There was a moment in 2005 when American democracy promotion efforts and national security interests seemed perfectly aligned. Syria announced its withdrawal from Lebanon; Egypt allowed contested elections for the first time in its history; elections were held in Palestine; and Iraq held parliamentary elections. A more secure, more democratic Middle East appeared to be only a matter of time. Then Hizbullah filled the void in Lebanon, leading to war with Israel. Egypt’s elections turned out to be a sham, and the government subsequently cracked down on the opposition. Hamas swept the elections in Palestine the following year, and Iraq was quickly mired in the deadliest year of its occupation. This swift reversal revealed that our democracy promotion efforts and our national security are linked in very complex, and sometimes contradictory, ways. Promoting democracy while protecting national security is always desirable, and in the long term those interests do indeed align. In the short term, however, we often have to make the difficult decision to prioritize one before the other. If we strike the right balance, we will be able to keep our country safe from immediate threats while laying the foundation for stable democracies in the future.

Today, the Middle East is, if anything, less stable than it was in 2005. The government in Iraq clings to the best news it can get—that the violence isn’t as bad as it used to be. In Afghanistan, NATO troops struggle to regain territory they controlled a few years ago and a corrupt government rules the country. The dream of a stable, democratic Middle East seems to be gone, replaced only with a desperate hope that we might be able to withdraw without triggering civil war. Democracy, if it is achievable in either country, will be a long, hard slog.

Last week, I attended a lunch with Larry Diamond, a fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and an adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq. Dr. Diamond discussed the challenges inherent in promoting democracy, and he also touched on reconciling democracy promotion efforts with security interests. The instability and corruption in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown us that encouraging democracy in those countries will be a complex process, expensive both in terms of blood and treasure. Dr. Diamond emphasized that democracy promotion is desirable for its own sake, and he also stressed that it can be an effective security tool in the long-term.

But what happens when national security and democracy are at odds? What happens when an autocratic nation is a crucial American ally and democratic elections in that country risk bringing power to more radical leaders? It’s exactly the question we face when dealing with nations like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, or Uzbekistan. We grant aid or coordinate military operations with these governments, lending them legitimacy and material support. By reinforcing such governments, we deal democracy a blow. In 2003, Undersecretary of State Paula J. Dobriansky and Carnegie Fellow Thomas Carothers debated a similar issue in the pages of Foreign Affairs. Dobriansky essentially claimed that there was no tension between security and promotion of democracy. That is not the case, and it is crucial that we recognize it. Rather than accept Dobriansky’s insistence that democracy and security are never at odds, we need to develop a framework for deciding how to prioritize our goals when they push us in different directions. We should consider at least four factors when making these sorts of foreign policy decisions:

1. The immediacy of the threat. If we face an immediate threat to American national security, short-term security concerns may well outweigh long-term goals for democracy.
2. The nature of our cooperation. Some types of support—such as economic and military aid—provide instant tangible support for the regime. If we can achieve our security goals by other means, that might be preferable. If not, we should consider exacting concessions on democratic reform or human rights in exchange for our aid.
3. How the aid we provide will affect the regime. It’s possible—as we’ll see in a moment—that aid to some regimes might actually help promote democracy and security simultaneously. In other cases, aid might legitimate and support autocratic governments.
4. The importance and loyalty of the ally in question. It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that the more strategically important a country is, the more leniency we will grant in terms of democratic reform and human rights (think Saudi Arabia). However, I list this question last because we must consider alternatives to supporting an autocratic regime for security reasons.

In the wake of the Christmas Day bomber, the United States is considering a package of military and economic aid to help the Yemeni government root out al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Of the governments on the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen is certainly not the worst potential ally. The problem is not so much that the government is undemocratic (in fact the International Crisis Group says Yemen has the most open political system on the Peninsula), but that it is weak. A well-designed aid package could help to reduce political instability and poverty. At the same time it might help to prop up one of the freer regimes in the region.

Yemen is an example one of the easier cases. Assessing the immediacy of a threat is always a complicated process, but a country that hosts a terrorist organization capable of planning an attack on American soil certainly qualifies. In the case of Yemen, a well-constructed aid package might promote both democracy and our national security. But we also face situations in which those two goals are much more difficult to reconcile. In fact, on Sunday General Stanley McChrystal indicated that ending the fighting in Afghanistan might require a power-sharing arrangement with the Taliban.

McChrystal’s position suggests that maintaining a modicum of stability in Afghanistan is a higher priority than establishing a truly democratic government—in the short term at least. Cooperating with the Taliban would be a major setback for democracy in Afghanistan given the Taliban’s abysmal human rights record, not to mention its collaboration with al-Qaeda. No doubt McChrystal would respond that the difficulties we have had over the past eight years render cooperation with the Taliban the most realistic exit strategy. Considering items 2 and 3 will be critical here, as it may be possible to establish some sort of compromise that eventually helps to transform moderate elements of the Taliban into a legitimate political organization. But it’s still a big risk to take. As tough as it is to make these sorts of decisions, considering the right priorities will help us craft more effective foreign policy, one that can protect our security in the short term and build democracy over time.

Related posts:

1. Goodbye to 2009: The year in review
2. Al Qaeda and the Taliban Still Tied in a Knot
3. Afghanistan: I don’t believe in miracles
4. Time to Think Creatively About Burma
5. American Idol holds big lessons for American democracy