START is Just the Beginning
This December, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), is set to expire. START is the only mechanism that places verifiable limits on Russian and American nuclear arsenals. Currently, diplomats from both nations have been hard at work negotiating an extension or successor to the treaty. At a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee last week, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, Ambassador Thomas Graham, and Dr. Keith B. Payne discussed the prospects for U.S.-Russia nuclear arms reductions. They were generally optimistic that we can make progress on arms reduction talks. It is imperative that we negotiate a new arms reduction treaty with Russia. But renegotiating START should be only the first step in a much longer process. We should view a new START as the beginning of a broader effort to curb nuclear proliferation and repair our relations with Russia.
Many experts agree that progress on START is crucial to maintaining the nonproliferation regime. Indeed, Ambassador Graham cited the recent PSA statement on nuclear proliferation as evidence of a broad bipartisan consensus on the importance of strategic arms reduction. Additionally, Dr. Payne called for an agreement that encompasses Russia’s large supply of tactical nuclear weapons, something Russia has resisted. Another major proliferation concern (though unrelated to arms reduction) is Russia’s continued support for Iran; it has supplied nuclear fuel to Iran’s Bushehr reactor and blocked or weakened efforts to stop Iran’s uranium enrichment.
The Russians have their own list of objectives. Russia has insisted that arms reductions talks should encompass more than offensive strategic forces. Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev has stated that he will only agree to a START successor if the United States addresses Russia’s concerns about ballistic missile defense. Russia is also disturbed by the expansion of NATO. While Medvedev has voiced his support of modest stockpile reductions, he has called for reducing the number of delivery vehicles by “several times.” According to Dr. Payne, Russia wants to limit delivery vehicles because Russia’s long-range missiles are quickly becoming obsolete. Due to a lingering Cold War mentality and self-consciousness over its limited conventional power, Russia is eager to maintain strategic parity with the United States. As Russia’s delivery systems go off-line, Russia will need American cooperation to maintain a comparable array of delivery systems.
Both the United States and Russia have compelling security reasons to negotiate a successor to START, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that things will go flawlessly. There is, however, room to maneuver—for example, Russia might agree to reduce its tactical nuclear weapons if we limit our delivery systems. At the very least, we should be able to extend START’s crucial verification mechanisms and reduce our arsenals below the ceiling set in 2002. That limited agreement needs to come before START expires in December, and therefore it should be relatively modest and focused on offensive weapons. But it should be negotiated with the understanding that it will be followed by a more comprehensive nonproliferation agreement that will address American and Russian concerns beyond offensive weapons. Given both sides’ interests, it’s not hard to imagine how that second agreement might take shape.
Generally, the United States should work to relieve Russia’s concerns about missile defense and the expansion of NATO in return for more support on Iran. Though missile defense has been a sticking point, the witnesses agreed that there is some room for flexibility. For example, the United States might agree not to deploy missile defense systems in former Soviet satellites. Another option would be to negotiate a new ABM treaty. American officials insist that our missile defense efforts are arrayed not against Russia, but against emerging threats from rogue states. If that’s the case, then the two countries should be able to find some middle ground in which the U.S. can pursue missile defense without threatening Russia’s strategic forces. With regard to NATO, we should agree not to recruit aggressively in Eastern Europe and to slow expansion of the alliance.
In exchange for our cooperation, we should request Russia’s support on a Security Council resolution to enforce sanctions on Iran. We should encourage Russia to help us lead a multilateral effort to end Iran’s uranium enrichment programs. Only if Russia agrees to support us in negotiations with Iran will we be flexible on NATO and missile defense.
An agreement along these lines will have crucial implications for international security. A new arms reduction treaty will reduce the world’s nuclear weapons and demonstrate our commitment to our Article VI obligations under the NPT. A more amenable approach to missile defense will ensure that we can continue to develop that technology without threatening Russia. An agreement on tactical nuclear weapons will reduce a serious proliferation threat. Gaining Russia’s backing against Iran will help us make progress on one of the most intractable security problems that we face. Repairing our relations with Russia is critical to American security, and extending START will be a strong first step.
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