I know the topic de jour these days is America’s torture policy, amplified by the recent release of Bush administration torture memos, but let’s not dwell on the past, as rightwing torture apologists, like to phrase it.

Instead let’s return to Afghanistan and Pakistan or Afpak in Washington jargon. Because if it is bad news in war zones that provide flimsy pretexts for torture, then Afpak seems likely to produce plenty in the future.

Let’s start with the under covered statement by Gen. David Petraeus, head of the US Central Command, who spoke at the John F. Kennedy School of Government on April 21. He said, “”We do believe we can achieve progress, but it’s going to get worse before it gets better,” said Petraeus. “When you go into the enemy’s sanctuaries, they will fight you for it. There will be tough months ahead, without question,” he said.

“Tough months?” Uh, General Petraeus? You meant tough years, didn’t you? Politico reported April 21 that the Pentagon’s senior military leaders are worried that the security situation in Afghanistan is stalemated or deteriorating, and now are preparing a far-reaching plan that would prepare the U.S. military for a war that could last three to five more years, officials said.

The effort, which is being coordinated by the Joint Staff and is still in its early stages, is designed to create an experienced cadre of officers and senior enlisted soldiers, who would rotate between assignments in Afghanistan and at their home stations until the end of hostilities.

The article goes on to say that “Until now, officers involved say, the Afghanistan war has been a secondary concern for the Pentagon, which has tended to view it as a short-term mission that took a back seat to the war in Iraq.”

Say what? 679 fatalities, and counting, in Operation Enduring Freedom since 2001, for a back seat “short-term mission?” If that really reflects the thinking of the past U.S. military and civilian leadership someone needs to be fired and perhaps court martialed or indicted for gross dereliction of professional responsibility.

Speaking of gross dereliction two weekends ago Afghanistan’s President Harmid Karzai asked Gen. David McKiernan, the top U.S. general in Afghanistan, to explain allegations of six civilian deaths in two recent incidents. It was the second time in three days Karzai brought up the topic with Gen. David McKiernan.

The United Nations has said a record 2,118 civilians died in the Afghan war last year, a 40 percent increase over 2007. The U.N. said U.S., NATO and Afghan forces killed 829 civilians, or 39 percent of the total. Of those, 552 deaths were blamed on airstrikes.

Even, if, for the sake of argument, you grant that the U.S. has an effective strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, it still has a people problem, not enough of them, and I don’t just mean soldiers. The New York Times reported last week that the Obama administration is finding that it must turn to military personnel and contractors to fill hundreds of posts in Afghanistan that had been intended for civilian experts.

Meanwhile, over in Pakistan, it was reported last week that Taliban militants had established effective control of Buner, a strategically important district just 70 miles from the capital, Islamabad. Buner, home to about one million people, is a gateway to a major Pakistani city, Mardan, the second largest in North-West Frontier Province, after Peshawar.

Just last Wednesday heavily armed Taliban militants were patrolling villages, and the local police had retreated to their station houses in much of Buner.

It did not go unnoticed that the Taliban advance came 10 days after Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari agreed to the imposition of Islamic law, or Shariah, in Swat, as part of a deal with the Taliban. Swat is both a valley and an administrative district in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan located 100 miles from Islamabad.

No doubt that was why Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told Congress on April 21 that the Pakistani government “is basically abdicating to the Taliban and to the extremists.”

Even more depressing was the fact that when the Taliban first began their assault on Buner the people spiritedly fought back, assembling assembled a volunteer force and reportedly killing 17 Taliban fighters.

But then, a local commissioner, Javed Mohammad, who is also the senior official in Swat, and who was appointed on the recommendation of the Taliban, ordered the local armies to dissolve. The order led many of those who had been willing to stand up to the Taliban to either flee or give up.

Subsequently, most, if not all of the Taliban left Buner. But they left of their own accord, not because they were drive out. What should disturb people is that the tactics the Taliban used there can be used elsewhere.

And why, you ask, should we care about Pakistan? Duh, as Homer Simpson would say. Here is what Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in an April 22 interview on NBC, “Pakistan, it’s a country that has nuclear weapons. My long-term worry is that dissent, you know, if it should continue, gives us the worst possible outcome there.”

As the New York Times editorialized yesterday:

If the Indian Army advanced within 60 miles of Islamabad, you can bet Pakistan’s army would be fully mobilized and defending the country in pitched battles. Yet when the Taliban got that close to the capital on Friday, pushing into the key district of Buner, Pakistani authorities sent only several hundred poorly equipped and underpaid constabulary forces.

…

And — most frightening of all — if the army cannot or will not defend its own territory against the militants, how can anyone be sure it will protect Pakistan’s 60 or so nuclear weapons?

Related posts:

1. Goodbye to 2009: The year in review
2. Out with the old, in with the new
3. March 2009: Those were the days
4. Escalation of Drone Use Risks Fueling Militancy and Increasing Instability in Pakistan
5. Petraeus off the mark on Pakistan