I appreciate James’s latest piece. His examination of some of the philosophical underpinnings of the “New World/Old World” relationship, and how that colors foreign policy debates around the issue of democracy promotion and America’s global mission, is extremely important. Understanding the visceral difficulty that Americans have relating to naked autocracy – a difficulty that can often be papered over only through willful ignorance or factual gymnastics when the exigencies of politics render such relationships unavoidable – is critical to comprehending the lens through which most American decision makers view foreign policy. I wonder, though, if James doesn’t situate the axis of opinion on an improperly skewed plane.

He identifies the Wilsonian ideal – the extension of liberty to all the peoples of the Earth – as a romantic notion of the left. This may have been true in earlier times. Wilson, after all, was a Democrat aligned with the center-left,* and the isolationist reaction that brought him low came primarily from the right. Since the Second World War, though, the American right has drifted from its isolationist moorings, undeterred by the occasional and generally ineffectual chidings of some paleoconservatives. For the past half-century, the primary difference on this score between the right and the center-left has been focused around the practical limits of American power, the moral complexities involved in applying it, and the means by which it should be operationalized.

The right tends to view the Wilsonian project as primarily a matter of identifying the nations and movements that are viewed as inimical to freedom’s progress, and then using American power to destroy them (think the Soviet Union, communist movements worldwide, the ‘Axis of Evil’ etc). This underlies the tendency of those on the right to have fewer moral qualms supporting undemocratic regimes in the service of a larger agenda. The center-left (at least since Vietnam) tends to view the Wilsonian project as a matter of creating the broader structural conditions that give people the opportunity to take charge of their own political destinies. James correctly points out that this is based on the premise that, given the opportunity, all people crave democracy, and that socio-cultural barriers are transient obstacles that can be overcome under the right conditions. That’s not to say the center-left eschews military action or the application of raw power, only that it is more skeptical of its efficacy and nervous about its moral implications.

These differing tendencies can be seen in James’s prescriptions for the freedom agenda going forward. He writes:

It would seem that America needs a new Machiavelli — not Zombie Machiavelli, but a Machiavelli for the New World. Such a figure might turn our expectations about the freedom agenda on their head. Why, he might ask, would we want to test our agenda by bashing it against the rocks of our closest ‘under-democratic’ allies — when we could marshall our energies for taking on our least friendly regimes and cherry pick the easiest victories for a democratic agenda? Why not be a lion when it comes to our real foes, a fox when it comes to expanding liberal democracy on the cheap, and a known hypocrite when that, too, is in our basic interest — or when we hardly have a choice?

Therein lies the rub. The most appropriate candidates for democracy promotion, in this view, are not our allies but our enemies. Our energies ought be directed towards them. It’s a seductive stance, for it posits a world in which we can promote freedom and spread our values without having to make tradeoffs in weaker global reach or less stable alliance structures. I fear, though, that it is misguided.

In this day and age, the regimes towards which we now take the most adversarial tones are precisely those over which we have the least influence. No amount of U.S. pressure is likely to change the internal political dynamics of Russia, China, Iran, Syria, North Korea or even Venezuela. They’re either too powerful to be manipulated or have already borne the brunt of our nonviolent diplomatic and economic arsenal; and you can’t bomb a country into democracy. Specific changes in regime behavior, like abandoning a nuclear program or a missile deployment, might be achievable goals. We should be wary of hoping for more. As for expanding liberal democracy “on the cheap,” I’m curious as to how James proposes we do that. Where are these undemocratic or semi-democratic regimes that are ripe for a liberal transformation that would not impose costs on the United States?

No, to the extent that the freedom agenda has a future, it is within the web of our own alliance structure, and it will involve sacrificing other priorities. Efforts to promote democracy by integrating nations of the former Soviet sphere into western institutions is sure to provoke a costly backlash from Moscow. Distancing ourselves from politically bankrupt Arab autocracies in places like Egypt and Jordan may be the best thing we could do for their democratic transformation, but such democracies would likely have an Islamist tinge, and would have at best cool relations with the United States, at least for a while. We have to be realistic about the fact that free populations will be free to steer their nations out of America’s orbit.

That said, there is one more idea worth bringing to this discussion. We’ve been talking about democracy promotion in primarily values-related terms. The freedom agenda is supposed to be important because it is ethical and reflects our traditions and values, etc. It is worth exploring, though, the extent to which global democratic progress is in the long term strategic interest of the United States. Alan Krueger and Jitka Malecková published an interesting multi-country study back in 2003 indicating that “the only variable… consistently associated with the number of terrorists was the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties. Countries with more freedom were less likely to be the birthplace of international terrorists.” The idea that democratic countries will, in the long run, make better allies, less intractable enemies, and more stable and responsible members of the international community has some basis in both theory and experience – perhaps enough to make some of the tradeoffs I outline above worth it.

For the sake of our long-term security and prosperity, I remain convinced that the freedom agenda remains a worthwhile project. We must not, though, deceive ourselves as to the uncertainties and costs it is likely to entail.

*I use this term to distinguish left-of-center liberals from the more socialist elements of the left that tend to view the freedom agenda as a hypocritical and imperialist impulse of questionable legitimacy.

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