Advice for the WMD Coordinator
President Obama has tapped Gary Samore to be the White House WMD Coordinator. This is a position that was recommended by the 9/11 Commission and legislated by Congress in 2007, but the Bush Administration chose not to create the post. The new White House office will likely be part of the NSC and reportedly have a staff of up to ten charged with coordinating efforts to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism.
In our WMD Report Card, PSA strongly supported this new position and made the following recommendations:
Put someone in charge. There is a critical need for a top-level official with authority to make government-wide decisions on funding and programs. Someone needs to be responsible for turning our resolve into results.
Build the blueprint. We need a strategic plan that links all existing programs together, prioritizes funding across the Federal Government, and coordinates implementation. We can no longer afford to hope that our patchwork of programs and initiatives will naturally cohere into an effective whole.
Samore does not have an easy task ahead of him. The programs in question are spread out across multiple Departments, including State, Defense, Energy and Homeland Security. Secretaries Clinton, Gates, Chu and Napolitano will each have their own strong ideas about how to move forward on preventing WMD terrorism and proliferation. This isn’t just herding cats — this is herding lions.
Obama needs to make it clear that all issues related to WMD terrorism and proliferation need to pass through the new office. The key players need to believe that their concerns won’t hit Obama’s desk unless they hit Samore’s first. The easiest way to do this, beyond allowing Samore visible access to the Oval Office, is to give the WMD Coordinator’s office a real role in the budget process.
By putting the WMD Coordinator within the NSC, the Administration will avoid Senate confirmation, but it also risks sending the message that Samore is actually not the top official on the issue. If signals are sent that Samore is merely another of James Jones’ lieutenants, will the aforementioned Secretaries listen to him? After all, both the Clinton and Bush Adminstrations had NSC officials in charge of these issues, but none of them were considered government-wide coordinators.
To succeed, Samore will also need to define his role as the Coordinator clearly. There is great potential here for a combination of mission creep and mission uncertainty. This office should not be involved in administering the the day-to-day minutiae of the wide variety of programs that touch on WMD proliferation and terrorism. The office should be aware of all those programs and be deeply involved in setting the overall priorities and funding levels that will allow them to accomplish their goals, but not necessarily clearing every minor program change and set of talking points. Samore also cannot let his staff get bogged down in trying to have a voice on the “hot” nonpro issues of the day. Iran, North Korea, Pakistan — all of these crucial issues already have their own heavy hitter coordinators appointed. Again, Samore should be involved in the big picture on these, but he can’t get drawn into a bureaucratic food fight over control of these issues.
So what does that leave as Samore’s responsibilities? Simple. As PSA recommended, someone needs to create a strategic plan, a blueprint for achieving the overall goal of preventing terrorists from gaining access to WMD capabilities. To this end, it is important that the new office resist the label of “czar” and all the baggage that accompanies it. The WMD Coordinator needs to be a partner, not a dictator. Samore will be the one official in the U.S. Government who has no competing interests other than to ensure that we employ, to quote the 9/11 Commission, “maximum effort” against WMD proliferation and terrorism. Samore will need to be an honest broker in setting the direction of the policy and a tireless advocate in prioritizing it for the Departments, the Agencies, NSC, OMB, our international partners and the President himself.
My final piece of advice for the new WMD Coordinator and President Obama is to study the history and the current operations of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. This independent agency is both part of the White House and separate from it. It was set up to coordinate efforts on a key national security priority. And ONDCP has some budget authority, including reprogramming of funds. Unfortunately, the National Drug Control Budget as it has become known is little more than a PR exercise. The drug budget is useful resource about U.S. Government efforts, certainly, but not the strategic plan that I hope Samore can create for WMD programs. The ONDCP budget is a record of policy rather than a proactive hand in it. And the ONDCP Director is an often-ignored czar rather than a critical coordinator.
All in all, the creation of this office and the appointment of Samore are promising signs. Now, we can only hope that the actuality of the position meets the potential as described by the 9/11 Commission, Congress, PSA, and countless others who have supported this concept. After all, the White House says “the gravest danger to the American people is the threat of a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon and the spread of nuclear weapons to dangerous regimes.” That’s the big stick that Samore can wield as he walks softly into the new Administration. Let’s hope Obama gives him the real authority to use it.
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Where exactly does the 9-11 Commission Final Report recommend establishment of a WMD Terrorism Coordinator?
Comment on February 23, 2009 @ 8:31 pm