On August 23, 1939, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and his German counterpart Joachim von Ribbentrop signed a nonaggression pact, along with a secret protocol dividing Northern and Eastern Europe into German and Soviet “spheres of influence.” Sixty years later, Moscow is struggling to retain its influence in the states along its border and agonizing over their flirtation with the West.

The Kremlin has no regrets about marching into Georgia last August and no intentions of restoring the pre-war political map of the Caucasus. In fact, a week before the first anniversary of Russian-Georgian conflict, Moscow accused Tbilisi of trying to rekindle violence in South Ossetia. On August 10, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev introduced a bill in the Duma authorizing him to send Russian troops abroad to defend Russian citizens or prevent aggression against other states. The next day, Moscow indefinitely postponed the dispatch of the new Russian ambassador to Ukraine warning Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko of the consequences of his defiance. On Monday, August 24, relations between the two states reached a new low as Russian officials directly accused Kiev for fighting alongside Georgian forces last summer.

This hectoring comes at a time when Russia’s neighbors are asking Washington to play a more active role in the region. Last month, in an open letter to U.S. President Barack Obama, 22 prominent thinkers and former officials from Eastern Europe called on Washington to pay closer attention to Russia’s resurgence. A similar message from Belarus followed. Stanislau Shushkevich, the first Head of State of Belarus, and Ivonka Survila, President of the Rada of Belarus Democratic Republic-in-Exile, expressed concerns about Russia’s economic and political pressure and called on the United States to create an initiative similar to the EU’s Eastern Partnership, which would include the countries of the former Soviet Union into transatlantic cooperation.

Even though Moscow is losing the loyalty of its neighbors — attendance at the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summits declined, Tajiskistan announced plans to ban using Russian in official documents, and Belarus reaffirmed recognition of Georgia’s sovereignty over Abkhazia and South Ossetia — it does not mean that the United States should openly celebrate Russia’s “loss of empire” a la Joe Biden.

The five-day war in the Caucasus — a preview of what mixed messages to Moscow’s neighbors may bring — has reaffirmed the importance of formulating a coherent policy toward the region. A key concern will be to avoid further fragmentation of the unstable post-Soviet realm, awash with weapons and fissile material. Incidentally, the breakaway province of South Ossetia is one of the most popular nuclear smuggling points in Eurasia. Since Georgia doesn’t recognize the South Ossetian independent border, it does not commit any resources to police it. This is one example where aggressive shopping for allies by the United States has led to the emergence of smuggling safe heavens undermining US-Russian cooperation in combating nuclear terrorism. Thus, no matter how loudly Russia’s neighbors call for Washington to counter Moscow in its own backyard, it is imperative to center US engagement in the region on the US-Russian relationship.

Past examples show how US attempts to compete with Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet realm pushed Moscow to cling harder to its neighbors, who are not shy about exploiting antagonism between Russia and the West. For example, Belarus’ furtive glances westward earned it an invitation to join the Eastern Partnership from the EU, a $1.5 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund, and a stabilization loan from Moscow offered in the hope to maintain historical ties. Central Asian nations are also adept at milking both cows. Kyrgyzstan received a $2 billion aid package from Russia after ordering out the US military base. After the United States persuaded the country to extend the contract by tripling its annual lease, Russia hurriedly asked for a second base in Kyrgyzstan. Calling for US forces in Uzbekistan to depart, Tashkent gained Russia’s backing and changed its mind only after receiving an invitation to attend the 2008 NATO summit. Moscow’s neighbors will continue to play this game until conflicting promises to these countries lead Russia and the United States into a new clash or until the tug-of-war over influence in the post-Soviet realm ends.

The conflict last year indicates the form this clash may take, and the United States should be careful not to ignite regional tensions with inopportune engagement. No one would have predicted that Georgia’s tiny military could go to war against the Russian Army or that Russia would attack Georgia, damaging its reputation in the West. This year, no one expects the row between Ukraine and Russia to escalate into a mini war or the US combat training mission in Georgia to be seen as a threat to the separatist republics by Moscow.

To feel welcome in someone else’s backyard, it’s wisest to try the front gate before jumping over the fence. The gate may well be open while the fence is undoubtedly guarded. Defining the US policy in the region as one of counteracting Russia’s will ultimately backfire. The key for engaging Moscow’s neighbors lies in normalizing the discourse between the United States and Russia. The best way to consolidate security in Russia’s neighborhood is to draw Russia into a closer association with NATO, perhaps by brokering a security cooperation agreement between NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which may otherwise turn into NATO’s rival. Engaging Russia in a broader network of global security would ease Russia’s phantom pains from the loss of its spheres of influence, increase the effectiveness of US involvement in the region, and insure against incidents like the one in Georgia last summer.

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