Russia has many interesting New Year traditions, but the most famous one, at least in the Western media, is its annual bickering over energy prices with neighboring states. It was Minsk’s turn to join Moscow in upholding the tradition this year.

No sooner had Belarus finished toasting the New Year than Russia halted oil supplies to Belarusian refineries through the Druzhba, or Friendship, pipeline. Although the Kremlin quickly restored the oil flow to pacify its European customers, the dispute over pricing is far from settled. Russia and Belarus are still arguing over terms of a new agreement on export tariffs to replace the deal that expired on Dec. 31.

Having subsidized Belarus for years on end, Russia is now asking it to pay full import duties for the oil resold abroad. While Russia agreed to Belarus’ continuing to buy crude for domestic market duty-free, the Belarusian government argues that the customs union between the two states obviates the need for duty on all oil imports from Russia, including the 14.4 million tons of oil that Belarus refines and re-exports.

The oil dispute has already driven oil prices to a 15-month high and elicited strong criticism from the Europe Union, which imports thirty percent of its oil from Russia, half of it traveling through Belarus. Were the oil supplies disrupted, Germany and Poland would be hit hardest because Russian oil comprises 15 and 75 percent of their total oil consumption, respectively.

In a Jan. 16 letter to The Washington Post, Dmitry Peskov, deputy chief of staff and press secretary to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, said “the so-called ‘dispute’ between Russia and Belarus is in reality an ongoing negotiation between supplier and customer.” Peskov likened Russia’s actions to what “any entity would do in a changing business climate.” But are things really as simple as Peskov claims?

To an extent, the assertive behavior of the Russian pipeline monopoly is not that different from the profit chasing of its Western counterparts. Elimination of subsidies to post-Soviet states by raising the price for natural gas and oil twenty years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union seems to be a good business decision. In fact, had the prices of Russia’s energy in the region depended on the market in the first place, Russia’s dealings with its former satellites would have been much more balanced and predictable.

But although Russia’s behavior can be partially explained by legitimate commercial interests, it also draws on the Kremlin’s desire to manipulate domestic politics in the post-Soviet states by controlling their energy infrastructures. To accomplish this goal, Russia has sought controlling stakes in the region’s key energy assets to secure both access to lucrative European markets and control over the internal markets of its smaller neighbors. In an earlier energy price dispute, with Moscow agreed to continue subsidies only after it bought a share in the Belarusian gas pipeline network.

Driven by the phantom pains from the loss of the empire, Russia would sometimes go as far as to cut off energy supplies to the facilities purchased by Western businesses and to construct additional pipelines to bypass infrastructure controlled by foreign companies.

The Russian-Belarusian dispute indicates the lack of diverse and original instruments in the Kremlin’s foreign policy toolbox. It is also a sign of the changing nature of the relationship between Russia and the states that it has unblushingly called its “zone of privileged interest” unwittingly prodding them to double efforts to escape the Russian orbit. Even Belarus, Moscow’s closest ally that has concluded a “union state” as well as the customs union with Russia, has been trying to chart a more or less independent foreign policy course.

Although Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka still remains persona non grata in most of Europe, in the past few years he has been flirting with the West. He released political prisoners, pardoned an American lawyer, refused to recognize the breakaway Georgian republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and even agreed to participate in the EU’s Eastern Partnership. Lukashenka, whose authoritarian regime had thrived thanks to Russia’s energy subsidies, is continuing on the path of defiance bickering with the Kremlin over the oil prices today.

While Russia is unlikely to acquiesce to all Belarus’ demands, one can be certain that some sort of compromise is near. One can be even more certain that the Kremlin’s “crude” New Year’s tradition will be followed year after year, as long as Russia’s subsidies last. This means that the EU has a few more uncertain winters ahead. On the bright side, however, the EU will receive a compensation of sorts as more post-Soviet states crave its friendship. After all, the EU’s attractiveness in the post-Soviet region seems to be inversely proportional to the amount of Russian subsidies.

The Russian-Belarusian oil row is not as far from Washington as it seems. Russia’s desire to retain influence in the Near Abroad is to a great extent driven by fears of US influence in those countries. The Russian-Belarusian oil dispute does not put key U.S. interests at stake, but it does affect Washington’s relations with both the EU and the former Soviet republics. Therefore, it would be wise for Washington to follow the recent developments in the former Soviet region, encourage Europe to reduce its dependence on Russian energy, and engage states that seek to leave Russia’s orbit without adding more fuel to the flame of their financial disagreements with Moscow.

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