Moral Hazard and the Olive Branch
The latest trend in media coverage of the Obama Administration seems to be to ask variations on the question, “Is he doing too much?” Most of these stories focus on the ambitious domestic agenda, but the scope of the suggested foreign policy overhaul, particularly when it comes to rethinking bilateral relationships, is no less dizzying.
Less than two months into the Administration, President Obama and Secretary Clinton have telegraphed their intention to change the landscape surrounding some of our most troubled relationships. Clinton went to China on her first trip and emphasized cooperation over conflict. Just a couple of weeks later, she sat down with her Russian counterpart and pledged to “reset” the relationship, despite handing FM Lavrov a red button that read “overload” in Russian. While in Israel, Clinton dispatched two envoys to talk to Syria. Same trip — invitation extended to Iran to sit down in the same room with Clinton and discuss Afghanistan. Now, throw in the Congressional changes to the Cuba travel policy that Obama has supported.
For those scoring at home, that’s one member of the Axis of Evil, two A of E wannabes and our two biggest headaches on the Security Council. I’ve personally blogged about the need to reach out to Iran, Syria and Cuba, and PSA recently put out a statement about renewing the U.S.-Russia relationship. So I would humbly suggest to the media that the question is not whether Obama is doing too much, it is whether any of the other countries will respond as he hopes they will.
There is a question of moral hazard here. When presented with an open hand, will these countries see any consequences in responding with a clenched fist? After Bush’s belligerence, will they view Obama’s openness as a free pass to do as they wish? They may view the transition to Obama in the U.S. as insulation from any real risk regardless of their actions.
You may notice that I haven’t mentioned North Korea yet. The DPRK is also on Obama’s to-do list and provides an early example of the pushback the Administration should expect. Just the wiff of an olive branch in the air seems to have riled them up, leading to an announcement of a missile launch and accusations that the U.S. is planning to invade. True, the DPRK is the crazy uncle of the Axis of Evil, so it’s hard to extrapolate anything from its behavior. Still, while the other countries mentioned do a somewhat better job of presenting a diplomatic face to the world, all of them have also made political hay over the years out of being in opposition to the U.S. Those habits will be hard to break. Already, Cuba is reportedly considering letting Russia use its bases for strategic bombers. Iran has said the U.S. must change to have successful negotiations. All of these countries are testing the waters, trying to determine exactly what the Obama Administration will be willing to do if rebuffed.
For eight years, the world has dealt with a Bush Administration whose negotiating tactics managed to make carrots look like orange-colored sticks. In contrast, the Obama Administration runs the risk of seeming a little too eager to please. Their efforts are not going to be any more effective than Bush’s if the folks sitting on the other side of the table believe that there aren’t any sticks at all.
Threats and bullying did not change these countries over the past eight years, but four years of polite conversation won’t be any better. When the Obama Administration gets these countries behind closed doors, the negotiators need to be a little more forthcoming about the consequences of refusing to play ball. After all, we still want these countries to change. And these countries still don’t want to change. With the Bush Administration, there was always the implicit threat of military action against rogue states, a threat that became impotent after the mismanagement of Iraq. Obama is going to need a different set of sticks.
Maybe the answer is that he can use his current popularity worldwide to push our allies (and almost-allies such as Russia and China) to join us in truly turning the screws on the rogue states through a unified front of sanctions and economic isolation. Otherwise you may see most of these countries deciding that there is more benefit to saying no to the U.S. than yes.
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