Considered the Pandora’s box of nuclear security issues for decades, Russia is now being recast as a nuclear security leader. At the April Summit in Washington, Moscow won praise for ending plutonium production and signing the Plutonium Disposition protocol. However, Russia’s active and at times reckless pursuit of nuclear business contradicts its claim to nuclear security leadership and could weaken the commitments made at the Summit.

Reading Russia’s memorandum at the Nuclear Security Summit, one is struck by its dissonance with its US counterpart. While the US national statement begins by stressing “the risk of nuclear terrorism as the most immediate and extreme threat to global security”, the Russian document begins by praising the nuclear industry as “one of the strategic directions of development.” Only in the sixth paragraph of the memorandum does Russia acknowledge that the risks of nuclear terrorism are “still present” in the world. Those risks clearly do not emanate from Russia, according to the document that claims there are no “vulnerable nuclear materials and facilities with inadequate levels of physical protection” on the Russian territory.

While it may be overly optimistic when describing the security of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and fissile materials, the memorandum presents an accurate reflection of Russia’s priorities. While the two goals are someone related, for Moscow developing its nuclear industry is much more important than advancing nuclear security.

In the last few years, Russia has embarked on the ambitious nuclear expansion program. It is leading in the number of new nuclear plants constructed and is currently consolidating all of its state-owned conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication companies into Atomenergoprom, which is to become the largest nuclear company in the world. This year, Russia has announced plans to invest $2.2 billion in the development of fast reactors by 2020, increasing its export of high technology equipment by 70 percent (for comparison, Russia allocated a similar amount, $2.5 billion, for plutonium disposition program praised at the Nuclear Security Summit).

While the US primary objective, according to its national statement, is to “ensure that terrorists never gain access to plutonium or highly-enriched uranium,” Russia seems more concerned about making money by selling nuclear technology. It is willing to conduct business even with the states whose motives are questioned by the rest of the international community. A great example of Russia’s unscrupulousness is the $1 billion Bushehr nuclear station in Iran.

Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation, has announced plans to build 60 new nuclear power plants in the next two decades. In fact, only a week before the Nuclear Security Summit, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin traveled to Venezuela to discuss building Russian nuclear reactors with Hugo Chavez. Unfortunately, the plant designs promoted by Russian companies (in particular, the floating stations) present high proliferation and environmental risks because they use uranium of a very high enrichment level, have caused accidents in the past, and create a byproduct that scientists are yet to learn how to dispose of.

As a result of Moscow’s focus on nuclear expansion at any cost, even the well-meant joint US-Russian programs may sometimes have unintended consequences.

Moscow’s most publicized and potentially significant contribution to nuclear security is signing the Plutonium Disposition protocol with the United States on April 13. The protocol amends the 2000 US-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), which commits each state to eliminate 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium. In addition, the Protocol ensures that the plutonium is disposed safely and securely and establishes a monitoring and inspection regime.

However, as long as Russia continues to put the development of nuclear industry first, there is a danger that one day it will decide to use the plutonium disposition facilities to revitalize its reprocessing industry or to develop a closed plutonium fuel cycle. Of course, the United States and Russia signed transparency provisions allowing them to monitor each other’s disposition efforts. However, there is no way to ensure that once the 34 tons covered by the PMDA agreement are processed, the same breeder reactors will not be used to produce plutonium.

One of the biggest contributions of the Summit in Washington this April may be making many states feel important by participating in a global nuclear security effort. In the limelight, nations may be more likely to follow through with their old commitments as well as make new ones. Moscow has gone a long way to secure its nuclear materials since the end of the Cold War, and it deserves respect and praise for that. However, Russia is yet to demonstrate true nuclear security leadership. Reminding Moscow of the many ways it can improve its nuclear security record today, on the anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, could ensure that it will be able to lead in the near future.

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