The Freedom Agenda R.I.P.? Part II
The question of whether or not the “Freedom Agenda” will be one day viewed as an historical anomaly – a relic of the Bush Administration’s overreaching on the world stage – or as an enduring feature of U.S. foreign policy is difficult, most especially because the phrase “Freedom Agenda” means different things to different people.
On one end of the spectrum, there is the generalized notion that the United States, unlike some other nations, enters the arena of international relations with a particular project. We are not merely interested in preserving our wealth and security, heavy though such concerns may weigh on our foreign policy, but in spreading the ideals of our revolution across the Earth. Democratic governance, human rights, the rule of law, self determination of peoples, free market economics – the universalization of these values has been an impulse in the minds of American international thinkers since the United States emerged as a world power more than a century ago. In his wonderful study of the shifting currents of American foreign policy, Walter Russell Mead labels this impulse “Wilsonian.” It informs the worldviews of both right and left (neoconservatives and liberal internationalists respectively), and even realists like Stephen Walt and Henry Kissinger have acknowledged its influence, even if they sometimes deplore it.
If the Freedom Agenda is defined thusly, as an impulse to apply American power to the project of remaking the world in a democratic image, then the Agenda isn’t going anywhere. America began as an idea that remains inescapably universal (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights…”), and that idea will continue to inform the worldviews and decisions of American leaders for a long time to come.
Narrowing one’s analytical scope, though, the question of how the Freedom Agenda really influences the direction of American policy becomes more hotly contested. Some have argued that the idea of spreading freedom and democracy is merely a fig leaf for imperial expansion and exploitation – the American version of the White Man’s Burden or the Mission Civilatrice. At the other extreme is the notion that the Freedom Agenda has distorted American leaders’ views of their country’s interests, pushing us into ideologically-driven wars (Vietnam, Iraq) and hindering strategically productive partnerships (Maoist China, Syria, Iran). The truth likely falls somewhere between the two. Certainly we do not apply our ideals consistently (see: Saudi Arabia, long relationship with), and are at times too ready to justify ethically questionable behavior as part of a larger mission to promote freedom. On the other hand, for better and for worse, the extent to which a country’s government mirrors our own ideals affects how our decision makers view that country’s place within the American strategic framework.
Rather than talking about the Freedom Agenda in life and death terms, then, it is more useful to analyze the extent and nature of that Agenda’s influence on U.S. policy. I think it is fair to say that, after eight years of Bush, the extent to which the American public will countenance major sacrifices, particularly where the military is concerned, for the sake of promoting freedom abroad will be restricted. The Obama administration has been careful to frame American goals abroad in more minimalist terms than those of his predecessor. In Afghanistan, he is clear that our principal interest rests in ensuring that the country cannot be used as a base for attacks against the West. In Iraq, the emphasis has been on stability and reduced violence. Administration officials seem to be contemplating overtures to Iran and Syria, and Secretary Clinton was notable in her failure to criticize Beijing for its human rights record during her recent trip to Asia.
Maybe again, though, those aren’t the real tests. Our reevaluation of our war aims in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as our posture towards emerging giants like China and regional players like Iran and Syria are more reflective of an acknowledgement of the limits of American power than of an abandonment of the Freedom Agenda. We probably can’t turn Iraq or Afghanistan into Jeffersonian democracies despite our deep engagement in both countries’ internal affairs. Policies of isolation and enmity haven’t served to bring about change in Damascus or Tehran. Beijing will do whatever it deems necessary to preserve the power of the CCP, our protests notwithstanding.
Rather, the test of whether the United States is truly committed to the Freedom Agenda will come in those regimes over whom we have significant influence, and which present us with a genuine conflict between principles and political expediency. Do we pressure the Mubarak regime in Egypt to allow the Muslim Brotherhood political space, even though that injects an element of instability into an important strategic relationship? What about the Hashemites in Jordan? What about our continued cozy relationship with the Saudis? Will we seek to check Russian influence in Georgia and Ukraine, even though it may lead to retaliation from Moscow in more strategically sensitive arenas? Will we countenance an Islamist but democratic Turkey?
I honestly don’t know the answer to any of these questions, though I’ve got a few ideas. I get the sense that diplomatic and historical inertia will probably have as much of a hand in their resolution as will carefully designed policy. My co-writer James is right that American policy will probably be less bullishly committed to revamping the structure of foreign governments than it has been in recent years. He’s also right to point out that our commitment such transformational change will likely be replaced by a more muted version. The right debate going forward, it seems to me, is the extent to which the United States ought to be willing to sacrifice its short-term material interests for the sake of global democratic development, as well as the extent to which U.S. long-term interests are bound up in the ultimate success of the Freedom Agenda. I look forward to a worthwhile discussion.
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