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	<title>Comments on: Once more unto the Afghanistan breach, dear friends, once more</title>
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	<link>http://blog.psaonline.org/2009/09/28/once-more-unto-the-afghanistan-breach-dear-friends-once-more/</link>
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		<title>By: marc</title>
		<link>http://blog.psaonline.org/2009/09/28/once-more-unto-the-afghanistan-breach-dear-friends-once-more/comment-page-1/#comment-2094327</link>
		<dc:creator>marc</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2009 03:09:33 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Gen Petraeus really would be an odd choice to sell the public on the idea that the very survival of our nation depends on success in Afghanistan. He has spent the better part of three years using his considerable influence with President Bush to prevent so much as a box of Kleenex from being diverted from the Iraq theater to Afghanistan. It would look a little awkward even opportunist , to say the least, for him to reverse direction now.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Gen Petraeus really would be an odd choice to sell the public on the idea that the very survival of our nation depends on success in Afghanistan. He has spent the better part of three years using his considerable influence with President Bush to prevent so much as a box of Kleenex from being diverted from the Iraq theater to Afghanistan. It would look a little awkward even opportunist , to say the least, for him to reverse direction now.</p>
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		<title>By: kim maynard</title>
		<link>http://blog.psaonline.org/2009/09/28/once-more-unto-the-afghanistan-breach-dear-friends-once-more/comment-page-1/#comment-2094178</link>
		<dc:creator>kim maynard</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2009 21:43:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Interesting non-contentious contentions Dave. 
  If you want a military solution to any problem, simply ask the military for their opinion. I recall that when Kennedy had advisors in Vietnam the military was advising in favor of full scale military involvement. Soon. Like right away. Kennedy chose to go elsewhere for advice. Academics, historians, and retired politicians and military leaders. Kennedy chose not to go into full military mode, which is why we have civilian control of the military. 
  I hear on all fronts about winning the support of the Afgan people. But having war in their country is probably not going to do that. So how do we not have war there? Probably by not having war there. 
  We have some monitary influence to wield in Afganistan. In a sense, we can threaten and cajole, to draw out troops, to cut off funds, unless the flawed government becomes less flawed. Should it not, which it probably won&#039;t, we need to try more unconventional methods, going directly to the people, direct aid, maybe cutting the government out of the loop.
  I hear everyone saying that this would cause vast turmoil and conflict. Well, what do we have now? Chopped liver? My point is that I believe we need more than the two or three versions of military solutions in play. The Afganistan question needs to be looked at from a greater number of perspectives than are currently being reviewed.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Interesting non-contentious contentions Dave.<br />
  If you want a military solution to any problem, simply ask the military for their opinion. I recall that when Kennedy had advisors in Vietnam the military was advising in favor of full scale military involvement. Soon. Like right away. Kennedy chose to go elsewhere for advice. Academics, historians, and retired politicians and military leaders. Kennedy chose not to go into full military mode, which is why we have civilian control of the military.<br />
  I hear on all fronts about winning the support of the Afgan people. But having war in their country is probably not going to do that. So how do we not have war there? Probably by not having war there.<br />
  We have some monitary influence to wield in Afganistan. In a sense, we can threaten and cajole, to draw out troops, to cut off funds, unless the flawed government becomes less flawed. Should it not, which it probably won&#8217;t, we need to try more unconventional methods, going directly to the people, direct aid, maybe cutting the government out of the loop.<br />
  I hear everyone saying that this would cause vast turmoil and conflict. Well, what do we have now? Chopped liver? My point is that I believe we need more than the two or three versions of military solutions in play. The Afganistan question needs to be looked at from a greater number of perspectives than are currently being reviewed.</p>
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		<title>By: Jess Barton</title>
		<link>http://blog.psaonline.org/2009/09/28/once-more-unto-the-afghanistan-breach-dear-friends-once-more/comment-page-1/#comment-2094010</link>
		<dc:creator>Jess Barton</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2009 15:44:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.psaonline.org/?p=2476#comment-2094010</guid>
		<description>The Gen. says, “(P)rogress is hindered by the dual threat of a resilient insurgency and a crisis of confidence in the government and the international coalition. To win their support, we must protect the people from both of these threats.” But he identifies a triple threat: (1) a resilient insurgency, (2) crisis of confidence in the Afghan gov&#039;t, and (3) crisis of confidence in the international coalition. The crises of confidences are two different things. In any event, how is that the US, or any other foreign gov&#039;t, is endowed to address the Afghan people&#039;s crisis of confidence in their own gov&#039;t? That a fundementally internal problem that only the Afghan people, and their gov&#039;t, can address.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Gen. says, “(P)rogress is hindered by the dual threat of a resilient insurgency and a crisis of confidence in the government and the international coalition. To win their support, we must protect the people from both of these threats.” But he identifies a triple threat: (1) a resilient insurgency, (2) crisis of confidence in the Afghan gov&#8217;t, and (3) crisis of confidence in the international coalition. The crises of confidences are two different things. In any event, how is that the US, or any other foreign gov&#8217;t, is endowed to address the Afghan people&#8217;s crisis of confidence in their own gov&#8217;t? That a fundementally internal problem that only the Afghan people, and their gov&#8217;t, can address.</p>
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