As Chris Preble mentioned in his post last week, there is are two different bipartisan responses to the war in Afghanistan.  On one side, a collection of those on the left and the right are advocating for pulling back from this conflict, and another group of unlikely bedfellows is pushing for further engagement.

This is a sharp contrast to other foreign policy issues such as Iraq that broke cleanly along partisan lines, particularly in Bush’s second term.  The fact that this issue doesn’t, in my view, is actually a welcome change.  Too often when a foreign policy dilemma is considered, a knee jerk reaction is to follow the partisan path laid out by party leaders.  Too frequently many tow the party line.  The fact that this seems to not be happening here, perhaps is an indication that further analysis and consideration is taking place- at least that’s my hope.

I’ll examine one of the approaches – disengagement – that has been supported by conservative columnist George Will and Democrat Senator Russ Feingold.  Although the arguments raised by this unlikely pairing are thoughtful and worthy of consideration, they both fall short when presenting their alternative to the current path.

Senator Russ Feingold (D-MN) wrote in the Wall Street Journal,

“Ending al Qaeda’s safe haven in Pakistan is a top national security priority. Yet our operations in Afghanistan will not do so, and they could actually contribute to further destabilization of Pakistan…. We need to start discussing a flexible timetable to bring our brave troops out of Afghanistan.”

Feingold seems to believe that one of the major obstacles to the completion of the mission in Afghanistan is the actual presence of US troops.  He point to a perception of US troops as an occupying force.  He also refers to 2009 polling that showed that a “plurality” of Afghans wanted a reduction in US troops.  I looked at that same BBC poll.  It found that indeed support for US troops in the country has decreased over the past several years.  In the 2009 poll, although 44 percent said that US and NATO/ISAF forces should decrease, 47 percent said that they should either stay the same or increase.  It is true that if one of goals of the US/NATO presence is to win over the local population, then these numbers really do matter.  There may be some time in the future when overwhelming disapproval by the Afghan population necessitates a drawdown of foreign forces.  The numbers, however, don’t yet show that.

The other important statistic to consider in this survey was the answer to the question, “Who would you rather have ruling Afghanistan today?”  Despite all its flaws, 82 percent responded that they would prefer the current government.  Only 4 percent chose the Taliban.  Afghans may not like the current situation, but it seems quite clear that it’s a vast improvement to most Afghans.   This statistic leads me to conclude that if the military presence is done right and actually brings increased security to Afghan citizens, they will be inclined to support it rather than the alternative.

Of course, that’s the big “if” – if the military presence is done right.  The problem is that for most of the past seven years, the US and NATO forces have been ill equipped and too few in number to actually execute a proper counterinsurgency strategy.  I agree that things have not been going well.  Most Afghans in the south and east see little security benefit from either Afghan or US/NATO security forces.  It’s no wonder that many have put their lot in with the Taliban.  It seems that one response to this problem would be a greater presence – not less – of security forces.

Yet, George Will and Russ Feingold propose that the alternative to a significant presence is air strikes and drone attacks.  Although this may seem like an attractive alternative, the reality is that it’s exactly these types of strikes that end up killing civilians and pushing more Afghans into the hands of the Taliban.  I think that we’ve tried this strategy before – it’s called the past seven years.  We thought that we could deal with the terrorist threat on the cheap with high tech weaponry.  It was tried both under the Clinton and Bush administrations.  It clearly hasn’t worked.  Additionally, the key ingredient needed for such strikes is intelligence that comes from a presence on the ground.  The counterinsurgency approach that prioritizes the protection of civilians is the more effective long term solution. This useful analysis examines some of the shortcomings of attempts to address the terrorist threat from afar.

Will and Feingold both point to Pakistan as the real threat.  The possibility of Al Qaeda getting its hands on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is truly a nightmare scenario.  However, to give up on Afghanistan and to focus primarily on Pakistan ignores the interrelated nature of these two countries.  Yes, it is true that increased pressure on the southern and eastern borders of Afghanistan pushes more insurgents into Pakistan.  The Pakistanis under the leadership of the military ruler Musharraf had only done the bare minimum to combat the jihadist forces on its western border.

There are some indications that Pakistan may be reexamining its previous allegiances to such groups.  The military offensive in Swat is one example along with the recent presidential announcement promoting broader democratic freedoms in the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA).  Recent polling in Pakistan has also shown a shift in public opinion against the Taliban.  We must continue with maximum pressure on Pakistan to deal with the serious issues on its side of the border.  However, if we cede the Afghan side, jihadist fighters will once again find safe haven that will allow them to plot their next attack. 9/11 has shown that it doesn’t take nuclear weapons to create massive death and destruction.

Of course, no matter how good a strategy is, it will not succeed unless it has the buy-in of the American people.  On this count, the administration is way behind the curve.  Recent polls have shown that less than half of the American public is supportive of the war effort.  The quandary the president finds himself in is difficult – as more Americans die, the American public becomes less supportive of the war.  Though, an effective counterinsurgency campaign requires that more Americans are put in harms way.  It seems that if we get the strategy right, we risk losing the support of the American people.  The president must lay out the options to the American people, their likely costs, the stakes of the conflict, and why sacrifice is necessary.  For the past seven years we’ve had too many overly optimistic assessments about our military engagements and their costs.

Yes, it is certainly possible to do Afghanistan on the cheap.  The question we must ask ourselves, is what is the increased risk to US citizens from not building up the local Afghan institutions and security forces to deal with the problem in the long run.  My conclusion so far is that the costs sufficiently reduce the long term risk to American citizens that they are worth bearing.  If we are to succeed, the president must ensure that the American people are also on board.

Related posts:

1. Afghanistan Debate Tonight
2. Who is seeing the real Afghanistan?
3. Afghanistan: Still Wrong after all These Years
4. Now is the time for a national debate
5. Speaking Honestly to the American People about Afghanistan