Partnership for a Secure Europe?
There are two ways to do away with the Cold War past. One is to adapt the existing security institutions to the 21st century threats and challenges. Another is to start from the pre-Cold War scratch, looking back to the times of imperial Russia’s heyday. Although its draft of the European Security Treaty favors the latter approach, Moscow deserves credit for trying to draw attention to the weaknesses of the European security architecture. Too bad its proposal was so bold and unrealistic that it failed to elicit a thoughtful response from the West.
The draft treaty appeared on the Kremlin’s official website on Nov. 29, on the eve of both the OSCE summit and the first ministerial meeting between NATO and Russia since the war in Georgia. President Dmitri Medvedev also sent the proposal to the heads of states and international organizations in the Euro-Atlantic region.
The ambitious document aims for nothing less than to “do away with the Cold War legacy” and the outdated institutions like NATO and the OSCE and to ensure that “no one state and no one international organization could strengthen their security at the expense of other countries and organizations.”
Ironically, Moscow appears to be doing just that. Not only do its troops continue to violate Georgia’s territorial integrity, but it is also about to change its military doctrine authorizing military interventions to protect Russians abroad and allowing the use of nuclear weapons in regional and local conflicts.
According to the draft, “a Party to the Treaty which is a member of military alliances, coalitions or organizations shall seek to ensure […] that decisions taken in the framework of such alliances, coalitions or organizations do not affect significantly security of any Party or Parties to the Treaty.” Signatories shall not take “any actions” on the territory of another treaty signatory that significantly affect the security of a third treaty signatory. Parties to the treaty shall be “entitled to consider an armed attack against any other Party an armed attack against” themselves and “to render the attacked Party […] the necessary assistance, including the military one.”
Moscow is not too keen on explaining what constitutes enhancing one’s security at the expense of another. Under the vague terms of the draft anything from a US base in Romania to its Patriot missiles in Poland could be construed as undermining Russia’s security.
An offshoot of Russia’s resentment over the expansion of NATO and US missile defense plans in Europe, the draft treaty would oblige the West to mind Russia’s feelings on virtually all security issues and stay out of Eastern Europe, which Moscow sees as its sphere of interest. Were such an agreement in force, any action frowned upon by Russia or the UN Security Council, where Russia has veto power, would constitute a breach.
However, adoption of the draft would also start a flood of complaints against Russia itself: Estonia would denounce Russia’s cyber attacks, Ukraine would object to the presence of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, Georgia would demand withdrawal of Russia’s troops, Poland would raise the issue of Russian-Belarusian military exercises, and most of Europe would condemn Russia’s cutting off oil and gas supplies.
For better or for worse, Russia’s proposal has fallen on deaf ears. Having politely agreed to study the draft, the West moved on to other issues, and even the media have largely ignored the Russian initiative. Most European states see no need for overhauling the existing security framework. At the OSCE ministerial meeting in Athens on Dec. 1, Georgia was the only state besides Russia to express frustration with the European security institutions. Not surprisingly, star-crossed Tbilisi sees the Russian initiative as a problem rather than as a solution and will not accept “redraft[ing] the European security in accordance to the whims of one revisionist power,” in the passionate words of its foreign minister.
Despite the lack of international support, the draft remains in the Major Issues section on the Kremlin’s website. It is wise to heed the smoke signals coming from Moscow.
Medvedev first raised the question of a new security framework in June 2008, warning that “Europe’s problems won’t be solved until its unity is established, an organic wholeness of all its integral parts, including Russia.” Two months later, Russia invaded Georgia, exposing the weaknesses of the existing European security institutions, in case anyone doubted their inadequacy.
The publication of the draft proposal is another reminder of the fact. However, enhancing European security does not necessitate brand-new institutions and treaties, especially as bold and as general as the one proposed by the Kremlin. Instead, Europe should use the tools already in place more effectively and wisely.
A good first step for revamping the dialogue with Russia is reviving the NATO-Russia Council and improving the exchange between NATO and the Moscow-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization. Another important step is resurrecting the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty regime, suspended by Moscow in 2008.
While its disregard of the existing security arrangements like the CFE should not be overlooked, Russia is correct in asserting that the existing architecture of European security is less than perfect. It is imperative that Russia is allowed to play a more meaningful role in the current security framework. The wider Moscow’s participation, the greater its stake in the system and the more it has to lose when defaulting on its agreements and obligations.
Medvedev’s draft treaty proposal should be seen as an opportunity to engage with Moscow. Brushing off the Kremlin’s suggestions without any dialogue, which seems to have happened to the draft treaty this month, will only strain the relationship between Russia and the West further and compromise European security.
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