I thought that Chris Preble had some worthwhile points in his recent blog post on America’s future strategy on Afghanistan.  In particular, I agree with Chris that it’s right to first determine the strategy and then determine the resources needed for that strategy rather than the other way around.  Frequently political campaigns on national security issues get reduced to the question of more or less troops.  If a candidate wants to prove his/her toughness, the answer frequently is more troops.  So, yes, it’s right for us to give serious thought as to what our long term goal in the region should be.

With that said, I foresee that the goal of a stable Afghanistan that empowers its citizens is both possible and necessary for long term American security.  In terms of long term goals, if we end up setting our sights too low, we risk returning to the very situation there that led to the rise of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the first place.

I admit that more troops might be part of the answer in Afghanistan, but only part.  I, like most people who watch the region closely, believe that a more regional comprehensive approach is sorely needed.  That will necessitate a greater commitment of the whole toolbox of American engagement – the military, diplomacy, and development.

I do take issue, however, with Andrew Bacevich’s December 31, 2008 article referenced by Chris that argued that we should focus our attention, not on building democratic institutions in Afghanistan, but rather on co-opting warlords who can be bribed sufficiently to do our bidding:

The new U.S. president needs to realize that America’s real political objective in Afghanistan is actually quite modest: to ensure that terrorist groups like Al Qaeda can’t use it as a safe haven for launching attacks against the West. Accomplishing that won’t require creating a modern, cohesive nation-state. U.S. officials tend to assume that power in Afghanistan ought to be exercised from Kabul. Yet the real influence in Afghanistan has traditionally rested with tribal leaders and warlords. Rather than challenge that tradition, Washington should work with it. Offered the right incentives, warlords can accomplish U.S. objectives more effectively and more cheaply than Western combat battalions. The basis of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan should therefore become decentralization and outsourcing, offering cash and other emoluments to local leaders who will collaborate with the United States in excluding terrorists from their territory.

What concerns me is that this this proposed alliance with Afghan warlords sounds eerily reminiscent of what we did back back during the cold war.  Wasn’t it the alliance with the Mujahideen warlords that eventually led to the defeat of the Soviets and the eventual rise of the Taliban in response?  This led to the the safe haven that Al Qaeda exploited in preparation for 9/11.  Is there any compelling reason to believe a reliance on warlords will ultimately lead to a different outcome this time?  It seems to me such alliances may result in short term gains, but in the long run, this approach fosters an environment where extremists continue to thrive.  Either we get serious about a comprehensive long term commitment in this region or we’ll find ourselves dealing with the blowback, perhaps in our own back yard.

It’s through the long hard process of building democratic institutions that we actually promote long term stability.  That long term stability and moderation that comes from well functioning democratic institutions is what can marginalize extremist elements in society.  Of course, as John Kerry wrote in today’s Washington Post, we are in a race against time.  We must be cognizant of history and the fact that all previous attempts by foreign entities to conquer this territory with an iron fist have failed.  This is why our approach must be one that empowers Afghan citizens, and not local warlords.  The end point may not be an idyllic Jeffersonian democratic system.  However, leaving the country with a system that leaves more control in the hands of ordinary Afghan citizens and has basic democratic institutions would be a worthy goal.

The problem is that these changes are beyond the time horizon of many of our political leaders.  One gains little political capital from doing the long term institution building that prevents terrorism.  An American political leader gets no points for preventing an attack in the long run.  But they get blamed if an attack happens in the short tun.  That’s why a long term approach in this region is going to require long-term bipartisan resolve.  The easy short term answer is to make a deal with the devil (the warlords) but in the long run we’ll all just get burned.

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