Over at the Cato – @ – Liberty blog, I’ve been hammering pretty hard on the F-22.

I don’t dispute that it is an exceptionally capable aircraft, and I don’t question the need for defending the airspace over, and the approaches to, the United States. But I long ago concluded that the F-22 is far too expensive (over $350 million per plane, when one takes account of all the costs of the program), and ultimately designed for a different fight, in a different era.

Indeed, in my book, The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free, I single out the F-22 as one of five weapons platforms that deserve special scrutiny. And I concluded that this expensive aircraft — the most expensive fighter plane in history – should be cut in order to make room for other programs, and other technologies, better aligned to our long-term national security needs.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates, among many others, agrees. In a speech to the Economic Club of Chicago last week, Gates pondered aloud:

[I]f we can’t bring ourselves to make this tough but straightforward decision [to terminate the program at 187 aircraft] — reflecting the judgment of two very different presidents, two different secretaries of defense, two chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff, and the current Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff, where do we draw the line? And if not now, when? If we can’t get this right — what on earth can we get right?

This Friday, July 24th, I will be discussing my book at the New American Foundation, and at the risk of tipping my hand too much, I plan to focus my remarks around Bob Gates’ plaintive question. I’m appearing at New America at the invitation of NAF Fellow Michael Cohen, and that seems the perfect venue, and this the perfect time, to focus on the topic of defense procurement and the opportunitity costs – the trade offs between public spending on defense and public and private spending elsewhere – that we too often take for granted.

I’m fortunate to have a very distinguished panel appearing with me. In addition to Michael as the chair and moderator, I’ll be joined by Gordon Adams of the Stimson Center, and Michael Lind of New America. All three individuals, along with other distinguished scholars at New America, including Steve Clemons, Bill Hartung, and Patrick Doherty, are perceptive and knowledgeable critics of our national security strategy. All are aware of the costs associated with maintaining global military dominance, and all have put forward sensible proposals for reforming the way we do business.

In The Power Problem, I offer my own alternative approach, but I’m looking forward to some healthy skepticism as much as words of support and praise, and I can count on NAF to put on a great program. So whether you are a fan or a critic of our current national security strategy, come out for the show. If you think the F-22 is worth price of three F-15s, come tell me why. If you think the defense budget is a bargain at 4.5 percent of GDP, be there to make the case.

I’ve had enough of stale Inside-the-Beltway debates where the panelists all jockey to affirm the conventional wisdom. Let’s see if we can generate a serious debate, over the most important function of government — our national defense.

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