Earlier today, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell presented the Obama administration’s new Burma policy, which includes engaging the Burmese military junta in high-level talks. This decision to directly engage the junta represents a major shift from past administrations, which chose to largely shun the repressive regime, maintaining the punitive sanctions that have been a cornerstone of U.S. policy towards the nation for years. Not that Obama is planning on abandoning sanctions altogether- instead, the new policy will combine engagement with sanctions, creating a “carrot and stick” enticement aimed at drawing the junta out of its feudal shell. Unfortunately, the U.S.’s new policy is unlikely to produce results, as the U.S. has no effective bargaining chips with which to influence the junta, whose primary goal is its own survival.  To make even a small impact in Burma, the U.S. must look for alternative routes for its foreign policy.

The shift in U.S. policy to “carrot and stick” is largely the result of the failure of past policy- notably sanctions- to achieve any sort of meaningful progress in Burma. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton acknowledged in her remarks at the UN last week, sanctions “have not produced the results that had been hoped for on behalf of the people of Burma.” Indeed, it appears that the only major change in Burma in the past decade or so has been the number of political prisoners, which keeps rising. The reason U.S. and EU sanctions against the regime have proved so ineffective is simple: the junta doesn’t need Western investment to get by. Burma’s rich deposits of rubies, teak, natural gas and oil tempt many countries to overlook the junta’s myriad human rights abuses in favor of a business partnership with the regime. As a result, the government isn’t hurting for cash- it exported $6.6 billion worth of goods in 2008, not including black market trade, which is estimated by the Australian Government to be massive. With investors from China, India, Russia, Thailand, and South Korea (among others) banging on their door, the generals don’t seem to be terribly upset about the West’s absence.

While sanctions have failed because Burma already has adequate foreign investment, engagement will likely fail because the goals of the U.S. are at odds with the junta’s main priority- its own survival. The junta knows it is wildly unpopular- the last elections in Burma clearly demonstrated this- and that allowing any sort of democratic concessions in the country is likely to reduce its grip on power. From the generals’ perspective, the only plausible strategy for achieving their goals is to carry on with repressive policies. In this respect, the objectives of the U.S. and of the junta are irreconcilable. Thus, while the junta may agree to speak with U.S. leaders, it is simply a sham. The junta will not make any meaningful concessions towards democratic freedoms, and the U.S. has no effective bargaining chips for forcing them to. Unlike North Korea and Iran, who are vulnerable because they face legitimate national security threats from abroad, Burma’s only threats come from within, meaning that while the U.S. can play on Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s and Kim Jong Il’s fears of attack, it cannot do so with Than Shwe. Just as it is unlikely that the junta will carry out a meaningful dialogue with the U.S. government, it is also unlikely that the junta will even allow an increased Western humanitarian presence in the country. As the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis so aptly demonstrated, the generals would rather let their citizens die than risk an influx of foreign ideas and influences into Burma. In short, no matter what the generals may say in public, nothing has changed.

This interpretation of U.S. foreign policy will likely be seen by some as defeatist, particularly as the Obama administration has brought engagement back in vogue. But the point of this analysis is not to say that the U.S. should throw up its hands and abandon Burma. On the contrary, the decision to engage is the correct one, if only for two reasons: first, it will give the U.S. greater insight into the mindset of the generals, and second, it will give the U.S. an improved platform from which to persuade other countries to push for change in Burma. And insisting on other countries promoting change in Burma is exactly what the U.S. should be doing.

One area the Obama administration should start with is that of corporate responsibility. Human rights groups and Burmese activists have long talked about the devastation that foreign companies drilling and mining in Burma have caused on a local level. The companies, which often hire the Burmese military for security, have been associated with forced relocation, slave labor, and other human rights abuses. In eastern Burma alone, almost half a million people have been displaced by mining and drilling operations. The Obama administration should go to the governments of countries invested in Burma, including the UK, France, China, India, Malaysia, South Korea, Russia, Thailand, and Australia, and insist that their corporations abide by international human rights law in their business operations. Ideally, the U.S. should also work with these countries to not only ensure their operations in Burma have no negative impact on the local populace but to try and create a measurable positive impact. Where the U.S. has no leverage for forcing the junta to allow humanitarian projects in Burma, countries with significant business interests in Burma do. The antipathy of foreign companies in Burma has long been an issue only addressed by human rights groups. It is now time for the U.S. government to get involved.

Change in Burma will, for the foreseeable future, remain an elusive goal. Unfortunately, there is very little the U.S. government can do through sanctions or engagement to promote democratic freedoms in the country. But by seeking alternative routes for pressuring the regime, the Obama administration might just be able to make the lives of villagers in Burma a little more bearable.

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