, with political factions in Tehran accusing the West of trying to swindle Iran out of its stockpile. A few months ago, Iran began producing its own 20% enriched uranium, a move that nonproliferation experts worried could bring Iran closer to the highly enriched uranium needed to fuel an atom bomb.

One would think that the U.S. and Western allies would welcome this. At the very least it could ease the international standoff over Iran’s disputed nuclear program and deflate the U.S.-led push for tougher sanctions.

Of course, predictably and sadly, one would be wrong. On May 17 the White House Press Secretary issued a statement that said, “We acknowledge the efforts that have been made by Turkey and Brazil. The proposal announced in Tehran must now be conveyed clearly and authoritatively to the IAEA before it can be considered by the international community. Given Iran’s repeated failure to live up to its own commitments, and the need to address fundamental issues related to Iran’s nuclear program, the United States and international community continue to have serious concerns.”

It is true that the deal is hardly a resolution to all the issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The deal is not as good as it would have been last October (because Iran’s stockpile of LEU is much larger now, making 1200kg a less significant portion of the whole; and because Iran continues to enrich up to 20%). And, the deal is only a short-term measure which does not address long-lasting concerns regarding Iran’s history of secret nuclear activities and its lack of transparency with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Yet, at the end of the day, this deal moves Iran farther away from a nuclear weapon.

Still, it is significant. Gary Sick, a former member of the National Security Council staff and executive director of the Gulf/2000 Project at Columbia University wrote on his blog:

We should all be reminded of the original purpose of the agreement. It was intended as a confidence-building measure that would open the way to more substantive discussions of other issues. The original offer that Iran provisionally accepted in October tacitly accepted Iran’s right to enrich uranium; in return Iran would give up control over a significant portion of its existing stash of LEU. Even low enriched uranium can be further enriched to create bomb-grade (roughly 90+ percent) highly enriched uranium (HEU) that is required for a bomb. The October agreement would have created an environment conducive to at least minimal mutual trust and the beginning of serious negotiations.

Note to negotiators: In the past six months, Iran has not used its LEU to build a bomb, even without an agreement.

Iran has set up a special line of centrifuges to enrich uranium to the 20 percent required for the TRR. But that line is small, separated from its other enrichment facilities, and under inspection of the IAEA. The move to enrich some uranium to 20 percent was obviously intended as a pressure tactic to drive the West back into negotiations, since Iran does not have the capability to manufacture fuel cells for the TRR.

We should also be reminded that Iran did not reject the original deal: they proposed amending it. Basically, when the Iranian negotiators came home with the proposed deal, they were attacked from all sides – including members of the Green Movement – for being suckers. Their opponents pointed out that they were going to rely on the word and good will of Russia (where the LEU would be enriched to 20 percent) and France (where the fuel cells would be fabricated). Iranians from left to right argued that both of these countries had repeatedly cheated Iran on nuclear issues: Russia by delaying endlessly the completion of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, and France by refusing to grant Iran rights to the Eurodif enrichment facility partially owned by Iran since the days of the shah. Why, they asked, should we believe that this agreement will be any different?

Instead, they proposed that the swap of LEU for the fuel cells should happen on Iranian soil, probably in stages and within a fixed period of time. That idea was rejected by the United States and its negotiating partners.

The new bargain appears to be a compromise in which the LEU would physically be removed from Iran and held in escrow in Turkey for up to a year, in which time the fuel cells would be manufactured and delivered to Iran. The new bargain also appears to go much further in formally recognizing the legitimacy of Iran’s independent enrichment program. That should not be a surprise given the fact that Brazil, one of the parties to the bargain, has its own enrichment facility similar to Iran’s and in fact concealed its details for some time.

So where does that leave us?

Essentially, it takes us back to last October. The one big difference is that Iran has more LEU now than it did then. But the reality is that Iran will keep producing LEU unless a new agreement is reached to persuade them to stop. If we had completed the agreement of a swap in October, Iran would have the same amount of LEU as it has now. If we wait another six months for negotiations, Iran will have still more LEU.

In short, this agreement is largely symbolic and limited in its practical effects. If the West accepts the deal as worked out by Brazil and Turkey, and if a new round of negotiations begins – on both the nuclear and other major issues – then this could be a breakthrough. If the West turns it down, or if the two sides do not use it to negotiate some of the major issues that separate them, then nothing much will have been accomplished.

The next step is up to the United States and its negotiating partners.

Although angst is high among the sanctions-at-all-costs crowd, this path to a nuclear swap deal was fully endorsed by the United States and was the centerpiece of the justification for sanctions. One way to respond at this point may just be to declare that our threat of sanctions worked: Iran has capitulated and we accept yes as an answer.

Hmmm…are we that smart?

So, the ball is in the U.S. and its allies court. But so far we seem determined to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. The usual suspects, Washington talking heads, are falling all over themselves condemning Iran for actually taking up the American offer to move LEU to a third country. Let’s see: Iran actually accepted the American offer just as it was presented, and had the audacity to accept it while it was still on the table. And then Iran went ahead and kept on enriching uranium so the American offer looked a lot less attractive to the West then it did in October. This left the White House sputtering about how untrustworthy they were, and no one believed their intentions anyway. This begs the question, if the U.S. thinks that this is a bad bargain now, why did they offer it in the first place?

This New York Times headline “Uranium Offer by Iran May Hinder Efforts on Sanctions“ and the “teaser” for it on the NYT home page–”Monday’s agreement between Iran, Brazil and Turkey could undermine efforts in the U.N. to impose new sanctions on Iran”– speaks volumes. The sanctions cart is obviously being held firmly in place, in front of the non-proliferation horse, by those shaping the interests narrative and who are determined not to let the “horse” move forward.

In fact, if a fraction of the effort that the US has brought to bear, in drumming up support for sanctions for nearly three decades had gone into serious diplomacy directed toward Iran rather than against it, the current confrontational climate would not have been nurtured by either side.

People need to keep their eyes on the prize. The objective here is not to continue holding a grudge against Iran for the Iranian revolution or the hostage crisis. The point as Cliff Kupchan, research director of the Eurasia Group said on the May 17 PBS NewsHour said:

I think we, potentially, the United States, potentially, gets something out of this, too. Look, the prize here is not to sanction Iran. The prize here is to find a diplomatic solution to this very worrisome crisis. Now, it’s just possible that, through this swap, we could build more confidence than we have now, which is virtually none, and more…

Related posts:

1. Are We Ready: The Consequences of ‘Bomb Iran’
2. Will U.S. Inaction on its own Nuclear Security Issues Compromise Summit Success?
3. Nuclear Security Summit Offers Unprecedented Opportunity
4. Should We Engage Iran Out of the NPT?
5. Winning Turkey’s Support on Iran