Now that we’ve wound up on the same page, let’s put a little daylight between right and left on foreign policy. As I see it, the main cleavage is implicated primarily in the philosophical roots of Wilsonianism, which Matt wisely introduced into the conversation by way of Walter Russell Mead. “If the Freedom Agenda is defined” — by way of Wilsonianism, Matt writes — ” as an impulse to apply American power to the project of remaking the world in a democratic image, then the Agenda isn’t going anywhere.” My paleoconservative friends might laugh that, yes, this kind of ideologically foundational freedom agenda is a nonstarter. But Matt of course means it’s here to stay — implying that the intellectual or conceptual foundations behind it are hardwired into America’s collective cultural DNA.

Consider, for instance, our view of Russia. Borrowing from some fashionable sociology, international relations theorists sometimes discuss foreign relations in terms of self/other relationships. It’s not very controversial to point out that Russia occupies a very strange place in terms of the West’s vision of selfhood and otherhood. But it is uncomfortable to discuss just how problematic that situation is — and why. The fact is, partisans of liberal democracy in the West — Americans above all — aren’t just intellectually or rationally opposed to the autocratic character of Russian political culture. They’re viscerally disdainful and contemptuous of it. Sen. John McCain’s utterance during the Presidential campaign that ‘we’re all Georgians now’ only makes sense in the context of one of his favorite stump-speech zingers: unlike President Bush, when he looked into Vladimir Putin’s eyes, he saw the letters K.G.B. John McCain is quintessentially American in his active contempt, heart and soul, for nonliberal, nondemocratic government — and any culture that breeds it. (more…)

His statement to FP can be found at this link here.

I suspect this quote will kick off a serious debate inside the beltway:

The outrageous agitation that followed the leak of my pending appointment will be seen by many to raise serious questions about whether the Obama administration will be able to make its own decisions about the Middle East and related issues.  I regret that my willingness to serve the new administration has ended by casting doubt on its ability to consider, let alone decide what policies might best serve the interests of the United States rather than those of a Lobby intent on enforcing the will and interests of a foreign government.  

Ever since the New York Times reported on Saturday that President Obama mentioned that he was open to talking with certain elements of the Taliban, there has been an uproar over the idea by both proponents and opponents. One opponent of negotiation, David Rothkopf, posted this humorous response.

It’s time to calm things down and take this for what it is – a pragmatic willingness to consider a variety of approaches.  Let’s look at the facts.  President Obama recently ordered a troop increase in Afghanistan of an additional 17,000 troops – the stick.  However, he also seems willing to allow at least some moderate or reconcilable elements to work with the United States (and the Afghan govt) – the carrot.  On the face of it, it seems to be a reasonable enough approach.

The question for me is exactly who are these reconcilable elements.  Peter Bergen writes here that he is quite skeptical of this approach and lays out a series of reasons why, ranging from the fact that there’s already an amnesty program in place to the fact that peace deals in Pakistan have not led to positive results.  On the other hand, David Kilcullen, a counter insurgency specialist, argued that about 90 percent of the Taliban are essentially Pashtun nationalists or people with their own agenda.  Only 10 percent are truly aligned with Al Qaeda.  The jury is still out in terms of exactly how many of the Taliban are reconcilable.  If we can agree that perhaps there are some elements, however small, of the Taliban that still can be convinced or co-opted to cooperate, might it be worth a shot to get them allied with us, rather than fighting against us?  (more…)

Slowly but surely Washington, DC is becoming a place where all the foreign policy challenges we face can be seriously debated. Perhaps it was inevitable that the backlash against the groupthink and self-censorship that marked the lead up to the Iraq invasion would embolden analysts who have long tired of the false boundaries drawn around discussion of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Cuba, Israel-Palestine and India-Pakistan. These analysts are hungry to push the debate along and to encourage similar diverse thinking inside government. The President also seems keen to avoid the groupthink and bubble formed decision making of his predecessor (remember the report of this dinner meeting at the Wilson Center).

The debate around the appointment of Chas Freeman to lead the National Intelligence Council is one area where we are currently seeing these boundaries being tested. Freeman, it seems, has been appointed to the position because he is a smart analyst who has a tendency to push back against groupthink. His appointment has triggered a backlash among some who disagree with his views on Israel and the Middle East.

Joe Klein, writing at Swampland frames the debate well in his own colorful way – please read the whole post here and Joe, forgive me for quoting you so liberally in this blog entry!:

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The International Criminal Court (ICC) has just issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. This action has historical implications with al-Bashir becoming the first sitting head of state to be subjected to an arrest warrant in the life of the court (the charges are war crimes and crimes against humanity). Now that the ICC has acted all eyes will turn first to Khartoum to see how the al-Bashir regime responds and then to Washington for the Obama administration’s reaction.

The challenge for the Obama administration is to leverage the pressure the court’s action will bring to bear on the Sudanese leader. I would like to see the administration publicly support the arrest warrant and make clear that the U.S. will not sit idly by if any member of the Security Council – notably China – attempts to shield Mr. al-Bashir. I’d also like to see the administration name a special envoy to take charge of the Sudan/Darfur issue (there are a number of attractive options but I’d urge the President to choose Gov. Richardson, who has worked this issue in the past, to serve).

An envoy would be in a position to take advantage of the space created by the ICC and push for a comprehensive peace agreement. Such an agreement would likely include: 

A long-term U.N. peacekeeping group in the region.
Complete demilitarization of the militia groups.
Governance concessions by the Sudanese central authorities.
Transfer of two other alleged war criminals – former Minister of State for the Interior Ahmed Haroun and janjaweed militia leader Ali Kushayb – to the ICC. 

The ICC has created some space – let’s hope the administration can use it.

The question of whether or not the “Freedom Agenda” will be one day viewed as an historical anomaly – a relic of the Bush Administration’s overreaching on the world stage – or as an enduring feature of U.S. foreign policy is difficult, most especially because the phrase “Freedom Agenda” means different things to different people.

On one end of the spectrum, there is the generalized notion that the United States, unlike some other nations, enters the arena of international relations with a particular project. We are not merely interested in preserving our wealth and security, heavy though such concerns may weigh on our foreign policy, but in spreading the ideals of our revolution across the Earth. Democratic governance, human rights, the rule of law, self determination of peoples, free market economics – the universalization of these values has been an impulse in the minds of American international thinkers since the United States emerged as a world power more than a century ago. In his wonderful study of the shifting currents of American foreign policy, Walter Russell Mead labels this impulse “Wilsonian.” It informs the worldviews of both right and left (neoconservatives and liberal internationalists respectively), and even realists like Stephen Walt and Henry Kissinger have acknowledged its influence, even if they sometimes deplore it.

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Is the freedom agenda in US foreign policy dead? By dead, presumably, we mean one of two things: discredited out of practice or rendered moot by events. Events change, and doctrines come in and out of fashion; but many on the left and the right feel well-served in pronouncing the freedom agenda a relic of the Bush administration — something to have gotten past. As a matter of political reality, the freedom agenda as we know it from the Bush years has clearly been humbled, frustrated, and even reversed. As a matter of political rhetoric, the whole concept of a freedom agenda seems too freighted and loaded to do the sort of work policymakers and public intellectuals wish to put their reputations and efforts behind. ‘The Israel lobby’; ‘The color revolutions’; ‘An end to evil’; ‘We are all Georgians now’: the catchphrases associated with what we recognize as the freedom agenda are themselves code words, shorthand for debates and postures that have inspired and reinforced an exaggerated, but not baseless, sense of cabalism. Partisans for and against the freedom agenda have become, like their subject itself, dangerously susceptible to caricature — fair and otherwise.

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Last Friday President Obama announced his plan for withdrawing U.S. military forces from Iraq. The planned withdrawal, if not graceful, will certainly be overdue, at least to most of his political base, if not to the military itself.

But the devil is always in the details so let’s examine a few. First, announcing a goal is easy, implementing it is difficult. For the military, which never goes anywhere without literally immense amounts of baggage, this means logistics, logistics, logistics.

As this post in Wired’s Danger Room blog notes, “How do you remove from the country in a year and a half 90,000 or so troops, 40,000 aircraft and vehicles, and 80,000 containers (not to mention 100,000 contractors) spread across more than 280 installations in anything approaching an orderly way?”

See also this 2007 article by veteran military reporter David Wood for details.

This is not to say it is impossible. After all U.S. forces withdrew the bulk of its half a million plus forces in a matter of months after Operation Desert Storm in 1991. But back then the U.S. had not constructed numerous huge military bases. Still, if the U.S. really wants to keep the timetable it better kick planning into high gear now.

It is not just a matter of packing up. Assumptions need to be rethought. Consider the February 12 testimony of Janet St. Laurent Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management United States Government Accountability Office to the House Armed Services Committee. She said, “with regard to an Iraq drawdown, DOD’s plans will need to consider the fact that some early planning assumptions about the conditions and timing of redeployments may no longer be applicable in light of the SOFA and evolving U.S. strategy.”

Evolving U.S. strategy is code for send more troops to Afghanistan. But if troops are delayed leaving Iraq it will mean delays, perhaps, not immediately, but certainly in the long run, in deploying troops to Afghanistan, due to the need to rotate troops.

And while you may be able to send more troops to Afghanistan in the near term, providing them with all the necessary equipment may be problematic. St. Laurent said:

the availability of equipment may be limited because the Army and Marine Corps have already deployed much of their equipment to Iraq and much of their prepositioned assets also have been withdrawn to support ongoing operations. Similarly, DOD will need to assess its requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to support increased force levels in Afghanistan, given its current allocation of assets to support ongoing operations in Iraq.

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