Obsession with Nuclear Deterrent Doesn’t Add Up

Retired Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral James Lyons argued in a Washington Times opinion piece on Monday that the US should “halt our participation in the START negotiations until we bring balance back into the equation.” The equation to which Lyons refers is that of nuclear deterrence: by maintaining the ability to destroy any potential nuclear-armed adversary, the logic runs, we can ensure that none will attack the United States. Unfortunately, a focus on the conventional logic of deterrence doesn’t fit in a world where the most urgent threats to US national security are posed by terrorists and other non-state actors who are difficult to identify, much less deter.
Lyons asserts that Russia has “embarked on an aggressive modernization program to field new nuclear weapons” and seeks a “breakout” capability, allegedly so that it could quickly build and deploy new weapons after withdrawing from any new arms control treaty. China, he adds, may be emboldened if the US commits to nuclear reductions, triggering a panic among our East Asian allies. Our looming nuclear weakness, the Admiral concludes, is exacerbated by the proliferation threats of North Korea and Iran.
Each of these assertions twists reality, but even if true, none would justify withdrawing from bilateral arms control, which is essential to protecting Americans from the clear and present danger posed by proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials to those most likely to use them against us. In recent Senate testimony, the Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, himself a retired four-star Admiral, called the possibility of terrorists acquiring nuclear capability a “top concern,” and noted that traditional means of deterrence would likely be of “less utility” against such a threat. For that reason the President has committed to stopping proliferation at its source, by halting the spread of nuclear weapons to new states, and securing fissile materials. These efforts depend greatly on US-Russian cooperation, since our two countries possess over 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons and material. A new agreement to replace the expired START treaty is an absolutely essential first step.
On the other hand, were the United States to give Russia and other nuclear powers a pass on nuclear security by withdrawing from bilateral arms control and expanding our own arsenal, the danger that terrorists could buy or steal what they need to build a nuclear weapon would expand exponentially. The simple fact is that the more nuclear weapons there are, and the more states have them, the more likely they are to fall into the wrong hands. It is hard to imagine how Admiral Lyons thinks such a scenario would benefit American national security, even if we built and deployed deadly new nuclear weapons, as he recommends. In fact, the most likely consequence of building a new US nuclear weapon would be to usher in a renewed global nuclear arms race, with all the dangers of Cold-War style mutually assured destruction and none of the multilateral cooperation that has helped to keep nuclear materials out of terrorists’ hands to date.
Of course, completing negotiation of a new START agreement by no means precludes sensible investments to upgrade the safety, security and reliability of the US nuclear arsenal. Lyons is absolutely right that new personnel will need to be trained, and new programs implemented to ensure that the US nuclear arsenal sets the global standard for safety and security, while continuing to effectively serve in the deterrent role assigned to it by our military planners. The brand new 2011 budget request already includes about three times as much for nuclear weapons activities as for nuclear non-proliferation programs. In reality, these categories are closely linked, because US nuclear security today is as much about advancing a comprehensive, multilateral approach to preventing proliferation as it is about maintaining the best possible nuclear arsenal.
Terrorists have declared time and again their intention to acquire a nuclear device and use it against us; even after the Cold War, governments from Pyongyang to Islamabad have crossed the nuclear threshold, while Iran’s iron-fisted dictators are pursuing a weapon of their own; and despite proof he sold nuclear technology on the black market, AQ Khan was released from house arrest last year. The equation is clear: If we fail to work with Russia, China and others to rein in and reduce global nuclear arsenals, we are far more likely to see a nuclear terror attack in the future.
Cartoon by Volha Charnysh.
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