There’s little new in Russia’s new military doctrine, approved by President Dmitry Medvedev on February 5. The document turned out to follow closely its predecessor, albeit possessing more clarity and concision. Fortunately, the role of nuclear weapons in Moscow’s security policy did not rise. Unfortunately, Russia continues to distrust NATO and resent its expansion. From the very day when the text of the doctrine appeared on the Kremlin’s official web site, the former has not been appreciated enough and the latter has been too strongly criticized.

Alarmed by Nikolai Patrushev’s divulging the plans to assign nuclear weapons to “local conflicts,” the international community sighed with relief upon reading the final document that keeps strategic weapons restricted to regional and large-scale wars.

However, instead of applauding the triumph of reason in the Russian military establishment, some hazarded guesses that the new doctrine is sane only because the true nuclear policy is concealed in “Basic principles of state policy in the area of nuclear deterrence to 2020,” a classified document approved simultaneously with the new doctrine. While the contents of the unpublished document remain secret, it hardly conceals the true contours of Russia’s nuclear policy: the point of deterrence is to make the others aware of the risks so that they refrain from aggression.

It is notable that instead of expanding the role of strategic weapons or specifying uses for its massive sub-strategic nuclear arsenal, Moscow has narrowed the criteria for crossing the nuclear threshold in its new doctrine, as Nikolai Sokov pointed out. The 2000 doctrine allowed the use of nuclear weapons “in situations critical for national security”, but the 2010 version provides for their use only when Russia’s “very existence” is threatened.

With the reset of the US-Russian relationship, the worldwide praise for Obama’s vision of the nuclear weapon-free world, and the large-scale modernization of the Russian military underway, Russia seems to be wising up and going with the flow. Its decision to play down its nuclear capabilities reacting to the gush of criticism evoked by Patrushev’s comments should be appreciated.

Concerning the NATO references in the new doctrine, critics should give Moscow credit for its candor and reread the text on a cool head.

First, Russia’s mention of NATO in its military doctrine should not have come as a surprise to anyone. When the 2000 version of the doctrine brought up “the broadening of military blocs and unions” that would “harm the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies,” everyone already knew what bloc Russia had in mind. Ten years later, NATO having welcomed nine states in its fold and considering extending the welcome to Ukraine and Georgia, Russia merely wrote down what it has been repeating year after year since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. And, for those who still failed to take notice, Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008 should have been the clearest indication of the Kremlin’s threat assessment.

Second, a more sober look at the document shows that it is not NATO per se that Moscow sees as a threat, but merely some of NATO’s policies and actions that, if continued, could make NATO the Kremlin’s enemy. In Russia, NATO is resented only to the extent that it sees acceptable to circumvent the UN Security Council, ignores Moscow’s views when taking military actions in its neighborhood, and creeps up to Russia’s borders from all directions, surrounding it with missile defense systems and radars. This is why in the new doctrine Russia’s concern is, first and foremost, NATO’s goal “to arrogate to itself the assumption of global functions in violation of international law,” and only then – its expansion to Russia’s borders.

Moscow clearly feels its security interests ignored by the West. While acknowledging in the doctrine that “the probability of unleashing large-scale warfare against the Russian Federation” has lowered, the Kremlin contends that the “existing international security structure, including its international law mechanism, does not provide equal security for all states.”

Even though the United States is never mentioned in the text of the document, it is Washington that Moscow has in mind when discussing threats like “attempts to destabilize countries and regions and undermine strategic stability,” “deployment of military contingents of foreign states (and blocs) on territories neighboring Russia and its allies,” “the establishment and deployment of strategic missile defense systems,” and “ the militarization of outer space and deployment of high-precision non-nuclear systems.” Whereas the United States considers Russia a potential partner in its efforts to combat WMD proliferation and terrorism, as its Quadrennial Defense Review has shown, Russia never mentions the United States as a potential ally in its military doctrine.

What has been largely unnoticed, however, is that Russia does declare its readiness to cooperate with NATO in Article 19 of the doctrine. It is important not to ignore this brief mention and continue engaging Moscow.

It is even more important to realize that whatever the doctrine says, Russia will continue to work with NATO and the United States, provided they take Moscow’s interests into account, accept its role as a regional power, and play by the rules. The success of this cooperation will depend on both sides, and the failures will not be the fault of Moscow alone.

Russia’s new doctrine hardly warrants the reaction its critics have exhibited. Instead, it should serve as a reminder of the cost of isolating Moscow. In the end, it is not the contents of the doctrine but the engagement and dialogue that could help defuse the antagonism between Russia and the West and rebuild their trust.

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