The game of nuclear rearmament/disarmament a-la Kremlin

A new year, a new beginning. While Washington discusses proposals like eliminating one leg of the nuclear arms “triad” and adopting a “no-first-use’’ policy, Moscow plays up the role of nuclear weapons in its national security and hypes its work on the new generation of nuclear weapons.
With viewpoints so different, it is not surprising that US and Russian experts are still haggling over a new strategic arms reductions treaty – already four weeks past the initial goal of Dec. 5. As if to make the negotiators’ task even more difficult, 40 Republican Senators and Joe Lieberman are urging the Obama administration to follow Moscow’s suit. They stress the need for a large-scale nuclear-warhead modernization program at a time when Washington is already spending approximately $30 billion per year to maintain and upgrade its arsenal for the next 20-30 years.
Russia’s expensive and unnecessary modernization plan neither threatens the United States nor necessitates intensification of the US modernization program, however. The Kremlin’s most recent saber rattling is scarcely more than an attempt to play hardball on the START negotiations issues. In fact, if Russian modernization of strategic nuclear forces continues in the direction it seems to be going, its nuclear deterrent may actually weaken.
Speaking to reporters Dec. 29, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said the US missile defense system is the main obstacle in the arms reduction negotiations. “If we are not developing an anti-missile shield, then there is a danger that our partners, by creating such ‘an umbrella,’ will feel completely secure and thus can allow themselves to do what they want, disrupting the balance, and aggressiveness will rise immediately,” he said. Putin said the US missile defense plans would upset the Cold War balance of power, forcing Russia to develop new offensive weapons.
Moscow’s determination to upgrade its nuclear forces is hardly new or surprising. Russia embarked on a modernization program years ago, investing enormous resources despite falling oil and gas prices. Russia’s procurement budget for 2009 was set at about $45 billion, with nearly $12 billion slated for upgrading the strategic nuclear forces.
The newest systems under development are the Topol-M long-range missile and the Borey-class submarine with Bulava SLBMs. On Dec. 23 Russia began use of a new radar station. On Christmas Eve, it successfully tested a nuclear-capable missile RS-20V Voevoda (Satan). On its Dec. 17 50th anniversary, Russian Strategic Rocket Forces Command called for a new MIRVed missile by 2016. Between 2025 and 2030, Russia also plans to deploy a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber.
What is new, however, is Moscow’s attempt to explain the need for modernization with the US missile defense plans. In reality, the rapid modernization efforts – as well as its move toward adopting a first-use nuclear doctrine and a proposal of a new European Security treaty – stem from Moscow’s concerns over the widening gap between Russian and US conventional capabilities. Russian strategic forces are growing increasingly obsolete. Today modern equipment accounts for only 10 percent of the existing arsenal.
An astute politician would think twice before broadcasting aggressive modernization plans at a time of a renewed push for a nuclear weapons-free world. An old hand at politics, Putin was playing for both domestic and foreign audiences when he shared the issue with the press instead of settling it in the bilateral negotiations with the United States. To the Russian voters, he demonstrated his skill at preserving Russia’s status as a nuclear superpower in the economic crisis and his deep concern for national security. To Washington (where some say the United States “should not pay for what is free” because Russia has to reduce its aging strategic forces with or without an arms control treaty), Putin signaled that the Russian nuclear arsenal is still strong.
Parading its nuclear arsenal is a sign of the deep distrust with which Moscow watches Washington’s every move nine months after the “reset” despite attempts by the Obama administration to ease tensions over missile defense plans in Eastern Europe. Calling on others to do away with the Cold War legacy, the Kremlin itself suffers from the Cold War symptoms. Its leaders continue to brace up for scenarios that involve the United States destroying Russian missiles, as if trying to wage the war that the USSR had lost two decades ago. Few doubt Russia’s ability to develop nuclear forces impressive by Cold-War standards, but even fewer doubt that these standards are dangerous and irrelevant in the new security environment.
Just one example of how wasteful and expensive the Russian push for modernization can get is the luckless Bulava. Bulava is Russia’s new submarine launched ballistic missile destined to become the core of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. The missile cost about 3 billion dollars over the 11 years of development. Bulava was supposed to enter production by the end of 2009, but its failures (the most recent on Dec. 9) have already become infamous.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains that modernization will strengthen security and strategic stability. However, if Russia continues replacing old systems with modernized new generation Bulava-like ones, its nuclear triad may actually suffer.
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