The world has been transfixed by the drama surrounding the Iranian elections. Worryingly, the events of the weekend seem to suggest a move from an imperfect-but-functioning theocratic democracy to autocracy. Perhaps naively, many in the West and in Iran believed that Supreme Leader Khamenei would allow Mir Hussein Moussavi a largely fair chance at defeating Ahmadinejad at the ballot box. It is now clear that the Supreme Leader and the power elite in Iran do view Ahmadinejad as their man, and virtually no tactic, however draconian, is beyond consideration to keep him in the presidency.

It is this realization that has confirmed the skepticism many had about Moussavi in the first place. While viewed as closer to the reformist camp, Moussavi would have been president inside a system run by the Supreme Leader and his cohort. Powerful institutions in Iran, including the Revolutionary Guard, have institutional interests that are threatened by moves toward a more pragmatic foreign policy. Human rights problems and intransigence on the international stage were more likely than not to continue under Moussavi, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent.

But what is striking about the apparent election rigging is that we now have evidence that the Iranian elite viewed Moussavi and the movement he came to represent as a threat to their interests and their view of a Revolutionary Republic. Before, more optimistic watchers, myself included, hoped that the unpopularity of the Ahmadinejad government due to its poor handling of the economy and bumbling aggression on the international stage would lead the Supreme Leader to sanction the election of a reformist, though establishment, candidate to succeed Ahmadinejad. This hope held out promise that the Obama administration’s friendly overtures may have eventually been returned. We now can say with some certainty that the Supreme Leader does not countenance a near-term future of normalized relations with the United States.

While this turn of events is truly disheartening for those of us who felt that normalized relations with Iran were important to the stability of the international system, it is important to note that this may enhance consensus on Iran in the international community. For years, debate and disagreement in international discussions weakened the ability of the United States to implement a firm policy course on Iran. It may now turn out to be easier for the Obama administration to persuade allies to have a united front. Whether the new policies involve increased sanctions or other options, unity will be important. Having Moussavi in office, while not dramatically changing the policy course of the Iranian state, would certainly have made such consensus more difficult to achieve.

This electoral trouble presents an opportunity, though it was one no one wished for. It is an opportunity into which policymakers can insert themselves and influence events. The Supreme Leader may have gotten his wish for a second Ahmadinejad term, but with the Iranian polity more precarious than before, the U.S. government and the international community have a chance to move the policy ball forward on one of the world’s most intractable security issues.

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