Last Friday, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a direct rebuke to Iran’s nuclear program, demanding that Iran cease construction of a new enrichment plant.  The final tally on the censure was 25-3, with Russia and China casting critical votes in favor of the motion.  Iran responded to the vote by suggesting that it might withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Maybe that would be a good thing.  No one in the Obama Administration would ever say that Iran withdrawing from the NPT is one of the U.S.’s policy goals, but it might just be the best achievable outcome.  I don’t see a problem if our engagement policy pushes Iran out of the NPT.

Of course, our main objective is a reversal in Iranian policy.  We want Iran to admit that it has been pursuing a nuclear weapons program and then verifiably dismantle it.  The Obama Administration is willing to engage directly with the Iranians to make this happen.  The problem is that, given Iran’s history of stalling public negotiations to buy time for covert nuclear programs, there is no reason to believe that the Iranians are going to change.

However, Obama’s engagement policy can be successful with either a positive or a negative response from Iran to our offers.  This is because by offering to engage Iran we are actually engaging Russia, China and the rest of the international community.  The more Iran spurns U.S. and global engagement, the most extreme instance of which would be withdrawal from the NPT, the closer our position aligns to necessary allies.  Russia and China’s votes on the IAEA censure are a clear sign that this is already happening.

Withdrawal from the NPT would make it very difficult for Russia to continue its civil nuclear collaboration with Iran.   China and other countries would also have to rethink trade relationships because though they would prefer to ignore Iran’s nuclear ambitions, none of them actually wants to be the exporter that directly enables Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.  To be deeply cynical for a moment, it could be said that Iran’s NPT membership has served to provide cover for other countries that wish to believe that Iran only seeks a civilian nuclear capability without affecting Iran’s ability to move toward a nuclear weapons capability.

I’m not sure that Iran’s withdrawal would hurt the treaty itself either.  The fact that Iran is a signatory is often cited as a reason the NPT is flawed.  And having Iran at the table for all NPT negotiations and decisions has made it nearly impossible in recent years to achieve anything from within the parameters of the Treaty.  When North Korea withdrew, there was much hand wringing, but ultimately the NPT did not change, nor did the obligations felt by most of the signatories.  I do not believe that Iran’s withdrawal would cause a cascade effect of other countries withdrawing.  Instead, it would make the Treaty seem more honest.  Iran would be clearly identified as outside international norms and could be dealt with accordingly.

In the end, Iran is unlikely to pull out of the Treaty.  They must realize that all of their arguments for the inherent right to a civilian nuclear program are built around being a signatory.  The worst outcome for the Obama engagement policy would be for the Iranians to successfully continue to stonewall, as they have done to the Europeans for years.  Therefore, engagement cannot be about pulling the Iranians into prolonged negotiations.  Instead, engagement must be viewed as an opportunity to present a series of reasonable options, such as the recent proposal to enrich Iran’s uranium abroad, that the Iranians will either choose to accept or reject.  As they are discovering, it is more costly to say no to an outstretched American hand than it is to rail against perceived U.S. belligerence.

So, I say let’s be aggressive in our engagement policy, both by offering new solutions that other countries that get behind and maintaining real deadlines for the Iranians to respond.  If we push hard enough, maybe we can force the Iranians to make a rash decision that will finally bring their true nuclear intentions into the sunlight and create an effective international coalition to oppose them.

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