Ever since the New York Times reported on Saturday that President Obama mentioned that he was open to talking with certain elements of the Taliban, there has been an uproar over the idea by both proponents and opponents. One opponent of negotiation, David Rothkopf, posted this humorous response.

It’s time to calm things down and take this for what it is – a pragmatic willingness to consider a variety of approaches.  Let’s look at the facts.  President Obama recently ordered a troop increase in Afghanistan of an additional 17,000 troops – the stick.  However, he also seems willing to allow at least some moderate or reconcilable elements to work with the United States (and the Afghan govt) – the carrot.  On the face of it, it seems to be a reasonable enough approach.

The question for me is exactly who are these reconcilable elements.  Peter Bergen writes here that he is quite skeptical of this approach and lays out a series of reasons why, ranging from the fact that there’s already an amnesty program in place to the fact that peace deals in Pakistan have not led to positive results.  On the other hand, David Kilcullen, a counter insurgency specialist, argued that about 90 percent of the Taliban are essentially Pashtun nationalists or people with their own agenda.  Only 10 percent are truly aligned with Al Qaeda.  The jury is still out in terms of exactly how many of the Taliban are reconcilable.  If we can agree that perhaps there are some elements, however small, of the Taliban that still can be convinced or co-opted to cooperate, might it be worth a shot to get them allied with us, rather than fighting against us? 

When the US invaded Iraq, we made the mistake of underestimating the complicated political dynamics on the ground between Sunnis and Shias.  An overly simplistic view of Iraq by the previous administration led many to view all Iraqis as pretty much the same.  It would be a mistake if, today, we also viewed all the Taliban the same way.  Helene Cooper wrote a useful piece in this past Sunday that explored the fact that the label of “Taliban” ranges for Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s leader in Afghanistan since September 11, 2001 to the low level militant whose primary interest is in feeding his family with the funds received from the Taliban.

My conclusion is that in some situations, perhaps discussion with reconcilable Taliban elements make sense.  Mullah Omar – no.  But, perhaps the low level foot soldiers that are the face of the Taliban for so many people, or perhaps those that are commanding them one level up.  However, it is equally important that such discussions are followed up with true governance reform.  In addition, talking from a position of strength (ie troop increase) is critical.  Right now, the smart Taliban negotiator sees little reason to throw his lot in with NATO or with the Afghan government.  From his point of view, at some point, NATO will be gone and unless stable government institutions are created, a betting man would probably wager on the Taliban to be the only authority left in the long run.  We need to have the muscle today and the long term commitment to the region and to building its governance institutions that alters this calculation.  Unfortunately, the track record of the United States in the region does not position us well to make this argument convincingly.

It’s important that we don’t see this as the cure-all long-term solution for the challenge we face.  However, if conducted in the right way, it might contribute to divisions within the Taliban and allow the breathing room for effective government institutions to take hold.

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